Sea Control - Sea Control 504 - Chinese Maritime Interests in the Indian Ocean with Commodore Venugopal Vengalil

Episode Date: March 22, 2024

Links1. “Assessment of Chinese Maritime Interests in Indian Ocean Region,” by Commodore Venugopal Vengalil, Chennai Centre for China Studies, December 7, 2023.2. Commodore Venugopal Vengali’s X Feed.

Hey folks, it's Jared. This is one of Nate Miller's last episodes with us, and he has Commodore Venugopal Vengalil discussing Chinese maritime interests in the Indian Ocean region. This episode was edited and produced by Jonathan Selling and Andrew Frame. Here at SimSec, we aim to further international maritime security through an exchange of ideas and the rigor of critical thought and writing. If you haven't already, please check out SimSec.org for new articles on the most important maritime topics. If you'd like to contribute to the discussion, check out the Write for SimSec tab to learn how you can submit articles for publication. And now, Kimbersman. You're listening to Sea Control, hosted by the Center

for International Maritime Security. Hello and welcome aboard the Sea Control Podcast. I'm Nathan Miller. My guest today is retired Commodore Vinogopal Vengalil of the Indian Navy. We're discussing his recent paper, Assessment of Chinese Maritime Interests in the Indian Ocean Region. Commodore, welcome aboard. Could you please start by telling the listeners a little bit about your background? Thank you, Nathan. Thank you so much. Nice to be with you on the podcast. I can say I wore uniform at the age of nine in a military school. Thereafter, I joined the National Defense Academy and moved on to the Navy as my choice of service. Served for 30 years. Then I took up premature retirement and I worked in Oman for 10 years as part of a shipping logistics

company where I was director of operations and that's the time when you know the thick involvement of piracy in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. So our company was involved in providing logistics to all the multinational navies who were involved in the anti-piracy patrol and also the ships which You are part of the Combined Maritime Forces under the command of the 5th Fleet in Bahrain. Thereafter, I took a call to relocate back to India. So now here I am doing some social service for differently abled people in their education and rehabilitation. As an OPI, I do write on maritime security issues, especially of Indian Ocean and anything to do with China. My wife is also part of the social initiative of the Tata's where I am now,

and we are both working towards the rehabilitation of differently abled people. Our daughter was a professional pilot who was working in Maldives, and her son was pursuing a career in the corporate sector in India. Well, thank you so much for coming on the show. And as a reminder to the listeners, all opinions expressed here are strictly our own and not reflective of any of the institutions with which we might be otherwise associated. I also wanted to timestamp this conversation because things going on in the Indian Ocean are rapidly evolving, but we are speaking in the United States February 5th of 2024.

To begin our conversation, a lot of our listeners will be familiar with what the PLAN has been doing in the South China Sea, but I imagine fewer of them are going to be familiar with the Indian Ocean region and what they've been doing, progressing really since 2000. Could you start by giving the listeners a little bit of background on those dynamics and how things have been evolving? The Indian Ocean has long been a secondary theater for Chinese strategists. Prior to the 1990s, China's maritime strategy revolved around Maoist style of coastal activists. Hence, the Chinese navy or the Chinese establishment did not invest in blue water navy and also they did not have the ability to protect power in the Indian Ocean. Moreover, China always

felt that Indian Ocean is a bastion of the U.S. Navy and the Indian Navy and they kept away from it. Now, when you go back, the first Chinese port calls were made in the 1980s when their ships called on Pakistan ports, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka. And during the 1991 Somalia crisis, China found that their naval capabilities or sea lift capabilities were inadequate, that they had to requisition commercial ships to evacuate their personnel from conflict region. The first Chinese defense paper of 1998 reflected a limited naval ambition. That is, China does not intend to station troops or set up military base in a foreign country. This was elaborated a little bit by President Hu Jintao, who's allowed the scope of Navy's ambitions during one of his speeches with the Communist Party Committee.

So, he said, defending Chinese national interests and safeguarding world peace also is China's responsibility. These statements got upgraded in the 2006 white paper, 2008 paper, 2010, 2013, 2015, 2017, and 2018. I will not go to the specifics of each of these white papers. All I would like to say is that the Chinese national interest slowly shifted from the near seas to far seas. And they also wanted to protect their investment in the Indian Ocean region. Parallelly, they had promoted the economic initiative of the BRI. And along with the BRI, they engaged with the countries politically also. So, with the result, by 2017 and 18, China expanded their strategic interests to support the BRI and the broad objectives were securing key sources of energy, protecting overseas investments and Chinese citizens, increasing China's reputation and political influence, and maintaining a strategic deterrence.

