Sea Control - Sea Control 515 - A New Age of Naval Power with Dr. Alessio Patalano

Episode Date: May 2, 2024

Links1. "The New Age of Naval Power," by Alessio Patalano, TIME, March 5, 2024.  

Hey folks, it's Jared. I've wanted to interview today's guest for some time. It's Dr. Alessio Padilano discussing a new age of naval power. This episode was edited and produced by Jim Jarvie. Here at SimSec, we aim to further international maritime security through an exchange of ideas and the rigor of critical thought and writing. If you haven't already, please check out SimSec.org for new articles on the most important maritime topics. If you'd like to contribute, check out the Write for SimSec tab to learn how you can submit articles. And now, Kimber's men. You're listening to Sea Control, hosted by the Center for International Maritime Security.

Aloha, shipmates, and welcome back aboard Sea Control. Today, we're welcoming Dr. Alessio Padilano for the first time, and we're going to discuss his article for Time Magazine, The New Age of Naval Power. So, Alessio, welcome. Could you tell the audience a little bit more about yourself, please? and first of all um hello everyone and um i am absolutely delighted to to to be here on this uh platform and it's a long while but you've been a huge fan of the program for quite some time really important moment for anyone who's interested in in the affairs um to uh to keep

yourself up to date with what's happening in the world of naval masters so i'm absolutely thrilled to join the Vlatkin. Just a couple of things about myself. I'm a military historian by trade who happens to speak Japanese, studied when I was at university, and that led to this sort of convergence of two things.

If you want, the method of study and an interest in a particular geographic area of the world. And the point about geography that I'm sure we'll come back to later on. And that meant that my main area of expertise was sitting at one of the main points of interest in military history in the past couple of decades, which was that intersection between history of a particular country and the

relationship the country has with the sea. And Japan is a very interesting one because you have the pre-war Imperial Japanese Navy, which was one of the largest forces ever conceived in human mind. But then in the post-war, you had this reception of the Japanese Navy being almost an appendix of the u.s navy but then by the time i was doing work on it there was a lot more agency there was a lot more force and a lot of connection when that imperial passed um in terms of lessons learned from it so so so you know i i ended up working at war studies the department where i met at king's college london um which traditionally always had a very unique approach that brought history and connected, if you want so wished, to the applied meaning and significance of history.

In my case, it led to leverage the knowledge about Japan, Japanese military history, and naval history in particular, into engaging with how that connects with the problems of today. From there, I worked my way into China and Japan, maritime security issues. And then from there, therefore, in the South China Sea, because if you're engaging with Japan and China, then you cannot really see also the Chinese approach to the sea in a broader context of which the East China Sea and the troubles and the tensions with Japan are just a manifestation. And so that led me to a stronger maritime emphasis. And then when you start seeing in unsuspected times, because if you think about it, 10, 15 years ago, the sea was not a matter of main conversations in national security circles because it was about Afghanistan, it was about Iraq. So it was about land-centric theaters open in the middle of a sandbox somewhere very far away from the sea. So in a relatively calm intellectual environment, I had the privilege to engage with the study of some of the most complicated maritime sports on what then became a main feature of today's international debate, which was how do states compete with each other in and over the maritime domain.

And so from there, that's really where I landed eventually, because the story starts with Japan and ends with a much more profound interest and engagement with the sea, the meaning of the sea today, and why strategically operating at sea and from the sea matters in the 21st century. So there we are. That's a little bit of history about me. Well, it was a lot of history about you. You're 100% correct. um we we have wanted to have you on for quite some time this has been a banner year we're uh capturing sea control white whales we got i i got to interview bj armstrong earlier he had spoken with other hosts but never with me and then uh getting you on here is a great thing for us now

as a reminder listeners all opinions today are our own and not reflective of any institution with which we might be otherwise associated we'll timestamp this too we're recording this on the 23rd of march so if something has happened in the red sea the black sea or anywhere else in the maritime domain that we're not discussing that's the reason why alessio you brought up the point early on in the article the war in the black sea is giving observers the impression drones are rendering surface ships obsolete that people are missing two points can you walk us through what those points were um hey john that's that's an excellent question to begin with because it allows me to go straight to the point look we're at sea and in the black sea we have to think about the

that we're in the middle of a conflict. So that's just one particular aspect of operating in a maritime environment. Remember, we're always, 99% of the time, navies actually work in terms of deterrence, right? The number of battles and conflict, extended operational campaigns at sea are actually the exception, not the rule.

So what we're looking at is a particular window, right, into one of the many aspects that navies and maritime forces contribute when it comes to aircraft and national security. But for the purpose of this particular space, we tend to forget two things. First of all, war at sea is attritional, right? So the first point that people tend to miss out

and sort of run to the, oh gosh, the fleet are obsolete. Well, the thing is, when you actually come to a point where there is war at sea, and war at sea is about pulses, it's about star noise, right? It's about the discharge. And whatever is left over is what you have got on your hands for round two. And we simply got, we lost track of this very basic fact.

