Stuff You Should Know - Boeing's Nosedive: The 737-MAX

Episode Date: May 5, 2026

Boeing used to be one of the most respected engineering firms in the world. Then it changed its focus from making great airplanes to increasing its stock value. The result was the 737-MAX, a plane that took the lives of 346 people in two avoidable crashes.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

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Hey, and welcome to the podcast. I'm Josh, and there's Chuck, and we are just flying the friendly skies with our co-pilot, Jerry, and our other co-pilot, God. And this is Stuff You Should Know. I thought it was dog. Yeah. Yeah. Okay. Well, before we get going, there is kind of an exciting thing we need to mention,

and we're going to mention this, you know, you're probably getting sick of us talking about it. But stuff you should know is going on a cruise. Yeah, a sea cruise. And not just like, so long, suckers, we're going on vacation. Right. It's like a stuff cruise with other, like, stuff they don't want you to know is going to be there. We're doing our live podcast. on board, and it's like, hey, stuff you should know, listeners, come, come cruise with us.

Yeah, come cruise with us. I think that's the message that we're sending out right now. It's on Virgin Voyages, which is pretty swank. And it's October 2nd to the 7th. It's five-day cruise from New York City to Bermuda and back even. They bring you back to your car. I think that's kind of key. Yeah, it's an adult-only thing. Yep. And I think the name of it is the big apple to Bermuda. cruise. And yeah, it's going to be a lot of fun. So, you know, like I said, we're doing our live podcast and we're going to be doing some other fun events that they haven't told us about yet. The feeling it'll be like trivia and stuff like that. But Jerry is going, and that's

reason enough to sign up, I think. Yeah, you can verify in person that Jerry exists. Might be able to rub some suntan lotion on her back, too. So where do people go to sign up for this sea cruise? Yeah, you know what I would do? I think we're going to have some like super specific information coming, but just get on your search engine and check out stuff at sea, Virgin Voyages, and that'll direct you. I can't wait. Yeah, I can't wait either. We'll see all of you in October on the high seas. That's right. This episode is not about ships, actually. It's about a plane. Which is technically a ship. It's an airship. An airship, yeah, yeah. That's a good way to say it. Yeah, that's how most people say it. I'm trying to watch what I say about this one, because it's pretty

touchy. It is touchy, but it's just such a shameful chapter in the history of what was long regarded one of the best engineering firms in the world, the Boeing Corporation. They made great airplanes. They were very innovative. They made very safe airplanes. They cared about the details. They put engineering standards before profit. And all of that just got wiped out in the course of a few years from about 2018 to 19, all of it just went bloop when it came to light that they had flip-flopped that a few years before and profits now came before standards. Yeah. And, you know, we'll talk about in more detail.

But, you know, the end result, as everybody knows at this point, is two of their 737 max planes crashed, fell out of the sky and killed a lot of people. It's super sad. And it's very sort of anger-inducing when you know the story. behind it all. So we're going to detail that now, starting, I guess, we should say, that the 737 Max airplane that we're talking about was a brand new fleet that was going to replace the old 737s and compete with their rival Airbus, the Airbus A320 Neo. Yeah. And Airbus has long been Boeing's rival since Boeing bought McDonnell Douglas back in

I think the 90s. And so it's just been Boeing Airbus head to head to supply the world with their airplanes. And the 737 max, the reason that they were updating the 737s is one, like you said, these were old 737s that needed to be replaced, but also that Airbus A320 Neo, it was like a step up. up. Like it was the same kind of body, like I think a narrow body is what it's called, narrow body mid-sized plane as the 737.

So companies now had an option. They could be like, well, we're going to go with this Airbus instead of replacing the Boeing's with Boeing. So Boeing said, good God, we've got to get out there and give them something that they're going to want besides this A320 Neo. Yeah, for sure. I think should we save talk of the actual incidents until later? I think just mentioning that they happened was enough for now. All right. Well, what you're going to hear is going to infuriate you a little bit. It's also going to shine a bit of a light on some of the, which will also infuriate you, just some of the systemic problems with the airline industry as a whole

and how these planes are approved for being safe to fly in the sky and the FAA is going to take some hits, deservedly. But we should probably start out by talking about Boeing. You know, you mentioned that they were, you know, dedicated to the top-notch engineering

for decades and decades. But starting in the 90s, that started to change, right? Yeah, there was a CEO that kind of kicked it all off His name was Philip Condit. And in 1997, he said, we're going to acquire McDonnell Douglas, like I said. Up to that point, McDonnell Douglas was also a neck-and-neck competitor with Boeing.

