Strict Scrutiny - Ketanji Brown Jackson Sounds the Alarm
Episode Date: June 23, 2025First, Leah is joined by international law expert Bec Ingber to lay out legal issues around the use of force (aka bombing Iran). Then, Leah is joined by two guest hosts–former legal journalist Mike ...Sacks and Georgetown Law’s Steve Vladeck–to break down last week’s opinions from the Court. Everyone’s up to their old tricks: Coach Kavanaugh makes sports metaphors, Clarence Thomas concurs (shudder), and Sam Alito feels his feelings. Through it all, Ketanji Brown Jackson shows us what the court could–hopefully–one day be. Hosts’ favorite things:Leah: The release of Mahmoud KhalilMike: Leah’s book, Lawless! Get tickets for STRICT SCRUTINY LIVE – The Bad Decisions Tour 2025! 10/4 – ChicagoLearn more: http://crooked.com/eventsOrder your copy of Leah's book, Lawless: How the Supreme Court Runs on Conservative Grievance, Fringe Theories, and Bad VibesFollow us on Instagram, Threads, and Bluesky
Transcript
Discussion (0)
Strict Scrutiny is brought to you by Americans United for Separation of Church and State.
You don't destroy 250 years of secular democracy without gutting precedent, shattering norms,
and dropping a few billion. The same people and groups that backed Project 2025 are part of a
larger shadow network that's relentlessly pushing to impose a Christian nationalist agenda on our
laws and lives. Church-State separation is the bulwark blocking their agenda. One of the last
bastions of Church-State separation is our bulwark blocking their agenda. One of the last bastions
of Church-State separation is our public school system. So they're pushing vouchers everywhere.
They're arguing for religious public schools. Yes, you heard that right, religious public schools,
at the Supreme Court in the case we talked about on the podcast. If you're listening to us,
you're seeing the writing on the wall. We can, we must fight back. Join Americans United for
separation of church and
state and their growing movement because church-state separation protects us all.
Learn more and get involved at au.org slash crooked. There's a lot going on right now,
mounting economic inequality, threats to democracy, environmental disaster,
the sour stench of chaos in the air. I'm Brooke Gladstone, host of WNYC's On the Media.
Want to understand the reasons and the meanings
of the narratives that led us here,
and maybe how to head them off at the pass?
That's On the Media's specialty.
Take a listen wherever you get your podcasts.
Mr. Chief Justice, may I please report, get your podcasts. clarity. She said, I ask no favor for my sex. All I ask of our brethren is that they take their feet off our necks.
Hello, and welcome to Strict Scrutiny, your podcast about the Supreme Court and the legal culture that surrounds it.
I'm your host for today, Leo Littman.
After we recorded today's episode, Donald the Dove, the peacemaker, announced on True
Social that he had bombed Iran.
The Post read, quote, We have completed our very successful attack on the three nuclear
sites in Iran. The post read, quote, We have completed our very successful attack on the three nuclear sites in Iran. A full payload of bombs, all caps, was dropped on the primary site. Now is the time
for peace. Also in all caps. Thank you for your attention to this matter, end quote. You're welcome
because we are going to give this some attention. At the request of some of the Friends of the Pod
subscribers, we wanted to offer a quick legal primer on issues surrounding the use of force. This is not to suggest that the legal questions are somehow more important than just
how dangerous and unwise it is to launch bombs on a foreign sovereign. Our friends at Pods Save the
World have explained this well, but the legal issues surrounding the use of force do underscore
how much this administration is corroding our separation of powers and democracy. Because
this topic is so serious, we needed to discuss it in an even-handed, level-headed way.
And so I am delighted to be joined for this conversation
by a true expert, Bec Ingber, professor of law
at Cardozo Law School.
Bec served as counselor on international law
in the Office of the Legal Advisor
at the Department of State for two years,
where she was previously an attorney advisor.
Thanks for joining the podcast, Bec. I'm very happy to be here. Okay, let's dive right in. As a general, very high level background,
the Constitution gives Congress the power to declare war and to raise and support armies,
and it makes the president the commander in chief of those armies. As Steve Vladek observed at One
First, if you're not subscribing to One First, it's about to become even more indispensable,
the federal courts actually used to review a range of
questions about military operations during wartime. But since the 1960s, the
trend has been toward more solo presidential action. And it was in
response to one of those solo presidential actions, Nixon secretly
bombing Cambodia without notifying Congress, that Congress passed the War
Powers Resolution of 1973. Beck, Congress passed the War Powers Resolution of 1973.
Beck, what does the War Powers Resolution do?
So when Congress passed the War Powers Resolution, they had really two overarching goals in mind.
So the first one is that they wanted to reset the constitutional balance of powers that
you just alluded to, right?
So they wanted to clarify and remind everyone that the Constitution actually
gave them the power to declare war and that the President was supposed to serve more of a
ministerial function as the Commander-in-Chief. But they relatedly also wanted to create a alarm
system for Congress so that they could get more information from the President, and they learned
this well during the Vietnam War. And ideally, they wanted to find out whether or not we're going to be heading down a war
path before it would, of course, be too late for them to weigh in or weighing in would
be politically impossible for them to do at that point.
So they did that in part through reporting requirements and through this 60-day limit
on the unilateral use of force.
But in terms of resetting the constitutional balance, they actually laid out in the War Powers Resolution Congress's understanding of what is the exceedingly narrow
context under which the president can use force. And namely, those are when Congress has declared
war, when Congress has given him statutory authorization to do so, neither of which are
here today, or a national emergency created by attack upon
the United States, its territories, or possessions, or its armed forces.
So that third category is the only unilateral power that the president has under Congress's
understanding, right?
And that is the power to respond to a true attack on the United States.
So what are the administration's legal arguments for the strikes against Iran?
Well typically when the US government uses force, they give the public an explanation
of why their actions comport with law.
Usually they're so transparent.
Well sometimes they're more transparent than perhaps we'd like them to be.
But we don't have any signal chats telling us what their legal theory is here.
But usually it happens formally through
the reporting requirements under the War Powers Resolution that I just mentioned, but often
we also get statements from the administration and we often get an OLC opinion, the Office
of Legal Counsel in DOJ, when it's released. So I've been trying to piece together what
we've seen from the various speeches and tweets, honestly, to that hint at the various legal arguments
the administration may be contemplating.
And on the domestic side,
and here the main overarching question is procedural, right?
Here the question is,
who gets to decide when to take us to war?
Does the president have the authority
to use force here unilaterally,
or is this question really in Congress's court?
And I think there's no question
that as a constitutional matter, and including under Congress's understanding of it as laid out in the
War Powers Resolution, the decision whether to use force in this context against Iran was not one
that the president could make unilaterally. On the international plane, the main overarching
question is actually substantive. So the background rule here is, at least since the UN Charter,
is that states cannot use force to settle mere disputes.
So there's the default rule,
and the default rule is a ban on using force.
And there are narrow exceptions to that,
like when the Security Council authorizes force
or when a state is acting in self-defense.
So if a state can use force that is necessary
and proportionate to repel an armed attack
by another state, and that includes an armed attack that is imminent, meaning you don't
have to wait until the bombs are actually dropping on you in order to repel them.
But short of that specific scenario, there's actually a lot of disagreement, as you can
imagine, about what imminence requires.
And where this concept of imminence begins and ends is often the whole ballgame in terms of disputes about whether a state's truly engaging in lawful self-defense.
In this case, there's one more point that's relevant here, which is collective self-defense.
So under the charter, and this is relevant because it's actually the only legal terms that I've heard come out of the administration thus far. So under the charter, there's a concept
called collective self-defense. And that means a state can come to the aid of another state
that is itself the victim of aggression. So for example, Ukraine, international law permits
the United States and other states, or I should say would permit, states to use force in aid of
Ukraine against Russian aggression. And that one seems to be at least part of the argument
that this administration is making,
at least as a matter of international law.
So how are these legal determinations usually made?
And does it seem like that process is happening here?
So normally, as the policymakers are contemplating
a course of action, the lawyers would be simultaneously
feeding analysis
into that process.
And over the last several decades,
through many presidential administrations,
this was organized formally
through regular lawyers group meetings
that would be chaired by NSC Legal.
And that would feed into the policy processes
such as the principals and deputies committee meetings.
And this process would include lawyers
from the justice department, usually OLC,
DOD Office of General Counsel,
the State Office of the Legal Advisor,
as well as lawyers from the intelligence community.
And OLC in particular has played stronger
and weaker roles at various points,
but certainly on any significant decision
to use force like this one,
OLC would absolutely be expected to weigh in
and would typically produce a legal memo
with its views on the legality of the course of action. Often, though not always, with the
expectation that it would at some point be released publicly. Now, I would assume based on some of the
little almost terms of art that have been thrown around by this administration that lawyers have
been consulted through this process, but given the insight that we've gotten
from those signal chats we were talking about
into the quality of the policy process,
I find it hard to believe that these decisions
are being informed by truly rigorous legal analysis,
let's say.
Yeah.
So I think in the past,
the Office of Legal Counsel, as you were saying,
has offered theories for when presidents can use force unilaterally.
So can you describe how that theory differs from what is envisioned in the War Powers
Resolution?
Yeah.
So there are two different lines of OLC theory on when presidents can use force unilaterally,
and they've largely actually played out under different administrations, but there's been
some convergence.
So one is a self-defense theory.
And that might seem like a more classic sort of repel attacks theory that the framers had
in mind when they contemplated that there would be some opportunity for the president
to act unilaterally.
But there are some OLC memos that actually remain on the books, in particular, memos
from the early Bush administration days in the wake of 9-11, that view this concept exceedingly
broadly, and would have, for example, permitted the president's actions to invading Iraq
in 2003 without congressional authorization.
Now, those memos were written and they remain on the books, but Congress ultimately did authorize the use of force
in both 2001 and in 2002.
And so the president didn't actually act
on the breadth of those authorities.
So that's one set of theories.
The other is the one that actually we see more often.
And this is a theory that relies on the Declare War Clause
of the Constitution, actually, in my view,
as an authority and not just as a constraint.
And the idea here is that the use of force falls along a spectrum where war is a constitutional
threshold.
And as long as they don't cross that threshold and act in a way that would be war in a constitutional
sense, the president has power to act unilaterally.
