Sea Control - Sea Control 606: The Growing Complexity of PLA Amphibious Exercises

Episode Date: June 11, 2026

Links:  China Maritime Report #52: Everything Everywhere All At Once: The Growing Complexity of PLA Amphibious Exercises: Direct link to China Maritime Report #52 China Maritime Studies Institute CMSI Reports LinkedIn IngeniSPACE News Site   Bio: Jason Wang is a national security researcher and COO of ingeniSPACE, a Silicon Valley geointelligence analytics house. Marvin Bernardo is a PhD candidate at the National Jung ju University, Taiwan, and serves as a maritime domain analyst at ingeniSPACE.

You're listening to Sea Control, hosted by the Center for International Maritime Security. Ahoy, shipmates, and welcome back aboard Sea Control. I'm your host, Brian Kerg, and our guests today are Jason Wang and Marvin Bernardo. Jason Wang is a national security researcher and COO of Ingenisbase, a Silicon Valley geo-intelligence analytics house. Marvin Bernardo is a PhD candidate at the National Zhengzhou University, Taiwan, and serves as a maritime domain analyst at Ingenisbase. Today, we'll be discussing a report they co-authored with the United States Naval War College's China Maritime Studies Institute titled, Everything Everywhere All at Once, the Growing Complexity of PLA Amphibious Exercises.

As a reminder, all views expressed are personal and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Department of Defense or any other organization with which we are affiliated. Jason, Marvin, welcome aboard Sea Control. Can you tell us a little bit about yourselves and your professional backgrounds? Jason, please, let's start with you. Thanks. First, it's an honor to be on the show. I'm a first-time caller, but a long-time listener.

a honor to be interviewed by a former 3MF and a Wolverine. Go blue. Go blue. You definitely understand the Indo-Pacific and the challenges ahead. Not long ago, you interviewed one of my favorite people at the Naval War College, Andrew Erickson. And so, you know, the China Maritime Studies Institute is like, it's a wealth of knowledge to warfighters, policymakers, and the public. And CSMI's foundational work in open source analysis, you know, has led to other programs like CASI and the Army's Land Power Studies Institute. So to see open source analysis become more exposed within the combatant commands is, to us, very important because open source is being used to, can really be used to cooperate and validate, you know, national things that we discover through

national technical means that you don't necessarily want to expose. So yeah, this is really great for us. Thanks, Jason. Marvin, could you introduce yourself as well, please? Hi, I'm Marvin Bernardo. I am a maritime diver analyst. My specialty is more on the politicization of conflict as well uh so that's just a brief interest great excellent uh thanks so much for setting the stage there and uh yeah jason i'll double down uh andrew erickson phenomenal uh phenomenal person great previous episode on pla amphibious warfare regarding the volume that he edited and authored a chapter for uh couldn't encourage uh listeners enough to go check that out or frankly any of the material and any of the reports put out by uh cmsi so so thank you

for that. So gentlemen, let's talk about the subject of today's discussion, which is that the report you just helped co-author. So could you begin by just giving us the elevator pitch for the report? What is the report about and why do listeners need to read it? Well, this report is written for government executives and the public, but we have something for everyone, including the war fighters. So the data that we use to produce this report is unclassified and so for middle powers like you know first island chain like japan taiwan south korea they can use this information to communicate directly to the public about the very real threat that the pla's military expansion poses to to them and moreover given all the number of high

profile spy cases in taiwan and the philippines protecting classified data is absolutely critical so we should be relying on the open source to do communication and so the data that the open source data that we produce gives you the kind of situational and awareness that is absolutely necessary for public executives and so specifically for this report on the amphibious warfare capstone exercise in august um it demonstrates concepts of operations that the pla are trying to operationalize for future campaigns in the indo-pacific and so there are probably three key things that are are important takeaways from this report first we saw the pla conduct a two-part phased exercise with simultaneous amphibious landings across three

locations it included realistic obstacles that you would find along the taiwan coastline two those locations were distributed at rough intervals and distances that were comparable to wartime beachheads that would be used in a taiwan invasion and then third and this is probably the most important thing is that because we use unclassified data from commercial constellations like Planic, Blaskot, and Umbra, we can show you that you can communicate with partners and allies how quickly the PLA is evolving without having to go anywhere near NTM. And so we don't, here at our team, we don't label China as a near peer adversary. Their peers and their evolution is accelerating, especially with regular warfare. That's a great breakdown. And what's really

