Strict Scrutiny - The End of Affirmative Action
Episode Date: June 29, 2023Today the Supreme Court delivered its opinion in Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College, declaring admissions programs that consider race to be in violation of ...the 14th Amendment. Melissa, Kate, and Leah break down the Chief Justice's opinion, Justice Thomas's galling concurrence, and the brilliant dissents by Justice Jackson and Justice Sotomayor.Listen to our recap of the hours and hours of oral arguments in these cases: "Affirmative Action Reaction"Follow @CrookedMedia on Instagram and Twitter for more original content, host takeovers and other community events. Follow us on Instagram, Twitter, Threads, and Bluesky
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Mr. Chief Justice, may it please the court.
It's an old joke, but when a man argues against two beautiful ladies like this, they're going to have the last word.
She spoke, not elegantly, but with unmistakable clarity.
She said, I ask no favor for my sex. All I ask of our brethren is that they take their feet off our legs.
Hello, and welcome back to Strict Scrutiny, your podcast about the super moderate, super chill,
very institutionalist, precedent-observing Supreme Court that is definitely the most
ethical court we've had in a long time and that you've been reading about in the media. So again,
this is another case where legal culture is on our minds and the court is really living up
to its ethical, super institutionalist, super observant vibes, right? Wait, I'm going to check
my notes here. It seems like we're getting a correction from someone, some liberal firebrand
named Joe Biden. So let's hear from him on this issue. Is this a rogue court?
This is not a normal court. Okay, so let's run that intro back one more time. Hello,
and welcome back to Strict Scrutiny, your podcast about the Supreme Court that is definitely not
a normal court. But don't worry, we're still your normal hosts. Well, I think we're pretty
normal, but we're definitely more normal than whatever
was affecting Justice Clarence Thomas in that affirmative action concurrence slash vying to
be the majority opinion opinion that he wrote today. But again, I'm Melissa Murray. I'm Kate
Shaw. And I'm Leah Littman. And if I'm extra unhinged today, it's because the last few weeks
of Supreme Court coverage have been truly crazy making, reminding me of how we got to where we are today.
So with that caveat, let's go right ahead.
And as Melissa just teased, we got the big affirmative action ruling today in the Harvard and UNC cases.
Many, many bad things in the opinion.
One thing in the opinion we should note, we're happy about, I suppose, which is that, Melissa, they saved this one until you were back in the country and we could benefit from your wisdom.
Is that one of the silver linings of this otherwise shit show of a day?
You sound so thrilled.
To be clear, I was in Jamaica and it was literally like fucking Wakanda.
It was amazing.
And I'm glad to be back to be in a non-Wakandan space where I can,
you know, discuss this opinion with everyone. So thanks, Clarence, for waiting for me. You're the
best. Thanks. Anyway, as we predicted, this was a six to three opinion because, of course, it was.
It was written by the Chief Justice. I will say I got this one wrong. I thought Justice Thomas was
going to finally have his chance to eviscerate
affirmative action. So did he, clearly. He clearly did as well. This came as a surprise to a lot of
us, including Clarence Thomas. But the Chief Justice actually exercised his prerogative as
chief to assign the opinion where he is in the majority. And he decided to keep this one to
himself, to keep it on the normalish side.
But even that wasn't enough to really give this opinion the patina of true normalcy.
So in the 6-3 opinion written by the chief justice, the court invalidated both Harvard and the University of North Carolina's affirmative action programs on the grounds that they illegally discriminate on the basis of race in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
Again, Harvard is a private institution and it's not bound by the 14th Amendment.
But the court notes in a footnote that they conceded that the Civil Rights Act,
that's the federal law that governs private institutions that accept federal funds,
imposes the same rules on private institutions as the 14th Amendment imposes on public institutions.
So Harvard and UNC,
you're in danger, girl. You're all doing the same wrong things, and the court's here to give you a
big rebuke. So with that in mind, let's do some big picture overviews of what the court did before
we get into the nitty-gritty mechanics of this decision. So one TLDR of this opinion is that
the 14th Amendment, again, that is one of the Reconstruction Amend, apparently the 14th
Amendment prohibits the government and these private institutions from doing anything that
might ameliorate racial hierarchies that have proceeded in the wake of that little slavery blip.
So the Equal Protection Clause, we learned, actually prevents equal protection of the laws.
That is the 6-3 opinion we got today, plus some concurrences. Don't worry,
we'll get to them. And dissents by both Justice Sotomayor and Justice Jackson. Both of the
dissents are joined by all three of the Democratic appointees. There are several very creative works
of historical fiction woven throughout the majority opinion that I figured we could also
get to up front. And on some level, I understand it, you know, historical fiction
sells, if you look at, you know, New York Times bestseller list, Outlander, Sarah McClain's,
you know, like always up there. But the point is, I guess you probably shouldn't put it in the US
reports. Just get some good stuff off bookshop.org. But one tale of historical fiction that is
interwoven in this opinion is predictably about the meaning of Brown that's basically like,
we, the Supreme Court, single-handedly ended racism in this country. And if anyone does
anything more than that to help bring about racial integration, that would itself be racist.
So that's the summary. Here's the actual language. Quote, the culmination came
finally in Brown in that seminal decision. We overturned Plessy for good and set firmly on
the path of invalidating all de jure racial discrimination by the states and federal
government. Immediately after Brown, we began routinely affirming lower court decisions that
invalidated all manner of race-based state action
in the decades that followed, this court continued to vindicate the Constitution's pledge of racial
equality. And in support of this highly subjective account of the court's role here,
the court quotes really selectively and very out of context, I would add, from the oral argument in Brown and the brief pretense of judicial humility that the dissent espouses is a claim to power
so radical, so destructive that it required a second founding to undo.
Who's the real racist here? It's the new Black colleague.
And who's really the one trying to accrue all the power to herself? Also the new Black colleague.
Yeah, the person not invalidating the challenge admissions programs.
Anyways, okay, I just need to point out this second founding bit for a second and what
the court is saying.
So the second founding refers, of course, to reconstruction, right?