So under this theory, OLC takes a chop on whether it's war in the constitutional
sense. And the way they do that under several administrations is, you know, analyze whether the
nature, scope, and duration of the hostilities, and that includes the likelihood of escalation,
amount to war in the constitutional sense. And the president can only act unilaterally if it falls
below that threshold. Okay. So it seems like from what has been unfolding
that the legal questions and maybe also the policy decisions
are being based more on vibes than on anything
approximating law or facts.
You can kind of hear that from the VEEP here.
And President Trump trust the US intelligence community
and its assessments.
Oh, of course we trust our intelligence community,
but we also trust our instincts.
And you can hear the same from Secretary of State
Marco Rubio, who the Democrats confirmed unanimously.
Are you saying there that the United States
did not see intelligence that the Supreme Leader
had ordered weaponization?
That's irrelevant.
I think that question being asked on the media.
That's an irrelevant question.
They have everything they need to build a weapon.
That is the key point in US intelligence assessments.
You know that.
No, it's not.
Yes, it was.
No, it's not.
No one knows what the assessment says.
I'm talking about the public March assessment.
And that's why I was asking you if you know something more
from March, if an order was given.
But that's also an inaccurate representation of it.
That's an inaccurate representation of it.
That's not how intelligence is read. That's not how intelligence is used. Here's what the
whole world knows. Forget about intelligence.
So it seems like the information we're getting about what is happening is also vibes rather
than facts. So as Senator Warren pointed out on Blue Sky on Sunday, quote, last night Trump
said Iran's nuclear program was completely and totally obliterated. This morning, JD
Vance says we will permanently dismantle that nuclear program over the coming years.
Elsewhere has reported that maybe it
wasn't severely damaged.
Anyways, I guess we'll find out someday.
But back to the legal slash legal-ish arguments,
so some brush clearing.
You mentioned the authorization of use of military force
that Congress passed in 2001 related to the war on terror and 2002 that was then relied on for the invasion of Iraq. Why don't those laws provide a
basis for the use of force here? Yeah, I'm really glad you asked about that because that's often a
source of confusion for government lawyers and in some cases as well. Not usually for the government lawyers
who are actually involved in the decision-making, thankfully.
But the 2001 AUMF, which was passed in the wake
of the 9-11 attacks, specifically references those
who organized and carried out the attacks
and those who harbored them.
And so it was widely understood to refer
to Al-Qaeda and the Taliban.
This is not an open ended use of force.
The 2002 AUMF, Congress passed this one to authorize the president to use force against
Iraq.
And here, this is actually an example of the president checking that domestic procedural
box.
He had domestic legal authority, but the invasion was nevertheless unlawful as a matter of international
law.
And then there are other examples, like for example, Libya, where the opposite was the
case. So really, you know, it's important example, Libya, where the opposite was the case.
So really, you know, it's important to question whether or not the president has checked both
boxes.
It's not like an either or situation.
But there's been over the years so much talk about how much power Congress gave the president
in the 2001 AUMF.
And that's in part because presidents since that time have used that power for conflicts
reaching far beyond the initial one that compelled it.
And all of that is true and there's room for criticism.
But nevertheless, all presidential administrations have tied those uses of force to al-Qaeda.
And we just need to be very, very clear.
In this case, there is absolutely no plausible basis whatsoever to claim that Congress authorized
the president to use force against Iran under either of those statutes.
Okay. So then how about the War Powers Resolution? You mentioned that that law limits the use of
force for more than 60 days. Does that by implication authorize the president to use
force for less than 60 days? That's another great question
because it's another misconception.
So the War Powers Resolution says that
when the president uses force unilaterally
and recall the limited circumstances
under which they thought he could do so,
then he has to submit a report
and he has to stop using the armed forces
within 60 to 90 days.
There's actually a little wiggle room under the statute.
So it's a further constraint on the use of force that the – that they view the Constitution
as already granting the president.
And in fact, they were quite explicit in saying that this statute was not intended to give
him any more power than the Constitution already provided.
But some, including OLC actually, have read this as an authority.
Oh, you've mentioned 60 days.
Well, of course, that means that the president can do anything within that 60 days.
And that might be exaggerating exactly what they're saying.
But they have viewed it as evidence of Congress's
understanding that the president could act unilaterally.
YOLO, OLC.
I don't know.
I feel like there's an acronym in there somewhere anyways.
So JD Vance says, we're not at war with Iran.
We're at war with Iran's nuclear program.
He added that we don't want war with Iran.
We actually want peace, something
Trump's two social posts also gestured toward.
We all know, Beck, that one and done bombings are definitely
a thing and definitely work.
Are they legal under domestic law?
Like, is anything he's saying relevant
to these legal questions?
Well, I, there are both legal and policy implications to these words that might explain why administration officials are trying to avoid saying we're at war.
And on the legal side, as a domestic legal matter, recall that OLC has this theory that as long as a
use of force falls below the threshold of war, it's within the president's constitutional power. So it may be that the administration is sort of holding onto that
and thinks that if they can wave around these words, that that would somehow keep it, keep them
below the threshold. But this is a fact-based inquiry. In which case it doesn't seem like an
assessment. It seems more like an excuse, but yeah. Right. And so, so it's certainly right. This isn't the first time they've
used either tried to use the word war or tried to say something isn't a war in this case for the
purposes of invoking law. Right. So interestingly, in other contexts, like the alien enemies act
context, they're deploying words like war and invasion in order to invoke the power that comes
along with it. So in both cases, they're trying to tell us
that two plus two, which we can clearly see
with our own eyes equals five.
But as I said, these are fact-based inquiries.
These aren't things that you could just turn on or off
based on the words you're using.
Yeah, it has a very wars piece,
but we're always at war with Eurasia kind of valence to it.
And already it seems like this idea
that this is just a one and done,
below the level of war is already being subject
to some slippage, at least on the president's
true social account, which posted later on Sunday, quote,
it's not politically correct to use the term regime change,
but if the current Iranian regime is unable
to make Iran great again,
why wouldn't there be a regime change?
MIGA, M-I-G-A,
exclamation mark, exclamation mark. But lest you are worried about another forever war,
JD Vance has this to say. I certainly empathize with Americans who are exhausted after 25 years
of foreign entanglements in the Middle East. I understand the concern, but the difference
is that back then we had dumb presidents.
I was surprised that they couldn't come up with a better distinction than that.
Well they'll keep trying. They're probably workshopping it over signal. So, you know,
but you've kind of alluded to international law and I know Trump doesn't
give two shits about it, which is part of why I want to talk about it.
But what does international law have to say about the president's use of force here?
You mentioned the UN Charter, self-defense and collective self-defense, but anything
else that kind of frames this?
Yeah, and actually, this is where the whole one and done idea, if we believed it, right?
And of course, they're immediately undermining
the statements by suggesting
that there might be further strikes.
But if we believed it,
it actually does have relevance under international law.
So as I mentioned,
the background rule is the use of force is unlawful,
but states can use force in self-defense
that is necessary and proportionate
to responding to an armed attack,
to basically repelling the armed attacks as long as they need to do so.
And if they're genuinely doing so, like in the case of Ukraine,
other states can come and lawfully use force for the same purposes.
So the US government's international law theory here seems to be,
from piecing together the statements of officials and Hegsep saying,
some version of self-defense and collective self-defense on behalf of Israel
relies on an argument that we're using necessary and proportionate force or would rely if we
were actually lawyering it properly, would rely on an argument that we're using necessary
and proportionate force to repel an actual or imminent armed attack by Iran.
I just want to dispel one thing because there's been a lot of chatter about past attacks by Iran and so I want to just mention the
extent to which those are relevant. They are relevant but they're not relevant
because international law permits reprisals in any way. It does not, right? So
we can't attack someone just because they attacked us. There's no tit-for-tat
legal theory. But they're relevant because they do go to the question of
whether Iran has intent and
capability to strike, whether it's us or Israel.
And therefore, whether these strikes are strikes or Israel strikes, because we're acting in
collective self-defense, according to Hexhav of Israel, were necessary to repelling such
a strike.
So those are fact-based questions.
And obviously, I don't have access to the intelligence that
would be required to answer it.
I think even if-
Miracle Rubio says forget about that, so no big deal.
Right.
I mean, if I could just trust his instincts.
My sense from watching these- I just want to be careful in how I analyze it, but my
sense from watching these issues play out historically and from what I've seen of the legal arguments in the past,
is that both countries are likely operating under legal theories of imminence that are fairly aggressive, let's say.
And that's especially so in this context because the question involves one of nuclear weapons.
So stepping back one last question, I think a lot of people have the intuition that presidents have been pushing the boundaries of executive power
on unilateral use of force for a long time,
using force without congressional input or approval.
But at least to me, this still feels
like a meaningful escalation from what we've seen in the past.
Are there things that strike you as different
about this latest episode from what has come before?
Yes, I think both of those things are true.
So I have long been a critic of US government views
on the use of force and war powers,
both international law and domestic.
And it's long been my view that even when acting
in good faith and with good intentions,
presidents have aggrandized power
and pushed the legal envelope further and further over time.
And they've done so with the aid of US government lawyers
who also acting in good faith and with good intentions
have believed their job to be providing the flexibility
that they could find under the law for the president to act.
But I think there are some major distinctions here.
And one is that I'm not sure that the US government has ever, ever taken strikes of this magnitude
and against another state without congressional authorization.
And the other, which is an overarching one, seems to be the total lack of legal guardrails
inside the US government right now.
Now these guardrails are, you know, when I talk about guardrails, these are the same
government lawyers whose very existence and their ability to write up fancy legal opinions
and arguments in court may have over time mollified both the courts and Congress and
perhaps aided their reticence to get involved in these places, right?
Like we've got it, the fourth, you know, the bureaucracy is handling it and therefore
we don't need to get involved.
But now even those internal constraints appear to be gone.
And in the meantime, I think Congress at least has lost its muscle memory to engage.
So we know this administration's tolerance for legal constraints is low and its tolerance
for legal risk is high.
And that's true even in areas where the courts tend to get involved.
But here, you know, in both the international law context and in the constitutional separation of powers context,
laws policed through a mix of norms, internal checks,
responses by Congress, public outrage,
and much of that has been muted or just plain exhausted
in just a few months under this administration.
So I think it's an opportunity
for the old school separation of powers
to reengage on these issues, perhaps.
But I think as members of the public,
we have to demand it of them.
