Sea Control - Sea Control 579: Partnering for Conflict in the Western Pacific

Episode Date: June 17, 2025

Links1. "Partnering Will Determine the First Days of Conflict in the Western Pacific," by Ben Van Horrick, Proceedings, December 2024.2. "Resolute Dragon: Reassurance, Deterrence, and a Call for Coordination," by Bill Matory and Ben Van Horrick, War on the Rocks, December 6, 2023.

You're listening to Sea Control, hosted by the Center for International and Maritime Security. Ahoy, shipmates, and welcome back aboard Sea Control. I'm your co-host, Brian Kerr, and our guests today are Major Ben Van Hork and Lieutenant Colonel Scott Chuck, by 11, of the United States Marine Corps. We'll be discussing Ben's recent article, Partnering Will Determine the First Days of Conflict in the Western Pacific, which was published in the December 2024 edition of the United States Naval Institute's Proceedings Magazine. Ben's article highlighted Chuck's work with developing the Bi-Level Ground Operations Coordination Center, a coordinating cell between 3MF and Japanese Ground Self-Defense Forces Western Army. As a reminder, all views expressed are personal and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any other organization with which we are affiliated. Gentlemen, welcome aboard Sea Control. Can you tell us a little bit about yourselves and your professional backgrounds? Glad to be here. Thank you for the invitation. I've been in the Marine Corps for about 16 years. I'm a logistician by trade.

I've had four overseas deployments, three to Afghanistan and one to Iraq. In 2022, I came out to Okinawa, where I currently serve with 3rd Marine Expeditionary Brigade as the current Logistics Operations Officer. Lieutenant Colonel Blatton here. As a co-pilot, I had the privilege to fly in all four airwings, flew in Afghanistan, a UDP here to Okinawa, and with the ace on the 11th MEU. After going to school, I returned back to Japan. and now I work in the future operations shop for the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Brigade.

Thanks for that, guys. So let's just get right to it. So, Ben, I hooked you into this episode, and then you hooked Chuck into it. When I came across your proceedings article, can you walk us through the big blue arrows on your article's core thesis? Like, what is your elevator pitch? So what I believe is during the first few days of conflict in the Pacific, the coordination cells are going to do critical tasks.

So that's going to include coordinate, synchronize, and de-conflict. What we have built over the past little over a year is during our exercises here with the Western Army that we partner with, we've staffed these coordination cells and then also built them out in order to learn not only about each other's capabilities, but also solve problems at a bilateral level. we believe as we progress and mature this concept that this is going to build the trust not only between the partners but also serve as a deterrence hey thanks for that uh that quick top line there just full disclosure i was uh recently in three months myself and i was out there at what i would describe as some of the early days or earlier days rather of trying to set up these coordination cells and i would brief them and the the idea that you just described was something that was known to me, but it was something that was pretty nascent. And in that

time, you've gotten lots of reps and sets. And so let me transition now to Chuck. Chuck, you've got some pretty deep experience now on the Bi-Level Ground Operations Coordination Centers, or the BGOCC. So now that it's matured and you've got that experience, can you explain what those are and how they inform coordination between each. Yeah, certainly. Thanks. So the experience has started for me with Resolute Dragon in the fall of 2023 and run through Yamasekura, which we recently concluded. What I learned early on is that the Japan Self-Defense Force is a highly capable force

and filled with high-quality individuals. What we also recognize is that at Echelon, we need to be able to synchronize actions across all the warfighting functions. and the work that we've done at the Coordination Center allows us to do just that, coordinate and synchronize our actions. The bilateral team is built with watchstanders, liaison officers, and subject matter experts. For the Marines, it's a whole of MAGTF effort, with our Corps personnel coming from the MEB and the MEF and support from the Division, MLG, the Wing, as well as joint partners.