But rather than making their name as also like a great engineering firm with innovation and a mine to safety, McDonald-Douglas is like, no, we're just going to cut costs. Yeah. Whereas Boeing, if they were going to design a new plane or if they were going to come up with a new plane, They would start from scratch and design a new plane and probably set all the industry standards for decades to follow. What McDonnell Douglas did was they would design a plane and then they would go back to it over decade and decade and decade after decade

and just kind of revamp it and update it. That is essentially what you call Cluji. It can be done, obviously, because they were doing it, but it is so much worse than designing a new plane from scratch. It's just it costs a lot less. and it takes a lot less time. Yeah, because over those decades, over those 30 to 40 years,

there have been so many innovations in flight technology that, like, you could build a really great airplane from the ground up if that's what you wanted to do. Right. We should mention that all of that. Did you name that first CEO from 97? Yeah, Philip Condit. Okay, so he was the first guy.

The other thing that he did, and this was a little bit later, this was, I think, four years after he was named CEO, So he didn't split up Boeing like a breakup, but he split them up physically in that he moved their headquarters from their longtime home in Seattle to Chicago. And he did this for a lousy $3 million a year. It was $60 million in state and local tax credit over a 20-year period. Three million bucks a year for a company like this is like chicken scratch. So it was a bit of a head scratcher move because you had a company that had a company that had a,

everything under one roof in Seattle. And now you had these Seattle-based engineers working there, and you had the C-suite in Chicago. And that's, anytime that happens that, I mean, I know people can work remotely and stuff like that, but it seemed like a great idea to have everything there in Seattle. Yeah, and plus up to that point with the executives and the decision makers working very closely with, like, the engineers and product division, those engineers knew the executives. They had a working relationship with them. so they felt comfortable saying, like,

I don't really think we should do that because it's going to make the plane fall out of the sky and the executives would listen. This is like, they didn't know these people anymore. It just got separated. And this transition really kind of became complete when a guy named Harry Stonecipher took over from Philip Condit in 2003.

He became CEO. He used to be with General Electric, but he was most recently with McDonnell Douglas. And even though that Boeing acquired McDonnell Douglas, McDonald-Douglas influenced Boeing's culture. Boeing's culture became that same cost-cutting, like, focus, shareholder. Yes, exactly. That kind of focus.

That became what Boeing adopted after guys like Kerry Stonecipher took over Boeing. Yeah, he has a quote even. He said, when people say I change the culture of Boeing, that was the intent. So that it is run like a business rather than a great engineer. firm. And that's one of those quotes where I was like, bro, you just said that out loud to the press. Like, no one wants to hear that. Yeah, well. I guess shareholders did. But exactly. Everyone else, the public at large wants safe planes that don't fall out of the sky. Yeah, but he was putting a signal out, a bat signal of sort saying like, hey, investors, come invest in Boeing.

We're going to make a bunch of money for you. And they started to. The next CEO was Jim McNerney. and he was the one who you can really put the most of the blame for the design of the 737 max. From him onward, essentially every single CEO had some sort of direct personal blame for what happened. But he was the one who was like, we need to get this plane out, we need to get it out fast, we need to cut every corner we possibly can to save time and money go.

Yeah, so he ran the company. Anthony until 2015. So he oversaw all of that planning and development, basically. And then after that, the CEO, man, I just hate saying that CEO over and over. I had a bad taste in my mouth. The new guy's name was Dennis Mullenberg. And he, you know, obviously inherited quite a mess after what we're about to talk about. So like I said, like these guys were saying, like, come on, we got to get going.

Like Airbus is already several steps ahead. and we need to get this thing out so people can start ordering before Airbus just sucks all of the market share out of us. I saw that they put countdown clocks for different deadlines all throughout the office in meeting rooms, conference rooms. There was constantly a clock counting down while you were at work. Engineers got the impression, and sometimes we're told directly, like, keep your mouth shut.

Yeah. The head of the project for the 737 Max, people didn't report directly to them anymore. They reported to their heads, and their heads may or may not have told that project manager about any problems that came up. So this whole rushed project also had like an aura of just keep your mouth shut. Do not do anything to delay this. Yeah, for sure. And, you know, as we'll see later, there were whistleblowers. But when it takes a, like, somebody requesting whistleblower protection to come forward, especially with, I mean, in any corporation,

but especially when it's something that's dealing with, like, public safety, that's not how it should be. You know, you should be able to say, hey, at your work, this is without fear of being a reprisal, you know, like, we're not doing the right thing here. Right. And it used to be, you didn't even need a whistleblow. You would go to the executives and be like, hey, this is a real problem. This is not safe. And they would listen to you.

That wasn't the case anymore. Should we take a break? Sure. All right. Let's take a break and we'll come back with the design phase right after this. I'm Ruby Carr, the host of the podcast, Encore. Check out our brand new episodes featuring music from the show that everyone is reheating as we speak. Heated rivalry.

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We're interested in why everyone's talking about it. Because everyone watches women's sports. So if you're already a fan, or you're just getting into the game, there's a seat for you right here. Listen to everyone watches women's sports. On the IHeart Radio app, Apple Podcast, or wherever you get your podcast. Hey, I'm Hoda Kotby, host of the podcast, Joy 101 with Hoda Kotby.

