Sea Control - Sea Control 529 - EU Maritime Operations with Piero Barlucchi

Episode Date: June 20, 2024

Links1. "From Atalanta to Aspides : Old and New Challenges for EU Maritime Operations," P. Barlucchi, Istituto Affari Internazionali, March 2024.

Hey folks, it's Jared. Alexia Bualagi returns as host, editor, and producer today, and she has Piero Barlucci that will be discussing Piero's article on EU maritime operations. Of note, since this episode was recorded, the EU order of battle attached to Operation Aspidus has changed, so if you think Piero is incorrect here, he was accurate at the time of the recording. We are not a news-breaking organization here, so there is some delay between when we record and when we publish, but our guest is right on on this one, and if you want to know what the current order a battle is, you can go ahead and find it online. Here at SimSec, we aim to further international maritime security through an exchange of ideas and the rigor of critical thought and writing.

If you haven't already, please check out SimSec.org for new articles on the most important maritime topics. If you'd like to contribute to the discussion, check out the Write for SimSec tab to learn how you can submit articles for publication. And now, Kimber's Men. You're listening to Sea Control, hosted by the Center for International Maritime Security. Hello shipmates and welcome back aboard SeaControl. My guest today is Sir Piero Barlucchi, Project Officer in the Centre for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy. Piero, thank you for joining us.

Could you tell us to begin a little bit about yourself to our listeners? Yeah, sure. First of all, thanks for having me. And I became passionate about maritime security during my studies. And then I devoted my thesis to maritime security from the perspective of the European Union. And following that, I published and researched maritime security, especially at CSDS, with the main focus being maritime endeavors and initiatives among the EU member states and agencies in the Indo-Pacific. Okay, thanks a lot for this introduction. So as a reminder, all opinions are our own and not representative of any institutions.

institutions with which we might otherwise be associated. So on February 19, 2024, the EU launched its own naval operation going from the Red Sea to the Gulf and a large part of the Northwest Indian Ocean. It's called EU NAFTA operation asides. EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs, Joseph Borrell, called the decision to launch the mission a fast and robust reactions to the attacks of the Houthis who are attacking commercial ships in the region. So first to understand better the general and broader context, could you rapidly present a SPIDES, which countries are involved and what are the main objectives of these operations? Sure, ASPIDES is the fourth EU naval mission under the common security and defense policy framework

and it aims chiefly to protect maritime trade and also as a secondary task it contributes to regional maritime situational awareness and the EU suffered enormous economic losses from the disruption of freedom of navigation in the Red Sea following the attacks of the Houthi militia on western trade through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and the Red Sea which attacked the virtual line of communication for the EU, which before used to pass around 12-15% of global seaborne trade. And therefore, the EU decided to act to address this issue

that was prompted initially in retaliation from the UTs to the Israeli war in Gaza. And being the largest trading bloc, the EU had to intervene, and it did so with a peculiar approach characterized by a strictly defensive naval mission which doesn't have a mandate to intervene on land and did so to contain the escalation and protect the commercial vessels and currently 19 member states are contributing to Aspides while Italy, Greece, French, Germany and from last week also Belgium are deploying naval assets and also Greece provides the headquarters and the overall strategic command,

while Italy furnishes the force commander to help for us with this. Thanks a lot. So this gives us an understanding of how this operation is taking place, and we can a bit dig deeper on that. To understand better, can you explain also the significance

of the Red Sea Theatres? The actors are playing, which ones are diverging? can we say which which are the converging interests also to better understand the key takes at play sure the red sea theater lies at the intersection between europe africa and asia and therefore it's a crucial passage for maritime trade every year around 30 percent of precious metals 12 percent of oil and eight percent of the trade of gas global gas passes through with the sea line of communication

and notably the trade between Europe and East Asia passing through the Bab al-Mandeb is full of high value added goods and so rerouting this strategic choke point means higher transportation costs and delays which have a tremendous impact on European economies and global inflation because commercial ships have to pass through the Cape of Good Hope

which means usually a 10- or 14-day longer trip. And so in response to the attacks of the Houthis, the Houthis decided to deploy enough for Aspides, while the United States led the international naval mission Prosperity Guardian, which groups more than 20 states. And on the other side, Iran tacitly supports the Houthis. lastly the region is also full and rich of regional external powers who have assets or bases in the region and notably there have been some big absences from this theater regarding

