Sea Control - Sea Control 412 - Balancing NATO's Navies with Sascha Rachwitz and Mark Baumert

Episode Date: February 12, 2023

“NATO Navies Must Get the Balance Right,” by Captain Sascha Rachwitz, German Navy and Commander Mark Baumert, German Navy, Proceedings, December 2022.

Hello, and welcome to the Sea Control Podcast. I'm Nathan Miller. In this episode, host Jared Samuelson speaks with Rear Admiral Sasha Rakowitz and Commander Mark Baumert of the German Navy. They discuss their recent proceedings article, NATO Navies Must Get the Balance Right. In the article, Rakowitz and Baumert argue for a re-examination of force structure to account for the most probable and the most demanding threats. I edited and produced today's podcast. SimSec is looking for a volunteer to join our technical team and support our web operations. We're looking for someone with a background in WordPress implementation and support, as well as knowledge in web hosting and networking. Some knowledge of identity management and security operations is also helpful.

Please reach out to content at simsec.org to share your background and discuss. I would like to pause here to highlight our local chapters. Whether you're in South Korea, Egypt, Singapore, France, New York, India, or the Caribbean, chances are there's a SimSec local chapter near you. You can find a full listing of local chapters and contact information on our website at simsec.org. So if you're interested, please reach out. Finally, I want to take this opportunity to recommend our partners in the SimSec podcast network, The Bilge Pumps. You can find Alex, Jamie, Drack, and a pile of Iron Brew bottles wherever you download your podcasts. And with that, Kimber's Men. You're listening to Sea Control, hosted by the Center for International Maritime Technology. Hello, Asha Mates, and welcome back aboard Sea Control. My guests today are Admiral Sasha Rakowitz and Commander Mark Baumert, German Navy, and we're going to be discussing their article in the

December issue of Proceedings entitled, NATO Navies Must Get the Balance Right. So, Sasha, welcome back. I think it's been about two and a half years since you were on Sea Control. Mark, welcome aboard. Mark, do you want to start by telling the listeners a little bit about yourself, please? Well, absolutely. So, good afternoon, Jared, at least in our time zone here in Europe. Many thanks for the opportunity to be on your podcast. My name is Mark Baumert. I'm a commander in the German Navy, and currently I serve as an executive officer on board of a frigate in Wilhelmshaven, which you know, Gerrit, because I think you've spent two years as well in Wilhelmshaven in your lifetime. It's in the northwest of Germany, and before that, I served on other ships in the German as well as the French Navy as a SWO.

I worked as a defense planner at NATO headquarters in Belgium and had smaller tours at the German MoD. Last but not least, I've spent months listening to a fantastic American teacher at the German Defense College in Hamburg, and that was you also, Jared. So when we speak about Wayne Hughes, Milan Vigo, Trenton, my knowledge pretty much derives from your and Captain Radcliffe's teachings back then. So thanks for the opportunity to be here today. Well, thank you for all the kind words. I did spend three years in Wilhelmshaven, actually.

You definitely don't want to forget that last year. um forgot a lubeck unfortunately left service here uh back in december so very very sad year for me with that and my own command uh being decommissioned this year but we'll see i still got two floating around out there but sasha like i said it's been uh probably two and a half years since uh you last appeared on sea control so could you refresh the audience on your background yes um i can't i've been i've been in the service now for 34 31 years i'm a submariner by trade So I was the captain of a boat, of a 206 Alpha class boat, one of those very old brown small boats, which we actually took across the Atlantic recklessly.

I was the force command of the German submarine force. In between, I went into several shore tours in Paul Mill Affairs, working both on the Ministry of Defense side and in the foreign ministry, in the German foreign ministry. I had a tour as the military assistant to the German Chief of Navy. Currently, I'm working or have been working until Friday this week in the Ministry of Defense again as the executive officer to the general director for forces policy. So he's in charge. It's a three-star who's in charge in the joint staff for everything which is about force preparation, force providing. and I'm now currently this weekend in between jobs and I will take up my new responsibilities tomorrow as commander of Flotilla 1 of the German Navy which is based in Kiel and in charge of the

naval forces in the Baltic Sea. Well congratulations to timestamp this for the listeners we're recording this January 15th so if something has happened in the naval war in Ukraine that you the listener think I should be asking these two about and we're not talking about it that's the reason. But as a reminder, listeners, all opinions are our own and not reflective of any institution with which we might be otherwise associated. So, Sasha, first question to you, then, what forces are you trying to, quote, unquote, balance in the article's title? It is all about that whole idea, that paradigm of a balanced fleet that any force structure should try to achieve. Balanced fleet meaning to somehow square the circle between those challenges which