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I know we talked a little bit at first about how they decided to sort of revamp this decade's old fleet design-wise instead of starting from scratch with all this great new technology. But that's what they did. They took that 737 body. They made a lot of changes. They added bigger engines. And one of the things that was the result, and they knew this by 2012, basically, was that they had created a problem, a balance problem. whereas at certain speeds, you could potentially go into a stall

because the airplane's nose drifted upward. Yeah, because they basically took the same plane and just put giant engines that the plane was never designed for, and it just knocked it out of balance, right? And you would say, well, why didn't they just move the wings? There was a good reason they didn't move the wings, because the more changes you make to an airplane,

the more likely it is that all the pilots at all the different airlines that fly, that plane are going to need updated training, right? The FAA will require it. Airlines don't like that. That's an added cost to the plane you're selling them. So they did, they bent themselves into pretzels trying to avoid making actual big changes. They just tried, they were playing whack-a-mole with all the problems that came up with an eye toward not actually doing the one thing that would solve the problem, which is redesign the wings. So what they came up with instead was some software that would take over and make the nose go back level whenever it got out of a suitable

angle of attack it's called. Yeah, it's called the, and this is the real sort of, well, I was going to say the real villain, but the real villains were the humans behind this decision. But we're talking about the maneuvering characteristics augmentation system, the MCAS. And this thing, like you said, I don't know if it was clear, but it literally like takes over controls of the plane and supposedly takes care of the issue for the pilot

instead of saying like, hey, you know, let's redesign this plane or at least train these pilots to rectify this on their own with their hands on the wheel? No, what's that thing called? The stick, I think they call it? The stick? Is it the stick in big planes too? Probably.

I'm pretty sure. Just a larger stick. Yeah. The big stick. The big stick. They said we designed this WISBang software that's going to do for you. And when they went around to test flight mode, I think there was like 2016, the MCAS was still a pretty small part of this whole thing, but it was part of the aircraft.

Yeah, and then they started testing this new design and simulators. And I know at least once, I think in 2012, I think the head test pilot for Boeing took 10 seconds to override the MCAS. crashed and they were like, ooh, okay, we need to keep working on this. So again, they're back to playing whackamol. Like the, the Band-Aid that they put on the issue of the imbalance, which was the software, now has its own bugs. So now they're fixing those. And then that would bring up more bugs and more bugs. So they had to fix those and those and those. And this was where the design for the Boeing 737 Max really started to get out of hand. Yeah, for sure. Because, like I said, it was a pretty small part of the system at first.

It had kind of that one function, I think, initially, or was supposed to. But by the time you're playing whackamole, it keeps growing and growing, and you're like, well, then the software will solve this problem, and then the software should solve this problem. And all of a sudden, as it's interacting with these plane systems, it's a huge part of flying this plane.

Yeah. And they had to integrate it with the existing software. They couldn't redo the software or the flight controls or else, again, you have pilot training that you've just triggered, right? So they were just basically hammering this thing into place as best they could. The way that it finally worked was there were two sensors on the nose that sense the angle of the plane, right? And when the sensors sent information saying, hey, this plane's at way too steep of an angle, it could stall out if it goes any further up. the MCAS system literally like you said took over the flight controls and then leveled the plane back out right

there was a huge issue that they made it they designed it which still befuddles engineers aerospace engineers today so that only one of those sensors saying the plane's angle was wrong could trigger the MCAS like there was no redundancy so if one of those sensors was faulty and the other was fine it didn't matter The faulty one was going to tell the MCAS to level out, even if the plane's angle wasn't actually an issue. Yeah, like the whole idea there is if one sensor goes off, you want to have that other sensor that aligns with it and says, yeah, we're getting the same readings or whatever,

which is, you know, it's that backup, it's that redundancy that you need. You need that matching data before that thing engages itself. So they said, you know what? We've done our calculations. and we think it's much simpler this way, and the risk of catastrophic failure is, quote, almost inconceivable. Yeah.

I think they figured the probability was one per 223 trillion hours of flight. So they said, you know what, we don't need this redundancy. It's not necessary. Which is still, it's just insane. Like, that is a basic principle. Redundancy is a basic principle

of any engineering, right? And it just, I don't, I still couldn't find why they made that decision, why it was so much harder. for that to have the sensors have to match. It's just nuts. But as we'll see, somebody clearly forgot to carry the one

because that calculation they came up with for that probability was not correct. So there was another thing that they did. They didn't tell anybody about the MCAS. Yeah, this is the one that really gets me. They created, this was brand new. No one had ever created something like the MCAS before. It wasn't like they took an existing software

and just kind of redesigned it. They made new software to do a brand new thing that hadn't been done before, and then they didn't tell anyone about it. And again, just want to reiterate, the MCAS took over the controls from the pilot. If you were the pilot, you were no longer in control of the plane

while the MCAS was bringing the nose back down to a more suitable angle of attack. Imagine that happening, and you having no idea what's going on because you don't know the MCAS exists. Yeah, and all of this is because they don't want to make the, again, make the plane less appealing to buyers to airlines because they're going to have to invest a lot of money in, like, pilot retraining and even as simple things as like, you know, flight manuals and stuff like that. Yeah. Supposedly, I mean, it was reported at least that Boeing made a deal with Southwest Air that said, hey, if you buy enough planes from us and if you don't require your special training for the pilots, like save yourself some money, we'll give you a discount on these planes. And Boeing lobbied the FAA, like actively lobbied them to allow them not to make any mention of the MCAS in the manual.