the threat posed by the utis and indeed for different reasons nato china and russia are not directly involved which represent a huge shift from the international response we had to somali piracy in the late to starting from the late 2000s okay very interesting in this matter we also heard a lot about atalanta can you help us compare the two atalanta and aspides to understand better the shift that aspides might intend to take sure both missions aim to safeguard freedom of navigation and protect maritime trade along with strategic sea line but they act on profoundly different backgrounds and acting on different threats because of atalanta was a somali piracy which is a blue crime threat which allowed the eu to take advantage of its capacity to establish

agreements with regional states to prosecute pirates and also to take advantage of their role in facilitating communication and coordination of naval efforts this enabled the eu to take the lead in international anti-piracy efforts to solve the issue. Furthermore, Atlanta could count on being part of a comprehensive approach, which included also capacity building, maritime domain awareness, and development endeavors. And in this way, it attained resounding success, being able to suppress piracy, even though it didn't eradicate its root causes.

And we've seen that with increasing woody attacks, also somali piracy is resurfacing but these are two different qualitatively different threats and because while piracy is driven by financial gains and it eschews attention maritime terrorism pursues political goals and seeks publicity and moreover while somali pirates reap profits from sea trade they utis target commerce as such and employ high-end capabilities such as anti-ship missiles and drones and therefore with Aspides the EU raised the level of operational engagement and also its level of ambition and finally I would like to say that having these two missions in with a partly overlapping areas of operations entails the risk of duplication of efforts which

is something that the EU right now cannot afford given the relative scarcity of its own naval assets so to jump back on that so in related what do you think are the main strength of the u in maritime operations and also what we might be careful about and there may be weaknesses too okay um the u another value of the u is that it can draw insights for over 15 years of experience in naval operations and also various maritime endeavors and in this way it can address a broad range of threats and it didn't only learn from atalanta but also like for instance on the communication sides the you largely improved with the passage from sofia to irini in the mediterranean sea and these lessons are evident if one looks at the communication strategy of

hospices. And besides, the Union has a broad understanding of maritime security, which among others considers blue crime, the interstate dimension, terror at sea, and the nexuses between ocean governance, blue economy, and maritime security, as well the environmental dimension and the resource degradation, and also the land-sea nexus. Hence, to solve insecurity at sea, the EU often deploys a holistic approach, drawing from a large toolbox of civilian and military instruments also the reputation of the eu as a natural neutral security provider and the success it attained in various maritime areas like atalanta above all but also in the management of fisheries or safety of shipping pose the eu as a reliable partner and it'll allow

it to lead international efforts so in this specific operation as it is most of the critics and articles pointed out the fact that asps was a purely defensive operation the fact that it could lack to address the root questions of the issue and therefore what is your interpretation of all of that what can we think about this operation i believe asps can be conceived as a sort of bandage on a fresh wound or in other words trying to limit and contain the damage without stopping the bleeding unfortunately the union is ill-positioned and internally divided on how to solve the underlying precipitating cause that is the israeli war in gaza and moreover one has to consider that now the ut campaign in the red sea may have taken like a life of its own it may

the link from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. But similarly, the EU did not have a strong role to play to address the Yemeni civil war or other regional rivalries and tensions. And another aspect to keep in mind is that the EU adopted UNAP for ASPEDES relatively quickly compared to its past standards And therefore, it's heavily drawn from the blueprints of mainly Atalanta and Lirini, where the underlying strategy is deterring their presence and by denying the ability of the adversary to reach its goals. And finally, the defensive nature of the operation underlines the willingness of the EU of not escalating the issue and also to reassure and restore the normal flow of trade through the Red Sea as soon as possible. That's indeed a complex context to evolve in and complex matters that are at stake.