Yeah, so on that front, it does seem
like something else that's missing to me
is like an absence of public discussion
about the possible bases for this strike.
And it also has an element of arsonist fireman to it,
and that he pulled out of the Iran deal.
When the Department of State had certified
Iran was in compliance and now is insisting, well,
because they might develop a nuclear weapon,
I get to launch these strikes.
But again, that's just my unlearned observation.
No, I think that's an essential component of it.
And I'm glad you raised it, because we
didn't even address that. And of course, that's an essential component of it, and I'm glad you raised it because we didn't even address that.
And of course, that's in the background.
But it does feel like yet again, you know, this administration is trying to create an
emergency or is creating an emergency that it then claims enormous power to resolve.
Beck, thank you so much for joining.
Where can people find you if they want to learn more?
For my personal views, you could find me at Blue
Sky at Beck-Amber but in my day job I am a professor of law at Cardozoa Law
School. Thank you again Beck for joining. Thanks so much for having me. While
everything is going to shit I wanted to note that there are currently four
undecided Supreme Court cases from the March sitting on the Voting Rights Act,
Planned Parenthood, non-delegation, and a statutory deadline case.
And the following five justices haven't written yet
in that sitting, meaning there'll likely
be the ones writing the opinions in these cases.
Alito, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett.
Womp, womp, oh.
And there's also a chance that Justice Thomas has a First
Amendment case about porn.
And now for more good news, our episode about how businesses get to challenge regulations
kind of whenever and wherever rather than how Congress intended, how tobacco companies
get to sue the FDA in the wild, wild Fifth Circuit, if they so please, and how fuel producers
get to sue the EPA in a ruling that, according to Justice Jackson, quote, will no doubt aid
future attempts by the fuel industry
to attack the Clean Air Act, end quote.
And she adds, quote, gives fodder to the unfortunate perception
that moneyed interests enjoy an easier road to relief
in this court than ordinary citizens, end quote.
So don't go away.
Strict Scrutiny is brought to you by Zebiotics Pre-Alcohol.
I have to tell you about this game changing product I use before a night out with drinks. Itbiotics Pre-Alcohol. I have to tell you about this game-changing product I use
before a night out with drinks. It's called pre-alcohol. Let's face it, after a night with drinks,
I just don't bounce back the next day like I used to. I have to make a choice. I can either have a
great night or a great next day. And I can't afford to make that choice in bad decisions era,
when I need a drink at the end of the day, but also need to be ready to go the next day.
Thankfully I found pre-alcohol. Zebiotics's pre-alcohol probiotic drink is the world's
first genetically engineered probiotic. It was invented by PhD scientists to tackle rough
mornings after drinking. Here's how it works. When you drink, alcohol gets converted into a toxic
byproduct in the gut. It's a buildup of this byproduct, not dehydration, that's to blame for
rough days after drinking. Pre-alcohol produces an enzyme to break this byproduct, not dehydration, that's to blame for rough days after drinking.
Prealcohol produces an enzyme to break this byproduct down.
Just remember to make prealcohol your first drink of the night, drink responsibly, and
you'll feel your best tomorrow.
Every time I have prealcohol before it drinks, I notice a difference the next day.
Even after a night out, I can confidently plan on getting up to get all of my anxiety,
or at least a lot of my anxiety, out with exercise without worry. And that happens whether I'm having a Martha Rita
or a Big Baller or even a bigger baller. Summer is here, which means more opportunities to
celebrate the warm weather. Before that backyard barbecue brew, glass of Pino watching the
sunset at the beach, or cocktail by the campfire, don't forget your Z-Biotics pre-alcohol.
Drink one before drinking and wake up feeling great and ready to take on the next day and all that summer has to
offer. Go to zbyattics.com slash strict to learn more and get 15% off your first order
when you use strict at checkout. Zbyattics is backed with 100% money back guarantee,
so if you're unsatisfied for any reason, they'll refund your money, no questions
asked. Remember to head to zbyattics.com slash strict and use the code strict at checkout for 15% off. Hi everyone, it's Leah.
Kate and Melissa are unfortunately unavailable for recording, but don't worry, I'm not alone,
or even on a frosting-induced sugar high. On the latter, you'll have to take my word for recording, but don't worry, I'm not alone, or even on a frosting-induced sugar high.
On the latter, you'll have to take my word for it.
But on the former, I'm stoked to be verifiably joined
by returning guest Steve Vladeck, professor
at Georgetown Law and author of the indispensable One First
Substack, and first-time guest Mike Sacks.
Mike is a former legal journalist
who is now running for Congress out
of New York for Republican Representative Mike Lawler's
seat in particular.
I figured we needed a boost of energy, something to be excited about. So how about a possible
congressional representative who knows what's what on the federal courts? Welcome to Strict
Scrutiny, Steven Mike. Thanks for having us. Yeah, thanks Leah. This is our first or annual or
semi-occasional DEI for men with good personalities episode.
So I literally think this is the third time
I was trying to remember that we have had an episode
with two straight cis white men.
But one of those prior episodes did involve Steve
and that worked out okay.
So I think this will work, but we'll see.
If it doesn't, I'm gonna hold it against all white men though.
The good personality requirement might cut me off, though.
So, you know, Karen, no one asked Karen about that.
So here's the plan for today.
We're going to chat Supreme Court actions and then some legal news.
So, boys, are you ready? Ready.
Start your engines and may the best queen win.
So we got a bunch of different opinions last week,
both Wednesday and Friday.
We're going to quickly cover most of them
so you can all be up to speed on what it takes
to finish a Supreme Court term.
These aren't huge opinions, but we're gonna nerd out a bit
because all of them have interesting angles and nuggets
if you know where to look.
First up, got the opinion
in Nuclear Regulatory Commission versus Texas.
This was a six to3 decision authored by
Justice Kavanaugh with justices Alito, Thomas, and Gorsuch in dissent. The bottom line here
is few. The lower court, the Fifth Circuit, because it's always the Fifth Circuit, had
held that the NRC does not have the authority to license certain sites for nuclear waste
storage, authority it had exercised for decades. So this had enormous potential for disruption, but the Supreme Court said the parties who were complaining
here, a private facility in the state of Texas, weren't authorized to challenge
the licensing decision. So the court reversed the Fifth Circuit, always a good
sign, and basically said, not today Satan, on upending our entire system of storage
of nuclear waste. Gorsuch, joined by Thomas Alito, would have said, yesterday Satan and so dissented. Steve, what am I missing?
Not much. I mean, I think the only two things I would add, Leah, are
first, this was this was one of those Jim Ho specials where the Fifth Circuit had
relied upon a really fairly preposterous application of the major questions
doctrine to hold that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission lacked the power to,
you know. Double whammy, Jim Ho, major questions.
Well, but second, I mean, I really do think
that there's a theme that, you know,
this term has been dominated so much by Trump
and by all of the emergency applications.
But if we were to just look at the so-called merits cases,
to me, the most overarching theme of the term
is the Fifth Circuit behaving badly.
By my count, I think it's 16 of the cases
the court granted certiorari in.
18, if you count the appeals in the Louisiana redistricting
cases, came from the Fifth Circuit.
That's basically a quarter of the docket.
And at least to this point,
the Fifth Circuit's not doing very well.
And here's another example of why, mind you,
with the court finding a procedural reason
to get rid of the Fifth Circuit's ruling,
as opposed to saying,
actually they were wrong on the merits.
And so, I would prefer reversals on the merits,
because I think some of these opinions
are really remarkably either bizarre or wrongheaded
or both.
But when this is the court you have,
this is the result you can get.
Steve, I'm a little bit worried that Edith Jones is
going to print out a transcript of this episode
and bring it in a Manila folder to the next Federal Society
event with that remark
about the Fifth Circuit. I've been trying to give her more fodder because, you know, for her clerks
who hate listening to this podcast, there was a letter to the editor in the Wall Street Journal
on Friday by me about how the Trump administration had judge-shopped in Reid O'Connor's single Judge
Division in Wichita Falls, that's
definitely going in the folder. So, you know, we'll see if they can figure out how to make
this transcript go in there too.
So speaking of judge shopping, we also got the cases about where entities can file challenges
to various EPA and FDA actions. That's the Environmental Protection Agency and Food and
Drug Administration, and specifically whether the suits must go to the law forward, DC Circuit,
or whether they can instead be brought in the what is law,
don't know her, Fifth Circuit.
So on the EPA cases, which were a pair of cases,
EPA versus Kalametsh report refining and Oklahoma
versus EPA, the Supreme Court kind of split the baby.
Both opinions were authored by Justice Thomas,
and the court adopted a two-step test to determine whether an EPA action had nationwide scope or effect,
which requires cases to be filed in the DC Circuit, or whether an action instead was
locally or regionally applicable, in which case it could be filed in a regional circuit,
cough, cough, the climate disaster that is the Fifth Circuit. Under the two-step test,
courts first ask if it's nationally applicable or regionally
applicable.
The two cases involve two different actions,
denials of exemptions for individual small refineries
from a renewable fuel program, and then
the other denials of state implementation plans
for the Clean Air Act.
Both actions, the Supreme Court said,
were local and regional because they applied only
to particular entities.
But at the second step of the test,
the Supreme Court said the former
had nationwide scope or effect, and the latter was regionally
and locally applicable.
That's because the denials of the refinery exemptions
were based on a determination that as a legal matter
applies throughout the country and would have
had nationwide effects too, and that that determination
was the most important part of EPA's reasoning.
Steve, what were your reactions to this kind of test-ish
that the court adopted?
I might be jumping in the gun a bit.
I will say, I think the test in the EPA cases
is a little bit self-serving.
And basically, if we want the relevant regional court
of appeals to have the case, we'll find a way to let them.
And if we don't, we won't.
This is jumping ahead a bit.
I was much more troubled by the venue analysis
in the FDA case.
Because it seems to me that-
I know.
But so it seems to me that like this was venue day
at the Supreme Court and not just venue day
because if we throw in diamond alternative energy, I think you get venue and standing day.
And it is just, I mean, we don't have the time to do this justice, but the lengths to which
the justices will go to basically facilitate the ability of litigants that they like
to bring lawsuits where they want them to be able to bring them. I think is you know I mean Justice Jackson
called them out on it a little bit in one of her dissents on Friday but I'll
just say a little bit yeah a lot I mean you know not as much as footnote 12 in
the ADA case but but I'll just say you're jumping way ahead give us a sec okay I'm
sorry spoiler alert I just want to say though I mean I mentioned a couple But I'll just say- Steve, you are jumping way ahead. Give us a sec. Okay, I'm sorry. Spoiler alert.