great about that is the unclassified or the open source materials you just used. Anybody operating the space is very familiar with the challenges of information sharing due to different policies and security protocols that might be different among nations. That creates an incredible hurdle for providing a common operational picture or just awareness of what adversaries are doing. So this is God's work as far as I'm concerned. So thank you for doing it. So the report itself, it's premised on satellite imagery revealing that in August, 2025, as you indicated, Jason, the PLA executed a large scale capstone amphibious exercise along China's Southeastern coastline, rehearsing an invasion of Taiwan. So could you start by discussing an overview of the entire

exercise itself, please. Sure. Let me just sort of set the stage as to how difficult work like this is. We used a combination of satellite and SIGINT data over a two-week period. And why are we using lots of black and white images? Well, those black and white images are SAR images, synthetic aperture radar images, which allow us to see in the dark and through the weather. because this region, like Ukraine, is cloud covered, you know, 71 to 80 percent of the time between September and July. And so you need to be able to see in the dark and through the weather. And so we spent a lot of time trying to think about how do we, we know that the exercises were coming. We thought a lot, we thought long and hard about how do we tip and cue to focus on

the areas that we need to, given all our other priorities as well. So, you know, choosing the right geometry, the timing, you know, all that is art just as it is science. I'll have Marvin talk about the specifics of the exercise. Please, Marvin, go ahead. Sure, sure. So the exercise integrates civilian dual-use vessels. As you will see in the report, there's multiple different types. What this does is increase actually the military's, not only increases the military's lift capacity uh but also minimizes their signature when you're like watching them um the exercise is uh consists of two phases over two days one per each day um phase one it was the biggest of the two uh you'll see about 13 large vessels and a few smaller vessels participating

this is where we observe the four different types of amphibious landings so you'll have the direct report using civilian facilities direct to shore deliveries of heavy vehicles right on the beach using landing craft transports. And then you'll also see the floating causeway that we'll get to later. And that's like over the shore deployment. And then you will have also over the horizon deployment for AFVs using the very large ROROs. These are civilian ROROs that transport like civilian commercial trans traffic around China. And the second phase is when you see the three simultaneous exercises in three different locations. Here, the ROROs participated heavily or played a central role um and during the second phase we observed the deployment of

amphibious assets um where the where you have obstacles such as possible fishing cages or aquaculture thank you very much for that breakdown marvin uh one thing i'd offer before going to the next question is many folks observing this problem often i almost say take solace in a critique of the PLA in that, hey, they may not be joint enough, or they're not level for the level of complexity or simultaneity that they would need to be to pull off an operation like this. And yet, as we've seen in exercise and after exercise, and notably in the one that this report documents, a rapid acceleration toward just that, you know, jointness, simultaneity, and especially these different layers unique to an amphibious operation. And I think you want to start

pulling on some of those threads so moving forward the report notes the consolidation of elements from previous exercises integrated into this single operation and of note this included a floating causeway system so for the listeners can you first explain what is a floating causeway system and then discuss its significance for an exercise like this so floating causeways are temporary bridges uh very much like the u.s uh u.s navy's uh you know improved ladderage systems they're used to connect ships to the shore to facilitate to transfer transfer cargo and personnel and so for this exercise we saw them use uh a self-propelled you know self-propelled segments uh and uh semi-submersible barge they've experimented with different

variations of this over the years but this is the first time where we we saw so many of these new elements put to put together and they they even had a tested a new hovercraft where they're able to do that uh marvin uh so the these closing causeways at least have been documented since 2020 2014 like the first one um and throughout the observed capsule and exercises we've seen And over the years, they've been repeatedly used. So it's marked in the report, 2021, 2022, and 2023, they were used. 2024, we didn't see any of it. In the absence of dedicated ports, the floating causeway allows for quick material transfer of equipment directly to shore from vessel that's required deeper waters, right?

