Tangle - The U.S.–Saudi civil nuclear deal.

Episode Date: July 28, 2026

On Wednesday, July 22, the United States and Saudi Arabia signed a civil nuclear-cooperation agreement. The deal is a “123 Agreement,” named after Section 123 of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act, outlining a partnership between the two countries to establish a civilian nuclear program in Saudi Arabia. However, the status of the deal is now in question after President Donald Trump said on Thursday that it was conditional on Saudi Arabia normalizing relations with Israel. Ad-free podcasts are here!Get 20% off your first year of ad-free episodes, exclusive interviews, and deep dives with Tangle’s podcast membership!We won!A few weeks back, we asked Tangle readers to support our nomination for the inaugural Newsletter Awards. On Friday, we learned we won the top prize — the People’s Choice award — for receiving the most votes among over 100 nominees. Thanks so much for voting for us; every bit of recognition like this helps spread the word about our work. It’s a proud day for the entire Tangle community. You can read today's podcast⁠ ⁠⁠here⁠⁠⁠ and today’s “Under the radar” story ⁠here⁠ today’s “Have a nice day” story ⁠here⁠.You can subscribe to Tangle by clicking here or drop something in our tip jar by clicking here. Take the survey: What do you think of the deal? Let us know.Our Executive Editor and Founder is Isaac Saul. Our Executive Producer is Jon Lall.This podcast written by: Will Kaback and audio engineered and edited by Dewey Thomas. Music for the podcast was produced by Diet 75.Our newsletter is edited by Managing Editor Ari Weitzman, Senior Editor Will Kaback, Bailey Saul, Audrey Moorehead, and Carina Pacheco. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

From executive producer Isaac Saul, this is Tangle. Good morning, good afternoon, and good evening, and welcome to the Tangle podcast, a place where you get views from across the political spectrum, some independent thinking, and a little bit of our take. I'm your host today, senior editor, Will K back. Today we're going to be diving into the potential nuclear agreement between the United States and Saudi Arabia. This was a deal that flew a little bit under the radar last week. I think for good reason, there was a lot in the news cycle here in the U.S. But I think this could be one of the most impactful non-Iran Middle East stories in some time. That is if they can actually get this deal over the finish line.

So my take is going to dive into what's inside this deal, what may undermine it or stop it from going into effect. and whether this is the kind of deal or agreement related to nuclear development that we actually should be pursuing at all. And as a bonus, we've got both a concurrence and a dissent to my take today. We're going to call that the Tangle trifecta. So stay tuned for all of that. Later on in the episode, we've got another under the radar story about a voter registration controversy in Alaska that you may have missed while all the attention was on New Jersey's own voting scandal. Before we dive in, one more exciting announcement to share.

A few weeks back, you may remember that we asked Tangle readers to support our nomination for the inaugural newsletter awards. And this week, just yesterday, we found out that we won. And we didn't just win. We won the top prize, the People's Choice Award, for receiving the most votes among over 100 nominees. And if you go to the newsletter awards page, you can see that we won going away several, several thousand more votes than the next closest nominee. So thank you so much if you took the time to vote for us because seriously, every bit of recognition like this helps spread the word about our work and the community that we're building here at Tangle. So it should be a proud day for everyone. And again, our sincere thanks.

All right, I'm going to pass it over to John to get us into today's topic. And then I'll be back in a bit to read my take. John, to you. Thanks, Will. And welcome, everybody. Here are your quick hits for today. First up, Senator Mitch McConnell said in a statement that he remains in rehab, facilitation care and is not yet able to return to in-person work. The senator's office did not provide a timetable for his return to the Senate. Number two, the Trump administration filed an emergency application with the Supreme Court asking it to allow an executive order implementing new restrictions on mail-in voting to go into effect before the November midterms.

