Sea Control - Sea Control 509 - Sri Lanka's Evolving Role in the Indian Ocean with Aditya Gowdara Shivamurthy

Episode Date: April 11, 2024

Links1. Sri Lanka’s evolving role in the Indian Ocean, by Aditya Gowdara Shivamurthy, Observer Research Foundation, January 24, 2024. 2. Sea Control 283 - Maritime Sri Lanka and Japan with Dr. Satoru Nagao, CIMSEC, October 10, 2021. 3. Sea Control 234 - Maritime Sri Lanka with Dr. Chulanee Attanayake and Dr. Jivanta Schöttli, CIMSEC, March 21, 2021. 4. ORF Online.

Hey folks, it's Jared. We have the Observer Research Foundation's Aditya Gowdara Shivamurthy on board today, and we're discussing a piece he wrote on how Sri Lanka's role in the Indian Ocean is evolving. This episode was edited and produced by Marie Williams. Here at SimSec, we aim to further international maritime security through an exchange of ideas and the rigor of critical thought and writing. If you haven't already, please check out simsec.org for new articles on the most important maritime topics. If you'd like to contribute to the discussion, check out the Write for SimSec tab to learn how you can submit articles for publication. And now, Kimbersman.

You're listening to Sea Control, posted by the Center for International Maritime Security. Aloha, shipmates, and welcome back aboard Sea Control. My guest today is the Observer Research Foundation's Aditya Gowdara Shivamurthy, And we're going to discuss his article for ORF Online, Sri Lanka's Evolving Role in the Indian Ocean. So, Aditya, welcome. Could you please tell the audience a little bit more about yourself? Hi, so I'm Aditya Gaurashyamurthy. I'm an Associate Research Fellow at Observer Research Foundation, which is a premier think tank based out of New Delhi, but we also have branches out in the D.C., in Mumbai, and in Kolkata of India. I focus particularly on broader strategic and security-related developments in South Asia,

But I also do look at, you know, broader developments happening around the Indian Ocean region, specifically since I look at Maldives and Sri Lanka. And I keep a keen eye out for whatever the closer developments are, the economic developments and their broader strategic impacts or implications. And I also look at broader security and strategic developments within these countries as well. Yeah. And I'm a 2019 MSC International Relations graduate from the London School of Economics. Well, thank you again for joining us. As a reminder to the listeners, all opinions are our own and not representative of any institution with which we might be otherwise associated. Also, timestamp this for the listeners. We're recording on Sunday, the 25th of February. So if there's anything that happens that would be pertinent after this date, that's why we're not talking about it. We'll jump right in here, though, Aditya. If we're discussing Sri Lanka's evolving role, we have to discuss the history. You went into this some in the article, but what has been Sri Lanka's historical role in the Indian Ocean over the last century? I think for Sri Lanka, you know, the Indian Ocean has been a crucial part of its geography,

has been a crucial part of its identity transformation and, you know, a nation building strategy as well. You know, what began, you know, hundreds and thousands of years ago in terms of mass migration process had also created a stronger sense of self-identity and a difference between how Sri Lanka seats itself with the rest of the Indian subcontinent, with the rest of the region. And this has strongly evolved ever since, you know, the modern history began since the 1500s. And this was something that also was consistently leveraged during, you know, the colonial rule. The Portuguese, the Dutch and then the Britishers, they were all consistently understood the importance of Sri Lanka in the broader Indian Ocean region. and what it means for the rest of the ocean and for the rest of peace and stability in the broader region. And that realization had also existed among the Sri Lankan policymakers when Sri Lanka became independent in 1949. In fact, in 1960s, Sri Lanka was consistently advocating for Indian