are most probable and the challenges which are the most demanding which is for a smaller navy as the german navy to square the circle between those everyday tasks we have been bound in for the last two and a half decades in crisis response operations around europe in the mediterranean in the indian ocean which have been mostly conceptually force operations with the especially now after the russian attack on ukraine the more demanding um challenges and tasks we have in deterrence and defense and connected with this underlying balance which we have to achieve to come up with a force structure which is not only a present at present a a viable force but will be in the future as well um so again balance between technology which is coming over the horizon

And squaring that again with what we actually have, because procurement and coming up with new technology, which will be then actually available frontline, will take us another couple of years, if not decades. So to get that all together and not just work on a modernization project, which will leave us somehow in the lurch with actual forces, but still having a meaningful force today and in the future, both for crisis management and for deterrence and defense. Your article was directed at NATO planners, and you highlighted the need to look to recent examples of naval combat as they reckon with what to do with Russia in conflict scenarios. So which examples did you choose for that and why? Well, we started off that those we have those basic three examples and which was started back from the Napoleonic Wars and war on the sale of the British versus the French 200 years ago. And then the fight of the Israeli Navy against the Egyptian and Syrian navies, and then the last ditch, then Falklands, if we put it in a line, in a chronological line. And the recurring theme is, how do you actually overcome technological or numerical odds? That was the recurrent theme, because there is that notion, especially in Central Europe, especially in Germany, that we have fallen so far behind both numerically as well as technologically, as we haven't invested so much in technology, in our forces, that in the end, we are fighting against the odds.

And we are arguing, well, if you have to consider that differently, you have to approach the problem differently, as did Nelson, as did the Israeli Navy, as did the British and the Falklands. And if I may, Jared, if I may add to that, what we have also stated in the article is that there is no single historical example which will teach you in totality how future combat will look like. So speaking of the Battle of Trafalgar and Israel and also about recent operations, it won't bring us to a situation where we can really predict 100% how future combat will look like. And if I may say so, having been a NATO planner in the last years and also last year, 2022 with Russia, I saw I've been in many briefings and I realized that we are not very good as officers in predicting future outcomes of operations. And we have to ask ourselves if maybe operations war has become too complex to be able to predict the outcomes. And then again, we have to get the balance right, because should we restrain ourselves of predicting or isn't that somehow expected from a military officer to predict somehow outcomes? So, yeah, historical examples, as we have written in the article, are very important, but we are not able to use them in totality to predict future outcomes. So, Mark, I'm going to come back to you to start off this next question.

What lessons did you feel NATO ought to draw from those examples as well as what we've been able to observe in the war in the Black Sea? Because when you talk about predictive outcomes, I think most, quote unquote, expert predictions and I throw the, quote unquote, expert predictions out not to demean anyone, but to like most. I do not consider myself an expert. I think most people were expecting to be the conflict in Ukraine to be over pretty quickly and pretty decisively. And that has not been the case. We have seen many articles and I've been in many briefings where people stated that Russian forces are so overwhelmingly better equipped or when it comes to quantities, better than what they face in Ukraine. And I mean, quite impressively, we saw that this is not the case last year. So when it comes to lessons that we that we're currently still learning, And I think we're still learning every day from this war, from this Russian war in Ukraine.

I think when it comes back to Wayne Hughes, I've just a couple of weeks ago read an article that he, shortly before he died, he created a new cornerstone, which he named the Home Team Has the Advantage. I think it was like that. And we see in Ukraine, actually, that the Home Team has a massive advantage. And maybe it's something also we have to keep in mind when we now recreate and improve our defense plans in NATO. if i may pitch in i think what we were today to to emphasize what mark said and coming back to to use cornerstones i think men matter most this is again touching on this question of of the home team the the determination the creativity and the sheer will of the ukrainian forces and the ukrainian people makes makes all the difference i think we've seen that very very nicely uh and

still are seeing that another thing which i and this is something which we have stressed in our article is the value of mission command delegation and decentralization to actually make use of the creativity creativity and and and the energy of the people uh you may lead in battle and lastly unexpected uses unexpected utility of technology who would have thought just as marcus said at the beginning of the war everybody looked at the that arsenal of the russian forces and everybody was arguing well that war has to be over in a matter of days or latest weeks because of the sheer size and sophistication of the russian arms arsenal but now who would have thought that after a year that the russians would import relatively stupid drones from iran to keep up their war effort so