I just want to say though,
I mean, I mentioned a couple of minutes ago,
I mean, in so far as one of the themes of this term
is how the, it's, you know, clean up on aisle Fifth Circuit.
It seems to me that the justices ought to be appreciating
that these two things are related
and that the easier that they're gonna make it
for litigants to basically steer cases into the Fifth Circuit, the more they're gonna have to clean up messes that the Fifth that they're gonna make it for litigants to basically steer cases
into the Fifth Circuit,
the more they're gonna have to clean up messes
that the Fifth Circuit makes.
I mean, how you can look at those two things
and not see a connection
is what I really don't get in these cases.
Let me go galaxy brain here on you guys.
Not just this term, but last term,
we're all about cleanup on aisle five.
And I was gonna use that term too, Steve.
My bad. But it's not just about cleanup on aisle five. And I was gonna use that term too, Steve. My bad.
But it's not just about cleanup on aisle fifth circuit.
It's about setting the fifth circuit up as a foil
to say, hey, we're not those guys, right?
They're MAGA, we're not quite MAGA.
And the Supreme Court uses the fifth circuit
to make itself look good.
I mean, the fifth circuit
is the one that takes the first action to do so.
But for the past two terms, this term and last term,
this court has brought terrible things
to bear on the Mariton cases, terrible.
But they are saying, but you can go with this
or you can go with those guys over there.
And in that way, this is more of Roberts
trying to make his court seem to look reasonable,
seem to get the headlines of a moderate court at the end of the term, even when they're doing wildly immoderate things on the things that actually truly matter to the supermajority.
But the galaxy brain stuff is this. They're shunting things to the Fifth Circuit only so that then they can get those things back on the merits and say, no, sorry, Fifth Circuit. And we saw that with the tobacco cases as well.
That was a note in, I think, Jackson's dissent
from that case.
Yes, we can send this thing back to the Fifth Circuit.
But remember, we still sided against tobacco folk
on the merits from the Fifth Circuit's decision there.
Yeah, well, so on that galaxy brain analysis,
I think even if the Supreme Court can't totally
control what cases they
have to take from the Fifth Circuit, given that because of how crazy the Fifth Circuit
acts, I don't think the court has a choice about whether to take some of their cases.
But what I do think they have a choice over is whether to tell the Fifth Circuit to knock
it the fuck off and actually go out of their way to tell them
they are out of line. And they have yet to do so even when they reverse the Fifth Circuit.
And friend of the pod, Sherrilyn Eiffel, has kind of described the relationship between
the Supreme Court and the Fifth Circuit as like the parent who spoils the child and never
actually disciplines them and therefore I think is enabling this bad behavior.
So anyways, since you both have already alluded to it,
we also got the FDA opinion about where
to file challenges to FDA actions or some of them.
And in that case, FDA versus R.J. Reynolds,
the Supreme Court went all in on go ahead
with regional circuits. So the Supreme Court went all in on go ahead with regional circuits.
So the Supreme Court said that retailers who would sell a new tobacco product, if not for
the FDA's denial order, may seek judicial review of the order in the place where said
retailer resides.
This essentially allows entities to pick where they will challenge an FDA denial order, cough
cough, Fifth Circuit, since you can always
find a prospective retailer.
So more forum shopping on matters of public health.
And the Fifth Circuit is going to help these guys make America
healthy again by requiring us all
to inject ourselves with ketamine, drink raw milk,
and do other things too.
So this was a 72 barred opinion.
And Justice Jackson, joined by Justice Sotomayor, descends.
I kind of think the Supreme Court has gotten the message from the Republicans in Congress
that forum shopping is bad when Democrats do it and good when tobacco companies do.
Mike, you had already kind of alluded to Justice Jackson sounding an alarm to that effect.
Did you want to explain a little bit more kind of what she had said?
So yeah, Justice Jackson and her dissent in this case continues along her path towards
being the avatar of what the Supreme Court can be, should we will it. Every time she writes
separately, almost every time she writes separately, since she's joined the bench,
she has focused on the democratic process. She's focused on deferring to Congress and what Congress
intends. She's deferred to the will of the people, absent clear constitutional restraints.
And this is something that we don't get anymore
in this judicial supremacist Supreme Court.
So I've been tracking this for some time,
and every time I read anything she does,
I go immediately to Control F Congress.
I go immediately to her first and last paragraphs,
which then in these cases-
Congress, what's that?
Yeah, correct.
In each of these cases,
she just goes full bore on talking about the will of Congress,
not the will of the court.
And sometimes this is kind of a thing that the dissent and majority do back and forth
when they're doing statutory interpretation.
But she comes out with such force and with such authority that it's clear when she's
writing, she is actually taking seriously Congress's will. So she just keeps going consistently
to talk about what Congress intended.
And that has been her when talking about federal laws,
has been her lodestar in ways that is refreshing
at this point with the Supreme Court
that all too often inserts its own interpretation,
its own understanding to pursue into its own
right-wing agenda when reading our laws.
Steve, I know you mentioned you were especially troubled
by the venue analysis in the FDA case.
So I also wanted to give you a chance
to add to why that was.
The really, really short version is just
that it is so easy for a large corporation
that wants to suit a challenge regulation
under the majority's analysis
to find any mom and pop retailer,
a gas station that sells vapes
and thereby sort of pick whatever court in the country
they want to put their lawsuit in.
And in a world in which we had a normal distribution of federal judges across the United States,
that might not be so troubling in a world in which I think even the folks who are more
positively disposed toward the Fifth Circuit than I think the three of us are, would have
to admit the Fifth Circuit is an outlier.
All this means is that more and more of these cases will be brought in the Fifth Circuit
when it's this set of regulations, and in the First or the Fourth Circuit when it's
in the other direction.
That just seems like it's only going to exacerbate these litigation trends that we're seeing,
where instead of randomness in the lower courts, litigants are really able to manipulate
to the maximum extent the best possible judge
or at least the best possible bench to get their case before,
which by the way, just puts more pressure on the Supreme Court.
Yeah, and you mentioned that it's
big corporations who are going to be able to do this.
And I think that speaks to the point
that you and Mike were gesturing toward earlier
that I know we're going to come back to,
which is which kinds of litigants the Supreme Court
favors and gives more power to control their cases.
Strict scrutiny is brought to you by bookshop.org.
Whether you're searching for an incisive history that
helps you make sense of this moment,
a novel that sweeps you away, or the perfect gift for a loved one, Bookshop.org has you covered. When you purchase from Bookshop.org,
you're supporting more than 2,000 local independent bookstores across the country,
ensuring they'll continue to foster culture, curiosity, and a love of reading for generations
to come. Also big news, Bookshop.org has launched an ebook app. You can now support local independent bookstores even when you read digitally.
Now that my book tour is somewhat drawing to a close, I have needed some reading material
to decompress.
Also now that we're really in the thick of bad decision season.
Melody recommended Lisa Claypaws and I have already devoured the entire Wallflower series
and the entire Ravenel series. If you're
also a historical romance person, please send me your REX. I always love a good book and I really
love being able to purchase those books from bookshop.org to support independent bookstores.
Use code STRIK24 to get 10% off your next order at bookshop.org. That's code STRIK24 at bookshop.org. So unfortunately, that decision wasn't the only attack on administrative agencies we
got last week.
These guys were not going to let Doge and Big Balls have all the fun.
So wanted to talk about two together.
One is the Supreme Court issued the opinion in McLaughlin Chiropractic Association versus McKesson.
The formal holding in the case is that a federal law,
the Hobbs Act, does not bind district courts
in civil enforcement proceedings to how an agency interpreted
a statute.
But the practical effect of that ruling
is to allow parties to challenge an agency's order, well, after the order has gone into effect,
in litigation in which the government is not a party,
and in another court where they can choose to sue.
So the judicial review provisions of the Hobbs Act
require agency orders, like the federal communication orders
at issue here, to be subject to the exclusive review
of the Court of Appeals in
pre-enforcement suits.
But these guys were not going to let that get in the way of a good time.
So as Justice Kagan noted in her dissent, this holding subjects all administrative schemes
and the many businesses and individuals relying on them to the ever-present risk of disruption.
This was a 6-3 Kavanaugh opinion with a Justice Kagan dissent, the very definition
of an unfair fight.
Just one sampling, Justice Kagan's footnote,
quote, the majority's response relegated to a footnote
is hard to make out.
Yeah.
Unfortunately, we've still more fun and done
with the deep state.
So the next decision is diamond alternative energy
versus EPA, where Brett the Builder said, fuck climate change.
But Steve, do you want to actually summarize
what the court said?
Sure.
I mean, so it's an Article III standing case,
at least in theory.
And the question is whether this alternative energy
group in California had the power or had the right
to challenge the EPA's approval of certain
attempts by California at the state level to regulate various forms of emissions and
other pollution.
I will say, Lee, what I find striking about not just the majority opinion in Diamond Alternative
Energy, but its authorship is this is the same Brett Kavanaugh who wrote the majority
opinion in TransUnion saying, no, standing
is super limited and we have to be very wary about it.
And here it's like, oh, you actually have some indirect way in which you think the EPA's
approval of this other thing is kosher or not kosher, go to court.
I will say I am relatively sympathetic to broad theories of Article 3 standing.
So I'm less troubled by the result
in Diamond Alternative Energy, what I find really exasperating about it is actually the inconsistency,
right? That you have the majority opinion written by Justice Brett Kavanaugh, who wrote the majority
opinion in TransUnion versus Ramirez, where a 5-4 majority struck down a statute, right? That
authorized particular plaintiffs
to bring lawsuits against credit protection agencies
when they were maintaining databases
with incorrect information.
It seems like you can't be like super anti-standing
when it's consumers and super pro broad theories of standing
when it's these energy companies trying to indirectly
challenge what California is doing.
And I think most of the justices are being-
Right, Kavanaugh doing the usher, watch this, yes you can.
I think it's just that like the conservative justices
don't see how much they like are sympathetic to standing
when they're sympathetic to the litigants
and how much they're not when they're not.
And it just seems like-
Well, except Justice Jackson made them see that today,
didn't she, in her dissent?