Like, we don't even want this in the flight manual. And the FAA said, sure. Yeah, they said, okay. Boeing told them that it was such a minor part of an already existing system. I think the existing airspeed sensor system that it was not worth mentioning. And the FAA, like you said, they were like, sure, that's fine. they also didn't even put an indicator light for it in there. That's how secret they kept this thing.

So you would have no idea it was on, right? So this was like that you might be stunned that the FAA just went along with that. It also shows you that they didn't, they had no idea what the MCAS was. They didn't go and look and say, well, let us see if it's actually important or not. Tell us what this thing is.

Later on, FAA officials, some of them would testify They didn't get the MCAS. They didn't understand what it was. And they really were encouraged not to ask too many questions. So they just said, sure, if you guys don't think that it's worth mentioning, we won't make you. Yeah, for sure. And, you know, this is all, you know, how I mentioned in the beginning, part of the systemic failures of just how things work. So we should talk a little bit about that as far as the FAA is concerned.

Because when they were formed in 1958, it was pretty clear right out of the gate that they're kind of, co-mandates could often be in conflict with one another, which was to promote the interest of the aviation industry and, very important, to promote the safety of the flying public. So they knew pretty quickly that, like I said, those don't always align. So Congress in, I think, 1967 said, all right, maybe we should have a new agency that really guides the safety side. So they created the National Transportation Safety Board, and they're like, they'll keep everybody safe and recommend regulations to the FAA to enforce, but they can't demand that. The FAA has never, like, had to do the things that they're suggested to do. Right. It's just the NTSB is looking out for the safety, but the FAA

doesn't have to enact it, because, again, that might conflict with the interests of the aviation industry. And that stuck out to me, Chuck, that the safety of the flying public isn't always in the interests of the aviation industry. It should 100% of the time be in the interest of the aviation industry. Yeah. That's just my take. Hot take. But what ended up happening was the FAA said, all right, well, you know, we're good at the industry stuff.

So why don't we just let Boeing, like they know planes. Why don't we let them handle their own certification process? And it wasn't, I mean, that seems to be sort of standard practice. It wasn't like some big exception was made, right? Yeah, no, they have a name for it. Organizational designation authorization. The FAA can say, like you just said, you know a lot about what we want and what we want. where you require. We're just going to let you go through and verify that all this stuff

adheres to FAA requirements and guidelines. And then you come back and tell us if it does. You, plane maker, certify your own plane and tell us if we should certify it in turn. And that's exactly what it is. That's that process. Yeah. They were like, hey, here's what you do. Just do it all. Then send me an email that just says all good. Right. Write an email to the president, but like it's from me and then I'll sign it. So this is part of a bigger problem that actually has a name. It's called regulatory capture. And it's this idea that when people are working closely together, like the FAA works closely

with the airline industry and Boeing, that they, you know, they know these people. And they end up, I don't want to necessarily say siding, but they end up more. sympathetic to the industry side than the public that they're supposed to be protecting because they don't work with the public at large every day. They work with these people every day. Exactly. That's the same reason why you should avoid ever agreeing to mediation instead of a lawsuit because the mediators typically, even though they won't say they do, they will typically work for the people paying them and the chances of your company that say you're going into mediation with hiring them again are far greater than you ever hiring them.

It's not exactly the same thing, but it's, they have a working relationship that just can't be avoided. And that also is supported by another issue called the revolving door. Regulatory capture is very much supported by the revolving door and vice versa, which is you are a friendly regulator. And the company you're regulating later on is like, hey, we want to hire you. We think you've done a great job, and we want you to come work for us for gobs of money. And it can go the other way, too.

A friendly colleague can go become a regulator, and, you know, you just kind of expect them to turn a blind eye when you need them to. That's just a huge problem, especially when you're talking about huge, like life and death stuff, like designing and certifying airplanes. Or, you know, pharmaceutical makers in the FDA, they're frequently talked about as regulatory capture. and a revolving door. Yeah, I mean, I'm just a dummy podcaster, so I don't know how any of this stuff works, but it seems to me like there should be like a rule or a law that says, you know, choose your path.