This is how China progressed up to 2018. Thereafter, China's investment in naval assets have been phenomenal, if you say the least. They were churning out ships, destroyers within two to three years from their shipyards. And they got the platforms that they built in their shipyards were state of the art. Having been to Chinese ships in Oman, I have seen that their status, their standard of ship construction, and their sophistication in their building of ships was fairly high, almost in comparison with the Western powers. China did not have any overseas bases initially.

They set up a small logistics facility at Djibouti, which is primarily intended to provide logistics support to their ships operating in Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. Initially, they were always doing the OTR, operation turnaround from Djibouti and Salalah in Oman. So China built a series of ships type 055 cruiser, type 052 C&D destroyer, 054 alpha frigates, six large amphibious transport docks, type 075 amphibious assault ships and auxiliary vessels to support their fleet. Meanwhile China also developed their submarine capability. They have six Jin-class SSBs and six Shan-class

SSNs and three old Han-class SSNs. So, they made a formidable submarine force as well. China also developed the facility in Hainan Island, which is likely to be the center of gravity for the PLA Navy's ambitious plans for Indian Ocean. Although Hainan falls under the South Sea Fleet, there are reports that China may build a fourth fleet with exclusive jurisdiction of the Indian Ocean region. A submarine base with underground berthing facility and large number of piers for surface vessels, all that indicate that using the base at Long Po and Yulian, SSB and bastion deployment is what the Chinese are probably thinking of. A bastion deployment is necessary for SSBN, which is a high-value strategic asset. From their deployment areas,

they are able to easily target their areas of interest or their targets. Like, for example, 12 JL-3 missiles have a range of 10,000 kilometers. So, when you look at the facility in Lungpho and Yulian, it actually caters to meet both their requirements. That's the Indian Ocean, if they intend to for future and also the South China Sea disputed. So this is how I see the evolution of Chinese Navy where they're looking at two different directions. One is the Pacific Fleet and one is an interest towards the Indian Ocean. Although they have not formally declared an Indian Ocean Fleet, they politically, they may not call it an Indian Ocean Fleet for various reasons. However, they have developing assets so that in future they are able to meet any

contingency in Indian Ocean. I think that gives a really good overview of what has been going on and frankly, also the assets that they're developing as well. I would like to move on to the next question of, I guess, quoting something that you wrote. In your paper, you said, while China will never establish full sea control in the Indian Ocean, it will likely possess the ability to provide a credible deterrent to other states that may threaten Chinese sea lines of communication. What obstacles do you see for the PLAN gaining sea control, and do you feel like it's even necessary for them to achieve their goals? Sea control itself is a subject of its own dimensions.

Even large navies may find it very difficult to establish sea control over a vast ocean like the Indian Ocean. So I see it from a point of view of a sea control for carrying out a specific operation. For example, it's an amphibious operation is where a sea control is definitely required. For China to have a sea control in the ocean means they need to have the control of the sea surface, the sea bottom and the favorable air situation on top. Now, favorable air situation on top is a no-no as of now because they have no support from shore-based air support. As far as their assets are concerned for the surface requirement, they do have a large number of vessels. And underwater capability is concerned, yes, they do have six assistants, which can, you know, look into that direction as well. However, what I feel is that sustaining operation in the Indian Ocean,

which is a long line of communication for China, is going to be a major obstacle for them. Why do China find it so important to have a kind of a deterrent capability in the Indian Ocean? Mainly, their energy requirements. Now, in case of a hostility or in case of a China-U.S. standoff, The main component that actually supports the war effort is going to be the energy. 80% of Chinese energy comes from this transit through the Indian Ocean. So they have to protect their energy requirements. What are the options?

One is probably a tactical routing of their ships, commercial ships, with support from their naval units. Number two could be, once the oil pipeline is completed in Gwadar, they could use the shore pipeline to provide oil and gas to interior China. And of course, the pipelines have got their own limitations. Ships are always the most sought-after option for transporting oil and gas. Similarly, they can avoid the use of Malacca's Crete and use the shore pipelines from Kyapayu in Myanmar. So this is how China may have to look at ensuring their energy requirements.

Peace time roles of China in Indian Ocean may be HADR, Cumulatin Resistance and Disaster Relief, evacuation of their personnel from trouble-prone area. All that is possible with the kind of force level that they have now. However, they have a limitation as far as their sea lift and expeditionary capability is concerned. They do have LSTs, that is a type 071 and 075, but the crew carrying capacity is about 800. Now, this is hardly, you know, it's a fraction of what is probably the capability of the America Plus of APDs of the U.S. Navy. What is the sea lift capability? Then the close air support for their ships and their ability to sustain an Indian Ocean for a long period of time without any shore support from any of the ports.