Ocean as a zone of peace, which basically meant that Sri Lanka realized that it is a smaller country located in the heart of the Indian Ocean. It knows it's a very crucial country with a lot of geopolitical stakes, and it was consistently being intimidated and scared by the geopolitical developments in the Indian Ocean region. Although Indian Ocean region was not a primary space for contestation between the US and the USSR, it still did have some kind of consistent impact on the region. The Cold War did impact the region. It did intimidate some of these smaller countries. And this was one of the reasons why Sri Lanka advocated for a zone of peace. But apart from that, Sri Lanka also did understand that being an Indian Ocean region gives it a lot

of leverage and a leeway to how it wants to navigate its geopolitical strategy and how it wants to navigate its broader strategic positioning in the region. It did sign a defense agreement with the UK maritime defense agreement with the UK in the in the late 40s and it did also manage to sign an agreement with the USSR in terms of its defense cooperation in the 60s and at the same point in time in the 60s it started advocating for Indian Ocean as a zone of peace being scared by whatever the broader developments in the region were and in 1970 finally UC Sri Lanka passing this resolution in the United Nations General Assembly declaring Indian Ocean as a zone of peace. And that basically defines how Sri Lanka sees Indian

Ocean as a very crucial region for its survival, for its stability, and also for its everyday activities, because the economy continues to depend on the peace and stability of the Indian Ocean region. Now, that is an identity that was consistently threatened, or I would say diminished ever since the elam war and the ltd war began in sri lanka starting from 1980s those sri lankan military and sri lankan strategic thinking was consistently compelled to look at the broader strategic security developments happening domestically within the country mostly to have a monopoly over violence in the state and mostly to eliminate the ltd terrorist and this is somehow You know, there was a stronger impact on how Sri Lanka stretched its maritime powers beyond LTT.

There was a lot of, you know, a lot of investment and a lot of concentration on its army rather than its navy. And this was primarily to defeat the LTT and also the JVP insurgency that began in 1980s. So as Sri Lanka began to witness turmoil and political unrest, its willingness to invest in the Indian Ocean region did deteriorate. And it's only when the LTT started using their naval power, importing weapons for importing drugs, that's when you could see Sri Lankan Navy stretching a bit of its muscles. But it was still consistently too weakened and too beleaguered to do something drastic in the Indian Ocean region. And that is where you see Sri Lanka consistently looking at itself to maintain its unity and stability within the country rather than focusing broader on the Indian Ocean region. But again, starting from 2009 and 2010, when the LTT were defeated, there was some kind of rethinking in Sri Lanka that Indian Ocean region is where the future of geopolitics is. Indian Ocean region and Indo-Pacific is where, you know, a lot of trade happens, basically 50% of the world's trade.

and this has in fact motivated Sri Lanka to have a bigger say in the Indian Ocean region rather to look beyond its domestic politics and have a broader strategic presence but again a lot of it was mere rhetoric rather than action till at least 2021 when the economic crisis broke out and that's when probably Sri Lanka has realized that rather than just the geopolitical developments where the US, China and India are consistently having an interest in Sri Lanka today it's better it's also to look at the broader domestic compulsions that Sri Lanka is needing right at this point in time which is basically to maintain the crucial sea lines of communication to maintain a supply you know resilient supply chains for the very reason that COVID-19 followed by the Russia-Ukraine

war has damaged Sri Lankan economic to economic to such an extent that it was it had almost declared itself bankrupt it had declared itself bankrupt in in 2022 and it is still struggling to get back onto its feet and that is something that Sri Lanka has realized you know to maintain and to recover and to revive its economy it's important to have its presence in the Indian Ocean region it is important to have a broader strategic calculation and broader strategic presence in the Indian Ocean region and make the most of what's happening in the Indian Ocean region in terms of geopolitical contestation make the best of the competition that's happening between China, India, and the U.S., but at the same point of time, make sure that it serves

your interests well. And I think that is broadly what Indian Ocean means for Sri Lanka today, is to ensure that a safe, secure, and prosperous Indian Ocean region is at the best interest for a safe and developing Sri Lanka. Thanks. I think you basically covered the next question that I was going to ask you here about what is sort of driving this foreign policy approach. So we'll continue on here. You referenced Defense Review 2030 in your article here, and that's not a publicly available document as yet, but what sort of broader defense reforms are underway right now? Look, I think it's a multifaceted approach towards looking at reforms, right? At one point in time,