A federal appeals court upheld a block on the order last week. Number three, temporary protected status for Haitian and Syrian nationals expired on Monday. Immigration and Customs Enforcement is reportedly planning a large-scale operation to deport Haitians who no longer have legal status. Number four, President Donald Trump will meet separately with the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Ukrainian President Volodymy Zelensky at the White House on Tuesday. And number five, Senator Rand Paul released over 1,000 pages of diary entries from Dr. Anthony Fauci, covering Fauci's thoughts during a three-year period overlapping with the COVID-19 pandemic. Fauci will testify before the Senate Homeland Security Committee on Wednesday. The United States may have reached a deal with Saudi Arabia that could allow the kingdom to enrich uranium. Now, this is coming after U.S. officials told the Associated Press that this deal is expected to be announced today.

We don't have very many details, but Saudi Arabia for years has been trying to get the Americans to agree to help them expand their nuclear program. That's raised some concerns because the Saudis have said that they wanted to enriches. rich uranium. Now, this is exactly how you would potentially make a nuclear weapon by enriching uranium up to weapons-grade levels and then building a bomb. Now, Saudi Arabia is insisting that its plans are peaceful for its nuclear program, but we have heard from their assertive crown prince Mohammed bin Salman that the kingdom would be willing to seek a nuclear weapon should Iran choose to build a bomb. On Wednesday, July 22nd, the United States and Saudi Arabia signed a civil nuclear cooperation agreement. The deal is a one-two-three agreement named after Section 123 of the

U.S. Atomic Energy Act, outlining a partnership between the two countries to establish a civil nuclear program in Saudi Arabia. However, the status of the deal is now in question, after President Donald Trump said on Thursday that it was conditional on Saudi Arabia normalizing relations with Israel. Under the reported terms of the deal, the Saudi government can enter into contracts potentially worth billions of dollars with U.S. companies to develop nuclear energy programs over the course of the next 30 years. One such provisional development is a joint uranium enrichment facility, conditional on the results of a two-year study. If the study finds that uranium enrichment would have significant energy benefits, the U.S. will construct a black-box facility to allow enrichment

while preventing Saudi officials from accessing the underlying technology. The U.S. in Saudi Arabia had previously discussed a civilian nuclear agreement during past presidential administrations, but the two countries haven't been able to reach a deal. For years, Saudi Arabia has resisted adopting nuclear non-proliferation protocols that have characterized other nuclear agreements, including the gold standard provision of abstaining from domestic enrichment of reactor fuel. Additionally, Saudi Arabia has refused to adhere to the additional protocol from the International Atomic Energy Agency, which would strengthen the organization's oversight authority.

Though the text of the U.S. Saudi deal is not public, it reportedly does not include either the gold standard or AP provision. Historically, Saudi Arabia's refusal to normalize relations with Israel has also prevented a nuclear agreement with the U.S. The Trump administration's initial agreement did not include a normalization provision. However, on Thursday, President Trump posted on truth social that the deal was totally subject to Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords. Democratic lawmakers have been critical of the deal. Representative Jamie Raskin said, So the Saudis enriched the Trumps, and the Trumps allowed the Saudis to enrich uranium,

and then we're going to have more nuclear weapons in the Middle East to set off another nuclear arms race there. Republican lawmakers have been mixed. Representative Tim Burchard, the Republican from Tennessee, said developing allies is important as long as the U.S. could verify effective safeguards. Senator John Kennedy, the Republican from Louisiana, said a deal is possible, maybe someday,

but not right now, while the U.S. is at war, Iran. Today, you'll hear from the left, right, and writers in the Middle East about the U.S. Saudi deal. And then, senior editor Will Quebec will give his take. We'll be right back after this quick break. All right. First up, let's start with what the left is saying. The left says the deal doesn't effectively mitigate the risks of Saudi nuclear proliferation. Many argue that Trump's pivot reflects the volatility of his broader foreign policy. In Bloomberg, Mark Champion argued in the world of security, such assurances can't suffice. The administration has some strong arguments for making such an agreement with Saudi Arabia.