So the whole use and utility of technology has has surprised us on so many levels, especially if we look at the usage of unmet area vehicles, drones and so on and so forth, both in the negative and in the positive. And the electric magnetic spectrum, everybody expected the electric magnetic spectrum to actually be dead. The Russians just blocking everything. We haven't seen that. So there is a lot of unexpected developments. And again, just as Hughes has said, know thy technology, but don't be surprised when it comes up with totally different utilities as what you would expect. Totally different utilities and totally different functionality as far as how well it works. I will go back to our time sitting with the two of you in the Fearings Academy, taking a brief from somebody's end, too, about Russian capabilities. Just the tone of the conversation was how completely overwhelming the situation in the Baltic would be.

And no one would be able to, you know, everyone would be destroyed in port the first day. And those who were lucky enough to survive probably would survive just long enough to clear the breakwater and be destroyed as soon as they were out there. And that is not what we have seen, but capability wise. So I'd like Sasha to ask you, like, this isn't on the list here. I'll ask you first. And Mark, if you have any thoughts, feel free to jump in. But this concept of home team has the advantage as we consider the Baltic, for example, or consider naval war. there's a little bit less home team where most of us go out and do our business, right? So is that the home team has the advantage if you're fighting in littoral waters? I think definitely applies. But when we talk about conflict at sea, do you think that advantage is less? Yeah, I think there's several levels to that question.

If you're looking especially at the Baltic Sea, you could obviously argue now with Sweden and Finland hopefully soon joining NATO, that there definitely is something like a home team because there is only the enclave of Kaliningrad and that small end of the dead end, so to say, of the Gulf of Finland at St. Petersburg, which is actually Russian. It's a dominant geographical position now. Exactly. So it's a dominant geographic position. On the other side, we always have to remind ourselves, because this is actually an ongoing debate in the German Navy, in German enforcement, it's a fierce debate of what that actually means. And very often what people forget is that we are actually not only concerned with fighting that war, as important that it is for that thinking always about the combat situation, which might be there in the end, but that our most demanding task will actually be deterring such a situation.

And while we are in the phase of deterring Russia from aggression in that area, in the Baltic Sea, well, there still is the enclave of Kaliningrad and there is St. Petersburg. So they are in the Baltic Sea and they have those capabilities. So how do we operate in a phase of competition, yet still without open conflict, but with a constant menace of Russian capabilities still present in the Baltic Sea? and deter the Russians from actually using their potential. So this is actually what I think what we should focus on, because this is what we would have to do for the coming years on a day-to-day basis. We're actually doing it right now. German forces as Danish, Swedish, Finnish forces, Polish forces,

and the Baltic states around the Baltic are in constant everyday contact with the Russians. And we have to focus very much on that part of the picture. And there you can argue there's no real home team because both are at home in the Baltic Sea. The Russians, as we are, once we come into the phase of an open conflict, that might change from a sheer appreciation of the operational factor of space. But for deterrence purposes, it's a totally different picture, I guess. And I would I would completely agree with what Sasha just just stated. And just adding that when I understood right what Wayne Hughes was stating in his cornerstone, he was focusing very much on the US Marine Corps, the Pacific campaign in World War II, as well as the unified combated commander structure that you have in the US military worldwide to understand geography, for example. And I think when it comes to the Baltics, I absolutely agree with Sascha.

But when it comes to the Geo-Norway gap to North Atlantic, I think we kind of set a pause for us in the last two decades on really exercising and operating up there, understanding the geography, but also organizing logistics and maybe sensor capabilities up there. So I think that also comes to the question of who is the home team and who would like to be the home team. And I think we should try to be the home team in the North Atlantic as well, not only in the Baltics. And again, if I might add another perspective, as I said, there's different layers to it because the same kind of military operation, whether it is in, well, especially in that phase of deterrence, may mean totally different things on a strategic level, depending on where you actually conduct them. So, operations in the eastern Baltic might be operationally the same as what we might do off the North Cape, but off the North Cape, close to the Russian bastion, that area which the Russians fiercely guard as the area where they have their second strike capability, might mean on a strategic level something completely different. So that makes it a little harder, I think, in the maritime world, makes it a little harder to argue about home team and away team. Because that might change both on the operational and the strategic level and might mean totally different things of what you might do or not do in certain phases of a competition or conflict.