And they can also deploy these floating causeway in mass across a wide range of locations. So you can this is not just one beach. You can do it multiple beaches across increasing. What this does is increases the logistical throughput of military equipment from ship to shore. So you can deploy a lot more and a lot faster simultaneously. And just as a historical footnote, there's almost kind of an inverted irony in that during World War Two, the Allies had planned but abandoned Operation Causeway, which was going to be the Allied invasion of Taiwan. That was deemed at the time to be far too difficult. Taiwan was bypassed and the Allies went for Okinawa instead. But I find the emphasis on causeways disconcerting, just noting that little historical tidbit. So let's drive on. know their weaknesses for sure right they they know that what their weaknesses are and so they've been experimenting with like crazy um so you know not just not only are they working on

letterage systems like the ones that we saw in this uh in this exercise but they've built massive massive barges or were what uh are being called shuichaus um to bridge uh row rows all the way uh all the way from deeper waters directly onto shore you'll see them stacked you know three deep uh you know extending out you know nearly a yeah half a kilo kilometer or more it's nuts and all editorialized just a bit there i appreciate you noting like they know where their weaknesses are and they are aggressively uh getting after those weaknesses uh another thing that observers kind of take comfort in is uh the thought that like well hey they haven't participated in you know significant or large-scale combat or fought in a war fired a shot in anger

and decades and decades and decades um well i'd offer that the form of warfare that they participated in then is not going to resemble anything at all like what they're planning for um exactly they're very very smart uh and they're improving just as we would uh and any any military force would. I mean, the United States, before it was involved in World War II, was rated, I think, as the 15th strongest army in the world. So that's not really a compliment and did not have the capability to prosecute its ultimate objectives. And yet it got there eventually. And we're seeing the PLA in a far stronger starting position relative to their objective if we're going to measure it that way. They're aggressively getting after it. So speaking of which, the report,

it captured a first for the PLA, a phased exercise with simultaneous amphibious landings in, Marvin, as you noted, three distinct locations. So why is this so important? And what does this do for the PLA preparedness that prior exercises did not? So first, the simultaneous amphibious landings demonstrate the PLA's capability to command and control large-scale distributed operations and logistics, right? Or, you know, I think most people don't realize that a fighting force, an expeditionary force, it's just only a small portion of the actual operation

where sustainment is really the bulk of that to ensure that the fighting force can move forward. um second is the amphibious landings were staged with civilian dual use vessels right so it wasn't these weren't gray hulls you know we've seen them experiment row rows in the past um and we've seen them kind of experiment with landing craft transports the last couple years but this is the uh but this is the first time we've seen them combine all these into a a single single exercise single operation across multiple locations yeah that's uh that is very very noteworthy uh that simultaneity uh doing multiple operations at once uh a common adage involving amphibious

warfare is that it is the most difficult operation to do um another one that you see cited in particular by our own forces is that logistics is the pacing function or rather that sustainment as the pacing function uh and so it's not just about the pointy end landing on the beaches but about sustaining the throughput of those forces and what do you do when you establish the lodgement expand the lodgement break out of the lodgement project forces out of the lodgement to objectives inland that requires significant sustainment throughput which they are clearly modeling and preparing for so that's um deeply concerning um as far as other deeper concerns the report it discusses new elements observed in this exercise appear to be part of a larger trend

whereby the PLA is mapping its exercises onto analogous geography that reflects envisioned targets that is targets in Taiwan so could you discuss this trend and where you think it may be headed next so as we outlined in the report and we draw it out uh the distance between the areas of activity roughly align with major cities or installments on the western coast of Taiwan. We are talking about 360 kilometer distance in total for the PLA exercises, which is about the same distance between the two main cities of Taiwan, Taipei and Kaohsiung. And this is where the first time we've seen the PLA test their amphibious and assault capabilities at a distance and time scale that was similar to what you could you would need to do for taiwan yeah i think it's

important to point out that the pla and the marine corps are continuing you know we see them evolving their tactics and techniques and uh procedures the pla isn't building up their capabilities just to invade taiwan they're they're preparing to take on the first and second island chain full stop uh and so you know for this exercise it looks like it's focused on taiwan but we don't necessarily expect you know future exercises just to be uh to model after you know the taiwan taiwan contingency to your point again that's a savvy enemy they know what they may face if there's third party intervention and that's not going to stop with optimizing a force for potentially seizing taiwan but interdicting uh intervention forces from elsewhere and that would require projection out