Our Japanese counterparts bring that same depth, quality personnel, and joint support. With this team in place, we coordinate current and future operations, and that span of coordination includes the joint and bilateral fires, sharing a common operational and intelligence picture, cross-leveling logistics, and planning for logistics movements in a contested environment. It's our communications and signature management, as well as health service support. Great breakdown there, Chuck. Definitely appreciate that. And I noted that you mentioned some of those exercises, like Resolute Dragon and Yamasakura. And of note, Ben's article actually begins by describing some key exercises that occur between the U.S. and regional allies and partners in the Pacific. Iron Fist, Keen Edge, you already know the Resolute Dragon, and Battle Catan, among others.

Some of these include the Japanese Self-Defense Force. Some include other allies or partners. But in the article, these exercises are described as insufficient. So before we get to those insufficiencies, can you give the listeners some greater context? So what are these exercises? Who else may be involved? And what are their objectives and outcomes? Yeah, thanks for calling out that series of exercises. I think it's a key point that over the last 15 months, we've completed six exercises with our counterpoints. Knowing that we had repeated touch points also enabled us to take our commanding general's guidance and weave them in a way to continue that forward progress through the various exercises.

The field training exercises are obviously key, as that allows the team to actually take to the field and work their craft together. Iron Fist, Resolute Dragon, and Keen Sword enabled us to do just that. And additionally, during those FTX events, our headquarters were able to come together and synchronize those events and close those bilateral kill chains. Yamaskura and Keen Edge were command post exercises. These command post exercises enabled our command elements to stretch ourselves as well as examine new problem sets and then develop the concepts to solve that problem set. Those specific CPX events also enabled our bilateral team to work together and through our higher headquarters elements. The series of exercises were also great because we saw how we could work through the

coordination centers at different echelons. We matured and developed our partnerships with the japan western army as you mentioned also the japan ground self-defense force amphibious rapid deployment brigade which we see as a team that works closely with our muse during those iron fists for seizing key maritime terrain and then as well as the ground component command in the japanese ground self-defense force which is that next echelon up in the japanese ground self-defense force structure that's really great ground work thanks for laying that there and so with that let's go into where the exercises are insufficient. So Ben, back to you, the article that you wrote discusses combining command post exercises with field training exercises. So why is that important?

Why are you recommending it, right? Especially in multilateral and bilateral. When you combine those two of the command posts and the field training, that gives you the most realistic look as a unit. And when you're bringing those two commands together and giving them a problem set that's normally outside of an exercise, you're going to look at those small tasks that are wished away. And those can look at battle tracking, force closure, signature management, and working. When you're combining the two elements, you're stressing a command. That's of particular importance for nascent units when chuck mentioned the ardb and then with the also the marine littoral regiment with third and twelfth mlr coming online those types of exercises

give each of those commands to test their units also to figure out how they're going to also field new equipment and develop confidence and that equipment and then also develop the small you know, leadership required to win. Yeah, I think that's really good stuff, Ben. And I think many listeners, if you participated in some sort of command post exercise before, yeah, it's a great exercise for the headquarters and you've got a response cell that's feeding you, you know, providing that feedback loop of the forces that might be subject to whatever information you're putting out there. But that's only going to get you so far, right? You're not really going to get the real friction of real complexity of moving forces in the field. And similarly,

if you're just doing a field training exercise or an FTX, right? Like, hey, it's great to go to this range and, you know, execute whatever mission essential task you might have at hand, but you don't actually have a robust headquarters that's, you know, de-conflicting the employment of you with other formations and other resources and other adversarial stressors. So you're missing a huge link. So that learning is very limited. And I think one of the really compelling takeaways of your article and the work that both of you are doing is what you gain when that is exponentially amplified by, and now you have somebody from a different military, from a different country, who might not speak the same language as you, who might not have the

same doctrine as you, and on and on and on. So I'll put a pin in that one right there and turn it back to you guys. So Chuck, you also highlight the importance of establishing command relationships, or or rather the article does, which are also referred to as ComRELs. So can you walk through with the listeners, what is the importance of ComRELs and the difficulties of getting those right, especially in a coalition? Yeah, thanks for that. So we learned early on that as planners, we have to get ComREL and battlefield geometry correct.