Like, you can't go work for the FAA for 10 years and then go work for Boeing right after that with some plum job or some pharmaceutical company and then you go work for the FDA. Like, it's just such an obvious conflict, you know? Yeah, I don't remember if you and I recorded the episode on it or not. I feel like we did years back. I definitely wrote an article about this. And people have proposed that over the years. I think three years is typically the average, which makes

sense. Like a lot of people change at a company in three years. So that would probably actually do it. But it's just like just added to the pile of problems that we have to solve to get things on track around here. I propose we take a sort of a quicker break here than we normally would. because we've got the crashes coming up, and after that, it's, you know, what do you think? I agree. Okay.

I'm not quite sure what I was trying to say there, but we'll be right back, and we'll talk about what happened with these planes right after this. I'm Ruby Carr, the host of the podcast, Encore. Check out our brand new episodes featuring music from the show that everyone is reheating as we speak. Heated rivalry. Join me as I go behind the songs

that brought Shane and Elia together. I'll tell you the stories of Fice, My Moon, My Man, wolf parades, I'll believe in anything, and tattoos all the things she said, and how they all became a part of this global phenomenon. Stream encore on IHeart Radio, crave, or wherever you get your podcasts.

What's up, fam? I'm sports journalist Ari Chambers. Hey, what's up, y'all? It's your girl, Sam J. And we're the host of Everyone Watches Women's Sports, a new podcast from Together and IHeart Women's Sports. Because let's be real. Women's sports is giving us way too much to talk about these days.

The highlights, the rivalries, the breakout stars, the moments to take over your entire timeline. And the conversations that start during the game and somehow keep going all week. Every week we're breaking down the biggest stories across women's sports. We'll give you our takes, our debates, and probably a few disagreements. We'll talk to athletes, celebrate big moments and get into what's happening on and off the field, sport, track, and beyond. Because we're not just interested in what happened. We're interested in why everyone's talking about. it because everyone watches women's sports.

So if you're already a fan, you're just getting into the game, there's a seat for you right here. Listen to everyone watches women's sports. On the IHeart Radio app, Apple Podcast, or wherever you get your podcast. Hey, I'm Hoda Kotby, host of the podcast, Joy 101 with Hoda Kotby. Okay, if you know me, you know this.

I'm always searching for inspiration, for support, and useful tools to help maximize joy. So this podcast lets us uncover all of that together. We're going to have these meaningful conversations with the world's most fascinating people. Like when actress Olivia Munn shared how she overcame fierce health challenges that she never saw coming. I've gone through breast cancer and then helped my mother through breast cancer. And that was more difficult. There's a lot of people who understand postpartum depression.

I was not prepared for postpartum anxiety. Olympic champ Sean Johnson revealed why she had no choice. but to be a gymnast. There was something about gymnastics that was intoxicating to me. It's given me a belief that we all have one of those treasures inside of us. We just have to find it. Listen to Joy 101 with Hoda Kotby on the IHeartRadio app, Apple Podcasts, or wherever you get your podcasts. Okay, Chuck, so we're back, and we're going to go back to March 2017.

and I guess this month is when the FAA certified the 737 Max 8 to fly. A few months later, the Max 9 was certified to fly. And both of these planes, I think they were the first 737 maxes to hit the skies. And one thing you want to point out is when the FAA certifies a new plane to fly, they and the European, the EU Aviation Authority, they're basically, their stamps tell the rest of the world, like, these planes are fine. You can buy them, you can fly them,

you can put them into your airline fleet. Other countries have their own aviation authority, sure. But they do not have the resources that, like, the FAA or the EU's aviation authority have. And so they're relied upon. Like, their credibility is important worldwide. So this is one reason also it was such a big deal that the FAA just completely fell down on the job. Yeah, because they're supposed to be the gold standard worldwide, like you said.

So on October 29th, 2018, Lion Air Flight, it was the 737 Max 8, crashed into the Java Sea very shortly after takeoff from Indonesia. And the flight crew communicated with air traffic control, that basically they were having trouble with flight control, they were having trouble with their altitude, and then the plane just disappears from radar. And I think it was about 13 minutes later, it plunged into the Jaba Sea at about 400 miles an hour and killed all 189 people on board.

Yeah. Yeah. And all of this was, I think, like you said, 13 minutes after the plane took off. So that angle of attack thing, we know enough now to know what. was going on. At the time, no one had any idea what was going on. And so Boeing said, oh, there's this thing called the MCAS that we put in. Just here's some information about it.

And if anything like this ever happens to you, here's the procedure to override it and you'll be all good. Just it was still, it was pilot error everybody. That's what the problem was. That's what Boeing blamed it on. Yeah. So that was crash number one. Then I guess about five months later in March of 2019, an Ethiopian Airlines flight crashed near Ejir, Ethiopia. This was six minutes after takeoff. And all 157 passengers and crew obviously on board died. And what made that crash even worse, Chuck,

is that those airline pilots followed that procedure that Boeing had told the world about after the Lion Air Flight a few months before. and it still didn't work because there was a software glitch with the MCAS, and it kept reactivating and reactivating, and they couldn't override it, and that's when it crashed. So even with this workaround that Boeing came up with, it still wasn't fixing the problem.