Well, and so, but no, but so this is why I found Justice Jackson's dissent
in Diamond Altar of Energy so fricking useful.
And something that's already going on
in my federal court syllabus for the fall.
Oh, for sure.
Because, you know, I mean,
and I really think this has been a theme
in Justice Jackson's opinions this entire term,
but it really came out last week,
is that she is
like calling things as she sees them.
Yeah.
And you know, in Diamond Alternative Energy, that means like literally accusing the majority
of recognizing standing for litigants, you know, for big for basically money, business
interests and nobody else.
Now you have sort of attempts to rationalize these doctrines that seem to be completely
just incoherent when it comes to why some people get to sue and why others don't.
So I want to just make two extra points about this particular case, bringing us back to
this case, the EPA case.
One is about the case itself and the other is about the makeup of the majority.
So this case has been going on for a couple of years now,
but it goes back to when 2013, the Obama EPA
let California lead the way on vehicle emission standards.
And then Trump comes in office in 2019,
then says, nope, sorry, reverses.
Then 2021, Biden EPA reinstates the 2013 Obama rule.
And then 2022, Republican state AGs and fuel companies
sue to restore the Trump rule
Because they weren't gonna get it back in and back into the political process and then the DC circuit
Said no standing for the fuel companies, which is how it came to here and rejected the suit from from others as well
right, so what happened now is Trump's back in office and
Multiple times in both the majority and then in Jackson's dissent,
the justices acknowledged that Trump is about to reverse course again.
And yet, as Jackson noted, this court still decides to jump in and make a hash and a mess
of standing analysis when they could have just said, you know what, we're not going
to even rule in this case.
I think even the Trump administration said, please don't weigh in at this point.
We're on our way towards rescinding the rule.
So this is the court again, jumping in to make a hash of things, but let's just note the majority here was seven to two.
You had Kagan with the majority.
And in Friday's cases, Kagan was showing herself as a conciliator
trying to, I don't know, you know, find common ground with the super majority
in ways that she did not on the issue that she really
truly cares about where it was 6-3 and she wrote the dissent on a matter of administrative law
and extending Loper-Bright outward towards new issues. And she made that perfectly clear.
But in other cases, she was siding with the supermajority here. We're siding with conservative
right-wing results. So I wanted to note one thing about the majority
and then one thing about the Jackson descent.
But I know we have a lot of other things to cover.
So just quickly, because this was a Coach Kavanaugh opinion,
my eyes and ears were subjected to the following hypothetical.
Quote, if the government prohibits aluminum bats
in Little League, then aluminum bat manufacturers,
not only Little League, might be objects of the regulation.
This was just an aside on a legal theory
he didn't even address.
And Steve, you had mentioned that he
might have had a special guest in the courtroom,
supposedly, Kim Mulkey.
And I wondered if that's why I was subjected to that terror.
But second, the thing about the dissent, the Jackson dissent,
which we've already alluded to, she
makes pretty remarkable claims about how the court can at least
be perceived to be favoring the fuel industry
and corporations.
So she writes, quote, I worry that the fuel industry's gain
comes at a reputational cost for this court, which
is already viewed by many as being overly
sympathetic to corporate interests.
She acknowledges some researchers have suggested
the reputation is unfounded, but at the end of the day,
that perception is pervasive
and the mere appearance of favoritism
can undermine confidence in the integrity of the judiciary.
I appreciated that call out.
That is also definitely going in my FedCourts class
as well, Steve.
So just, I think that that was part of the pro-democracy
concern, Mike, that you had been highlighting.
Anti-billionaire capture.
Yeah, it's terrible.
Yeah, exactly.
So another case in which that theme came through
was Stanley v. City of Sanford, a 7 to 2 Gorsuch opinion.
There were some concurrences in the judgment.
There the court held that a retiree cannot bring a suit
under the Americans with Disabilities Act
if they, quote, do not hold or desire
to hold an employment position, end quote,
that they're capable of performing
with a reasonable accommodation.
So here, Stanley retired because of a disability.
And then after she retired, she sued her employer
because of changes they made in their policy on health insurance
benefits for retirees.
But at that point, the Supreme Court said
she didn't want the job and therefore she can't sue.
So Justice Thomas had a concurrence
that we do have to talk about.
Welcome to our now recurring segment
of we need to talk about Clarence Thomas's concurrence
or conclarance.
What was the concurrence Mike
and why was it so striking?
Oh geez, okay.
And this was joined by Justice Barrett.
We need to remind ourselves of this as well
because of all the chatter over the past couple weeks
of Barrett somehow slipping left
because she's not always with Trump,
we need to remember that she is fully on board
with the right-wing legal movement's agenda here.
And in this Clarence Thomas concurrence,
he writes separately to express my concern
with the increasingly common practice
of litigants urging this court to grant certiorari to resolve one question and then after we do so, pivoting to an entirely different question.
That's exactly what Mississippi did in Dobbs and Thomas and Barrett weren't exactly complaining about it then. So when the jobs came to the court, Ginsburg was still alive. And the question that Mississippi put to the court
was about its 15-week ban and whether to, I think,
erase the viability line or really revise
the undue burden standard in Casey, right?
It was geared towards Roberts, then the median vote,
to uphold a 15-week ban and strike
the penultimate death blow towards Roe,
but not the ultimate one.
But then Barrett came to the court and the court was considering whether to take the case for a very long time and the moment they then agreed to hear the case, Mississippi in its merits brief,
then said, oh never mind that, let's overturn Roe. And what did the Supreme Court do including
Justice Thomas and Justice Barrett? They went
along with that. They did the very thing that Thomas and Barrett, in this very opinion, is big
mad at the litigants doing here. So just the hypocrisy and the lack of self-awareness is obscene.
Maybe this was hypocrisy week at the court, although that seems like more than one week
from what we are seeing.
So this was another case where there was a Jackson dissent
that I think sounded some of her concerns with the court's
project and whose interests the court was favoring
and how they were going about it.
So there was a remarkable footnote.
And even though her dissent was joined by Justice Sotomayor
here she spoke only for herself and instead of reading this footnote I am instead going to share with our listeners
The following jam of the summer which is friend of the pod
Ellie must all putting this footnote footnote 12 to music on tik-tok and we all need this energy right now. So here you go
And we all need this energy right now. So here you go. The majority's contention that I reject pure textualism as
insufficiently pliable to secure the result I seek stems from an
unfortunate misunderstanding of the judicial role. Our interpretive
task is not to seek our own desired results, whatever they may be, and
indeed it is precisely because of this solemn duty that, in my view, it is imperative that
we interpret statutes consistent with all relevant indicia of what Congress wanted,
as best we can ascertain its intent.
A methodology that includes consideration of Congress's aims does exactly
that and no more. By contrast, pure textualism's refusal to try to understand the text of a
statute in the larger context of what Congress sought to achieve turns the interpretive task into a potent weapon for advancing judicial policy
preferences. By finding answers in ambiguous steps, and not bothering to consider whether
those answers align with the other sources of statutory meaning, pure textualists can easily disguise their own preferences as textual inevitabilities.
So, really, far from being insufficiently pliable,
I think pure textualism is incessantly malleable.
And that's its primary problem.
And indeed, it is certainly somehow always flexible enough to secure the majority's desired outcome.
Mike and Steve, I know, I mean, like this footnote is a banger.
I don't know if you wanted to share particular reactions to it.
I mean, the last sentence is amazing.
I'll let Steve handle this one though, if he wants to.
No, I mean, I think it's just Jackson, I mean, again, she's saying what I think so many of us have
been thinking and she is distilling into accessible prose what really are in many respects the
central analytical critiques of the dominant methodological commitment or at least the
dominant purported methodological commitments of the justice in the majority.
And you know, more power to her.
And I'm curious as to Sotomayor not joining in this footnote
because she doesn't agree with it
or because she actually wanted to let Jackson
have it for herself.
Yes.
And not take credit for what really is
an unusually strong accusation of methodological manipulation by one of the justices.
I think to some degree Sotomayor, because this was this a Gorsuch opinion?
Yeah.
Yeah, I think Sotomayor to some degree still likes to hold on to her
frenemieship with Gorsuch when it comes time for certain criminal justice issues.
Now, Jackson joins those two as well.
Yeah.
But I think I think there's something to what Steve just said
because this footnote is consistent with, again,
Justice Jackson's vision of the future
of a pro-democracy Supreme Court, right?
She says, quite literally, she says,
it is imperative that we interpret statutes
consistent with all relevant indicia of what Congress wanted
as best as we can ascertain its intent.
And then she just goes and says pure textualism is result-oriented garbage.
That's how she ends it.
And it's a straight-on assault on Gorsuch and his pure textualism.
But it's also a defense of the modality of statutory interpretation that conservatives
have spent the last 40 years vilifying, which is looking like, yes, legislative
history is imperfect and yes, legislative history can be manipulated, but there are
reasons why it is legitimate to ask what the context is in which words are adopted.
She really is, I think, in some respects, claiming the mantle of intellectual leadership for the,
not on everything, I mean, I think it's still
Justice Kagan on some of the other stuff,
and I think it's still Justice Sotomayor
on criminal procedure issues, for example,
but on methodology, this is like Jackson really,
I think, stepping up.
She is the alternative voice there.
It's vision, it's vision.
I think Kagan and Sotomayor arrived at the bench in a defensive crouch in the pre-Dobbs
era.
And Jackson is the justice for a post-Dobbs era, for those who no longer believe in judicial
supremacy for good or for ill.
And also for those who don't think the battle or war will be won by trying to compromise
and instead we need something entirely new.
That's also where I see her coming in.
I just want one quick thing about the Thomas concurrence
and then just before we run past it,
which is just there should come a point, right?
Where the justices have to stop pretending
that they are ignorant of all of the discussion
of what the court does.
I mean, right? There is so much work being done out there right now
about how often the court is reaching questions
the parties didn't present, about how often the court is
rewriting the question presented to answer whatever
they want to answer.
For Thomas to say, this is not what we do is is, you know, it's galling.
Yeah.
So two quick opinions I'm going to quickly summarize
before we get to another that has an Alito dissent that
is worth pausing over.
So one of the opinions, FOLD versus Palestinian Liberation
Organization and Palestinian Authority,
is where the PLO and PA were sued
under the Promoting Security and Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act.
The law designates those entities
as defendants that shall be deemed
to have consented to jurisdiction in Anti-Terrorism
Act litigation.
