Sea Control - Sea Control 500 - The UK's Indo-Pacific Engagement with Dr. Peter Chalk

Episode Date: March 7, 2024

Links1. “The United Kingdom’s Indo-Pacific Engagement,” by Peter Chalk, War on the Rocks, November 30, 2023. 

Hey folks, it's Jared. Walker Mills is back as host today, and he has Dr. Peter Chalk on board to discuss the UK's engagement in the Indo-Pacific. This episode was edited and produced by Brennan Costello. Here at SimSec, we aim to further international maritime security through an exchange of ideas and the rigor of critical thought and writing. If you haven't already, please check out SimSec.org for new articles on the most important maritime topics. If you'd like to contribute to the discussion, check out the Write for SimSec tab to learn how you can submit articles for publication. And now, Kimber's men. You're listening to Sea Control, hosted by the Center for International Maritime Security. Welcome aboard the Sea Control podcast from the Center for International Maritime Security.

I'm Walker Mills, and my guest today is Dr. Peter Chalk, a security consultant and former RAND analyst based out of Phoenix, Arizona. We're going to discuss the essay he recently wrote for War on the Rocks, the United Kingdom's Indo-Pacific engagement. Peter, welcome aboard. You start by telling the listeners a bit more about your background. Yeah. Hi, Walker. Well, thanks for having me on the on the podcast. I'm currently a subject matter expert with the Institute for Security Governance out of Monterey. And we do capacity building programs for U.S. partner nations basically around the world. And we also run in-residence courses there. And my particular role with ISG is to look at maritime threats.

So I cover things like maritime piracy, armed maritime crime, terrorism, and then trafficking of goods, people, weapons, and so forth. Before that, I was a senior analyst with the RAND Corporation in Santa Monica. And the RAND Corporation is basically a federally funded think tank that, again, looks at helping U.S. partner nations deal with threats that are also of concern to the United States. And I was with them pretty much until about 2018. And prior to all of that, I was a professor in Australia at the University of Queensland in Brisbane, got a PhD from Vancouver in Canada, and also was in the UK for quite a long time where I did a small stint with the infantry, the British infantry over there. So it's a fairly varied background, but mostly in the sort of academic policy think tank sphere. We're very excited to have you on and all your expertise. And I should note for the listeners that Peter and I do know each other.

We've been on a couple engagements with the Institute for Security Governance together. Really, Peter doing most of the work and myself just kind of tagging along. Don't put yourself down there, man. And as a reminder to the listeners, all the opinions here are our own and they're not reflective of any of the institutions with which we might otherwise be associated. Getting started, Peter, how is the current government in the United Kingdom been managing its relationships in the Indo-Pacific broadly and then specifically with China, which is really kind of the core of the article that you wrote for War on the Rocks? Sure. Well, ever since Britain left the European Union, there's been an emphasis on trying to broaden out its foreign policy outlook to other critical parts of the world. And when Boris Johnson was in power, the UK issued a review of its defence, economic and political priorities and policies for the next decade. And within that document, there was a strong emphasis on engaging with the Indo-Pacific, really due to the region's growing international importance, both politically and economically.

So that was the first real thrust on the part of the UK to extend its footprint beyond Europe. And then under the current government of Sunak, there's been a real push to further engage the Indo-Pacific on a more permanent basis. And it's become a priority of his. Again, it's reflective of the growing commercial as well as political importance of the region. But as far as the current government is concerned, it's also reflective of heightened Chinese assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific, particularly in terms of its bellicose behavior towards the South China Sea, the Taiwan Strait. And basically, there's a concern that its expanding naval presence within the Indo-Pacific could have implications for freedom of navigation and overflight in very critical regions, including particularly the South China Sea. Really, the current thrust of the UK at this point, it still reflects that Europe is a core defense and security priority for Britain. But at the same time, the government is wanting to extend its influence to the Indo-Pacific in order to capitalize on the opportunities that could present themselves in that part of the world.

Should we expect more British naval presence or naval engagement? I'm sure some of our listeners are familiar with the now two British aircraft carriers, but I think at least one of them has already had a deployment to the Pacific. Is that something we should expect to see more of going forward? And what might that look like? I think so. And we'll certainly under the present conservative government, I think that that's a strong reality. But even under Boris Johnson, when Global Britain came out, one of one of the initiatives that the UK quickly did was to deploy the carrier strike force group 21 to the region. I think it was deployed between May and December. And that was the largest deployment in many years for the strike group carrier. So that sort of set the scene.