to other island chains. And so the rapid buildup of the PLA at large, it emphasizes that. And we could discuss other objectives with respect to global hegemony and having a strong, true blue water Navy that could do much of what the United States Naval Force has done for many decades. But absolutely, it's looking at other phases of this operation and getting ahead of potential intervention so um hey another key element of this exercise is the increased level of realism that the pla is imposing on its exercise participants so similarly a common critique is oh pla does everything very cookie cutter rehearsed it's all for show and yet here we saw things like the incorporation of waterborne obstacles that the exercise

participants had to work through so could you discuss the implications of that and what What conditions the PLA might seek to incorporate in future exercises? So amphibious fighting vehicles, AFVs, aren't the most nimble of watercraft, right? It's a tank with an outboard motor. So it actually takes skill and accumulated hours not to die. So to drive them off the back of a row, row five to seven kilometers offshore, that's not easy. Just that act alone is not easy. And then there's a narrow range of sea states that you can operate in.

Have we seen them do sea state four or five? No. We're seeing them doing in sea state one and two. But they still have to transition onto shore and under fire. So that in and of itself is challenging. Then when you throw in obstacles like aquaculture, I'm not talking about mines. i'm actually talking about like aquaculture um that complicates things and and what most people don't realize is that taiwan's got a billion dollar seafood industry and if by the way if

you haven't experienced it uh you need to go to taiwan and you need to try the seafood there um but uh but you know if you're an afv and you got entangled onto you know oyster wrap or kelp wrap you'd sink straight to the bottom right so the pla marine corps is training their afv operators to navigate through those obstacles under time conditions and you can see that in the imagery that we collected you know there you see one boat out there you know monitoring uh monitoring uh afe's as they're uh are they're running through the course and then getting onto the ROROs. And so the PLA is focusing on their weaknesses, they're training through their weaknesses, and it's likely that, you know, future exercises are going to be even, will have more

chaotic obstacles and other elements that are going to test the mettle of their soldiers. I'd offer that one of the most compelling elements of the report is the timeline, which you provided in the Appendix A, and it details minute-by-minute actions and movements of the PLA forces. It's incredibly detailed. So from a war planning perspective, this could be quite revelatory regarding PLA timing and sequencing and perhaps revealing vulnerabilities or, as you noted, increasing strength as they're closing those gaps. Yet like all exercises, this included only a fragment of the entire force that would likely be involved in a real contingency. So what would you say was missing from this exercise, what was missing from those minute-by-minute actions

that we might see in a real operation? So just to answer your question, the PLA is developing capabilities across multiple domains, right? We expect to see underwater assets, air cavalry soon being incorporated, and more hovercrafts as well. They've, for instance, there was great work done on the Sui Chiaos already that we've mentioned earlier, so we expect to see those. Maybe we haven't seen them at scale or being used integrated for these exercises but who knows in the future right the joint operations that it's an incredible ballet across multiple platforms assets and targeting data is what the u.s does best to see that capability evolve with the peer competitor using civilian platform is a concerning because

of four things first uh a dedicated decision maker is concerned about optics of gray hall used to take out civilian vessels right so and it's a form of cognitive warfare especially targeting the bureaucracy and the executive leadership. Second, the use of civilian vessels is irregular warfare. This is China's bread and butter or the best things they can do. They have declared war on some liberal democracies, but generally the public and frankly most politicians have not realized that the regular warfare is still warfare. The use of civilian vessels, sorry, third, the use of civilian vessels in military activity reduces overall signature, thereby it reduces the executive decision time so it complicates decision making

it forces the first island chain nations to recognize these forces for modern warfare where it isn't about like exquisite hardware because you are these are just uh not the top of the line right today's military have to have larger um isr operations with software and analysts who eliminate false positive quickly uh that requires multi-year investments in people and training as well as a lot of time on the atlas part as i can speak to um well-trained resources are something that everyone from the philippines and south korea even taiwan is uh is short of and china kind of knows this as the fourth point is it requires more monitoring resources and people uh restraining military activity using civilian vessels is something we want a good