Founding the country anew. And it seems as though the court is saying that
the country required a second founding to undo efforts to integrate schools. Like, I'm sorry,
I missed that lesson about what the Civil War and reconstruction were about.
Mostly about economics, Leah, I'm told.
Mostly economics. Well, duly noted. In the midst of this exegesis on what can Brown do for you,
and I used to love those UPS commercials back in the day. I didn't know they would have a second life here in this opinion, but here we are. Anyway, in the middle of this exegesis about this newly repurposed Brown versus Board of
Education, Justice Sotomayor intervenes and asks her colleagues to seriously have a fucking
seat.
So she notes that the majority suggests that, quote, it required a second founding to undo
programs that help ensure racial integration and therefore greater equality
in education. But at the risk of stating the blindingly obvious, and as Brown recognized,
the 14th Amendment was intended to undo the effects of a world where law systematically
subordinated Black people and created a racial caste system. And here she appropriately cites
Dred Scott. Brown and its progeny recognize the need to take affirmative, race-conscious steps to
eliminate that system.
So as Leah was suggesting, she completely rebuts this ridiculous invocation of Brown.
But then she goes further and tells her super-majority conservative colleagues to please get Justice
Thurgood Marshall's good name out of
their goddamn mouths. So again, you'll recall Justice Marshall before he was a justice was
one of the litigators with the NAACP Legal Defense Fund. And he is the person who argued
Brown versus Board of Education before the court. And she notes here, if there was a member of this
court who understood the Brown litigation, i.e. not you fuckers, it was Justice Thurgood Marshall who, quote, led the litigation campaign to dismantle segregation as a civil rights lawyer and rejected the hollow race ignorant conception of equal protection endorsed by the court's ruling today.
Justice Marshall joined the Bakke plurality and applauded the judgment of the court that a university may consider race in its admissions process. In fact, Justice Marshall's view was that Bakke's holding should have been
even more protective of race-conscious college admissions programs in light of the remedial
purpose of the 14th Amendment and the legacy of racial inequality in our society. The court's
recharacterization of Brown is nothing but revisionist history and an affront to the
legendary life of Justice Marshall, a great jurist who is the champion of true equal opportunity,
not rhetorical flourishes about colorblindness. Mic drop. Boom, lawyered.
Right. There's literally nothing else to be said after that. I am wearing the sweatshirt that we
were kindly gifted from Howard Law School that says the Mecca and
depicts, among other people, Justice Thurgood Marshall, because the invocations by the majority
of his statements from oral argument are so deranged and so galling. I mean, it's like when
they invoke Justice Ginsburg to overrule Roe and yet somehow worse.
We should talk. I mean, like, again, that's it's all of a piece. They also invoke Judge
Constance Baker Motley, who was one of Marshall's lieutenants at LDF, became the first Black woman
to serve on the federal bench and is someone that Justice Jackson has noted is a personal hero of
hers. They brought her into this this bullshit too. And she literally wanted
nothing to do with this reading of Brown. And I think Justice Sotomayor appropriately
recuperates them from this nonsense. So we jumped right in with an overview of and some actual
excerpts of the various opinions in this case. And that includes like the bad, which is the majority
opinion by Chief Justice Roberts and a number of concurrences that we will get to, and the good. There is like righteous and
white hot fury from the pens of both Justice Sotomayor and Justice Jackson. Again, we will read
more excerpts from their respective dissents. But maybe first, let's do a little bit more kind of
ground laying in terms of what the court does in broad terms. And maybe first, let's just say the
court offers this incredibly abbreviated overview of American history, the 14th Amendment, the court's role in
it. This version of history, I think, is extremely effectively corrected by both Sotomayor and
Jackson. But then in the majority opinion, the court, after this really cursory overview,
the court purports to apply its affirmative action precedents,
so primarily the Bakke case from 1978 and Grutter versus Bollinger from 2003,
and basically finds that under those cases, Harvard and UNC, and by extension, any comparable
policies, basically fail to adhere to the guidance the court set forth regarding when
race-conscious programs can constitutionally
be utilized. So Bakke, again, was the 1978 opinion in which Justice Powell's controlling
concurrence agreed that some race-conscious admissions policies could be constitutionally
permissible. And then in 2003, in the Grutter case, a majority of the court held that, yes,
strict scrutiny applied in evaluating the University of Michigan Law School's race-conscious admissions policy,
but that the policy did survive that constitutional scrutiny because diversity was a compelling government interest,
and universities like Michigan should be able to pursue that interest using race if it's done in the context of an individualized and holistic assessment of applicants.
And even though that is literally exactly what the schools
in these cases were doing, the court just moves the goalposts here and says, no dice. It says it
isn't overruling Grutter, although Thomas in his concurrence says, obviously, yes, we are.
But the court basically says, we're not going to add another tick mark to the list of enormous
precedents we have overthrown. Instead,
we're going to purport to just apply Grutter and find these schools fall short. But that is a very,
very difficult contention, I think, to take seriously at face value.
I just have to say the Thomas and Courant show, yeah, we're obviously overruling Grutter,
has all of the vibes from Dobbs last term when he wrote separately to say,
oh, by the way, obviously, we'd also
overrule Griswold, Lawrence, and Obergefell if given the chance. And the joint dissenters are
like, not all of the people in the majority are with the program. So anyways, just reminded me
of that. He's just like, we'll get there. Give me time. Give me time. A major problem that the Chief Justice has with these holistic uses
of race that have been followed in the wake of Grutter is that he views them as being standardless.
And by standardless, he basically means that it's not easy, nor is it convenient for courts
to review them. And for him, that's a major problem that makes these policies unworkable.
Because after all, they're not just courts.
They're not just lawyers.
They are also historians, as we learned in Dobbs.
And as we're learning in this case, they are also educators who know how to administer
classrooms and educational programs.
So one of the first things the chief justice notes is that you can't subject the compelling
interest in diversity to meaningful
judicial review. He notes that Harvard identifies certain educational benefits that it's pursuing,
including training future leaders in the public and private sectors, preparing graduates to adapt
to an increasingly pluralistic society, and better educating its students through diversity and
producing new knowledge that stems from people with diverse outlooks.