One may say Humpendota is where they are establishing a commercial base and that could be utilized. But the question remains as to whether Sri Lanka would permit use of their port during hostilities, which will be a major issue. In all probabilities, their all-weather friend Gwadar, Pakistan, would permit them to use Gwadar as a port for operational turnaround. Djibouti again is a big question because you have the Cab Lebonair that the U.S. naval base about 30 kilometers from the Chinese facility. And so also the French base. So all these factors put together, I would consider it right to say that China is developing capabilities, but they are not in a position to have a free will in Indian Ocean. Instead of saying sea control, I would say a free will in Indian Ocean.

But at the same time, there are limited objectives they should be able to undertake. You also mentioned in your paper a bit of a reality check when it comes to Chinese air power and their carriers in particular. You even were talking about kind of the myth of the carrier killer. Can you speak to your perspectives on that? First, I look at the carriers. They have now Liaoning and Shenyang. And the third carrier, Fujian, is under sea trials. Now, Liaoning has got a capacity of 24 fighter aircrafts, J-15 and J-14 helicopter.

Shenyang has also got a SAE capability. Both these carriers are short take-off assisted recovery. That means they are from a ramp, they take off from a ramp. J-15 is incidentally the heaviest carrier-borne aircraft today in the world. And Chinese find it extremely difficult to operate these aircrafts on the carrier because of the weight constraints. So they had to actually operate this aircraft with limited fuel and limited ordnance. So that is one basic constraint for the Chinese. Now, when it comes to Fujian, they are modifying the carrier to have the E-VALS.

That's what the USS Ford class has got, the electromagnetic launch system and recovery. As per available information, Fujian is not a nuclear-powered carrier. And whereas in the case of deploying EMALs, the kind of power requirement for the ship is phenomenal. And it would be difficult for a ship to probably provide the necessary power for the EMAL system to operate unless it has got unlimited power, like in the case of the nuclear reactors. So these constraints are there. Secondly, they require about 200 qualified pilots to man their three aircraft carriers, which they are finding extremely difficult. Because to get a pilot trained from a shore-based facility, graduating on to daytime landing on carrier, graduating

further on to nighttime landing and takeoff on the carrier is a long process. The kind of investment in training that's required to qualify a pilot as a fully operational carrier fighter pilot is a very, very delicate task and very crucial task. I would give an example of U.S. Navy because U.S. Navy has got the maximum experience of operating carriers. You've got about 11 carriers, 11 carrier battle groups are operating. The shortage of pilots is very important. Now, the trainer that they have is JL-9G trainer. JL-9G trainer is almost half the weight of the J-15 and it's a single engine aircraft with twin seat. So now graduating a pilot who's trained on a light aircraft into operating J-50 is going to be a big challenge for them. They are developing

what's called the J-31. That's what the nomenclature which is given now. These keep changing and is all estimation yes that would be j31 some say it is j20 so i really cannot say on that but the fact is that they're developing an aircraft which can meet the requirement of the carrier when you look at a carrier operating in in the notion carrier operates with a normally a 500 nautical miles security bubble and that means you should have a aw aircraft on top they have to have combat air patrol that means one or two aircrafts ahead of the formation and they have to have integration of all these units with the escorts of the carrier all these does not come overnight it takes time so the number of platforms that the Chinese navy builds and the strategists or

analysts estimating that China is a very powerful blue water navy has to be taken with a bit of skepticism because they have a long way to go integration of a carrier with the surface units and the air units and even having a ssn at the flags to protect the carrier is something which china has not uh you know looked at so china chinese navy may be able to have a carrier operating in south china sea because they will have shore air support for the requirement of carrier. They're able to give communication and rather they're able to link with shore facilities in their island outposts and they'll be able to probably carry out their mission. But in Indian Ocean, without shore-based air support, without an overseas base, without adequate AEW aircrafts,

the job is going to be quite difficult. I don't think China will be able to operate a carrier carrier strike group in the Indian Ocean for the next decade. That's my view. And many analysts I have seen have indicated the same thing, that it's about 10 years required for China to develop that kind of capability. Most importantly, the human resources. The pilot who is in the cockpit is the center of gravity. When you think of having a combat air patrol continuous, and you have 24 aircrafts means out of 24 aircrafts, you will have about 18 operational aircraft at any one time.