well-trained analyst uh to be able to trigger and pull yeah well let me just talk about appendix a first so appendix a is is our love letter to the open source community um it uh the way we've written it makes it easier for any alice that is going to study this in the future uh to be able to look at the event with rigor and and challenge what we what what we even what we wrote and that's what we want um we we felt that it was absolutely important to the reviewers at csmi to be able to see what was happening um you know you know in a very detailed back background a very detailed timeline the exercise the exercise itself what do we expect to see in the future well we haven't seen very much of l l calvary you know uh plagf exercises tend to be uh separate um that so we

don't see that jointness yet uh we suspect that there were some unders uh underwater assets uh that were deployed for this um and um and this will come in a follow-on paper um in the coming coming months um and then uh we we we haven't seen very much lcac use other than the the small lcac which we don't have a name for yet but um it's uh it's primarily a troop in troop transport rather than equipment transport uh hovercraft um and maybe maybe this year we'll see them apply this uh shuichaus uh into an integrated uh integrated exercise this year um they've been they have uh two uh two sets of hulls uh of the shuichaus that have been exercising by themselves experimenting but they haven't actually integrated that into an actual

integrated joint operation. So it's going to be, it's going to be, this summer is going to be quite an interesting time to observe the PLA, that's for sure. Yeah, it's, I shouldn't say, wow, it's going to be an exciting time to watch PLA advancement. It's not something I want to be excited about, but as far as a field of study in this particular area, it absolutely is. I just to say again for listeners you owe it to yourself to read the appendix a if you really want to see a minute by minute play by play ship by ship movement of what this particular exercise looked like i haven't seen anything with this level of detail uh in open source before so so thank you very much for doing that incredible work thank you another thing that's of course uh one thing

that's notable about this report as well again another thing that makes just a total standout is the extensive and detailed use of high quality satellite imagery many listeners are familiar with prior cmsi reports all of which are great but this one had perhaps some of the most detailed and useful unclassified satellite imagery i've seen in any report discussing pla exercises so listeners really just need to give this report a look to truly appreciate it but short of that gentlemen are there particular images you draw readers attention to or maybe new ideas that were revealed only by the images that you collected yeah the the power of data fusion is is is really um unparalleled the the kinds of systems that we have available uh in in the open source um

is all the stuff that we dreamed about you know even a decade ago um so folks should know that i personally paid for the imagery from the report so that uh so that we could make everything available uh to the public to see uh and we want as many people as possible to read it so please please please read appendix a um and uh and and go through the imagery with a fine-tooth comb um and you know this this this we especially want the war fighters to see we want the combatant commands to see that the number of constellations and sensor platforms that we took advantage of can really produce uh rigorous intelligence um that you know will validate the same conclusions that was produced in a skip and

but given that we put this report together in in a matter of two weeks uh means that we probably did with significantly less paperwork involved government analysts you know need to fill out of mountain of paperwork just for just to get a a collection going you know and you know our our our setup here is uh is is unclass we tip and queue and process in seconds um and we've been doing this for several years now and it's just it's just humbling i have to say thank you to my my my team and my co-authors it's just it's humbling to see what you know what you can do with a bunch of dedicated deep tech engineers and analysts for those familiar with this work the dedication shows absolutely i'm sorry marvin did you have something else oh yeah so i just

wanted to talk about specifically some of the images in the report um so almost every single image included in the report is a result of sensor fusion a composite of like two forms of data or more so you'll see within the report SAR and optical imagery working together you'll see SAR and AIS position data sometimes all three at the same time what we what this highlights is by themselves the individual platforms do not provide enough information the insights made in this report would not have been possible without having all three data sources at real time um after so um take figure four for example right i don't know if people have the reports right on their fingertips right now um the figure four is a composite of three data sources right it

fuses three data sources uh there's two satellite images we're taking almost five hours apart but they do give you a sense of one was taken in a very early stage of the exercise another one is a later stage of the exercise and you see what the start and end of things are and helps you kind of stitch things together as well the as data adds that other part of like identifying which vessels there are there so it comes gives you common operating pictures when you have all of these data sources um or uh for listeners go ahead no i'm just saying it's it's hard work but it's insightful and we're grateful and i'm sure the community for those who who do take a look at this are going to be very grateful for the work that was done and uh for listeners as well

this, the report itself, the link to the report will be in the show notes. So you'll be able to pull it up and reference figure four that Marvin noted. And of course, take a look at the entire report in detail. Often reports like this, you'll make additional discoveries or find other data that had to end up on the cutting room floor through the editorial process. And there's lots of hands on the steering wheel as something goes from draft, even just with multiple authors deciding what should or shouldn't make it. And then of course the editors and then the publisher and CMSI, Naval War College, et cetera. So probably a lot that you intended to go in the report

did not make it into the report. So is there anything else that you discovered while working on this project that didn't make it into the report, but that you would like to discuss now? There are a few things, but we're in the process of actually trying to write those, trying to write up the follow-up reports on that.