But he notes, though, that it's really hard to figure out if that's happening.
How do you measure that?
How do you find that?
And later on in the opinion, he echoes this, noting, and given the mismatch between the
means respondents employ here, the use of race, and the goals they seek, it is especially
hard to understand how courts are supposed to scrutinize the admissions
programs that respondents use. So again, this is really not necessarily about the educational
environment, but whether or not the educational environment is constitutionally legible to this
group of nine lawyers. And even though the court manages somehow to superintend legal tests that
require, you know, the consideration of multiple factors, all the time in other contexts, it is all of a sudden impossible for a court to possibly manage to administer evaluating the kinds of standards that these universities have said they are pursuing through their use of race in admission. So he says, you know, can't possibly actually implement these standards. And importantly, he says, what matters is our ability to assess how these courts are
faring on their own metrics.
So it is just fundamentally a court-centric and court-empowering vision of the Constitution,
right?
So he says, Robertson, the majority, he says, universities may define their missions as
they see fit.
Very nice of him to allow them that courtesy.
But then he goes on to say the Constitution defines ours.
Courts may not license separating students on the basis of race without an exceedingly persuasive justification that is measurable and concrete enough to permit judicial review.
Once again, it is all about the nine of them or the six of them.
Everything else, be damned. It also strikes me that this is the same thing that
they were talking about last year in Dobbs about the reliance interest, insufficiently concrete,
insufficiently measurable to inchoate. I mean, basically, when anyone who is not a white guy
gets something, we can't measure it, and we therefore can't actualize it in any way.
They're not real because they're not real people, right? No real
interests, no real benefits, no real people. So thank you. Yes, that seems right. So in addition
to all of a sudden finding this impossible to manage just in this context, the court identifies
other objections suggesting that the way the university uses race sometimes operates as a
negative or involves the
use of stereotypes. The court is very critical of the racial categories that universities use,
including things like treating Asian American as a unified category rather than South Asian or East
Asian as being sort of separate subcategories, using Hispanic as a unitary category. And that
independently troubles the court deeply in addition to what it views as the kind of amorphousness
of the overall set of objectives
the universities are pursuing.
He's especially mad that they don't break out
Middle Eastern as a distinct category.
And I think this is the point where Iqbal would like a word.
Well, you know, if there's anyone in the United States
who understands the complexity of racial categories
and the different lived experiences
of different racial groups in the different lived experiences of different racial
groups in the United States, it would be John Roberts. So I appreciate his knowledge about this.
On the court suggesting that the schools here were using race sometimes as a negative,
I did want to draw listeners' attention to a USA Today piece that documented an interview with one of the
students whose complaints of discrimination against Asian Americans actually triggered
this litigation and whose views have since evolved. So as a senior, Michael Wang filed
discrimination complaints with the Federal Department of Education's Office for Civil
Rights that the piece notes helped to set in motion this latest movement to end affirmative action. And in hindsight, he now says a part of
me regrets what I put forward. Okay. I'm sorry, deep breathing. The piece further describes how
Wang, quote, met with Edward Bloom edward bloom bloom of course is the
driving force behind the opposition to race-based admissions and they agreed to speak publicly about
his own situation over and over and over again and the piece goes on to describe the way in which
wang has come to feel that the issue is much bigger than just whether he got to attend Harvard College. That's great. Ultimately concluding that, quote, affirmative action is a band-aid to the cancer
of systemic racism. Very glad that Michael got there. Really wish that the whole country did
not have to go on this journey with him, but I'm glad that he got there. Welcome.
So someone who did not get there is, of course,
the Chief Justice and this majority opinion, which maintains that it is merely applying the court's
precedent rather than inventing it anew. This is where it should have included that image of
Katherine Hahn doing the winky face because, like, this is certainly not applying those cases. So I'll just tick through
a few things that seem like notable differences. So previously, the court had said that when
schools use race-conscious admissions programs, they are subject to the legal test known as
strict scrutiny, which of course is also the name of this podcast. And formally, strict scrutiny
requires the government to identify a compelling interest that a program serves. Now the court says the interest has to not only be
compelling, but also coherent. New legal tests just dropped, I guess. And this makes sense
because the words compelling and coherent both start with a C, so seems legit. So the court
writes, quote, although these are commendable goals, they are not sufficiently coherent for purposes of strict scrutiny.
Additionally, you know, as Kate recounted in her recap of the law up until now, previously, the court had said that facilitating educational diversity, diversity in educational settings was a compelling interest. But the court effectively negates the force of that interest
here by coming up with some new rules that are basically, you know, cherry picked from language
and previous opinions and how it applies these rules. So as we noted, the court says, you know,
schools can't use race as a stereotype or negative. And at some point, you know, the race conscious
measures must end. And it suggests that schools
are using race as a stereotype because of how it groups the students into different racial
categories. And the court says it's, you know, treating educational diversity as a compelling
interest and trying to achieve a critical mass of students is essentially treating applicants
according to stereotypes. So thereby, again, negating the idea that schools could ever justify these programs with reference to educational diversity. And it basically just
treats this holistic, you know, application review as running a quota system. It also seems to assume
that minority students, whenever they get in, it's only because of race. And again, I go back to the
standing questions that the liberals, now the dissenters,
advanced an oral argument, like we just don't know in a holistic calculus, what factor is actually
determinative, because they're considering so many. But interestingly, in this whole discussion
about how affirmative action fuels unfair stereotypes, the chief has no problem engaging
in the most brutally unfair stereotype that basically every minority candidate who ever got into an elite college only got in because of his or her race, which, 65 of the 67 Black applicants among the highest achieving band got into UNC. Not all of them did. And he's like, well, obviously, that's a sign that affirmative action is all about race. And it's like, what? No, no, it's not at all. And that was, I think, a pretty telling footnote along the lines of what you're suggesting. Totally agree. And I thought another passage that was also very suggestive of the same point is when
the chief basically says, the student must be treated based on his or her experiences as an
individual, not on the basis of race. Many universities have for too long done just the
opposite, right? So the assumption is students are being admitted solely and exclusively on the
basis of race. And Roberts goes on to say that universities have
concluded wrongly that the touchstone of an individual's identity is not challenges bested
or skills built or lessons learned, but the color of their skin, literally as if that's what
admissions officers are doing, that last piece, literally selecting based purely on the color of
their skin. And there's just nothing in the record that it all supports that point. Like when
universities do take race into account, they are not doing so because of literal physical features like just race.