Here in this environment, we also know that we need to get the partnerships right. People are a finite resource, and we have to be in the right place. And we get to that right place with our coordination centers by understanding the roles, authorities, and concepts of employment for each formation or headquarters that we partner with. Our comrade in here with Japan is a parallel command structure with each nation retaining command of their own forces. And this is why those coordination centers become so important, because that's where we're able to achieve unity of effort. So that's very important. I appreciate that you highlighted the parallel command structure that the U.S. and Japan have taken with the BGOCC specifically. And not to become too much of a doctrine nerd, but there's other structures that are out there. And leaning back into my own time, not too long ago when I was a Korea planner working with Combined Forces Command,

that was, I believe, it's the only standing combined structure that exists and one of which we are a part where you have forces. that are in a combined structure by some parallel structure where you have, for example, at one echelon, a U.S. commander commanding U.S. and Korean forces, and in another echelon, maybe the reverse is true. But even with that combined structure, difficulties still remain because of different militaries, variances in doctrine, challenges as far as how often can you actually rehearse and exercise. So there's tradeoffs. There's pros and cons. if you take a combined structure versus a parallel or others.

So I definitely appreciate you highlighting the approach for the U.S. and Japan coordination centers here. So let me turn it back to Ben. So Ben, your article, it also discusses the importance of establishing coordination cells to facilitate coordination over time between allies and partners. And I think that over time is really what you're emphasizing there. So what is the concept for these coordination cells? For example, are they permanent or temporal? What are their roles and responsibilities? How do you staff them? And also, how do you time, how did your time, rather, as an advisor to the Afghan National Army influence your work with the Western Army?

The coordination cells that I envision here within the First Island chain would be a permanent. So it would give the opportunity for countries, allies and partners to send a liaison officer to Okinawa, have them in bed within the staff in order to build the MEF's understanding of what partners need and what they are concerned about during competition. And then when the transition to conflict, that coordination cell becomes invaluable. I think I reflect back on the advisor tour that I have as well and how that influenced how I work in the coordination cell. And those are two very different missions. In Afghanistan, in Helmand in particular, we're focusing on building partner force development within a counterinsurgency.

Here, what we're trying to do is integrate and accentuate partner capabilities. There's important traits for when you're an advisor to the ANSEF and when you're in the coordination center now. And those are openness, patience, intellectual curiosity, empathy, and endurance. I think the final note that I'll make is that nothing is possible without our linguists. And we have a very talented and dedicated cadre of linguists here in 3MF, Japanese linguists who do an exceptional job in order to make our partnership a reality. Thanks for that, Ben. I think the qualities you described are absolutely essential, and it's important to know, like

as you indicated, so much that you learned as an advisor and some of the parallels in your current role, some of the characteristics, the leadership traits, or the organizational behaviors you want in an effective advisor are, in many cases, the same ones you want in somebody who is going to be effective at working with an ally or partner of any military force, no matter how complex or how exquisite their military capabilities are, how robust their military force is. That intellectual curiosity, that patience, that willingness to be a collaborative partner with your foreign counterpart, that just expands across so many lanes in which we could find ourselves, Marines in particular, and the two of you gentlemen in particular

out there in the weapons engagement zone in the WIS in Okinawa, Japan. So, Chuck, finally, the article, it discusses pushing the envelope on partner force development and exercise design. And specifically, the article notes advances made in recent exercises with the Japanese Western Army, specifically Resolute Dragon 24 and Keen Sword 25. So can you expand on that? And outside of the ARC, what happened during Ombudsman Corps 87 that was new or different that could inform future partner force development or