Now we have AUKUS going on, and that's going to provide for a rotational presence, deployment of UK submarines to help with the defense of Australian territorial waters. And there's also been, I don't think we can say it's been official talks, But there's certainly been speculation that the UK may actually look towards becoming part of the Quad. Now, if that happens, that would be a very significant development. In many ways, it would be a natural evolution for the UK, given the fact that AUKUS also involves Australia and the United States and the Quad involves both of those countries. The one question mark there is India. India has generally been pretty reluctant to expanding the membership of the Quad

instead its focus is to deepen the engagement between the existing four members Japan I think would support the UK's entry into the Quad but as I say India is somewhat more of a bit of a question mark but should the UK become part of the Quad that would open the door for a much more regular codified naval presence for Britain in the Indo-Pacific over the long term. And it would, as I say, it would complement things such as AUKUS, in which the UK is already playing a pretty prominent role.

Under a Labour government, should they win? I still think that there's going to be a major push to the region. Whether or not that would also include major naval deployments is open to debate. But should the Conservatives remain in power, I certainly think it's a policy priority of SUNAC, Particularly in light of the increasing naval presence of China in the region, which is raising concern in the UK that it could come at the detriment of British national security interests and priorities. So would it be fair to say kind of in summation then that with a continued conservative government in the UK, we're definitely going to see continued and probably more naval engagement going forward. But with a Labour government, it may continue, but it's a little bit more uncertain.

I think that's fair. I mean, with the Labour government, there's not going to be I don't think you're going to see a reversal of the US, the UK's engagement with the Indo-Pacific for several reasons. I think that that will remain a core priority. however in terms of actually deploying assets to the region as opposed to deploying assets in the euro atlantic theater i think under labor the latter will be the the main priority whereas with the conservative to the extent that they can i think that they are going to try and entrench their naval footprint in the region in conjunction with australia and the united states in particular so the three the three countries i think are trying to form a beachhead within the region uh which is obviously of geostrategic importance to china but it will give them a

give the uk for instance a forward maritime footprint in the indo-pacific from which it can actually serve to deter aggressive or bellicose chinese behavior but again in collaboration with in conjunction with forced asset deployment from the US and Australia and Japan. We mentioned AUKUS before, and just as an outsider, it seems to me like they've got a good plan, but some of these goals and milestones are pretty far out, and they're going to take some pretty heavy investment, not only by the United States and certainly Australia, but also by the UK. So I'm curious if you think that there's a little bit of uncertainty in the future of AUKUS, especially if we don't know whether or not we'll have a Labour or Conservative government in the

future in the UK. And then also, you know, it seemed just that AUKUS was heavily US and Australia, and that the kind of involvement of the UK was a little bit lesser. Yeah, well, I mean, it's a very ambitious program and you're right. Actually, AUKUS was the idea, I guess, if you want. Well, certainly Australia was the main advocate for the alliance because it's going to be the main beneficiary of what comes out of AUKUS with these nuclear powered conventionally armed submarines. And Australia certainly views that as critical in terms of expanding its underwater offensive capabilities. So Australia was definitely a keen advocate to push for the agreement. As far as how the UK will benefit or the cost burden on the UK,

the Sunak government has made it clear that it's in this until the end. So until the first fleet of next generation submarines comes out. And so they, in San Diego, when was it, March of this year, The three leaders from Australia, UK and the US put out a timetable for the completion of the submarine component of the AUKUS pact, because it also actually includes areas which provide for the sharing of information on things like artificial intelligence, quantum technology, cybersecurity and electronic warfare. That's a sort of second pillar of AUKUS. The first pillar, which is where most attention has been focused on at this point, is the development of these conventionally armed nuclear powered subs. So the target date is to deliver one for Australia and one for the UK by the late 2030s, 2040. So that's still quite a time away. And obviously, a lot of developments could occur within that time frame.

And already there are, I guess, questions that have complicated somewhat the development of AUKUS, one of which is congressional approval for the transfer of sensitive U.S. technological information on propulsion technology. The U.S. is already sharing that with the U.K., but it still has to get the approval to do that with Australia. There's another issue with regards to the U.S. because part of the AUKUS pact provides for, by the 2030s, the deployment of three American Virgin class submarines to help resolve Canberra's existing deficit and underwater seaborne attack capabilities while the AUKUS submarine is being developed. So there's been some concern in the U.S. that that could deplete inventory of advanced submarines that the U.S. has available. I don't think that that will derail the agreement at all. And as I said, SUNAC has pledged his commitment to seeing the initiative through to the end until the 2040s. Again, the U.K. will benefit from the development of one of these submarines. There's also going to be investment, job creation, because part of the development of the submarines will be taking place in the UK.

So there will be economic spinoffs coming from this. With regards to a Labour government coming in, there was earlier on in the year a lot of pushback from the Shadow Defence Minister, John Healy, about generally the UK's engagement in the Indo-Pacific and more specifically about the UK deploying assets and helping out with security in that area. Basically, Healy's argument was that the UK just didn't have the inventory or the capacity to take both the Euro-Atlantic data and then project influence in the Indo-Pacific.