Both of your answers to this gets directly to the question of balancing and a unique position that Germany has. I say unique. There's a couple other countries who face the same sort of dilemma here, whether it's Denmark, the Norwegians to a lesser extent as well here. But the company, the countries that we're talking about have equities both like very much in the Baltic, where they have coastlines and naval forces, but also in the North Atlantic. And there's really two different sets of forces that you kind of need for those two different problems. In the Baltic, you're talking smaller, lighter forces that can move in and out of fjords, inlets, other places here where they can seek refuge if somebody is trying to conduct surveillance against them. But in the North Atlantic, you need a lot more rugged units that, you know, they're going to be able to put up with some severe weather conditions. They're going to be able to conduct convoy operations. They're probably having larger sensors on board, whether that's towed array sonar, hull mounted sonar, the type of stuff that you're not going to see a lot of in the Baltic on those smaller forces.

So when you get into that balance and you're looking at your own procurement decisions here, and we talk about NATO as like this larger political entity, but these are also national decisions that are being made. Now, Germany is the best of itself of its, the S-vote, the Schnellvote. Denmark has done the same in favor of these larger units because I think those larger units convey a certain amount of prestige and also allow you to operate. You know, you can do worldwide operations and send our frigate around to the Pacific if you want to do that, as FGS Byron did last year. So what is the discussion like in balancing between those smaller units, the larger units, and trying to find some sort of resolution on having both and being able to conduct both of those? Oh, that's exactly the point about balancing. And we would have to add something, which is then there is still the issues about crisis response operations, especially for Germany or for European Navy, especially in the Mediterranean and around the North African coastline.

So from the Gulf of Guinea to the Horn of Africa, which adds another level of complexity because there's, again, totally different requirements for the forces you might use there. the fast attack craft like the Schnellbooter of the Cold War days are not to come back we still have to think about lighter forces which are easily using the geography using the archipelagos especially in the East and Baltics

but nevertheless, especially again in a phase of deterrence, you still need larger forces you might even lead frigates and destroyers Even if you might question their utility in an all out war in the Baltics, they have a lot of utility as a signaling platform in deterrence. And everything you said about the Northern Atlantic, everybody who's ever sailed in the Northern Atlantic in January knows what you're talking about. It's not a very pleasant place to be in that kind of weather. So, yes, this is the big that that's the sixty six thousand dollar question, actually, how to balance that that force with limited means. And limited means currently more than ever means not exactly financially, but in manning.

So I think the biggest challenge we ever had, the strategic challenge is actually manning that fleet. So what we need to look at instead of dreaming back things we've lost over the years would be to go into a lot more into manned where necessary, unmanned where possible, and most probably modular designs, which we could man in deterrence or unmanned if it comes to defense and larger forces, which we need then in the more demanding environmental conditions of the North Atlantic. Mark. I completely agree. And Jared, if I may say so, your question actually hits the very core of our discussions that we currently have in the German Navy and Germany in total. So when it comes to fast attack craft, fast patrol boats in the Baltics, I'm very skeptical that those boats are coming back. And also, I think it's not necessary. Why? Because the situation has changed. When I speak to colleagues, sometimes I realize they mentally they switch to the Cold War. But the situation is completely different.

Our mission in the Cold War was to stop Russian forces of getting into the North Atlantic eventually from the Baltics. But that is not necessarily our mission now anymore. So what is our mission in the Baltics? It is eventually supporting land forces that operate in the Baltics. And that is completely different. So we need a completely different set of forces for that. And hence, we have a big discussion around it. There are some colleagues who would argue that we need amphibious ships, which, as you know, Jared, we currently don't have in our inventory, dog landing, dog landing ships.

Eventually, there's a business case for that. So it's just going to ignore the locks like that. So we. I would align what Mark's been saying, a piece of American, well, our discussion, which I always highlight, and you know that, Jared, we have talked about that when you have been still in Hamburg, is actually what General Berger of the Marine Corps, the commander of the Marine Corps, is saying about the role of the Marine Corps in the Western Pacific. There is a lot of lessons in how he envisages the role of the Marine Corps in a fight for sea control or breaking a A2AD bubble and fighting, contesting sea control in littorals that we could learn a lot from. We could take some pages off in thinking about the Baltic Sea. And I'm not only saying that because starting tomorrow or the day after, I will be in charge of the German naval infantry as well. But there's a much different role than we've actually discussed for those guys in recent years in Germany.