If they are taking race into account, they are doing it because, and here I want to quote a great piece in The Atlantic by Issa Kohler-Hausman that ran a couple of weeks ago, that look, race in our society is not a category of like physical difference.
It is a category of difference with respect to some set of opportunities, social meanings, family histories, life experiences, personal identities, and so on. So I'm not sure what straw man Roberts even thinks
he's constructing in saying that's all admissions officers are looking at is literally race as a
feature apart from these other characteristics, but it's ridiculous fiction. And I think the chief,
you know, did this, that is insisted, I'm not overruling Grutter, I'm applying these precedents,
you know, by taking these quotes out of context from them, and then utterly transforming the
legal test. But I think he did this in part because like, he is the best politician in DC.
And he has convinced, I think, particularly his new colleagues, maybe Brett Kavanaugh,
Amy Barrett, that his way of doing things might be the best way
contra Dobbs. And, you know, it is because he gets away with fucking murder, and he has for a really
long time. I mean, I mentioned in the intro, you know, consider some of the press the court has
been getting over the last few weeks as it rejected these utterly deranged fringe theories and was
greeted as a liberator.
You know, the New York Times had a headline, quote, conservative court, moderate decision.
Or think about all the pieces about how the court saved democracy and the Voting Rights Act and
safeguarded, right, the rights of like black voters. And, you know, what does he do in this
case? You know, not expressly overrule the prior cases or formally bar all race-based affirmative
action, just reconstrues the test and seizes on a few passing phrases in the previous opinions and
transform them into a rule that schools will never be able to satisfy. So ending affirmative
action without saying they're ending it and muting the negative press. Check, check, and check. But
you know who's not fooled by all of this tomfoolery? That's right. She's been around
the block since 2009. And she knows who these fools are and what they're here for. And that,
of course, is Justice Sonia Sotomayor, who wrote a fiery dissent in which she reminded everyone
who's literate and reading this opinion that her conservative colleagues literally do not give a fuck about precedent.
And they've been giving stare decisis the finger for the last two terms
and they show no signs of stopping.
So again, this dissent read to me in the same way
that her clarion call in the oral arguments in Dobbs read.
She's like, wake the fuck up.
These people are insane and they're not stopping. They have all the power
and it's up to you to stay on their necks. So like any good con law scholar might, she begins
this by talking about precedent. So weird. And she canvases the many different factors that the
court is supposed to consider before it utterly dispatches with a prior decision.
So here she notes that nothing has really changed here. This opinion, Grutter, seemed to have been
working. There was a standard that universities and institutions could deploy, and they had been
deploying. It was all very workable. It had engendered considerable reliance interest,
both on the part of the institutions and on the applying students. And the court just sort of came in and decided,
you know, when you have five, they let you do what you want. And they basically overruled Grutter.
But as Leah mentioned, the chief doesn't do it formally, although Justice Thomas
gives up the game pretty quickly and says, yep, that's exactly what we're doing. Justice Sotomayor responds by saying it is, quote,
a disturbing feature of today's decision that the court does not even attempt to make the
extraordinary showing required by stare decisis. The court simply moves the goalposts, upsetting
settled expectations and throwing admissions programs nationwide into turmoil. In the end,
the court is forced to change the rules of the game to reach
its desired outcome. There is no better evidence that the court is overruling the court's precedents
than those precedents themselves. Every one of the arguments made by the majority can be found
in the dissenting opinions filed in the cases the majority now overrules. And then she just
kind of goes through and talks all about them. And what I really appreciated about this dissent is that she really focuses on the students
of color who are the ones who have a lot at stake here.
She literally quotes from briefs and affidavits where these students tell their stories about
how race has sort of shaped their formation of identity.
And she rejects the majority's bullshit nice guy compromise
that would allow schools to consider racial self-identification, but only if it is tied
to the expression of individual qualities like leadership or courage. She quotes these students
and she notes that their racial identities are absolutely a part of their actual identities
and experiences.
And she chides the majority for perpetuating the view that they can somehow be hived off
and that when schools do consider their holistic experience, that they are simply providing
a preference on nothing more than race alone.
She has a couple of zingers here.
She notes it's not a stereotype to acknowledge the basic truth that young people's experiences are shaded by a societal structure where race matters. And then she turns around
and responds to Justice Thomas, who again, really wanted to write the majority opinion here. She
says, Justice Thomas, for his part, offers a multitude of arguments for why race conscious
admissions policies supposedly burden racial minorities. None of them has any merit.
Zing. And just to highlight one note from the majority opinion that I think sets up another
line from the Sotomayor dissent. So again, the majority opinion, as we've said, was written by
the Chief Justice. And he's got a line, which I'm sure he was extremely proud of, which is the
following, eliminating racial discrimination means eliminating all of it.
And I think that is Robert's new version of the line from the 2007 Parents Involved case,
which was the only way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating
on the basis of race. That was his previous absurdly simplistic and circular answer to
racism. And I think that's the old,
this is the new means eliminating all of it. That's today's Roberts, I believe.
Balls and strikes. This is your moderate chastened chief. You're welcome, America. But as Kate
mentioned, I think that that new Roberts line, as well as the previous iteration of it, teed up the closing to Justice Sotomayor's
dissent, which has another formulation that I take to be a response to the Chief Justice's
formulation. So she writes, today, the court concludes that indifference to race is the only
constitutionally permissible means to achieve racial equality, that interpretation of the 14th
Amendment is not only contrary to precedent and the entire teachings of our history, but is also
grounded in the illusion that racial inequality was a problem of a different generation. Entrenched And then here's the line.
She's the Draymond Green of justices because that was a full on in your face.