And it would allow us to put into perspective more broadly, the EU strategic autonomy concept has been put forth in the last years and months. So what do you think this operation tells us about this willingness of the EU to promote its strategic autonomy? The EU is engaging here in new fields of military operations. does it have the strength and means to do so by launching enough for hospice the u reaffirmed its willingness to being a relevant stakeholder for regional and global maritime security and in doing so the member states leverage their maritime expertise by adopting a distinct line from washington and they use u.s led prosperity guardian mission and in this way the u adopted

a defensive approach to remain true to its own values and it demonstrated that when other frameworks don't align with its identity and interests, it can operate autonomously and in cooperation also with other actors. Indeed, in the mandate of ASPIDES, the EU committed to pursue closer cooperation with Prosperity Guardian and also Operation Aganor. Furthermore, the choice of adopting a common security and defence policy mission underlined the willingness of raising the maritime profile of the European Union, and also it stresses cohesion and trust in the crisis management tools of the EU

and on the added value of the EU dimension. Since, for instance, the other alternatives that were on the table would have left naval assets outside the European command, In particular, this included like using the coordinated maritime presence concept or following the US lead or embarking on another coalition of the willing like the French did with Operation Agenor in the Strait of Hormuz. And regarding the strengths and the means, unfortunately, the EU suffers on the one hand from a relative scarcity of naval assets, especially the high-end ones, and on the others on a multiplicity of national and EU-level commitments. And therefore, without serious and coordinated investments in the naval sector and in the industrial base, it will be difficult for the EU to reach full naval strategic autonomy. more broadly again so drawing on this distinctive uh line that you took what does it tell us sorry what does it imply for eu nato cooperation uh right now and in the future okay um nato is one

of the big assents from the international response to the ut terrorist attacks and it's really a loud absence especially considering that various uh nato member states either opted for the prosperity guardian led by the us with also the uk or for enough for hospice but um besides right now nato is mostly absorbed by the russia russia ukrainian conflict and also it's my time security strategy my time strategy sorry without security it's my time strategy is uh is rusting we can say because it's been there since 2011 it hasn't been updated and also in the latest uh strategic concept of 2022 it emphasized it gave importance to the maritime dimension to the maritime domain but it poorly articulated the maritime dimension of the alliance however we shall not easily

disregard the added value emerging from combining the relative strengths of the u.n at sea in In particular, the update of the European Union Maritime Security Strategy last year in 2023 stressed the special partnership with NATO and committed to intensify cooperation and dialogue between the two organizations. Lastly, by leveraging the relative strengths of the UN-NATO, this could lead to a better division of labor and a fairer burden sharing, For instance, if the European side of the alliance will take responsibility in the Red Sea, in the Mediterranean, or in general in the Middle East more at large. Thanks a lot, Fioro, for articulating with us all these key points that are crucial to better understand this operation.

Lastly, I would like to ask you, what do you think are the main challenges ahead? the EU you say in your paper needs to adapt the best practices and lessons learned from the past to a higher level threat operation environment what do you think these challenges and lessons are okay starting from the challenges it's difficult to outline what will be these challenges in the future especially considering that the development of a concept of maritime security and its conception in the eu have often followed a contingency approach let's say but even without having a crystal ball there are some trends that are worth noting above all the increasing relevance of the geopolitical competition which sustain a strong return to the interstate

dimension while a blue crime and terror at sea will become less relevant compared to to the interstate dimension and furthermore the attacks to the north stream pipelines and the belt and road initiatives have raised the issue of the security of critical maritime infrastructure and relatedly in if one looks at the red sea dossier if the utis see that their strategy stopped work stopped working they might decide to severe the submarine cables that transport the flow of data, which will have strong repercussions in the EU and worldwide. Another aspect worth noting is that climate change will have a

detrimental impact on security at sea, especially in the Arctic. But mostly it will increase the depletion of natural resources, and this will make global grievances to escalate, to boil, which might lead to arrays in blue crime. And lastly, another dangerous trend is the expansion of hybrid and grid warfare from land to sea, which is a huge problem due

to the complicacies in replying to these actions that remain below certain thresholds. And in general, to tackle these and other sea challenges the EU but not only the EU also other international actors shall invest in mostly in two areas

which are the maritime domain awareness which will allow to better understand what's going on at sea and how to better intervene and also to invest heavily in robust naval assets to face the future challenges Thanks a lot, so that's very

interesting and we'll keep an eye on all these key challenges that you point and that are critical to research, Sean. Unfortunately, that's all the time we have for today. I would like to thank my guest, Piero Barlucchi. Piero, where can we find you online and what

are you working on next? Yep, you can find me on the website of the Center for Security Diplomacy and Strategy and on X and LinkedIn. And at the moment, I'm working on the lessons of the Black Sea for the South China Sea.

and on the deep seas dimension so now you know where to find me yes many thanks and thanks to our listeners also and we'll see you next time Thank you. We'll be right back.