So the first thing is that WalletC is attritional. And for a long time, partly because technology was not as expensive in terms of the impact it has on developing major capabilities as it is today, reconstitution was a fairly easier um uh task not that it was easy but it was easier and in terms of particularly on or on time frames well if you think about it the u.s navy starts with less than 500 surface combatants uh the beginning of war two it's got almost next to 7 000 by the end of world war two that's that's five years without counting losses during the war which is very attritional in the pacific right so the fact that for 70 years we haven't had to think about this and we weren't there i i think it's part of a psychological sort of increase in

the growth and of course the human element in this is massive like loss of life now and it's something that we feel it's not acceptable at any particular time cost in and so the combination of of these factors meant that we tended to underestimate how attritional war at sea is, how complex it is for us to reconstitute our forces. So before asking the question, are fleets obsolete? It's like, are we asking, are we looking at the picture of what war at sea is in a relevant fashion? And I think there is a little bit of catch up to do there. The second thing, and the second reason why people are too quick to go to the like, or absolutely obsolete, is about the particular type of context that we have in the Black Sea.

And that is, at this stage, with Ukraine, the key objective is to create a denial bubble that prevents Russians from operating safely in the Black Sea, so that other things may happen, not least the movement of grey. And that is a very important function in which technological advancement, and in particular, surface drone capabilities, seem to have been contributing very nicely combined with the relevant ISRT, so intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting capabilities. But that's it. There is much more to war at sea than just denial of function. This is good enough for Ukraine at the moment. And within that context, there's also the other element of like, well, how are the Russians performing in terms of the type of task at hand? And we know that the Russians are not performing particularly well from everything that we've seen in terms

of video images so before running to ask yourself the question are fleets obsolete because of what is happening in the black sea the second element to think about is to what extent what is happening in the black sea is a reflection of the potential panoply of missions the navies perform in times of war what the answer comes out is that well in the black sea we'll notice that in sea denial performances in narrow basins, the weaker party can have a higher advantage if the stronger party does not prepare itself in terms of responding to what unfolds on the terrain. You can be excused to be caught by surprise the first time, like the Russians did with Moscow. And you can ask a question about, well, yeah, sure, but. But you can't really do that systematically. And here,

I would say, even in that denial of space, yes, technology and asymmetry is rewarding Ukrainian daring. But at the same time, we cannot appreciate it without reflecting about that the Russians are perhaps underperforming compared to what would have been the type of task at hand. And you understand that mostly because in Russia, there's been changes of command right, left, and center over the past couple of years, which reflects also an understanding inside the Russian military system, that the Navy and Naval Command in the Black Sea is not performing as they should.

We'll shift theaters here for a second here. Do the events in the Red Sea support your arguments? I think the events in the Red Sea are very interesting because they allow us to reflect a little bit more on the question of geography and

the, if you want, the distribution in the Red Sea. You have two elements that are absolutely essential. First, that is a narrow corridor for shipping that is by far the most convenient, most affordable, and most environmentally sustainable way to connect Europe to Asia. Therefore, it's a very narrow corridor. It's a place where you have relatively limited margins to maneuver and so in that sense um if for political reasons you uh want to exert pressure on the broader international community uh by creating and exploiting exploiting uh

the vulnerability of their fundamental uh ways of life which in this case is moving goods and primary resources around for the purpose of living and here let me drop the sort of like the slightly more english eccentric example of the fact that for the past three weeks the main companies for tea bags in the uk have been monitoring carefully uh the movement of stocks so you know it's not just about far removed from our daily lives things as simple as cocoa beans and tea bags become like a matter of concern when that happens. So in that context, the first point to make is that the Red Sea reminds us that the strategic value of the sea and the geography of how shipping in particular,

connectivity, brings international economic interdependence together can be a very highly prized target for someone that wouldn't put pressure on you. And again, that is, if you want, one particular component of the broader picture of what sort of navies are for, in this case, the protection of shipping, in which in a narrow basin, provided the density of traffic, the capacity to have good ISRT combined with land-based drones and missiles then automatically can put the rules under pressure. So from my perspective,

it does validate the point because it speaks to this element of identifying a particular task that is based on a clear vulnerability and that in which that particular task can be rewarded in an aerospace by the sort of democratization that technology allows the smaller parties to radiate and amplify the effects