You know what I'm talking about.
Do you know what I'm talking about?
Yeah. This dissent is a full send.. Do you know what I'm talking about?
Yeah.
This descent is a full send. Kate does not know what I'm talking about.
A full send.
I understood nothing in the last three sentences, but I will say it is a great line and not circular.
You can actually write a good, memorable line that is not empty and circular, and she needs to take John Roberts to school and teach him that.
But it was a strong note to end.
I think it's time to teach them lessons.
That's right.
We read some of the Sotomayor dissent.
We now need to read some of Justice Jackson's also epic dissent.
So one line maybe to start with is the following.
With let them eat cake obliviousness, today the majority pulls the ripcord and announces colorblindness for all by legal fiat.
But deeming race irrelevant
in law does not make it so in life. So good. Very good. And again, delivered with the kind
of insouciance that only the only black woman on the court could offer. It's an incredibly powerful
opinion and a very efficient distillation of race and history. And it answers the objection that it's somehow unfair to consider race
because she notes that to completely blind yourselves to the history of race
is to be blinkered as to both reality and history in ways too numerous to count.
Our country has never been colorblind.
And again, that is a play on the Harlan dissent from Plessy versus Ferguson that the conservatives like literally love to vomit ad nauseum. And I loved how she began her dissent by again, sort of going back to the hypothetical that she had posed an oral argument about these two hypothetical applicants to the University of North Carolina. One, a fourth generation North Carolinian whose family had attended the University of North Carolina for many years. Another, a
fourth generation North Carolinian whose family had not been able to attend the University of
North Carolina because the applicant was black and North Carolina was a slave state and then
practiced segregation, which precluded people from attending the University of North Carolina on the
basis of race.
So she continues in the dissent to say history speaks.
In some form, it can be heard forever. The race-based gaps that first developed centuries ago are echoes from the past that still exist today.
And again, this is very much a dissent that trades in history, that talks about history.
And it's really striking because there are points in this dissent where her discussion of history, including the history following the Civil War and the period known as redemption, really echoes some of the history that Justice Thomas has invoked on several living up to the promises of the Equal Protection Clause, whereas Justice Thomas is talking about this history for the purpose of expanding
the Second Amendment.
So again, really interesting how they're basically identical in the kind of histories they're
using, but very different purposes for which they're deployed.
On the force and echoes of history that she alludes to in her dissent, I feel like I would
be remiss if I didn't note the Reuters study that came out, I think this week about, you know, political elites
of today being descended from slave owners. So the Reuters story notes that two members of the
current Supreme Court, Justice Gorsuch and Barrett, quote, have direct ancestors who enslaved people
and the study found, you know, hundreds of political elites have the same. So in
just thinking about, again, like the echoes, ramifications of history, I feel like that
study was very well timed. But back to the Justice Jackson dissent, where she cites chapter and verse
of the enormous and enduring race-based gaps in health, wealth, and well-being. You know,
she shows how the law and the Supreme Court were instrumental in maintaining those disparities. You can compare and contrast that with the chief's grudging acknowledgement,
where he writes, quote, for almost a century after the Civil War, state-mandated segregation
was in many parts of this nation a regrettable norm, end quote. John Roberts regrets this unfortunate blip in history. I feel like this
passage from his opinion will be excerpted in all of those Ron DeSantis public schools because
this would be an approved text and version of history. Maybe also John Roberts wants a guest
spot on Drunk History. I mean, who knows? This could qualify for that as well.
Why did Rosa Parks sit down? Because of regrettable norms.
Why did Martin Luther King march? Regrettable norms.
Why did Malcolm X invade against everything? Regrettable norms.
Regrettable, regrettable norms. I love this for them.
She also, KBJ that is, not Rosa Parks, goes forward to talk about the contemporary importance of these programs.
It's not simply about remedying this past history.
She notes that beyond campus, the diversity that these schools pursue is not simply a trendy slogan.
I think that's a nod to Justice Thomas, who thinks about diversity as some sort of aesthetic project.
She notes diversity actually saves lives. For marginalized communities in North Carolina, it is critically important that UNC and other area institutions produce highly educated professionals of color.
Research shows that black physicians are more likely to accurately assess black patients' pain tolerance and treat them accordingly, including, for example, prescribing them the appropriate amounts of pain medication.
For high-risk black newborns, having a black physician more than doubles the likelihood that the baby will live and not die. Studies also confirm what common sense counsels,
closing wealth disparities through programs like UNC's, which beyond diversifying the medical
profession, opens doors to every sort of opportunity, helps address the aforementioned
health disparities in the long run as well. So again, this was such an interesting kind of
intervention, like something I don't think
that we've seen. It's sort of interestingly Breyer-esque in its use of statistics, but not
Breyer-esque in that it's very much grounded in this experience in a marginalized, underrepresented
community that she's sort of bringing to the fore here and making it quite concrete why this matters.
Yeah, it is data rich and rigorous in terms of
identifying the kind of present need and present benefit for race consciousness in admissions. But
of course, it does discuss history. And that part of her dissent made me wonder whether she is,
and I think she pretty clearly is, laying the groundwork, right? We think about the sort of
long-term purposes of dissents. And here, it seems pretty clear to me that she is laying the groundwork, right? We think about the sort of long-term purposes of dissents. And here, it seems pretty clear to me that she is laying the groundwork for fully reviving a remedial
justification for affirmative action, right? She is walking through slavery, the Civil War,
redemption, the Jim Crow period, the enduring effects of all of that. And I'm going to quote
from her here. She then says, yet the court's own missteps are now both eternally memorialized and
excruciatingly plain. For one thing, based apparently on nothing more than Justice Powell's initial say-so, it drastically discounts the
primary reason that the racial diversity objectives it excoriates are needed, consigning race-related
historical happenings to the court's own analytical dustbin, and also by latching onto
arbitrary timelines and professing insecurity about missing metrics, the court sidesteps
unrefuted proof of the compelling benefits of a holistic admissions programs that factor in race. Hard to do for there is plenty,
simply proceeding as if no such evidence exists. So she is sort of saying it's not sort of broad
diversity goals. The court has so narrowed the permissible rationales and then even on those
narrowed rationales finds the university programs wanting, but says we should, at the front end,
take a far more expansive view of the purposes of race consciousness in admissions. And, you know,
I sort of see her seeing a world in which we are able to do that with our law. I mean,
it's not happening anytime soon, but I think it's really, really effective long-term thinking on display. I just wanted to give a kind of tip of that hat shout out to Justice Jackson and her like very apparent
immersion in legal scholarship. So I mentioned, you know, earlier how this opinion is really a
kind of sharp distillation of, you know, the history of race and law. And, you know, the
citations are one testament to that. So she relies on work by Marissa Baradaran, The Color of Money, Risa Goluboff on racist
vacancy laws, Rick Schrager, Eric Foner on Reconstruction, Richard Rothstein, Ira Ketz-Nelson,
Isabel Wilkerson, Michelle Dickerson, Erica Wilson, LaToya Baldwin-Clark.
