Sea Control - Sea Control 443 - Asymmetric Black Sea Warfare with Charles Rahr

Episode Date: July 9, 2023

Links1. "Going Asymmetric: How Ukraine is Keeping Russia at Bay in the Black Sea," by Charles Rahr, Center for Maritime Strategy, May 25, 2023.

Hey folks, it's Jared. My guest today is Charles Rahr, and we're going to discuss his article on lessons learned from Ukraine's asymmetric warfare in the Black Sea. This episode was edited and produced by Dr. Ed Salo. We're once again looking for audio editors, and if you're interested in learning how to put these podcasts together and think you're able to learn a few basic editing skills, drop us a note at seacontrol at simsec.org. I'd like to pause here to highlight our local chapters, whether you're in South Korea, Egypt, Singapore, France, New York, India, or the caribbean chances are there's a simsec local chapter near you you can find a full listing of our chapters and contact information on the website simsec.org so if you're interested please

reach out and get involved finally i want to take the opportunity to recommend our partners in the simsec podcast network the bilge pumps you can find alex jamie drack and a pile of iron brew bottles wherever you download your podcast and with that kimber's men you're listening to sea Control, hosted by the Center for International Maritime Strategy. Aloha, shipmates, and welcome back aboard Sea Control. My guest today is Charles Rahr, and we're going to be discussing his article for the Center for Maritime Strategy entitled Going Asymmetric, How Ukraine is Keeping Russia at Bay in the Black Sea. Charles, welcome aboard. First-time guest here. Could you start by telling the listeners a little

bit about yourself, please? Thanks so much for having me on today, Jared. I really appreciate it. So I'm a research assistant at the American Enterprise Institute where I focus on defense budgets and grand strategy. Prior to working at AEI, I worked on Capitol Hill for a congressman from Pennsylvania, and I have a degree in international studies from the University of Denver in Denver, Colorado. Well, thank you again for coming on board. As a reminder to listeners, all opinions are our own and not reflective of any institution with which we might be otherwise associated. Also, timestamp this for the listeners. We are recording this on Monday, June 12th. So if there's something that has happened, because it looks like

the Ukrainian offensive has kicked off, but there's something that's happened in the Black Sea that we're not talking about. The reason is because it hasn't happened yet. So Charles, back to you then. What did the Ukrainian Navy consist of prior to the 2014 invasion of Crimea? And what happened to the Navy during that invasion? Sure. So I think before going into the, I guess, naval capabilities of Ukraine. It's important to remember that prior to the invasion in 2014, the Ukrainian Navy was not really in the best of shape at all. A lot of its ships were really old and fairly decrepit. Some have been scrapped. So it was actually difficult to figure out what the Navy consisted of and by extension, what it lost after the 2014 invasion. But the

best information that we have is that the Ukrainian Navy consisted of between 12 and 17 large ships. So I think major service combatants, including a frigate, some corvettes, a single submarine, which actually hadn't been used since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, and then two large armed landing ships. So after the invasion, the Ukrainian Navy shrunk by about 70% in terms of its fleet, lost 11 ships with eight auxiliary vessels as well, and then that single submarine, which I just mentioned. Three of the vessels that the Ukrainian Navy lost were actually among the fleet's most advanced, including two corvettes, as well as a command ship. So with the loss of naval capacity also came a loss in sailors, too. The Ukrainian Navy shrunk from 17,000 to 5,000 sailors, roughly. Most of those were a result of defections or dismissals. And actually, the former head of the Ukrainian Navy defected to Russia after that time.

But one last important thing to note about what the Ukrainian Navy lost was that a lot of its shipbuilding capacity was lost as well. So while a lot of these Ukrainian shipbuilding facilities weren't really in the best of shape as well, kind of just like its fleet, they were still a significant loss in terms of what Ukraine is able to build domestically. And then just one last thing that I'll mention, too, is that they lost a good amount of their training, repair and depot facilities with the 2014 seizure as well. What has the Navy done since or what is it doing to recapitalize its fleet? Sure. So the Ukrainian Navy really seems to have abandoned any hope of building back a significant number of large surface combatants. So certainly not any sort of blue water Navy at all. And it's mostly focused on building up kind of the elements of a coastal defense force.