we are looking at the broader geopolitical developments and geostrategic developments in the Indian Ocean region, which is basically what I was saying about Sri Lanka thinking to, you know, expand its priorities in the Indian Ocean region. Sri Lanka intending to have more presence in the Indian Ocean region, that is one. And now the second aspect of it is obviously the economic crisis itself was such a big shock to Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka as a country has seen consistent militarization throughout the years, you know, with consistent fights and Elam wars against the LTT, Sri Lanka had continued to invest a lot in its military force. And this was, ironically this is something the number of military people the strength of the military

continued to increase even after the post-war years uh till 2022 and i think we they had reached around a military uh personal of 240 000 and that is that is something uh which was a drastic increase uh even after the post-war years uh now there are multiple reasons for it one is After the Rajpaksas won the Elam war, there was more and more interest in politicizing and nationalizing and promoting nationalist sentiments, basically saying that we were able to defeat the LTT. The Sri Lankan army were able to defeat the LTT and it's not fair on our part to cut on their budget or to cut on their military strength. Now, this was also one of their way or means to, you know, cover up their inability to create more and more employment opportunities for the rural youth. that eventually led to a lot of rural youth joining into the Sri Lankan military and given the complex history that Sri Lanka had a lot of these Sri Lankan military personnel were also

involved in civil administration and they continue to be involved in civil administration a lot of these in fact we we have seen a lot of these people being involved in the civil administration when COVID-19 broke out so you see there has been consistent involvement of the military in terms of its civil administration, in terms of the expenditure, in terms of increasing strength. And now, basically, when the economic crisis broke out in Sri Lanka, and that's when people realized that there has been so much of expenditure on the military where there is no return on investment. Basically, expanding the military strength didn't mean anything except for more and more expenditure rather than any source of revenue generation. And this is something that

Sri Lankan government has realized. It has realized that let's not just increase the strength of military, but also look at the geopolitical momentum, which demands we need more and more capable military to deal with the broader strategic challenges that are confronting Sri Lanka today. We don't need more strength in the military, but we need more strength in the naval capabilities. We need more strength in the air force capabilities so that we could counter whatever traditional and non-traditional challenges Sri Lanka is facing today. So basically, the defense reforms, and also the broader, the Indian Ocean, the new Indian Ocean outlook that Sri Lanka is looking up to, together, they make up this factor where Sri Lanka wants to reduce its military, it wants to downsize its military, and it wants to expand its military partnership with other countries. And it also wants to bring in more and more modernization and well-equipped defense equipments to Sri Lanka in terms of, you know, to counter modern traditional and non-traditional challenges and to be more equipped to deal with the contemporary geopolitical setting.

Now, for example, you see also that the U.S. has recently promised a coast guard cutter to Sri Lanka with Ambassador Richard Worma visiting there this week. Similarly, Sri Lanka has been negotiating with France for a school on maritime security. And at the same point in time, you also see Sri Lanka talking to India in terms of getting two tournament aircrafts from India. But at the same point in time, it is also looking for a maritime rescue coordination center from India. It is also looking for Indian fusion center being installed in Sri Lanka. And it is also looking for a floating dock facility, which basically means that Sri Lanka is moving on more and more towards strengthening its maritime capabilities and its aerial capabilities and surveillance capacities, just so that they can be more and more equipped to deal with the challenges. And at the same point in time, they also understand and make the best of whatever contestation and competition is happening in the Indo-Pacific region today. Yeah, I just want to go back to the numbers in the Sri Lankan military again, because the first time I read it, and this was my own ignorance, I thought it was a typo.