of that trying to put pressure on vulnerability. There's a fair amount of commentary trying to extrapolate lessons from here for the Indo-Pacific and a potential conflict there. Do you think that those discussions are ignored? You brought up the term narrow basin on multiple occasions already here. Do you think those discussions sort of ignore the role that geography is playing here in these two conflicts? Because my assessment in the Black Sea is that the Russians are basically penned in. They have no choice but to operate as close as they are under the guns where relatively uncomplicated drones can reach them. yes and i think here you've got this question of um uh uh you know let's if we step if we step up for a second there you go the question of time and space connected together um in the pacific

you know the type of observations that we're making about the galaxy about the um uh the are applicable in some sub-theater or sub-components of the main theater if you think about i don't know the gulf of bohai and for those of you who are not familiar that that's the gulf that then leads into the sort of outer coast of china where there are the main portal areas that lead straight into beijing and we're talking about the western sort of side of the taiwan strait that's another place or off the coast of china in between the space of um the chinese coast and then Matsu, Kinmen, or in places like the two sides of the Tsushima Strait or Tsugaru in the north. The first thing that we should really take away from all of this is no technical

observation about the application of a particular type of technology and its impact at the operational level should ever be conducted without a close look at the chart of the potential places we're talking about you know you're absolutely right and some of these conversations like because in the indo-pacific or in the western pacific uh this should be applied or can be applied i'm like well for a second because the western pacific is like um and what happens in a space whereby you're using land-based missiles to reach a target within 150 170 miles it's a rather different gig than if you tried to hit something at 400 miles um partly because the defender will a see coming seconds you need to rethink about the extent to

which you know the the the the volume of fire and the sequence of fire to complicate the picture for the defender and so the best example of this is how simplistic if you want sometimes the conversation is about carriers and carrier strike groups operating and anywhere closer um on if you want the fringes of the south china sea or on the margins of of the western pacific yes of course there is an element of vulnerability but hey again um we are starting from two slightly which is like attrition it's something that will happen right number one number two what it is exactly the missions that would see the carriers being deployed there in the first place number three these things move and so and and so for a target well they need to be able to recalculate

and then remain locked on them and and for uh the distance by the time you launch a land base to reach the carrier supposedly as the red sea deployment of international forces suggests empowers the attack side as the international ships that there are defending shipping in red sea are doing to have the time to see the targets clear the target identify the target lock in on the prepared weapon to respond to it and then take on and you can complicate that the distances in the western pacific and in general in the broader sort of east asian theater east of singapore absolutely vast and just i'm sure that the majority of people on on the program and listening in and will will will require no reminder of that but but let's think about the

fact that just you know if you're based in australia or an australian base just to get out of australia is like a seven-day steaming any direction right so distances are massive it's not the mid it's not the red sea it's not even the north sea these are places where that geographical correlation element space particularly when it comes to the use of long fires will inevitably have an impact and the red sea is showing us that even in short distances you still have time with drones in particular and missiles of a certain category to think about what it is, identify the target,

be it that it is actually a target, and then from there decide what kind of weapon. And we've seen this now, because we've dealt with missiles and drones in and around the Red Sea in a variety of ways. We've done it with fighter jets from the Canadians. We've done it with helicopters. We've done it with missiles.

We've done it with guns. so in that sense you know if on short distances we still have that kind of choices imagine the long places and distances of the pacific so we'll transition a little bit here you already brought up the teabag example but why do you argue that we live in a maritime century so yeah you know ajay let me let me let me do devil's armpit here right let me then we start with the other side which is like you Can you not say that any century, to some extent, is not a maritime century? And in a way, it's true, because the reasons behind the development of the world the way we

know it, and despite all sorts of terrible legacies of the imperial age, imperialism at heart was built on maritime connectivity, right? So living inside the judgment value, There is one objective observation, which is that oceanic navigation is really what made the world shrunk. Against that, one sort of criticism could be that any century is about a century. True. However, I would argue that the 21st century is becoming very different in the sense that dependence or delivering baseline prosperity which is the most fundamental benchmark or

the way we understand the way of life certainly in industrialized western societies and and which sort of like globalization has as as connected the world together not just physically through shipping but increasingly more today through digital connectivity which is an incredibly invasive invasive aspects of our life right this century is is nothing else it's even more mad you know it's more mad than any other century because before because that physical connectivity that has been the long-running theme of any maritime century it's been doubled down by the digital connectivity that relies on undersea cables the so-called um if you want um undersea infrastructural connections that keeps us together that may that has increased our dependency on the maritime

domain on the sea um and in that sense it has increased also as a flip side of that coin um the potential ways to exploit the vulnerabilities of such a system so This century is a marathon century because the fundamental link between prosperity and connectivity is not just about the physical connectivity that has always been there, but now it's got that digital dimension that is absolutely essential. And the second thing that I think makes this century a particularly different one is that we have now an awareness. And whether it is because of anglos, whether it is because of climate-related and environmental challenges, we understand the sea and the ocean not just as a place where you go from point A to point B as an easy way to travel. Not easy, but if you want a reliable sort of long-distance connection, physical connectivity element. It is because we understand now the sea, the ocean, as a living entity, and we are completely committed as societies to the idea that any sustainable future for humanity needs to take into consideration governance in the sea, order in the sea, a sustainable engagement with the resources that exist in the sea in a way that it was never the case before. Now, let's not forget that the Third Conference and the whole UNCLOS process really comes together only in the early 1980s. And it is not until the mid-1990s that UNCLOS has become a real sort of piece, a live piece of documents, which in turn create an awareness in governments, societies, and departments of government to have to engage with that.