And so we'll definitely follow up with you on that question at a later date. But I think if I could take the opportunity to talk about the importance of monitoring programs, it's absolutely imperative that we monitor PLA's evolution, and it has to be funded at scale. You know, we find that in some organizations that there's an expectation for exquisite access and that, you know, we would provide a carte blanche. um but i think with the current administration it's it's clear that um that kind of access doesn't won't continue unless you're domestically investing in building capacity and capability um and so like recently we had a conversation with uh one country their their department of ed or department of education or their department of education equivalent only gives their academics

like 50k per project to cover both research research staff and and imagery that that doesn't kind of build that doesn't build the kind of analysts that you can depend on during wartime conditions like you know the first thing that you know the the pla is going to do is bomb your ai data center so um you're going to be knocked back into the the stone age so you have to have people who can actually do this work at at scale um and we're we're also seeing you know because we also do monitor united front activity we know that they're propagating and parading quasi true quasi false information about you know uh other uh other theaters of operation and it makes that kind of um the use of these influencers make it harder for you know any given country to domestically

fight against so having you know having rigorous programs uh that you know vet and and and and revet material um like our report went through uh with the naval war college is is absolutely important within the first island chain we're seeing that um that spending isn't the same uh across the region. And, you know, so we see countries that are spending hundreds of millions to billions of dollars like Japan, but others are not building out their ISR capabilities.

So, you know, I think we need to see more consistent, more consistent spending on building these capabilities, these geospatial capabilities in the first place. You know, it kind of brings to mind what, I just saw Rear Admiral Mike Studeman, the former J2, you know, he just said this to me a few days ago, you know, situational awareness, pattern analysis, indication and warnings have to be taken seriously.

It's a discipline, right? And so if you ignore that and you're not investing in that, that's the fastest way to surprise and defeat. And this is really the only way that we're going to be able to beat PLA irregular warfare. We have to bring transparency to their actions. And that requires, you know, dedicated programs to build that capacity, not only through hardware and software, but through people. You can't beat a good analyst. Thanks, Jason. That's a powerful and compelling call to action.

Marvin, did you have something else? I'm good, thank you. okay um so uh gentlemen finally is there some place where listeners should find you online and what else are you working on these days hey um well we don't really have a social media presence per se uh other than the stuff that we we present through uh present through our studies um part of that's the fact to minimize the attack surface for the ccp but our website's news section is pretty fairly up to date it's www.ingenispace.com and there's a news tab there we we prefer to be focused on our work and and our analysis we are looking for

collaborators so you know if you're if you're a researcher a think tank or a government government agency trying to build local capacity you know we're happy to work with you we're happy to train your people um and you can send email to insights uh at ingenispace.com we we do have a quasi linkedin presence kind of think of it but typically we don't respond to requests unless there's a party that we know in common in real life because uh you know there are too many you know uh you know virtual uh bots that uh that are you know uh that are it's just problematic Yeah. In terms of what we are working on next, China really prefers the use of irregular warfare. They really want to win without fighting. And this is part of their ingrained total war strategy.

And frankly, it's been successful. You know, their island building, militarization of the South China Sea, you know, occurred largely impeded over the last decade. Um, and so we are, we are spending a lot of time understanding how their regular warfare, uh, it works, uh, how it's funded and, and how it's deployed. Uh, and, um, uh, hopefully in the coming weeks, you'll, you'll see more about that, um, uh, in the news. thanks for that i'll definitely put the uh link to your site into your new site into that uh that email address in the show notes in case anybody wants to to reach out and they happen to be that familiar connection that uh that will get a bite so uh jason wang marvin bernardo thank you so much for joining us and sharing your insights today and we wish you fair winds and following seas to listeners bravo zulu for tuning in and we'll see you next time thank you I walked up to the powerhouse counter.

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