when it said 240,000 is I'm used to dealing with sort of a lot of Western European nations who they have a very high capability, but they have very low numbers in density. And there's 240,000 from a population of, from what I can tell online, approximately 22 million. So roughly 1% of the population is in the military, which is extremely high. What is Sri Lanka's role and why the government decide to get involved in Operation Prosperity Guardian? And again, I'll remind the listeners, 25th of February. So if something happens with Prosperity Guardian, because there are new developments every single day, that's why we're not talking about it at this point. With the Prosperity Guardian, I think it's more of a momentum that the Sri Lankan government is

in right now. It deals back to what Sri Lanka wants to do in the Indian Ocean region. In fact, increase its maritime capabilities and capacities, that is one, and also to show itself that it wants to be present in the broader Indian Ocean region setting, to basically flex its muscles and say that Sri Lanka is here to make the best of what Indo-Pacific is offering, to make the best of whatever this modern global competition is, right? And Prosperity Guardian is basically what Sri Lanka has consistently supported and has received a lot of criticism domestically as well, because some people deem it as a violation of Sri Lanka's non-alignment strategy.

But in reality, for Sri Lanka, I think it's two reasons. One, again, it traces back to the issue of that Sri Lanka. Domestically, it's still an economic that's recovering. It's still an economy that is about to revive. And for it, for such an economy in such a fragile state, it is important that it maintain its crucial sea lines of communications and it's important that it has a resilient supply chain. Now, domestically, look, that's one line of narrative that Sri Lanka and government is maintaining. But again, to be honest, I think one offshore petrol vessel is not enough. to, you know, counter whatever is happening in Red Sea or mitigate whatever is happening in Red Sea. So in my thinking, it is an effort by the Sri Lankan government to just send a message out there,

to just, you know, send a signal out there that we want to play an evolving role in the Indian Ocean region. We also want to be present in the Indian Ocean region, and we want to show that we will not back off from having a stronger and firmer presence in the Indian Ocean region. What role is Sri Lanka seeking in discussions between the Maldives and India? I think this question, again, as related to the previous question, it is about making the best of the competition and making the best of the contestation. Now, as Sri Lanka came out of the civil war in 2009, this is something that Sri Lanka saw that Indian Ocean region is the future of geopolitics. And it is important that a stable and secure Indian Ocean is important for it to grow economically. now basically in 2012 you see Sri Lanka making a lot of noise to join Colombo security conclave

which is basically a sense of cooperation between India and Maldives and then Sri Lanka joined in to say let's make this into a trilateral cooperation so that we can institutionalize it and then we can basically counter all the traditional and non-traditional maritime security challenges that all of the both of the countries are facing right sorry the three of the countries are facing. And this was something that Sri Lanka consistently pushed for. And eventually in 2013, we see some kind of institutionalization of the Colombo Security Conclave. Five years down the line, the Colombo Security Conclave becomes basically dysfunctional because of domestic politics and the situation between India and the Maldives. And only in 2019, we see that there has

been some revival of the Colombo Security Conclave and India and Sri Lanka have been consistently pushing for renewal of this institution, as well as expansion of this institution, which now includes Bangladesh and Seychelles as observer states and Mauritius, again, a crucial Indian Ocean country as a new member state. And this is important for Sri Lanka, because for Sri Lanka, Maldives and India, both of its closest neighbors are crucial in countering the challenges like illegal fishing, I mean, countering challenges like maritime piracy, countering challenges like armed trafficking, which is still a big challenge. And obviously, it also relates to what these countries have gone through in the past. Drug trafficking, again, a big challenge in Sri Lanka.