So in essence, a mosquito fleet. And as part of that, it's focused on two different efforts, one of which is domestically producing ships with the shipyards that it still has after the 2014 seizure of Crimea, as well as procuring vessels from abroad. So in terms of domestic efforts, it's largely focused on building GERSA-class inshore patrol craft. These entered service in 2016. The seventh one was commissioned in 2020, and an eighth is apparently under construction today. And there's also been efforts to build corvettes, as well as assault ships, domestically. But both of these programs have actually been plagued by problems like corruption in the case of the assault craft program, and then a bankrupt shipyard for the Corvettes.

But then, you know, because of its lack of shipbuilding capacity, the Ukrainians have also looked abroad. The U.S. has provided four former island class cutters from the U.S. Coast Guard to Ukraine between 2019 and 2021. One of these was unfortunately sunk within the first month of the war, but a few are still in service. They've also looked to Turkey, where they have an agreement with them to build two Ada-class corvettes. One of these was scheduled to be provided to Ukraine at the end of this year, but given the war, it's not sure whether that'll actually happen. And then the last main effort on procuring ships from abroad has been with the UK, where they have stopped to make armed patrol boats as well as potentially a frigate.

Part of that, they've also been provided with a few mine hunters. And then just one final effort that they focused on is basically getting coastal and river green patrol boats from Ukraine security assistance packages provided by the West and other countries. Ships aside, what happened to the Navy then or what remained of the Navy then at the outset of the 2022 invasion? So with the majority of the Navy kind of shrunk and largely confined to a coastal defense force, their Navy has shrunk even further. Most ships were either captured, sunk or scuttled, including the former flagship of their fleet, which was their only frigate that escaped seizure by the Russians in 2014 because it was actually on a counter piracy mission in the Gulf of Aden at the time. And then in addition to that ship, they've also lost gunboats and patrol boats to the Russian Navy. So in essence, they've kind of had to think creatively about how to build back a naval force, which is really the focus of my article for the Center for Maritime Strategy.

And what has Ukraine accomplished at sea today and what assets has it used to do that? Sure. So in terms of, like I mentioned, thinking creatively about how it can have a naval presence without actually having a large number of ships at all, they've turned to asymmetric capabilities, such as land-based anti-ship missiles, armed unmanned surface vessels, and sea mines. And by doing so, they've really confined the Russians to only carrying out a few missions, largely just launching cruise missiles on Ukraine, including, as we all know, on civilian targets, unfortunately. But one of the main uses of these asymmetric capabilities, which I'm sure your listeners are well familiar with, was the sinking of the Russian Black Sea Fleet flagship, the Moskva. And the Ukrainians, while there's a lot of disinformation from the Russian side, it's clear that the Ukrainians made use of these indigenously produced land-based anti-ship missiles called Neptunes. And they actually coordinated that attack with a Bayraktar Turkish drone to distract air defenses as well. There's a number of other instances, too, where they've made use of land-based anti-ship missiles, one of which was in June 2022 when they struck a Russian support ship near the

now-infamous Snake Island. There's also some interesting cases where they've used anti-tank missiles and tactical ballistic missiles to hit Russian ships that were currently at harbor at some of their Crimean ports. But when it comes to unmanned surface vessels, you know, there's a lot of debate over whether this is heralding a new age of warfare or something like that but it's clear that they're pretty useful not necessarily for sinking ships because the ukrainians really haven't managed to sink a single ship using these uh unmanned surface vessels but still damaging them and changing how

the russians operate in the black sea so another or i guess one example of uh of those capabilities these was an October attack, where the Ukrainians coordinated the use of armed unmanned surface vessels with aerial drones to attack the Russian Black Sea Fleet at Sevastopol. And while no ships were actually sunk, their current flagship of the Black Sea Fleet, the Admiral Makarov, was damaged. So that's just one example. And then since then, there've been a few others, specifically in April, another attack on that port. It seems that the Russians had enhanced defenses after the October attack, so that wasn't as successful. But just recently, there have been reports of a Russian intelligence ship, which apparently was guarding, according to the