And I feel like we have been pointing out how the Republican appointed justices are
often in the habit of citing conservative legal scholars and how this is a way
of credentialing people and basically creating people who are experts in these areas of law.
And to me, Justice Jackson has kind of emerged as someone who has emerged in legal scholarship,
like progressive legal thought and legal commentary in a way that I guess like I'm
excited about at this point. One thing we should note is that Justice Jackson and Justice Sotomayor
very conspicuously do not append respectfully to their dissent. Jackson says, because the
majority's judgment stunts that progress without any basis in law, history, logic, or justice,
I dissent. And Justice Sotomayor says the court
cements a superficial rule of colorblindness as a constitutional principle in an endemically
segregated society where race has always mattered and continues to matter. And she ends because the
court's opinion is not grounded in law or fact and contravenes the vision of equality embodied
in the 14th Amendment. I dissent. Full stop. Here for it. It's also worth noting that the
Jackson dissent involves a little bit of crosstalk with Justice Thomas. And I, for one, was here for
this black on black crime. This is going to require me to spend some time talking about
Justice Thomas's pick me, choose me, love me, but only on the basis of my considerable merits concurrence that was
really vying to be the majority opinion here. So we're going to get that to that because I have a
lot of thoughts. But I will just say that the cross chatter between the courts to black justices was
really something to see here. And I talked about this when she was first nominated to the court,
like there was going to be, I think, a real contrast here, not simply because they were
both African American, but because they come from such different worldviews, like he's from a
different generation than her. And I think that was very much on display in the crosstalk between
them. But there's also some like kind of really weird gender vibes going on in the crosstalk between them. But there's also some like kind of really weird gender vibes going
on in the crosstalk as well. So I just want to note here, I really do think we should require
a psychological profile of everyone who is shortlisted to the Supreme Court because
Justice Thomas is very clearly working some stuff out here. And it's just regrettable that the
entire country has to be the canvas on which he is doing this.
Like, it cannot be the case that a lifetime appointment becomes the venue for someone working out all of the shit that they have not yet processed.
So there's that.
In his concurrence, Justice Thomas really systematically tries to dismantle the KBJ dissent.
I think that is noteworthy because there are two dissents here.
And one is the lead dissent and also really attacks
the majority opinion and his concurrence. But the only person for whom Justice Thomas has all of
this fire is his junior black colleague, Justice Jackson. And this is a weird kind of gender moment
in my view. I just think that there are these moments where in work environments,
the older black male colleague
expects a kind of deference from the junior black colleague.
And when it's not forthcoming, this is the kind of result.
And I'm just sort of, again, this is observational.
I'm speaking only from my own experience.
It can be very difficult to challenge
one of your colleagues
who shares the same racial background of you, especially if that person is older, has considerable
status, and believes that he is owed deference. And that was kind of the vibe I got from Justice
Thomas's attempted takedown of Justice Jackson. And it made me believe Anita Hill even more. I mean, so there's that. This was a fact
free concurrence from Justice Thomas. He basically calls Justice Jackson out as quote unquote race
obsessed. But this actually feels a little bit like projection, right? He says at one point,
this lore, i.e. the idea that race continues to matter is not and has never been true. Even in the segregated South,
where I grew up, individuals were not the sum of their skin color, end quote. To which I say,
sir, what the actual fuck? Are you serious? The literal point of segregation is that people are
treated because they are viewed as the sum of their skin color. That's the whole point of segregation. Also,
Emmett Till, an individual who was literally lynched because he was treated as the sum of
his skin color, and someone who Justice Thomas knows about because he's discussed Emmett Till
extensively in McDonald v. City of Chicago, a case about expanding further the Second Amendment,
because of course. So again, there's just a lot of like,
this was this was a really weird exchange. And I think it was actually weirder, because Justice
Thomas really seemed to be the one who was prosecuting it as an intergenerational beef
between this old guard who grew up in segregation, and this young Turk who values diversity and doesn't seem to be getting it right.
And I have to say, I really admired the way Justice Jackson handled this, because she was
basically like, she didn't even acknowledge how fucking weird all of this was, except for
a footnote where she basically says, I wish you well in your much needed quest for therapy.
Good day to you, sir.
That's a TLDR. I do want to read some of the passages from that footnote.
Because it would have been amazing if she'd said that, though.
Yes, no, agreed, agreed.
Be well.
So her footnote says, Justice Thomas's prolonged attack responds to a dissent I did not write in order to assail an admissions program that is not the one UNC has crafted.
He cray.
Continues that Justice Thomas's opinion also demonstrates an obsession with race consciousness that far outstrips my or UNC's holistic understanding that race can be a
factor, just as Thomas ignites too many more straw men to list or fully extinguish here.
The takeaway is that those who demand that no one think about race, a classic pink elephant
paradox, refuse to see, much less solve for, the elephant in the room. Anyways, that's just a flip.
Okay, so it's a little bit more than just bless your heart, right?
She does a little bit respond to him.
But it is so gracious compared to his insanity.
Oh, totally.
Oh, yeah.
I mean, he spends like 15 pages taking her down.
She's like, I can handle this in a footnote.