And for this, Sri Lanka has been concerned of broader security and situation in the Indian Ocean region. And ever since a new government has come into the Maldives in 2023, in late 2023, You have seen, and just to remind our audience, that the new government came into power with this very strong anti-India narrative and anti-India rhetoric called the India Out campaign, basically asking the Indian government to withdraw its 75 troops or near to 75 military troops in the Maldives who are there to look after some of the Dornier aircrafts and the helicopters which India has gifted to the Maldives. Now, ever since the new government came to power, there has been a lot of distrust and a lot of disharmony between India-Maldives relations, which is otherwise a very good relationship. In fact, Muizzou, who is the new president of Maldives, visited Turkey as his first destination and basically broke the tradition of all the Maldivian presidents visiting India as their first preferred destination. And at the same point in time, we also see Muizhu, you know, basically saying that India is a bully and also causing up with China and getting a lot of Chinese investments into the Maldives. And this is something that even Sri Lanka has seen with a bit of cautiousness. Sri Lanka has seen with a bit of uncertainty. And as and Ranil Vikramasinghe was the only president, the Sri Lankan president who visited Maldives when President Muizu was swearing in.

And in fact, in one of his interview to Indian media channel, Ranil Vikramasinghe said that he would recommend or he would suggest if he had an opportunity to suggest to for Muizu to do whatever he wants to do very slowly and very diplomatically, which is basically telling not to antagonize India and make this into a very diplomatic conversation rather than making it into a political or, you know, a nationalistic conversation. And fast forward, you know, in the last month when the Sri Lankan foreign minister again met Indian foreign minister and his Maldivian counterpart separately and then reiterated the need for security and a peace and stable Indian Ocean region. And again, the president in recent past, again, said that he wants both of these countries to have a peaceful relationship or peaceful negotiation, which is in a way it hints that Sri Lanka has a lot at stake. because one it has it is recently recovering from a economy that is fragile and it has seen what Chinese debt traps can do and what you know mere geopolitical contestation in India and

in the Indian Ocean region between India and China can be a strong sense of you know it can basically derail the strong sense of Indian Ocean zone as a piece of zone that Sri Lanka admires and desires to be. Now, this is why Sri Lanka has been cautious. It has been consistently signaling India and Maldives that it is willing to have a shuttle diplomacy kind of an approach towards this whole situation if it wants to be, because even for Sri Lanka, I think it has seen, it thinks that a lot is in stake. In fact, if Chinese investments start coming into the Maldives into a bigger scale as fear, it might, you know, create a lot of disharmony between India and Maldives, which will have obvious impacts on how Sri Lanka wants to maintain the security

and order in the Indian Ocean region. Now, in a similar point in time, I think Sri Lanka is also scared that if Maldives gets into a debt trap of what Sri Lanka had experienced not long ago, and that will cause a lot of instability and unrest in the Maldives, which has highest per capita ISIS fighters, which means that it'll also have a broader impact on the Indian Ocean region in terms of terrorism and in terms of internal security. So these are some of the broader concerns that Sri Lanka actually has. And it is trying to have both India and Maldives negotiate over it.

And it is hoping that, you know, this relationship and this equilibrium would be maintained rather than having a diplomatic disruption on both the sides. Well, unfortunately, that's all that we have time for today. I'm going to point the listeners to a couple other places. We have done a surprising amount of content on Sri Lanka on the podcast over the years. But Sea Control 234, Maritime Sri Lanka with Dr. Chulani Atanayake and Dr. Javante Shottley. And then Sea Control 283 with Dr. Satori Nagao talking specifically about Japan's relationship with Sri Lanka. But I'd like to thank my guests, Aditya Gaudara, Shivamurthy.

Aditya, where can we find you online and what are you working on next? so you can you can find me online on orfonline.org you can also find me on twitter and linkedin i'm pretty much proactive there i'm currently working on a project that is attempting to explain why many laterals in the indian ocean region or in south asian region broadly are tend to be more effective than the broader regional organizations that we are planning to do and i'm also working on a project that is explaining what challenges the muizzou's government, the new president of the Maldives is facing in terms of politics, society, and in terms of economy. And this is something that will probably be up. This is probably something that's

under review and should be up by a month or so on our website. Well, thank you again for joining us. To the listeners, thanks for tuning in. We'll see you next time. Thank you. We'll be right back. Oh, help me, Bob, I'm bullied in the alley. Why, I ain't bullied in the alley. Help me, Bob, I'm bullied in the alley. Put it out of your mouth.