The law subjects them to jurisdiction on the theory
that they pay salaries for terrorists in Israeli prisons
and families of deceased terrorists, which
promote terrorism, and because of their activities
on United States soil.
The Supreme Court said that did not violate the due process clause because a statute reasonably
ties the assertion of jurisdiction over the PLO and PA to conduct involving the United States
and implicating sensitive foreign policy matters within the prerogative of the political branches.
This was a unanimous opinion with a Justice Thomas concurrence in the judgment that I actually, blessedly,
think we don't have to talk about.
In Perttu versus Richards, the Supreme Court
held that parties are entitled to a jury trial on Prison
Litigation Reform Act exhaustion questions, which
are about whether plaintiffs exhausted
their administrative remedies for legal violations that
occur in prison, at least when that issue is intertwined
with the merits of a claim that requires a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment.
Here, the issue of exhaustion was linked with the underlying merits, because the plaintiff
had said there were threats of retaliation after they reported a sexual assault claim,
and that those threats deterred them from seeking future recourse, i.e. from further
exhausting their remedies.
This was
a 5-4 opinion by the Chief Justice, joined by Justice Gorsuch and the Democratic appointees.
Final SCOTUS opinion. In a Starris v. United States, Justice Barrett in a 7-2 opinion held
that district courts, in considering whether to revoke a defendant's supervised release,
may not consider retribution vis-a-vis the defendant's underlying offense.
The statute setting out preconditions for imposing supervised reliefs does not include
that sentencing factor, which is listed in 3553a, the statute about imposing the initial
sentence.
The opinion was 7-2.
The dissent was authored by Alito, joined by Gorsuch.
Justices Sotomayor and Jackson filed concurrences.
They don't think courts revoking supervised release
can consider retribution for any purpose.
And Sam Alito really needed to take an emotional lap
before filing this dissent.
So here's the opening.
Quote, veteran trial judges often complain
that their appellate colleagues live
in a world of eerie abstractions and do not
give enough thought to the practical effects
of their holdings.
Today's decision is likely to earn
the rank of exhibit A
in the trial bench's catalog of appellate otherworldliness."
End quote.
Raise your hand if you are a trial judge
and you have felt personally attacked by Sam Alito.
Notice everyone raising their hands.
So Sam Alito is the guy in the hot dog suit meme.
Like, we're all trying to find the guy who did this
because we could play a game where we go around and name examples of Sam Alito not the guy in the hot dog suit meme. Like, we're all trying to find the guy who did this, because we could play a game where we go around and name
examples of Sam Alito not giving two shits about trial judges.
I would start with his opinion in Alexander versus South
Carolina conference of the NAACP.
Or there's New York versus Department of Commerce.
Like, this guy just doesn't care about fact findings
that don't go his way. Also the only two former
district judges on the court voted the other way, Sam, and that didn't give him pause.
Also, I don't understand why Sam Alito was so angry. So Wired reported that one of Martha
Anne Alito's favorite flags, the Appeal to Heaven flag, a popular symbol for Christian
nationalists that was waived by January 6 rioters, was raised over the small business administration
headquarters in the last two weeks.
Apparently, they're knocking back Martha Riedes at the SBA.
And I'm pretty sure Melissa manifested this at our live show
by engaging in some Martha Anne erasure
by admitting that she, Melissa, had forgotten about the whole
freak flag flying thing.
Now to more SCOTUS-adjac adjacent legal news. So the Ninth Circuit formally
stayed Judge Breyer's order that found Trump's federalization of the California National
Guard unlawful. So that order returning control of the California National Guard to the California
governor is not in effect and isn't going to go into effect. So Steve, what did the
Ninth Circuit do and how concerned should we be about the decision?
Yeah, I mean, I think I know what the Ninth Circuit did is it basically said that given
where we are right now, it is not clear that the plaintiffs have that strong the plaintiffs
that Governor Newsom has that strong a chance of winning on the merits with regard to the
claim that this random obscure federal statute 10 USC U.S.C. section 12406, doesn't allow for the federalization of, so far,
4,000 members of the California National Guard
for what they've done to date,
which critically, at least as of now,
or at least in the posture
in which the Ninth Circuit decided this,
did not include what we might call
ordinary law enforcement activity.
The case was already back
before Judge Breyer Friday afternoon, with California now arguing that there has been
some law enforcement activity. And so there's been, in California's view, a violation of the
Posse Comitatus Act, this 1878 statute that prohibits using the military domestically for
law enforcement without specific congressional authorization.
Leah, I don't see the Ninth Circuit decision
as really foreordaining what happens
on the preliminary injunction.
I think it's just saying, we need more.
Before we can really hold that any of this is unlawful,
we need more evidence that something
is happening beyond just federalizing the National Guard.
So can I ask you about that?
Because obviously I agree that this decision doesn't say anything about the Posse Comitatus
issue.
That is, it only addresses this kind of threshold question of activating the Guard.
It doesn't say anything about what the Guard might be doing.
But are you saying that this decision doesn't even
foreclose Breyer doing the same thing for other reasons
or based on additional evidence based on the activation issue?
So I mean, I think it makes it harder.
So granting a state of a TRO is not necessarily saying
there's 100% chance we're going to rule for President
Trump on the merits.
It certainly makes it harder.
And so I think Judge Breyer would need pretty good reasons to say that the federalization
itself was unlawful for the purpose of the preliminary injunction.
I will just say, and I think Leah betraying my own views to a degree, I've always thought
that the much larger concern here is the law enforcement piece of it.
Yes, yay, yay, yay.
I am not as bothered in the abstract by the notion
that president should be allowed to federalize
the National Guard in some circumstances
without the governor's consent.
I think that's not just a fair reading of the statute,
I think it's a good reading of history.
To me, the issue is what are you using the National Guard for?
To my mind, what you're using the National Guard for
is basically inextricably linked to this activation question.
If you think the president is kind of federalizing
the National Guard based on the idea
that there has been some legal violations, vandalism,
disorder that is ordinarily the purview of state and local law enforcement and that efforts to do
something about it are just inextricably related to that traditional law enforcement. Mike, it looks
like you wanted to say something. Yeah, I think this ultimately came down to a level of deference to the executive as the
executive, not to the executive as Donald Trump.
And this panel, which was one of the normie, they said one is a normie Trump judge in the
Ninth Circuit, a Trump judge in the Ninth Circuit, and then a Biden judge was unanimous
in extending this presumption of regularity to the executive.
And I think what Judge Breyer did was say, you're not regular.
This is not normal.
But when it gets to the Ninth Circuit, maybe their view was that at this point, well, at
least for Judge Sung, the Supreme Court will probably do what the other judges of the Ninth
Circuit wanted to do.
So let's not stick my neck out here in ways that the Supreme Court could then see otherwise.
But really, this comes down to presumption of regularity.
We talk a lot about this.
And this is a hard question for judges, because on the one hand, we have a deeply irregular
president who acts in consistent bad faith, and it's plain for all to see.
But when it gets laundered through the court system, the courts have to look at it at this
president or they insist they must look at this president through the lens of just a
theoretical executive.
This is what we saw with the Supreme Court, at least with John Roberts's position in
Trump v. US.
That runs headlong into letting a would-be autocrat run rampant through this country,
so long as he can pull some statutory authorization that requires courts to defer to the executive.
And that's messed up.
But on the other hand, if you don't presume regularity,
then when the worm turns, then if the next president
who is a Democrat has to pull a little rock
and a court says, well, no, that's irregular too,
and we won't let the president activate the National Guard.
In that regard, that's another consideration.
But then we have to remember that at least at this point in our political history,
Republicans are deeply irregular, both in how they act in power
and how their judges act when they don't have political power.
And there will be no fair play.
Republican judges will extend a presumption of irregularity
to a regular Democratic administration in ways
that now, at least Judge Sung in this case,
was extending a presumption of regularity
to a highly irregular president in this case.
Steve, I know you are going to have to bounce.
So I want to give you the chance to say more about the Ninth
Circuit decision and this issue before you have to go.
Sure.
So first, I'm going to say I'm really
glad that someone from my fall 1L small group, other
than Stuart Rhodes, is now making news.
Jennifer Sung, fall 2001 Rubenfeld small group
for the win.
And boy, was that, yeah, that's a whole, that's
a different episode. So I think, I mean, Mike's exactly right that the whole issue here is
the presumption of regularity. I will just say that I also think it is entirely proper,
given how the Supreme Court has been behaving on emergency applications for circuit judges
who are not just in the bag for whatever President Trump wants to do,
to be thinking about how to put these cases
in the best possible posture for if and when
they go to the Supreme Court.
And it seems like, you know, Mike,
I agree that figuring out when the presumption
of regularity can and should be overcome
is perhaps the dominant tricky question of the moment.
I think a national
security case about using military force is not going to be first for John Roberts, Brett Kavanaugh,
and Amy Coney Barrett. And so part of this, again, is my own biases. I actually am less troubled
historically by using the military domestically in some circumstances. And part of it is also that I think
in the broad strokes of things,
the place where this becomes a big problem
is not just the federalization, but if we're doing...
So let me back up a second.
If it's okay for the president to use troops, for example,
to protect the federal courthouse in Portland,
as President Trump did in 2020, then I think the question is federal courthouse in Portland, as President Trump
did, right, in 2020, then I think the question is, what's happening in LA that's different?
And there are answers to that question.
And that's what, and that's, and there are good answers to that question.
And I'm on, I'm on the side that this is different, but it's different not simply because he said,
let's have troops to protect federal functions, right?
It's different to me, at least, because of largely what's happening on the ground.
That's why, Leah, I think the preliminary injunction hearing and proceedings are so
important.
Yeah, no.
I mean, Judge Breyer acknowledged that he did not have before him at the time evidence
as to whether these National Guardsmen were performing ordinary law enforcement functions.
And that would be very important to have in any proceedings on this issue about whether the
National Guard are being used properly. Steve, thanks so much for joining us.
Thanks so much for having me, Leah. Mike, great to be with you too.
Strict Scrutiny is brought to you by Mint Mobile. You know what doesn't belong in your epic summer
plans? Getting burned by your old wireless bill. While you're planning beach trips, barbecues, and three-day
weekends, your wireless bill should be the last thing holding you back. That's why
crooked staffer Nina made the switch to Mint Mobile. With plans starting at $15 a month,
Mint Mobile gives you premium wireless service on the nation's largest 5G network, the
coverage and speed you're used to, but way less money.