And after that second crash, it was quite clear that Boeing had screwed up royally and also that the FAA had let them do that and still certified these planes that were way too dangerous to carry human beings. Yeah, the whole 737 Max Fleet was grounded at that point for 20 months. It was the biggest sort of grounding like that in aviation history. Took out 450 planes from the sky. And, you know, it's tendrils ran all throughout the airline industry, like travel, stock prices, obviously. Southwest, you know, I mentioned supposedly having that better deal.

They had to ground, I think, 30. of their 58 plane stock? Yeah, fleet. Fleet, that's the word. The fleet with the sticks. That's right. I mean, it's clear I'm not an aviator, you guys. I'm sure that's not a surprise to anyone.

But governing bodies really kind of came in quickly after that point. They launched investigations, not just into Boeing, but also into the FAA. And, you know, they did the thing you do, which you start issuing statements like that are really angry. And then there are press releases and there are denials, and then CEOs come and go. obviously lawsuits and at least one criminal charge would come and regulatory actions. But while this is going on, there's still like problems with this plane. Yeah, and the reason they grounded all 737 maxes everywhere in the world for 20 months,

it was supposed to be a very short time, but it turned out to be 20 months, is because these were brand new planes that dropped out of the sky. Remember that 1 and 232 trillion chance of the malfunction? This is two. Yeah, the Lion Air plane had 800 hours of flight time. The Ethiopian air had just 1,30 hours. Yeah. So this happened two times in just 2130 flight hours.

Yeah. Boy, there's some Josh Clark math in there that we just edited it out, Chuck. Right. So in October 2019, this is a year after that Lion Air crash. The CEO, who I mentioned earlier at the time, Dennis Moolenberg, was called before Congress, which is what you do. You've got to take your lumps and go in there and get yelled at, basically. And the whole time he's insisting the plane is safe. And in that hearing, and I remember watching some of this stuff, Connecticut Senator Richard Blumenthal said, after that second crash, he met with Boeing reps in his office.

And they said what Josh Clark would say one day is that it was pilot error, which, like, That's just complete fabrication. Yeah. I mean, yeah, it's just so scummy, you know, to be that responsible for the deaths of hundreds of people, terrible deaths. And then just to blame two people or four people, I guess, who are blameless in it. That's just, I just think that's terrible. And you might say, well, okay, what's wrong with Mulemberg? He was the one who inherited the problem.

He's to blame because he didn't ground the 737 maxes. The FAA made Boeing do that. See, he had the option to do this. He had the opportunity to, and he didn't. Yeah, for sure. You know, obviously the FAA, we've been pretty hard on here, and they were found responsible for good reason. There was a 2020 congressional report that said Boeing and the FAA jointly were responsible

for these two plane crashes. And the FAA, this whole time, is insisting that it did the right thing. It's like, we, you know, did everything like we were supposed to be. to as far as certification goes, but it seems to be a systemic thing where no one stepped forward before this and said, you can't allow them to certify themselves. Because they may have been telling the truth when they said they followed procedure, but the procedure was wrong. Exactly.

Yeah. So when that report came out, the shares of Boeing plummeted. As far as fines go and actual money that they had to shell out from this. Yeah. The FAA fined Boeing $17 million in 2021, 17 million with an M. Yeah. For using unapproved or non-conforming parts or mislabeling the parts. Neither of these, those things had anything to do with the crashes.

So Boeing was never fined for those two crashes by the FAA. Yeah, was that just them trying to be like, hey, let's slap them with something so the public sees the headline? That's my interpretation, yes. And that's the little pussycat bite that they came up with. Right. Is that a thing? Wow. Sure.

The other thing is the FAA didn't start issuing penalties like that until the Justice Department filed suit against Boeing for defrauding the United States government by saying this thing is fine. You can go ahead and certify it FAA. and there was actually a criminal misconduct facet to the whole thing as well. And I think Boeing negotiated a $2.5 billion payment or fine to the United States to basically say like, just here, make this go away, here's some money. They also had to pay $8.3 billion to the airlines. And then, man, the victim's families, all I think 345 victims' families, there was $100 million pot set aside for them

as part of this negotiated agreement with the Justice Department. The thing that I saw, though, when I was looking that up, Chuck, on like a Google search or whatever, the reporting on it said that Boeing is dedicating $100 million to victims' families, almost across the board. All of the report.

Like they weren't forced to? Yes. It's disgusting. Because it also shows that all of these outlets we're basically just copying the Boeing press release. Yeah. Yeah, for sure. You did mention a criminal charge.