And it is not just simply between it's amphibious or not. We have to rethink what amphibious actually means. And that does not necessarily have to do with big ships, with well decks and craft coming out of them. It will be perhaps a role which is a lot more to do with with small craft and making best use of the mobility of those forces in archipelagic waters. Mark, I'm going to come to you to start this next question, and obviously Sasha will chime in. But how do you propose we break the enemy's decision cycle? Yeah, Gerrit, thank you. So coming back to the article, we highlighted that, well, it's a little bit buzzwordy, but everybody speaks about multi-domain operations. But we think there's a lot of truth in it.

So we have to think also outside our naval maritime domain. And why? Because we want to break the enemy's decision cycle and not just get the same amount of missiles and the same amount of ships and boats. We want to be smarter. And that is what we write in the article. So when we speak about the decision cycle, what is it? At the Fugls Academy, I was taught that it has four parts, observation, orientation, decision, and then act. so by increasing the speed of our initiative always our operations being in having the

initiative all the time we force our opponents to get back always to the orientation phase of his decision cycle and so we we try to hold him back from acting actually but then to be honest speed alone is not it's not always superior so if you look at world war ii the sleeping plan or World War I, World War II, and the idea of the Schlieffen Plan, speed was not the issue. It was just a bad plan. So if you have a bad plan and you have speed, the bad plan doesn't get a good plan. So speed is important, but it's not everything. And then, Sascha, I'll come to you for the final question.

What suggestions do you have for command and control in a peer conflict? You already mentioned the concept of decentralization or the idea of decentralization, but any other thoughts that you had on that? Yeah, I think decentralization gets us a long way. I think technologically wise, we still are in the early stages, especially in the German armed forces, I think, in understanding what, for example, satellite constellations like Skylink have actually done to the question of connectivity, of communications and connectivity, which we would have to look into. But basically, it comes down to make best use of our strengths, which is that we have very, very highly skilled and very creative thinkers and deciders, even down to very low ranks and levels of command. And we see that again in Ukraine, very, very flat hierarchies on the Ukrainian side, a very, very big room for decision making for commanders on the front line versus the Russians who are very still back in the in the old paradigm of going really always the whole way up and down the ladder of command. So invest in our people and make the best use of them as investment and giving them the room to take the decisions by themselves. And I think we've unlearned a lot of things.

That's why we go back to the Nelson touch and saying, how do you actually phrase a sound command intent? We have to relearn that in order to make best use of the investment we've put into our people. And Mark, any final thoughts on that is our last question there. the concept of command and control? Well, no, basically, I think this Nelson touch, as we have mentioned and emphasized in the article, we have to get back to that. We have the tendency to be over-detailed,

to try to over-control our subordinate forces. And just as Sasha has emphasized, we need a little bit more of Nelson nowadays. Well, unfortunately, that's all that we have time for today. I'd like to thank my guests, Admiral Sasha Rockwitz and Commander Mark Bomber. Sasha, where can we find you online? I think we know what you're working on next, but I'll let you fill us in if you have any other projects besides, you know, running an entire fleet.

No, exactly. Exactly. That will will encapsulate what I will be doing the next couple of weeks, at least, to come to grips with what my what my command will entail. And you might find me if you look for Fertilla 1 of the German Navy, you will find us on social media, on Instagram and Twitter. and you will find all the squadrons and battalions which belong to the flotilla, the submarine force, corvettes, the naval infantry, special operations forces of the Navy. So I'd be happy if you peek in. Well, thank you again.

Mark, same questions to you. Where can we find you and what's your next project? Well, same here, being executive officer of a frigate takes a lot of my day. When it comes to social media, we are a little bit less good equipped as compared to the Flotilla 1, which Sascha is going to take over on Tuesday.

But we will have our own social media accounts beginning in March on Instagram and Twitter. So you eventually can then follow the Red Eagle of my frigate Brandenburg beginning in March. Well, thank you both again for joining us. To listeners, thank you for tuning in. We'll see you next time. © BF-WATCH TV 2021

I don't want to hear you say more now. So help me, Bob, I'm going to be happy. Why are you going to be happy? Help me, Bob, I'm going to be happy. Put it out, you're going to be happy.