She's like the Olivia Pope of footnotes.
She's like, it's handled.
It's handled.
She handled him. Yeah. I do know who Olivia Pope is footnotes. She's like, it's handled. It's handled. She handled him.
I do know who Olivia Pope is, by the way.
Good. I'm glad for you. Bless your heart.
The bar is in hell.
All right.
Was it just me who had thoughts about the
Thomas concurrence? Please say it's not just me.
Lots of thoughts, but yours were the best thoughts.
Yeah, yes. I
did want to draw attention to Justice Thomas's observation that the Freedmen's Bureau is race neutral because Freedmen is a race neutral category, not blacks writ large. And it's like,
let's, you know, you can interrogate that one a little bit. But also there were laws that dispense
benefits on the basis of race and race alone if the aftermath of the Civil War as well.
But also like, you know what else is formally a race neutral category? Enslaved person. That
doesn't say race. And you know what? It wasn't actually race-neutral, and neither was Friedman. We all know that George Washington
was our country's first Friedman president. There was that classic question from oral argument that
was like, well, descendants of slaves, that's kind of like a racial proxy. So I'm not sure
that we would allow- Too closely correlated.
Too closely correlated with race.
Cannot acknowledge that category.
So that one actually is ruled out, Kate.
Sorry.
My bad.
My bad.
But for everyone else, Friedman is just basically anybody who's free.
Obviously.
I also appreciated in the Thomas concurrence the fact that he apparently is a student of critical race theory.
So there's this really awesome part of the concurrence where he notes that race is a
social construct. We may each identify as members of particular races for any number of reasons
having to do with our skin color, our heritage, our cultural identity. And over time, these
ephemeral socially constructed categories have often shifted.
Does Harlan Crowe know that you are moonlighting in CRT classes, Justice Thomas?
This is woke Justice Thomas. Smuggled into this opinion. Yeah, I don't know.
Woke warrior.
He may not get invited on any future billionaire jaunts.
Well, but it's not just CRT for me and not for thee. It's also
affirmative action for me and not for thee, because I think it is worth observing here that
Justice Thomas is a beneficiary of affirmative action, whether he wants to admit it or not.
He's talked about this. He's just now denouncing it because he believes it's led to stigmatic consequences
for minorities. He's basically denouncing it as largesse bestowed on minorities by well-meaning
but ultimately nefarious white people. And yet, this is the same man who is accepting largesse
from well-meaning but perhaps nefarious billionaire mega donors who have provided his
grandnephew with a whole ass boarding school education.
Right.
So is anyone going to talk about the irony of this?
Like,
I think we're a couple of decades out of him ruling unconstitutional other
people benefiting from the largesse of billionaire friends.
Well,
no,
I think he would say like,
look like you people just need to go out and find yourself a billionaire
benefactor.
Right.
And like, it's not my fault that you're not as charming as Sam Alito, who can just pick
up personal jet rides from strangers, or me who just has my grandnephew's like, tuition
paid for for free, because this person is a passionate advocate for education, right?
So.
Okay, so we could go on about the Thomas concurrence. And I
think during the term wrap, we probably will. But in terms of some of the kind of bottom line
takeaways, like the what happens next? And how do universities respond to this opinion? We have to
spend some time talking about that passage late in the opinion, that it just feels like kind of
ultimate gaslighting, but let's break it down a little bit.
So Roberts writes, all parties agree that nothing in this opinion should be construed as prohibiting
universities from considering an applicant's discussion of how race affected his or her life,
be it through discrimination, inspiration, or otherwise. But despite the dissent's assertion
to the contrary, universities may not simply establish through application essays or other means the regime we hold unlawful today. And then he says in Prenn,
a dissenting opinion is generally not the best source of legal advice on how to comply with the
majority opinion. There is a lot of nastiness between and among the opinions in this case.
He's like, ignore the dissent. Listen to me. I'm John G. Roberts, the G stands for God. So that's, he's saying don't
listen to them. So but he is kind of saying, this is not a full throated embrace of colorblindness
in admissions. But how are universities supposed to respond? I think one thing he might be thinking
about here is the way in which those schools and states that have basically been operating in a
post affirmative action world because of the imposition of state-level constitutional amendments have operated. And so California, for example,
has famously since 1996 prohibited the consideration of race in hiring decisions and admissions
decisions under Proposition 209. And what that has basically led to is part of an holistic
kind of admissions criteria is that you can talk about the ways in which you could contribute to
the diversity of a campus. But it's not about checking boxes. So you know, this quote unquote,
diversity statement, which is available to those who apply for jobs or who apply for admission,
is open to anybody. So you know, I've read diversity statements where people talk about,
how growing up as a closeted gay person, like really shaped their outlook on this is how it would
inform their work with students or their work with other colleagues. Or, you know, this is what it
was like growing up in a household where someone had a mental illness. And this is how it would
inform, you know, my work as a student or what I'm planning to do in law school. So it's a very
broad kind of statement
that really sort of thinks about diversity in almost every facet and everything is accepted.
And, you know, I wonder if this is what they are gesturing toward, because this is certainly,
I think, something that schools could begin to implement and probably would implement using
verbatim the language that's specified here in the majority opinion. It's hard to know exactly. So I also read this passage as basically an ominous warning against
schools' efforts to kind of circumvent the rule in the sense that they would actually try to
achieve racial diversity, like using other measures. And those measures are likely to
engender significant and potentially long-lasting litigation. So we've talked previously about the Fourth Circuit decision that came out affirming Thomas Jefferson High School's race neutral admissions program does not take explicit account into race, but is still designed to achieve a racially diverse class. Like, could the court be coming for that next? I don't know.
You know, I'm sure that they'll get a chance, right?
Because that was a divided panel opinion.
And it's very clear the court is going to be asked to take it up.
And I think very likely will.
Definitely.
I think it's unclear whether schools could invite essays about how race or, you know,
other aspects of your background have influenced your life.