future exercises? Yeah, thanks. I'll lead with your last question then with the YS-87. It was a great rep for us. And what was different for us there, it was free play in a command post exercise. So there was a red cell that set out the enemy force and then maneuvered as we continue to maneuver our friendly forces. And so that challenged the staff to adapt to the new environment and present options to the commander to adapt to that changing environment. Additionally for our YAS, we also then had to establish multiple coordination centers to address defensive operations in one area while also looking at offensive amphibious counter-attack operations directly adjacent to it and recognizing that the partners in each one of those areas while adjacent

were slightly different and you can see the articles online with ys that not only was that the japan ground self-defense force but it was also australia came into a part of that and so not only did we have the bilateral coordination that needed to happen we had the trilateral coordination that needed to happen for ys which was a huge new piece for us overall as these new capabilities come online, we're working these into our exercises. So some of these new systems are going to support logistics in a contested environment, while others are extending our reach with kinetic fires, non-kinetic effects, and sensor nodes. The other great point from our multiple touch points is it's allowed us to move forward as a team. Every time we have come

together, we've been able to build or find the playbook, which is increasing our speed of action as that bilateral team. We're also continuing to see joint participation on the staff. So the command post exercises and the field for the FTX, both we and the Japan team recognize that the conflict will be fought in a joint environment. And with each one of these exercises, we're moving that ball forward. That's a great answer. And it just enlivens me to hear in particular when you discuss free play. And even within like a single service U.S. military exercise, sometimes we don't get the benefit of that. And then in other services or other echelons or maybe in a joint exercise, it can be hard to get that level of free play that we want to really get an acting

live red cell working against us, an active live thinking enemy trying to defeat us. That gets even more complex when you are doing that in a bilateral, multilateral environment because of the importance of that alliance management or that partner management. Oftentimes Sometimes those exercise designers may be tempted to have a much more scripted approach so that everybody feels great and no one potentially gets embarrassed. And different echelons, different services, different units in the U.S. or elsewhere might have different tolerances to coming out with, you know, hey, a loss or maybe a different attitude toward, hey, that can be positive because we're learning and we need to introduce the risk of defeat in order to actually become more lethal. And so the fact that even in this bilateral environment, that level of free play or trilateral environment, that free play was permitted, that is remarkably positive. And just to impress on listeners, that is a huge, huge, huge deal, one that is very difficult to achieve and is probably atypical and hopefully becomes more normalized over time. So I'll stop ranting.

Gentlemen, are there other key points that we didn't discuss? I think one of the points that I want to highlight is that Chuck and I are building on the work that has been done by the Japan Desk here at 3MF. So with the work of Lieutenant Colonel T. Terry and Major Brad Hood, who's permanently up at Kangoon, and then also the work of Major Chris Denzel, the article highlights our work within the BGOCC, but that was enabled by their work as well. So we're just taking the opportunity that they presented to us that they've built over the past two or three years. Well, really decades of the alliance that we've had here with the Japanese. Yeah, you just named a bit of a rogues gallery of some incredible talent, especially working in Japan lanes, among other unsung heroes out there at 3MF and elsewhere working on this very, very important problem set. But, gents, finally, where can listeners find you online if you reside there? Or what else are you working on?

I'm on LinkedIn. You can look me up and drop me a note if you want to discuss further. Continue to work on book reviews and also help other writers who are looking to get their work published. Brian, you can find me in the gal on the Marine Corps site. I'm not nearly as prolific as my friend Ben here or you. I appreciate just reading what you guys do and then plugging in when I can. Awesome. Well, listeners, you heard it here first.

Look up Chuck by 11 and the gal, and he'll do what is his best to engage you. But, hey, guys, that was all great. Thank you so very much. And to listeners, thanks again for joining us. And back to you guys, Chuck and Ben. Good luck at your current assignments, fair wins, and following Cs. To listeners, bravo Zulu for tuning in And we'll see you next time

© BF-WATCH TV 2021