But we've seen more recently Healy becoming somewhat more supportive of the Indo-Pacific push and AUKUS. And it's certainly David Lammy, who's the shadow foreign minister. He is also has become on board with regards to extending the UK's footprint in the region. And notably, Healy actually, at a lecture before Chatham House quite recently, affirmed that the UK's support, in his own words, for AUKUS would be absolute. So I think in terms of the future of AUKUS, irrespective of who's in power, at least at this point in time, the political support for the initiative is there, both with respect to the Conservative government and the Labour government. The only difference, as I said previously, with Labour, I'm not so sure that they would also support, say, the UK's accession to the Quad initiative.

But definitely, at least at this point, I don't see AUKUS not proceeding. I certainly see the UK giving its support to AUKUS. And any unravelling by the UK of the pact and would do pretty bad damage to two very important bilateral relationships, namely the US and Australia. It would dent the UK's special relationship with Washington and it would undermine the credibility of Britain's strategic and defence posture.

So for all of those reasons, I think both the Labour administration or a Conservative administration would be keen to ensure commitment to the AUKUS initiative. That makes a lot of sense. And I've definitely heard from some other folks as well that as much attention as the first pillar of the nuclear submarines should clarify again, like you did nuclear powered conventionally armed submarines gets the lion's share of the attention. But, you know, that probably won't actually follow through until the late 2030s or 2040s. But in the much shorter term, the second pillar of the technology sharing and kind of cooperative research agreements actually has a lot more potential to make impact in the short term. Yeah, it does. I mean, I think with regards to the two pillars combined, it will revolutionize the defense sectors of all three countries. And I think that that's very important. The other aspect about this is that through the sharing of advanced technological information on electronic warfare, artificial intelligence and so forth, you're also going to promote greater interoperability between the defense sectors of the three countries.

And that's also going to be very important in terms of future engagement and alliance engagements, certainly with regards to the US and UK in terms of NATO deployments and stuff like that. So I definitely think that it's going to be a payoff in terms of more closely enmeshing the defense sectors of these three countries. And that you'll probably see dividends like that flowing much more quickly and certainly prior to the development of one of these ARCA submarines itself. and so the benefits will start to come more quickly than the final deliverable which is set for 2040 so you have to look at the initiative in terms of the short to medium term and i think you'll start seeing benefits in that in that respect right away so even if political conditions change, I think there will be a growing momentum for the initiative to continue, particularly as short and medium term benefits become manifest.

In 2022, we woke up to the Russian invasion, the most recent Russian invasion of Ukraine. Has that challenged or been any kind of an obstacle to the United Kingdom's interest for greater engagement in the Pacific. I mean, it seems like if nothing else, there's been a little bit more awakening, not just in the United Kingdom, but in the rest of Europe, that they probably need to invest more in defense, even if that money doesn't specifically flow to the Royal Navy. How has the Russian invasion of Ukraine kind of shaped or impacted the policy? Well, it did have an impact. Actually, one of the biggest things that occurred was after Global Britain was published by the Johnson

government. The Russia's invasion of Ukraine plus growing Chinese assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific generated pressure for a review of the Johnson's policy paper. That's where you got the so-called integrated review refresh document basically underpins the UK's current defense and security policy going forward. Now, definitely it reiterated the critical importance of Europe for British national security interests, not least because we saw Moscow precipitating the largest

military conflict on the continent since World War II. But at the same time, with China becoming much more active in the Indo-Pacific, there was also a greater need in the part of the UK to further engage and deepen an entrenchment within the Indo-Pacific. So basically what you have now is a reiteration of the core priority of European defence, whilst at the same time the UK seeking to extend its presence and deepen its presence within the Indo-Pacific. And so as far as the tilt, as it's called, with regards to the UK's reorientation towards the Indo-Pacific, I don't think that Russia's invasion of the Ukraine has necessarily caused that to reverse, simply because other developments have been manifest within the region that have attracted UK foreign policy interest, particularly in terms of what China is doing in that region. But at the same time, it's also been it also, I guess, strengthened the necessity for the UK to not ignore the Euro-Atlantic theater. And so but that's also been a continuation of UK policy.