And, you know, but another way of reading this passage of the opinion is
it's responsive to Justice Jackson's hypothetical, which we alluded to previously about how
applicants can actually volunteer information about how race has shaped their life experiences,
their personal experiences, and how that would inform the kind of community citizen that they
would be. So I think this all suggests that just like with Dobbs, this court hasn't settled a vexed or
fractious issue. It's answered one question in a pretty limited way. And it's going to tee up more
litigation and more questions in the future. And, you know, buckle up, we're going to be on this
ride. But I wanted to just offer up an Elena Kagan appreciation round of applause, because
I think this was one of those opinions
like Dobbs where, you know, who gets to write whose voice is heard was really important. And
I really appreciated her restraint here, because, you know, it could have been very easy for her to
write her own dissenting opinion here as the former dean of an elite law school, whatever.
But she allowed her two women of color colleagues to do
the talking, to do the writing, and she simply joined both of them in what I thought was an
incredible exhibition of restraint and allyship that I really appreciated.
Snaps for Justice Kagan. So just looking forward to future implications, the majority in this case
drops a footnote saying that they are not resolving the issue about whether the federal government can use race in military academies, suggesting that that case might
present different issues. Justice Jackson's dissent has a kind of pointed response to this.
So she writes, quote, the court has come to rest on the bottom line conclusion that racial diversity
and higher education is only worth potentially preserving insofar as it might be needed to prepare Black Americans and other underrepresented minorities for success
in the bunker, not the boardroom, a particularly awkward place to land. In light of the history,
the majority opts to ignore, writing also that the court's opinion is truly a tragedy for us all.
Justice Gorsuch concurs. He thinks just to pile on that the Civil Rights Act,
in addition to the 14th Amendment,
also prohibits race-conscious remedies.
President Lyndon Johnson would like a word,
so he said some potentially relevant things
in his commencement address at Howard Law School.
You do not wipe away the scars of centuries
by saying now you are free to go where you want and
do as you desire and choose the leaders you please.
You do not take a person who for years has been hobbled by chains and liberate him, bringing
up to the starting line of a race and then say, you are free to compete with all the others, and
still justly believe that you have been completely fair.
Thus, it is not enough just to open the gates of opportunity.
All our citizens must have the ability to walk through those gates. This is the next and the more profound stage
of the battle for civil rights.
We seek not just freedom, but opportunity.
We seek not just legal equity, but human ability.
Not just equality as a right and a theory,
but equality as a fact and equality as a result.
Not to be outdone, Justice Kavanaugh concurs because if there's two people I really wanted
to hear from about affirmative action, it was the Georgetown Prep PEP squad. So thank goodness for
that. Justice Kavanaugh writes to emphasize that that 25-year time limit was definitely really
serious. So they are honoring
Grutter and all of the court's prior cases rather than overruling them. And he has a nice bullet
pointed list to demonstrate that. He literally is like, listen to all these other members of the
court who also thought it was important that any race conscious program expire within 25 years.
He cites O'Connor and Grutter, also a Justice Thomas concurrence,
also a Justice Kennedy concurrence, also Justice Ginsburg noting the 25-year limit.
It is just really striking to me that the Equal Protection Clause means one thing today or one
thing 25 years ago, but something different today or something different 25 years from now.
That really strikes me, I don't know about you guys, as the purest form of originalism. I mean,
Brett Kavanaugh, just originalist to the core.
And he sort of interestingly makes a similar gesture in his concurrence in the Voting Rights Act case, Allen.
So I'm still sort of mulling over what to make of this new version of originalism.
It's the Constitution as a poison pill.
It's the Constitution as a poison pill.
Right, right.
The conception of liberty that we hold cannot expand, but the conception of equality can contract. Okay, I see.
Yes. One-way ratchet.
Cool. So maybe we can end on this decision where we started out, you the court can render a decision, it cannot change
what America stands for. America is an idea, an idea unique in the world, an idea of hope and
opportunity, of possibilities, of giving everyone a fair shot, of leaving no one behind. We've never
fully lived up to it, but we've never walked away from it either. We will not walk away from it now.
So today I want to offer some guidance to our nation's colleges as they review their admission
systems after today's decision. They should not abandon their commitment to ensure student bodies
of diverse backgrounds and experience that reflect all of America. So one other just quick note,
which is we got some absolutely bombshell reporting that
is relevant to one of the cases that the court has outstanding that we're kind of expecting a
decision in tomorrow. And that's 303 Creative, Alanis, in truly wild reporting in the New
Republic that was written by Melissa Gira Grant. She reports how the entire case of 303 Creative,
after the standing of the plaintiff was challenged, you know, on the ground that she had
never been asked to make a wedding website. And so why is she challenging this law as potentially
requiring her to make one after, you know, her standing was challenged, the lawyers representing
her introduced an affidavit or some statements or some evidence that, well, like this person, a man, once asked her to design a website for a gay wedding.
And Melissa, the reporter, decided to go ahead and contact this person because his information was listed in the relevant documents in the court. And guess what? It turns out that this
already highly dubious case just became a lot more fucking dubious because they say that this person,
Stuart, asked for a wedding website to Mike. Stuart, it turns out, is straight and married
to a woman, was at the time. And he's like, I never would have said, right,
would you make me a wedding website to marry a man?
I did no such thing.
And so, you know, we'll see kind of what happens with this case.
But, you know, this case never should have been at the court.
It's not remotely a live case.
And it just became a lot more dead.
Hypothetical. Even more hypothetical. So even more hypothetical.
Exactly. With that in mind, I think this is another good time to just play that Joe Biden
clip again. Again, the man is speaking prophecies here. So let's hear as we close out from the pods
most famous listener one Joseph Robinette Biden. Here he is again.
This is not a normal one.
You're right, Joe. This is not a normal one. But this is Strict Scrutiny, which is a
Crooked Media production hosted and executive produced by Leah Lipman, me, Melissa Murray,
and Kate Shaw. It's produced and edited by Melody Rowell. Ashley Mizzuo is our associate producer.
We get audio support from Kyle Seglin and Veronica Simonetti with music by Eddie Cooper,
production support from Michael Martinez, Leo Duran, and Ari Schwartz, and digital support
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If you're new to Strict Scrutiny, welcome.
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