So while your friends are sweating over data overages and surprise charges, you'll be
chilling, literally and financially.
Say bye-bye to your overpriced wireless plans, jaw-dropping monthly bills, and unexpected
overages.
Mint Mobile will rescue you.
All of their plans come with high-speed data and unlimited talk and text, all delivered
on the nation's largest 5G network. Crooked staffer Nina ditched her old wireless plan
and she says, I'm saving $40 a month. Love love love this service and recommend it to
everyone I know. This year, skip breaking a sweat and breaking the bank. Get your summer savings and shop premium wireless plans at mintmobile.com slash strict.
That's mintmobile.com slash strict.
Up from payment of $45 for three month,
five gigabyte plan required equivalent to $15 a month.
New customer offer for first three months only,
then full price plan options available.
Taxes and fees extra.
See Mint Mobile for details.
options available. Taxes and fees extra. See Mint Mobile for details.
Mike, we are going to proceed onward with legal news. And here it is legal news that's kind of like other Supreme Court actions that relate to developments in the lower courts that we wanted
to highlight. So the Supreme Court ordered a state court
to take another look at whether New York's
abortion health care coverage requirement,
the law requiring insurance to cover abortions,
violates the religious rights of anti-abortion entities.
The reason why the court ordered reconsideration though
is kind of what raised a red flag.
And that's the Supreme Court said the lower court
had to take another look at the case
in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Catholic charities.
The decision that held unconstitutional a rule
requiring religious entities to engage in proselytization
in order to be eligible for a state tax exemption.
There, that is in Catholic charities,
the court reasoned that the anti-proselytization rule
discriminated against certain denominations that
don't allow for proscelization.
Suggesting Catholic charities is relevant here.
To a law requiring health insurance coverage for abortion
is concerning because it's holding open the possibility
that a rule protecting abortion rights
discriminates against denominations
that object to abortion.
And that's basically exactly what
we warned about when we discussed Catholic charities,
as you can hear here.
I think we'd be remiss if we didn't point out
all of the ways in which this decision, despite its efforts
to hem in this out-of-control majority,
may still pave the way for more significant changes
in First Amendment doctrine.
So here's a question.
What other conditions will the Supreme Court
say discriminate between different religions
or different religious denominations?
What about a non-discrimination condition?
Would the Supreme Court say that that discriminates
against certain denominations, provides an opportunity
to distinguish between different denominations?
What would this decision mean in the context
of religious hospitals or organizations that
are affiliated with a church?
And I don't think this is an abstract question,
because over the last couple of years,
there have been a number of hospital consolidations
under hospital corporations that are affiliated
with the Catholic Church and the Baptist Church.
I'm thinking of Dignity Health, for example.
What rules can states apply to those kinds of organizations and their work going forward?
And the Supreme Court is not the only Republican controlled federal court that's digging into the
anti-abortion, anti-feminist aspects of the Republican Party's agenda. So the country's
chief scientist, slash chief immigration officer, slash chief financial regulator,
yes, Matthew Kazmieric, a district judge in Texas,
issued a banger of an opinion that struck down the 2024 Biden HIPAA rule protecting reproductive
health information from disclosure to law enforcement investigators when legally obtained,
including in other states, because what we really need right now is more policing women's reproduction.
And because Matthew Kasmyarek is Matthew Kasmyarek, he had to go a little fetal personhood. So he wrote, quote, The 2024 rule relies on the Dictionary Act to deny legal status and
rights to unborn humans.
In so doing, the 2024 rule is facially contrary to the Dictionary Act's terms, end quote.
Mike, can you remind us what fetal personhood is and why this is not just a threat in Texas?
Fetal personhood is the legal theory that would declare abortion itself unconstitutional
throughout the entire country.
That's at bottom what it is.
To expand, it's saying that fetuses are persons
under the 14th Amendment,
and so their rights would trump women's rights
under the 14th Amendment and their reproductive freedom.
A challenge to say New York State's strong abortion law
as violating the right of a fetus to life,
if a court buys that, then down goes every other state
protection for abortion in the rest of this country.
I would call it the reverse row.
Yeah.
For years, for years, the fight against Roe coming from
Justice Rehnquist's pen and Justice Scalia's pen and the
Federalist Society was a Federalist argument.
It wasn't pro or anti-abortion as the justices and dobs insisted
on in its decision.
No, it was a federalist issue.
It was something that the constitution was silent about.
The constitution is silent on abortion.
Therefore, it should be a state policy preference.
Or in Kavanaugh's concurrence, Congress can weigh in as well.
But not courts, not the constitution.
But in the Dobbs briefing, you saw briefs by Robbie George and John
Finnis, who are leaders of the more theocratic element
of the right-wing legal movement, who have been for years
arguing for fetal personhood.
The court in Dobbs didn't want to go there,
but that's clearly the next step in the right-wing anti-abortion
movement, to get, by judicial fiat, abortion banned across the country
as unconstitutional.
It's really the mirror image of Roe versus Wade
for those who were once screaming
that Roe versus Wade was awful.
And anti-democratic, yeah.
And this isn't just happening in Texas, right Mike?
No, it's not.
It's happening here in New York. So last week a trio of Republican-appointed federal judges on the Second Circuit,
Court of Appeals, threw out a challenge to New York State's Reproductive Health Act,
but gave future plaintiffs a roadmap to establish fetal personhood and have abortion declared unconstitutional.
There was a case called Doe v. Hokel, and there was a plaintiff there who sought to represent
a, quote, class of viable fetuses in New York
against the Reproductive Health Act.
And the argument was that it violated fetuses' right
to life and equal protection under the 14th Amendment.
Now, these judges said that this next friend
of the class of fetuses
she sought to represent did not have standing
because she wasn't able to actually say this fetus got,
this one fetus or several fetuses were directly impacted
by the Reproductive Health Act.
But the court then went on to say that though she failed
to identify or otherwise describe any class member
in the viable fetus class that she sought to represent, it did say someone, at some point, an expectant father,
this is another quote, other relative, or perhaps even a non-relative, who describes
the viable fetus they seek to represent with sufficient specificity could walk through
the courthouse doors.
Now this trio of Republican appointed judges were coy about what they would rule if they're presented
with a proper standing litigant.
But this is the roadmap through the courthouse doors
to get into federal court to argue for fetal personhood,
at least one of the ways.
So we're seeing it, it has begun now.
It's wild because this is just three years after Dobbs
and it is a reminder of how quickly the Overton window
shifts and courts roll in that.
And it's a matter of the composition of the Supreme Court
too.
If there weren't five justices ready to go full reverse row
this time in Dobbs, all it takes is a few more.
And that's what this movement is hoping for.
Meanwhile, Mandy Kazmeric, Emperor Amarillo, as I like to call him, is trying to still
– we're waiting to see whether he's going to resuscitate the case against Smith
and Pristone.
And he would do so by saying that several states that sought to intervene that are not
in Texas can be in his courtroom, even though the Supreme Court threw out the actual Texas-based
plaintiffs.
And we're waiting for that to come out, even as this Trump administration is
considering whether to do what Kazimerek was looking
to do by court through administrative action
and revoke FDA's approval of MFDI.
Yeah, that's the case we've talked about with Emily Amick,
where the state's theory of injury
is that teenagers are not having enough babies.
So anyways, that unfortunately is not the only thing happening
in the lower courts as fallout from the Supreme Court's
approach to sex discrimination.
So we did an emergency episode last week
on Skirmety with Chase Strangio and talked
about how there the Supreme Court,
or at least the Republican justices,
signaled that maybe a little sex
stereotyping is a OK, totally kosher.
And longer time listeners might be familiar with the case
of Brenda Andrew.
That is the woman who was convicted and sentenced
to death on the basis of a trial that
included some absolutely outlandish instances
of sex stereotyping, so much so that the case has been
described as an instance where someone,
Brenda Andrew, was sex shamed to death.
So Brenda was accused of conspiring
to murder her husband.
At trial, the prosecution introduced
a bunch of evidence of Brenda's sexual history,
suggesting a grieving widow wouldn't
have dressed like such a slut, eliciting
lurid details about her affairs, showing the jury
her sexy underwear, also using that to suggest Brenda
wasn't innocent and maybe was guilty of murder. In what was truly an extraordinary win, Brenda
Anders' lawyers pulled off a nearly impossible feat, convincing the United States Supreme Court
to issue a decision siding with a habeas petitioner. After the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th
Circuit denied Brenda's habeas petition on the ground that there was no clearly established law
prohibiting sex stereotyping.
Yes, you heard that right.
The lawyers at Phillips Black convinced the Supreme Court to send Brenda's case back down
to the 10th Circuit on the ground that the 10th Circuit had erred by defining clearly
established law too narrowly.
Well, the oral argument in Brenda's case happened in the 10th Circuit.
The question in the case, again, is whether Brenda's trial was so infected with sex discrimination
and sex stereotyping that her conviction and sentence
violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
Let's hear how some federal judges decided
to engage with that issue.
The argument starts out this way.
Mr. Greenfield?
Ms. Greenfield.
Always love to hear a federal judge starting out
a sex discrimination case by assuming
there must be a man arguing.
And that's not all.
Peep this exchange.
It was relevant for him to say that she had told him
she hated her husband and wished he were dead.
You agree?
Correct.
That's a remarkable statement for a woman to say to a guy.
That kind of sounds like a sex stereotype to me.
But Mike, you're a man with a good personality.
What do you think?
Oh, man.
Yeah.
I wouldn't say that.
Nope.
Yep.
That is definitely just locker talk.
Okay.
So we will be watching to see what happened.
Natalie Greenfield, who argued the case on behalf of Brenda
Andrew, was phenomenal.
Definitely worth listening to the argument.
A little bit more on sex stereotyping,
the always classy New York Times decided
that the day after Skrimetti was the perfect occasion
to publish a long, excruciatingly long piece,
second guessing the decision to challenge
bans on gender affirming care for trans people
and to have that case get to the Supreme Court.
I think the best commentary on the piece
came from a Blue Sky account whose handle
I'm now blinking on, which said, quote,
if only trans people had been politically savvy
and gave up their own humanity so that the Democrats could lose
by one percentage point less, end quote.