There was one. There was one individual that faced criminal charges. It was a former lead technical pilot named Mark Forkner. And he is the guy who convinced the FAA that the MCAS was not something worthy of including in the flight manual. I think it was exposed later on in internal emails. He was frustrated about MCAS and the EACS and the EACS. email, and he said, quote, I basically lied to the FAA, end quote. And he was found not guilty of defrauding federal regulators. And that was the only person to be brought up on criminal charges.

Yeah, after that, the DOJ said, okay, we're closing this case. It's done. As you can imagine, the families of the victims were not at all happy with any of this. Yeah. So the whole thing put to rest. Everybody's moving on. This is, what was that, 2021, I think, when that whole thing got settled. Yeah. And then three years later, less than three years later, there was another catastrophic incident with another Boeing 737 max. Yeah, and I remember when this would happen after all the other stuff,

it was just like, what is, because, I mean, I feel like there was this weird, certain amount of national pride with Boeing even at one point. Like, I remember growing up hearing about, like, Boeing, like, this great company of engineers, like, these brilliant people. And then by the time this happened in 2024, I'm not even in, like, a plane head. And I was like, what is happening with this, like, once great company? And that's when Alaska Airlines flight depressurized rapidly at 16,000 feet because a door plug blew out. And there was a hole in the side of the plane. Yeah, door plug is essentially a panel that covers an unused emergency exit.

And that panel came off, blew off, and just by total luck, or the grace of God, depending on your view of what's going on behind the universe, there was nobody seated right there. Yeah. And the reason why this was lucky is because parts of the seats were sucked out, and there would be a good chance that a human sitting in one of those seats would have been sucked out at 16,000 feet. It's mind-boggling that nobody was killed or I think seriously injured even than that. It's just it could have been so bad and lucky for Boeing it wasn't. Yeah, initial reports indicated that they couldn't find the bolts that were to hold that plug in place. And then apparently there were signs that maybe there were never bolts in place to begin with and that a Boeing worker removed that door plug

for some maintenance, routine maintenance, didn't put the bolts back in. At this point, the FAA is like, all right, this can't, you know, this is such a public thing after the disaster of the two crashes. They grounded the planes again. They said, quote, this should never have happened and it cannot happen again.

And when they did follow-up investigations, I mean, it seemed kind of like a clown show going on at Spirit Aerosystems that like the factory where these things were being put together, one of their suppliers. Yeah, this was not a good look. There were assemblers who were in charge of putting plane stuff together. They would jump up and down on airplane parts and, like, kick it into place to make the drill holes line up the way that they should. A part like that for something like an airplane and the Boeing of yesteryear would have immediately been sent back

and supplier would have been sweating that they were going to. get dropped for somebody else. That's not the case, or that certainly wasn't the case with their vendor spirit. There were other problems that also came up with the Max, too, that didn't even have anything to do with the MCAS, but were still both potentially catastrophic themselves. Yeah, there was an air pressure sensor that seems pretty vital to me as a non-pilot that would ensure that pilots had enough air to not lose consciousness, I guess, in the event of something bad. important to you as a passenger, too. Yeah, it is.

They also found loose bolts in the rudder system. And by this point, like, it's pretty obvious that the FAA was complicit in this whole sort of shoddy operation going down with the 737 max. They were non-compliant with FAA regulations. And if the FAA's saying they don't know about that, then that's on them. Yeah, there was no argument or justification that FAA. could put forward that exonerated them in even a little bit, you know? Yeah.

And here's the thing. Before that door plug blew out, just before that, the FAA had gone to Congress and said, hey, I think it's all good now. Can we go back to letting Boeing certify their own planes? And then after that door blow out, or plug blow out, they withdrew that request. And this is the last CEO, Dave Calhoun. The reason he was a problem or an issue as well is because he didn't. change Boeing enough for this door plug incident to not happen. So there were two high-profile

whistleblower deaths. 32 people came forward to seek whistleblower federal protection to complain against Boeing. Two of them died, and it turns out both of them died, well, one died by suicide, another one died of Mercer, so I guess natural causes are disease. But the guy who died by suicide, of course, there was a conspiracy theory that he was actually murdered. He had just given a deposition in Charleston when he was found dead of a gunshot wound in his truck in a holiday and parking lot where he was staying after giving that deposition. And apparently there's all sorts of evidence including CCTV or security camera footage that show that this was suicide. The point is that doesn't exonerate Boeing. And his suicide note, he actually named Boeing as a huge reason for this because they ruined his life, he said.

Yeah. He requested to be buried face down so they could, quote, kiss his ass. Yeah. So, yeah, it's very, very sad, obviously. So they are identifying all these issues with the 737 max. The most scathing stuff obviously would come from the NTSB because they're separate from the AAA. and they basically have taken to bypassing the FAA by issuing their own safety notices directly

and not like going through them. Yeah. And I think in June 2025, just last year, they issued a bulletin of a possible engine problem on the 737 max. Yeah. Yeah. I feel like airlines should alert you.