It's never been a mutually exclusive choice between engaging the Indo-Pacific or remaining committed to the Euro-Atlantic theater. Both have always been priorities of the Conservative government. And I actually believe, although that Piers Starmer has stated on numerous occasions that he's going to prioritise re-engaging with Europe in order to undo the damage done by Britain's hasty and chaotic withdrawal from the European Union. He said it repeatedly, but both Healy and Lammy have also at the same time emphasized that they are going to, they recognize the need to engage with the Indo-Pacific, particularly in terms of dealing with a much more assertive China. And I should also add that Lamy has gone on record as saying that unlike anything that the conservative government has ever done, that should they get into power, they will carry out a complete audit of Britain's relations with China to ensure that they are reflective of UK interests and values. So Labour shares many of the concerns of the Conservative Party with regards to the Indo-Pacific. And so, again, I think there will be obviously a continued emphasis on the defence of Europe. But at the same time, there's also going to be a continued push to make a more concerted impact on what is going on in the Indo-Pacific theatre.

I think Lamy has got basically saying that the rise of China has been characterized by increased oppression at home and increased assertiveness overseas. And that actually mimics a line taken straight from Sunak when he was releasing the UK's Indo-Pacific policy this year. So in many respects, both Labour and the Conservative Party are following a similar trajectory. The differences between the two are much more tonal than substantive. And in many ways, they reflect a common position of strengthening Britain's defense and security needs within Europe, whilst at the same time heightening its presence and influence overseas, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region. It sounds like political will is probably not going to be an issue with continued UK engagement and naval presence in the Pacific. But besides, I mean, simply a lack of assets, are there other or any other obstacles in the coming years that you might see that would hamper or potentially wind back British engagement in the region or not really? well there's always things that could occur and we i mean you know what russia is intending to do is a big question mark now that u.s uh domestic politics have held up uh funding uh for the

ukraine war effort we could actually see russia defeat ukraine um and that's actually i read today Orban from Hungary vetoed the EU defense package for the Ukraine as well. So they've lost significant funding from the European Union. Should Moscow be victorious in the Ukraine? People have speculated that Putin's ambitions don't stop there, that they may continue. And that could then heighten the concern and emphasis of having to pay much closer attention to what is going on in Europe as opposed to the Indo-Pacific. But at the same time, you could also see heightened instability

in the Indo-Pacific that could make that region become relatively more important. And here, I mean, I've been following very closely tensions between the Philippines and China over contested areas in the South China Sea. And the nature of Chinese interference in terms of Philippine resupply missions to places like the second Thomas Shoal is taking on a much more kinetic character. And I fear that if there's a major collision between Philippine resupply boat and a Chinese Coast Guard vessel or Chinese maritime militia vessel that leads to an exchange of fire, there will be a lot of pressure on the US to come to the defense of the Philippines under the terms of the Mutual Defense Treaty, which in turn could heighten the UK's awareness of the need. Not necessarily, it wouldn't be in the same light as the U.S. in terms of mutual defense commitments, but I think it would heighten the visibility of the region in terms of the U.K.'s foreign policy interests. But then going back to your original question, should China, should there be a resolution of what of the South China Sea disputes and should there be increased pressure on China to rein in its behavior and respect international norms? If that occurs and there's greater stability in the Indo-Pacific, whilst at the same time, should Russia step up at the tempo of what it's doing in Europe, that could actually then also re-governize or reorientation by the UK back to Europe.

So, I mean, it's all very, it's hard to say, because politics, you know, changes very rapidly. But at least at this point, I think it's fair to say that irrespective of who is in power, there's going to be a continued UK push to the Indo-Pacific, just for the effect that the geostrategic balance sheet, in terms of economics, politics, security, defence and so forth, has actually shifted significantly eastward, and I think both Stunak and Starmer appreciate and realize that. Well, thank you, Peter. I think that's about all we have time for today. I'd like to thank my guest, Dr. Peter Chalk, for joining us today to talk about his recent essay on the United Kingdom's Indo-Pacific engagement, and we'll put a link to that essay in the notes below the show. Peter, where, if anywhere, can the listeners find you online, and what are you working on next i don't have my own website i'm afraid i'm not savvy enough on the computers to do that but i'm on linkedin and so you can always find me there well actually right now i'm looking

quite closely at what's going on in the red sea with respect to strikes against commercial vessels that are either allegedly or actively taking supplies or goods to israeli ports and the The Houthis have come out. They've launched a couple of drone and missile strikes against these commercial vessels. They've declared themselves to be part of the axis of resistance under Iran. They're very supportive of Hamas. So I'm looking at the potential evolution for maritime terrorism

in the Red Sea. And, you know, if it does occur, if there's an escalation, that could have very detrimental effects for the global economy given the importance of the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, the Red Sea, and, of course, the Suez Canal. So that's something that I've been paying fairly close attention to and will probably occupy myself at least for the short term. Yeah, that's definitely something worth watching.

And if you write about it, we may have to have you back on the show. I'd be more than happy to. But hopefully we don't see a continued escalation and there's nothing to write about. Thanks again for joining us and to the listeners. Thanks for tuning in, and we'll see you next time. Thank you for watching.