Russians, guarding natural gas pipelines in the Black Sea, and that ship was apparently attacked by armed unmanned surface vessels. Again, it didn't seem to be entirely successful, but still goes to show how the Ukrainians are thinking creatively about keeping the Russians on their back foot in the Black Sea and kind of confining them to only a certain set of missions. Are the armed unmanned surface vessels, are those a Ukrainian-produced item? That's not something they're procuring from overseas, right? Exactly. So the Ukrainians have actually spearheaded a campaign to crowdfund a fleet of about 100

of these armed unmanned surface vessels. Ukraine has set up a crowdfunding website for a number of different projects across Ukraine. This is one of them. Each of these come with a cost of about $274,000. So they are produced in Ukraine. It's an indigenously produced weapons shop. What lessons can you draw from what Ukraine's done to date and who could make the best use of that information? Sure. So I think while the use of asymmetric capabilities is certainly not a new development in naval history, I mean, it's been going on for a long time in terms of cannons fired from shore, for instance, etc. I think that Ukraine's experience of sending off the Russian Navy has a few different lessons,

one of which is that countries don't necessarily need a significant naval presence to mount a naval defense. I think with the use of these missiles, with sea mines, with unmanned surface vessels, they're showing that you don't have to have a large fleet. And I also think the Ukrainians are really showing how to mount an asymmetric naval defense, right? They're showing how to coordinate attacks using these surface vessels as well as aerial drones. So I think that obviously is lessons for other countries around the world. I noted in my article, specifically countries in the Baltic Sea, as well as the Indo-Pacific. So in terms of the Baltic Sea countries, Estonia and Latvia were two that I mentioned, which are both currently looking to equip themselves with coastal defense capabilities.

Latvia, for instance, has looked to purchase the naval strike missile from the U.S., and that's currently going through the whole FMS process. But Estonia has also looked to buy coastal defense capabilities like anti-ship missiles and sea mines and while there's certainly a lot of takes going around about what ukraine means for taiwan and what lessons can be drawn from that conflict for a potential conflict on taiwan i certainly think there is some lessons for lessons for taiwan here specifically with a the porcupine strategy that is often advocated for for the island which would make use of these sorts of asymmetric capabilities like land-based anti-ship missiles to take out a potential

invasion fleet. And there's already evidence that the Taiwanese are making use of these, or at least purchasing them in anticipation, you know, if there was ever to be an invasion from China. For instance, they've bought U.S.-made anti-ship missiles as well as produced their own. And I also think that there is some space for the Taiwanese to be thinking about how to use these unmanned surface vessels and sort of a swarming tactic to overwhelm landing vessels potentially coming from China. So let me ask you a couple unscripted follow-ups here, things that have just come to me as you've given your different answers here. We didn't actually talk about sort of what the quote-unquote effect is on the Russian Navy from everything that Ukraine

has done so far, but as far as everything that I can tell just from open source reporting, it does not look like they're really coming out at all anymore. They're mostly just either in port or they're in waters just outside the port, and then they come straight back in. Is that sort of what you're seeing? Exactly. That's exactly right. They're either being stuck in their ports or being moved from Crimea to bases closer, or I guess just on Russia or on Russian territory. I think one other thing to note about that is that despite a lot of reporting about a potential amphibious invasion from the Black Sea at the beginning of the war, it doesn't seem that that ever happened and hasn't happened since. I would argue largely a result because of these capabilities that Ukraine's been adopting.

And the last question that I would have is as far as when we're talking about who could learn lessons from this, what about Russia itself in the Baltic Sea? Because Russia is increasingly, especially with NATO expansion to Finland and NATO, I'm sorry, Finland and Sweden, Russia itself is more in the role of Ukraine in the Baltic, surrounded as it is by these other countries now. And could it adopt some of these tactics were it to get into some sort of conflict with NATO there? Sure. And I think there already are some instances of Russia adopting, at least I know they have an anti-ship missile system set up along their coast as well. So they're already adopting some of the tactics of the Ukrainians in that sense. But I also think they're learning a bit about how the Ukrainians are using some of these capabilities like armed unmanned surface vessels. I mean, after the October attack in Sevastopol, they put up more barriers to protect their ships. And also, they've been making use of combat dolphins, which is kind of an interesting development in order to keep Ukrainian sabotage divers reportedly out of their harbor.

So there are some ways that the Russians could certainly take these lessons from the Ukrainians, as well as they're already adapting to the new realities that Ukraine's putting on them. well i'm sorry that's all that we have time for today i'd like to thank my guest charles rar charles where can we find you online and what's your next project sure so my latest work uh is under my name charles rar at aei.org um and i'm currently working on a report uh looking at alternative alternative to some of these uh new build programs that the services are currently pursuing well thank you again for joining us to listeners thanks for tuning in we'll see you next time. We'll be right back.