So two things for me that makes this like a genuine maritime century in a way that we've never experienced before. The expansion, that idea of connectivity that is physical and digital, and to an awareness of, for any way sustainable for humanity to continue to live in this beautiful planet, it has to respect, engage, and sort of flourish alongside what happens in the ocean and underneath its waves. okay i think that's a good transition point here to finish with sort of the last pc article was um how are the authoritarian nations i'm talking about russia and china now reckoning with the maritime century and how are the democracies responding i think first of all um there's three things really for me that are important to think about first thing is something that we discussed a little bit and really there's this question of

vulnerability, right? Our dependency on the sea, on the ocean as a source of life through, you know, fish stocks and resources, but also as a place that underwrites prosperity through connectivity, that makes it an exploitable vulnerability, right?

So two authoritarian regimes, I think it is becoming increasingly apparent that whether directly or indirectly, right by subsidizing supporting non-state actors that want to pursue political agendas while making very hard for anyone of us to sort of respond to them as we've seen with the hooties in the red sea uh exploitation of this vulnerability i think is the first thing that really sort of jumps out um the second thing is about the really an attempt at

upending international order as as as we understand it starting with some of its core pillars which i believe the maritime is one um chinese behavior and whether it is in the south china sea this china sea indeed even the current debates that we've heard about in russia of getting out of the components of Anglos as far as the Arctic is concerned. This is very much the intersection between the often used but never really sufficiently clarified

international rule-based system or order, whichever way you want to do it, and the fact that the maritime order, from that governance normative perspective, is one of its core pillars. the authoritarian regimes in their pursuit of for international orders that are not US led that are

seen as more democratic because they move away from the current status quo in the way they operate if you notice there is always a plausible legal narrative that is based on this idea well that's because the order that we have

was imposed upon us work with us into this alternative reality that we want to create And the maritime space, through contestation of maritime claims, through contestation of exploitation of undersea resources and seabeds, that's really one of the places where it's happening. And to me, it's remarkable how there is an insufficient, I think, correlation between this idea of a rule-based international order and how much the maritime order is at risk and how that would have terrible consequences in a broader sense. and the third thing is for all of us it's almost like okay so well let's say all right so so what do we do about this and and to me it's like the first two points come together in the third one in the sense that we need to understand that there are some of them is um some all right some of the countries with the largest ez on the planet and certainly the majority of the countries with

The largest sea-to-land ratio, as in their sea-sovereign space, is considerably larger than their land-sovereign space, as some of the smoothest countries in the world, with very limited resources to approach and do something about this. And therefore, it is upon us to understand that if we want to take the challenge back to the authoritarian regimes, we cannot just sort of talk to those who see their concerns vis-a-vis the sea less in terms of state-on-state competition, but more on that sort of governance or the normative side of life. We need to be able to be more nuanced and rearrange how we approach our priorities in terms of the conversation and how some security model is defined in a way that it speaks to these different perceptions. That is a very important lesson

that I think we should start taking forward if we want to convey the strategic to the normative and in that sense, the security to the order as to why in this part of the century the sea is becoming central to our endeavours. Well, unfortunately, that's all that we have time for today. I'd like to thank my guest, Dr. Alessio Parolano. Alessio, where can we find you online and what are you working on next? and thank you for the question actually um so first of all thank you for the pleasure and the honor of joining the bathroom today and well you can find me online on on social media posts i mean

on x twitter and if you're unfortunate enough to follow me you'll know that i tweet about all sorts of things naval for sure but even sceptorial elegance is one of those things that comes back into the questions um and and and one of the reasons why i also was selfishly very pleased to be able to talk about this because this is the subject of a book that I'm currently writing and hopefully I will finish at least in the first complete draft

before the end of this year with the current title being Steel and Statecraft Why Maybe the Shape of the World We Live In Alright well I'm already excited for that release and do let us know when it comes out and I'd be happy to bring you back on but thank you again for joining us

to the listeners thanks for tuning in we'll see you next time © BF-WATCH TV 2021 Water, wine, both white and red, I'll put it on the shimbo now. So help me, Bob, I'm pulling the alley. Why are they pulling the alley? Help me, Bob, I'm pulling the alley.

Put it on the shimbo now.