You have two aircrafts already in the air. You have two aircrafts on the deck ready. You have about two in the maintenance. So when you look at that, the kind of stress and strain on the air crew is phenomenal. And Chinese probably would learn it over the years.

But as of now, they are incapable of carrying out any meaningful carrier operation in the Indian Ocean. With things that are going on in the Red Sea, with the Houthis attacking shipping, and frankly, with the number of commercial vessels going through with on their AIS saying, you know, Chinese ship, Chinese crew, how do you feel that that conflict plays into potential view from Beijing of the region and the importance of the Indian Ocean? See, as far as, you know, the open source information is looked into, China has generally maintained a very kind of neutral stand. However, they've, you know, used their votes in the UN judiciously for the Hamas-Israel war. That area, the Red Sea, that region, is filled with Houthis, and you also have the piracy. So it's a combination of two, because piracy had come down over the last decade.

But now, pirates also can be effectively deployed to carry out gruesome attacks on shipping. Now, Houthis are using their unmanned vehicles, they're using drones to attack, and they're doing it at will because the region geographically the area is such that all these have a tremendous advantage you might have you know multinational ships patrolling that area but you're patrolling the area or you're escorting a commercial ships for 24 hours for 23 hours 59 minutes you could be alert and that one minute when the attack takes place is what counts What I call the fog of war, because naval ships on patrol looking for the unknown from a direction which they are not aware of. Fatigue sets in, which causes accidents, and also it causes the alertness being down, which can result in attacks.

So even if Houthis are able to launch 10 drones, they are very cheap drones, hardly have any cost for them. At the same time, so out of the 15 drones which are sent in to attack a shipping in the area, even if two makes it to their target, it's a win-win situation for the Houthis. Yes, we have good AD systems and they've been shooting down. But when you have an unalerted drone or a missile coming from a direction which is all around, any system has got its limitation. but the Houthis will be very very careful not to attack any naval ship of any country because that can completely change the nature of the conflict. They will only attack commercial shipping after they are sure about the target and will avoid attacking naval ships. As I said earlier also Houthis have an advantage. It will be a nuisance value. The ships may not get sunk but the ships

may get damaged. Now, what happens in the long run? The commercial ships will use the Cape of Godot route, which will entail transit of another 4,000 nautical miles. Fuel costs, insurance costs, crew insurance costs, all these go out. And with the result, it's going to affect the global economy a bit. The multinational ships participating in that operation is nothing new because we already have a combined maritime forces headquarters, a system in force, different task groups are there for different areas. All the navies from the European Union, India, South Korea, Japan, they are all involved in it. So this is not a new operation. This is just an operation getting a revival as you are looking at the Houthi angle in addition to the piracy.

Is there anything that you would like to add to the conversation or anything that you feel like I've missed that the listeners would benefit hearing. China is building ships at a rapid pace. This will result in huge maintenance costs of the ships and the ability to man the ship at the speed at which they are being put together into water is a big challenge for China. Nation can build a blue water navy with advanced technology, but it is extremely difficult to accelerate the knowledge of trained crew from generation to generation. And that can happen only with seasoned navies

who've actually been deployed globally in different scenarios. All of a sudden, you know, a brown water navy cannot just come up with number of ships and claim to be a blue water navy. Takes time. Not that I'm not saying China will not achieve it,

but it'll definitely take a long. China has got this, what they call the Malacca syndrome, where they're completely capsuled in that South China Sea. But all that is more of, I would say, hype because they have enough of routes out into the Indian Ocean. They can use that. But as I said earlier, sustaining operation in the Indian Ocean

is going to be a major challenge because geographically, it does not favor them. Well, I'm sorry, but that is all the time that we have for today. I would like to thank my guest, Commodore Venugopal Vengalil. Kamdo, where can we find you? And what are you working on next? I don't have any fixed schedule. You know, when I get time, I write.

That's been my hobby. I do that. I wrote an article on the String of Pearls, which, you know, String of Pearls strategy of the Chinese, I think last year or the year before that. Thereafter, I had, you know, written a couple of articles for Nine Dash Live,

and I do write for ADF at times. I'm generally available. you have a topic which is of interest to me, I'm definitely game for, you know, addressing that. Well, thank you again for joining us. And to the listeners, thank you for tuning in. We'll see you next time. Help me, Bob-I, bully in the alley, bully down the shimbo now. A pot of rum and a pot of gin, oh, way, hey, bully in the alley. A pot of wine, both white and red, oh, bully down the shimbo now.

So help me, Bob-I, bully in the alley, way, hey, bully in the alley. He helped me, Bob, I put it in the alley, put it out in Chippewa now.