I know they're not going to, but I feel like they should give you a choice. Like this is a 737 max. Well. You can see what plane it is, like when you book the flight. Yeah, that they switch them sometimes, too. Yeah, I'm going to start looking, though, man, after this. Oh, I do.

I do. I don't think I've ever been on board of Max, but I feel like it's just a roll of the dice every time, you know? Yeah, I mean, yeah, it's something I'm paying a lot more attention to now, obviously. We also can't not mention another thing that happened after the Alaska airline blowout that had nothing to do with their airline division or airplane division, but still was Boeing and it was a terrible look. It was an aerospace thing.

When the Starliner test flight to the ISS did not go very well. Yeah, they, I mean, there were a lot of failures there. We're not going to get into all of them, but it was a test flight carrying a couple of astronauts to the ISS. And they ended up stuck there. I think it was supposed to be a little more than a week, and it turned into nine months, and SpaceX had to go get them? That's just not a good look, right?

It's not. I mean, luckily, Wilmore and Williams, the two astronauts, made it back to Earth safely, and the Starliner, uncrewed, remotely controlled, made it back to Earth safely. But still, it's just, like, your stock price goes down every time. And the reason I mentioned that is because every step of the way with the 737 max, all of it followed that like psychopathic corporate logic where the shareholders return on investment is the most important thing. It is more important than morality, safety, practicality, sensibility, anything, right? And so the whole like sad trombone twist, I guess, is that the 737 max cost Boeing investors $87 billion.

Right. Over the six years from 2018 to 2024. It didn't make them money. It cost them money in share price drops over and over and over again because one thing after another just kept going. And Airbus was eating Boeing's lunch all of these years too. Yeah. I mean, there's a lesson in there.

No one will heat it, of course, but there's a lesson. Yes, there is, Chuck. You got anything else? I got nothing else. I mean, they're still out there, right? the 737 max? Yeah, they got recertified by the FAA. I think the last one was towed out of groundage.

I don't know if that's the word or not, but you know what I'm saying. And it was declared ready for delivery to China on August 29, 2025. So there is a very good chance that you will fly on a 737 max at some point in your life if you fly a lot. Yeah. Oh, and also just real quick, they also have the max seven and the max nine are the newest ones. and they're having trouble getting those certified because they're having an issue that they can't figure out how to fix yet. Yeah, software is a great thing. So I'm not bagging on the software industry, but like I have a car that has a, like a lot of newer cars are like very software based, as a lot of people know.

Yeah. And sometimes it'll just do something. Yeah. We had ours brick once. Yeah, it happens. I've seen it happen in my own car. And, like, that's not a plane with hundreds of passengers, you know? No, no.

Thankfully, we were parked and couldn't get it back on. But, yeah, I can't imagine how terrifying that would be if it happened while you were driving, you know. We should also say talking about software, it was widely reported that Boeing had hired, had outsourced their software coding to Indian companies to curry favor with India so they could sell more jets there. That's true. I think they were recent college graduates who were being paid. $9 an hour, who were entrusted with very important software stuff, but none of them worked on the MCAS. Right.

Which was the thing that caused those two crashes, obviously. That's right. I think that's it for the 737 Max. I got to dedicate this one to my dad because he's the one who gave me my interest in engineering because he was an engineer all these years. Yeah, I knew that. That's great. Well, since Chuck said that was great that I just dedicated this episode to my dad, as foretold in 2008. We just opened listener mail here in 2026. All right, this is from Alexa from Seattle.

It's short and sweet. Hey, guys, just wanted to add to the topic of the cherry blossom trees. And I remember when we recorded this, I was like, I know there's some places that are known for their cherry blossoms that we're not going to mention. And luckily, Alexa wrote in. Seattle loves their cherry blossoms, guys. The quad at UW is probably the most popular spot for cherry blossom viewing, and it's always packed with people.

all over the city you'll find cherry blossoms blooming and events themed around the cherry blossoms including food items and anime conventions. Nice. Cherry blossoms bloom in the spring when we get random breaks from the bleak winter weather and it's absolutely beautiful. And Alexa, I can confirm,

I think my first two trips to Seattle were in spring and I got like the best weather and I think I saw cherry blossoms and I was like, what's the deal with this place being gloomy? Like this place is incredible. I remember that too. I think we've done at least five, maybe six shows there over the years. And this past one in January was the first time it ever reigned while I was in Seattle.

Yeah, we got big-time Seattleed on this last trip. We did. We did. That was smart to choose a Seattle one because that's where Boeing's from. So that fits this one very nicely. Oh, fantastic. That was from Alexa. That's right. Alexa, send email.

No. Thanks, Alexa. Oh, my God. I'm so sorry. If you want to be like Alexa and send us an email and have us thank you like you're a robot, we will do that. All you have to do is send your email off to Stuff Podcast at iHeartRadio.com. Stuff you should know is a production of IHeartRadio. For more podcasts My Heart Radio, visit the Iheart Radio app.

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