Also, the piece is kind of a remarkable self-own
because in some ways the story in the piece
is how the laws forged in response to and against
the backdrop of politics and public opinion.
The New York Times poses something along the lines of,
why take this case to the court when the public and states
leaned into anti-trans backlash?
That public opinion thing they're talking about,
like the Times, the New York Times
had a hand in shaping it with their obsessive anti-trans coverage.
So the piece is not quite the own they think it is.
And The New York Times coverage was cited seven times
in the majority opinion in Skirmetty itself.
OK, so two other pieces of legal news.
Mike, we have to go back to the Fifth Circuit.
I'm sorry.
There was a recent Fifth Circuit ruling, although you're going to like this Judge Jones, that
managed to be both bananas and not bananas.
So I know you had wanted to highlight this.
So do you want to give a quick summary of the ruling and what wasn't bananas about it?
Sure.
So this was a challenge to the federal ban on guns near schools.
And what's not bananas is the Fifth Circuit upheld the federal ban on guns near schools. And what's not bananas is the Fifth Circuit upheld
the federal ban on guns near schools.
Whoa, whoa.
Right, and that's always perhaps an open question
with the Fifth Circuit.
Now the panel here was, well, you know, that's why.
They gave it to one of the Trump judges to write,
but it wasn't a fully Trumpy panel.
But, you know, Jim Ho would have had a ball with this.
OK, so that sounds inoffensive slash harmless.
So what was the bananas part of the non bananas opinion?
The bananas part was the part where they had to follow the Supreme Court's bananas ruling and brewing.
Is that enough alliteration for everybody?
I could have put a little bit more in there.
So brewing bananas, those sound like bad bananas.
The decision from the Fifth Circuit, instead of just saying, you know, bans of guns near
schools make sense, which is how these laws were upheld for all of American history until
just the past decade.
If that, after Bruin a couple years ago.
Is that instead they had to go for the
unfathomably stupid reason that a 697-year-old English law was sufficiently analogous to
the ban.
Like-
And not just any law, the statute of Northampton, which we literally created a Second Amendment
drinking game around, given the Supreme Court's fixation on that law as like the lodestar
of the Second Amendment.
Yeah.
No, that you heard the Statute of Northampton
referred to over and over again,
starting with the Heller decision in 2008.
I was in the Supreme Court room
when that decision was handed down.
I was Nina Totenberg's intern, and I was listening to it,
and I was jotting down the Toten turn.
I was jotting down all of the things
that Justice Scalia was saying
and things that Justice Stevens was saying. And I kept hearing the Statute of Northampton and the fundamental right of self-defense
in the home.
And thus began this totally bananas Second Amendment jurisprudence that what, 14 years
later the Supreme Court codified in Bruin to make sure that any contemporary or even 100 or 150 year old restriction on
firearm use has to be measured according to either the statue of Northampton almost 700 years ago
or what the founders were looking to do in 1791. And that's no way to run a country. That's no way
to have a democratic process. And there's no way to keep people safe. Period. Yeah. Just want to
say we could use more
members of Congress who know how to pick up disturbing signs from the federal courts,
you know, before they actually materialize in a bruned bananas bombshell. And, you know,
more generally to understand like what is going on in the federal courts. Yeah,
hands raised. A raising hands moment of this episode, the second one.
So speaking of disturbing signs,
there's been a deeply concerning trend,
like more than one actually,
among Donald Trump's judicial nominees.
So Jay Willis at Balls and Strikes highlighted
how multiple Trump judicial nominees are answering questions
related to the 2020 election results,
which surprise they are basically unwilling to say
was a legitimate
victory by Joe Biden.
So Senator Durbin asked nominees, quote, did President Trump lose the 2020 election?
To which all five nominees said the exact same thing, quote, President Biden was certified
as the winner.
To the extent this question seeks to elicit an answer that could be taken as opining
on the broader political or policy debate regarding the conduct of the 2020 presidential election,
my response is that it would be improper to offer any such comment as a judicial nominee."
Mike, this seems bad. Yes, it's very bad. This is the MAGA version of what we saw in Trump 1.0,
where every Trump judge put forward would refuse to answer whether Brown v. Board was properly was rightly decided because they knew that was the next question would be
was Roe versus Wade rightly decided and they wanted to hide the ball on that.
So they just decided to not answer about Brown v.
Board.
But no, this is that version because anyone put forward by Trump has to pledge fealty
lest they have their nomination pulled and they have to plead fealty to the animating mythology
of this administration, of its second time around,
which is dude never lost.
Now, that might create some problems
for the 22nd Amendment,
because if dude never lost the second time,
then he shouldn't be in office this time.
But these people aren't thinking that far ahead.
In fact, they're probably thinking far enough ahead
to, I don't know, create a pathway for a dude to run again in violation of the 22nd Amendment. But these people aren't thinking that far ahead.
In fact, they're probably thinking far enough ahead to create a pathway for a dude to run again in violation of the 22nd Amendment.
Exactly.
And there's a Trump judge on the 10th Circuit who's already talking about that too.
Oh, yeah. this as like a MAGA trend from Trump 1.0 to 2.0 because, you know, Trump exchanged a vice
president based on their unwillingness to overturn the results of the 2020 election.
And he is now exchanging judicial nominees because again, a bunch of federal society
judges refused to overturn the results of the 2020 election. And it seems like he wants
to replace those ones with Lollis Hacks, who would do something
different in a future election, right?
Can I tell you what really deeply terrifies me?
Oh, please.
We can all agree that- I love not being able to sleep at night.
Right.
We can all agree that whether Trump runs again and courts let him or whether Vance runs or
some other Republican runs and say that person does not win the
electoral college.
We can probably all agree that JD Vance being up on the rostrum on January 6th, 2029 would
do what Mike Pence refused to do on January 6th, 2021.
Now there's been a law passed in the meantime saying that one of vice president presiding
over the Senate as constitutionally required must
go full ministerial in that moment that Pence did as well.
But you can also imagine that-
But as Justice Jackson warned us, right?
Right.
Yep.
And you can also imagine that Vance will say, sorry, no, that law is unconstitutional.
And you can then see this case going to the Supreme Court because that law requires an expedited movement towards the
Supreme Court. This Supreme Court saying, political question,
guys, fight it out.
Yeah, right.
And we are in, if we think we're in the bad place now, and if we
think we're in the bad place every single day of this
administration leading up to then, and we kind of will given
this administration, it gets worse and worse, that's going to
be a bad place. And we need to keep given this administration, it gets worse and worse. That's going to be a bad place.
And we need to keep our eyes open, not only in the courts, but all around to
make sure that should those guys try that stuff, we're aware of the anti-democratic
forces trying to lock the voice of the people out of our own self-determination.
Again, just want to suggest it would be very helpful to have members in Congress who foresee
the bad things the Republican Party might do rather than telling us all the Republican
Party is a bunch of normies and refusing to see what is before their eyes until it blows
up in our faces.
And speaking of the bad place, Mike, why did I learn about these responses
from judicial nominees from a reporter
at an independent media site rather than
from fucking Senate Democrats screaming
to high hell about this?
I think weren't Senate Democrats not there
in the room a lot of this?
Yeah, that was part of it.
Yeah, that could be one of them.
But yeah, it's a credit to independent reporters
being there.
Having been a reporter myself once, being in these rooms,
we got to respect and realize that those
are the eyes and ears of our government
when those in the government aren't sending the message out
to the rest of us.
OK, so we like to try to end these episodes on positive
notes now by saying the things we enjoyed reading
this past week, or watching, or seeing.
So I am going to start.
And I will say the thing I enjoyed reading the most
was that a judge has ordered the release of
the Columbia protester Mahmoud Khalil from ICE detention. This just broke as we were
recording and it's possible there will be additional developments, but I think that
is a very welcome thing to have learned. Mike, you want to add anything?
I do. Oh, for those to add anything? I do.
Oh.
For those on the pod who aren't watching your video.
Mike, what are you holding up?
I am holding up your book, Lawless,
How the Supreme Court Runs on Conservative Grievance,
Fringe Theories, and Bad Vibes by Leah Littman, co-host
of the podcast, Strict Scrutiny.
Great book. Some people have given me shit for using that
as my author descriptor rather than like
constitutional law professor or something.
No, it's always about the pod.
And I'm keeping this up here until you turn off the video.
I'm just gonna hold this here so that
your listeners who know I'm holding this here
and your viewers who see my holding it here
will continue to see it and buy the book
Really? It's been just astounding amazing seeing how successfully become and how influential you are
Thank you. So really I'm proud to know you and I'm very grateful that you asked me to be here on the pod today and also
For those of you listening for you to read
I'd say check out Mike sacksforCongress.com.
Learn about the campaign, learn about what I'm about,
and, you know, join us.
Mike, thank you so much for joining.
Thanks for having me.
Piece of housekeeping, before we go,
the Crooked Store has a bunch of great new merch.
Mike, you really don't have to keep holding the book
as I'm reading this.
For all your hot protest summer needs,
there's the Due Process Freak Tea,. For all your hot protest summer needs, there's the due process freak tea,
don't tread on us pride tea, and a gay for due process tea
and tank, plus fresh designs of the classic friend of the pod
tea.
The Crooked Store also got a quality upgrade,
so you can expect more durable materials and updated cuts
for year-long wear.
Nothing warms our hearts during this dark time,
like seeing our merch in the wild.
So when you wear it, make sure to snap a pic and tag at Crooked Media on Instagram so we
can respectfully stan you.
Pick up your new favorite summer fit at crooked.com slash store.
Strict Scrutiny is a Crooked Media production.
Hosted and executive produced by me, Leo Libman, Melissa Murray, and Kate Shaw.
Produced and edited by Melody Rowell.
Michael Goldsmith is our associate producer.
Jordan Thomas is our intern.
Audio support from Kyle Seglund and Charlotte Landis.
Music by Eddie Cooper.
Production support from Katie Long and Adrienne Hill.
Matt DeGroote is our head of production.
And thanks to our digital team, Ben Hethcote, Joe Matosky and Johanna Case.
Our production staff is proudly unionized with the Writers Guild of America East.
Subscribe to Strict Scrutiny on YouTube to catch full episodes.
Find us at youtube.com slash at Strict Scrutiny podcast.
If you haven't already, be sure to subscribe to Strict Scrutiny in your favorite podcast
apps.
You never miss an episode.
And if you want to help other people find the show, please rate and review us.
It really helps.