Top of the list is the concern that Riyadh will eventually go to Russia or China if Washington refuses to supply nuclear technology, champion wrote. Moreover, like any other nation, the kingdom has the right and the rationale to add nuclear power to its civilian energy mix. And let's not forget the commercial gain that would result for U.S. companies. But all of this misses the forest for the trees, because, two tests that override all other considerations must be applied here. The first is that any nuclear deal with any country in the Middle East must assure its neighbors that it is not pursuing a nuclear

arsenal, champion said. This reported agreement by no means guarantees a Saudi enrichment, let alone weapons program, but other Middle Eastern countries can only read it as opening the door to one. The second test is whether the case for risking nuclear proliferation in this way is dependent on the current leadership in Riyadh. In other words, can the U.S. feel confident that if the House of Saud were one day to be replaced or to change its ideological complexion, it would remain in U.S. interests to have it enriching uranium? The answer to that question is an emphatic no. In Slate, Fred Kaplan said Trump's deal reversal is right in line with the rest of his foreign policy. It's becoming a standard feature of Donald Trump's second presidency. He makes an

announcement or sets in motion a new significant policy. Then he utters a remark or post-a-cavia on social media, and the ship of state is cast into chaos, Kaplan wrote. The Saudi Arabia nuclear agreement was a very big deal. The Saudis have been seeking such a deal for many years. It could wean the kingdom away from its reliance on oil, but it could also lay the foundations for a Saudi nuclear weapon. Then, on Thursday at 7.52 a.m., Trump posted on social media that the deal is totally subject to Saudi Arabia joining the very respected and successful Abraham Accords.

Trump's new condition, which was not included in the deal negotiator, earlier this week by Secretary of Energy Chris Wright and his Saudi counterpart, pretty much scuttles the deal, Kaplan said. It's unclear why or how Trump changed his mind, if he did change his mind. Did he know or just not notice that the agreement signed by his Energy Secretary contained no Saudi concessions on Israel or much else? If you're really an American ally or adversary or something in between, it's basically impossible to believe anything our president says at this point

or to view us as anything close to a reliable partner. All right, that is it for what the left is saying, which brings us to what the right is saying. The right is mixed, with some saying Trump's late provision on Israel was a masterstroke in negotiations. Others argue that Saudi Arabia is not a trustworthy ally. In town hall, Kevin McCullough called the agreement diplomacy with teeth. Saudi Arabia has spent the better part of a decade quietly signaling that it wants integration with the West, investment, technology, security guarantees, a seat at the table that used to exclude it, McCullough wrote. Trump has placed a single condition in front of the Saudis that costs Riyadh very little to accept in principle,

since it was already the direction the kingdom was leaning, and that delivers an enormous strategic prize to Washington, Jerusalem, and every Gulf state watching how this plays out. Every additional country that joins the Abraham Accords framework, and Riyadh is by far the biggest remaining prize, knits the region tighter into a coalition organized around commerce, security cooperation, and mutual defense against exactly the kind of Iranian-backed disres. that's defined the last decade, McCullough said. Saudi Arabia gets a modern civilian nuclear program and deeper integration with the world's

most advanced economies. Israel gets a security partner and is sought for years. The United States gets a more stable, more prosperous, more predictable Middle East. In National Review, Noah Rothman asked, what do we get out of the Saudi nuclear deal? The Trump administration has provided ample assurances that its nuclear deal with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is nothing to worry about. trust us, they say. All the necessary checks and safeguards are in place. And yet, even those with faith in this presidency's competence and forthrightness should be cautious about what the future will hold when the Trump administration is gone, Rothman wrote. Saudi's strength has played a key role in the Trump administration's efforts to reshape the geopolitical landscape in the Middle East. A Riyadh that is flushed with cash and a model for regional development augments the regional Sunni bulwark against Iranian influence and aggression. That's the pro side of the ledger.

The con side, however, is more voluminous and more compelling, Rothman said. The kingdom is not like France, Britain, or even Israel, nations that nuclearized with America's tacit acceptance, because its government does not enjoy the consent of the governed. It's an authoritarian regime with plenty of ominous domestic challenges and a lively culture of Islamist radicalism. America should not make an enemy out of Riyadh, as the Biden administration foolishly attempted. But neither should U.S. policy take the House of South's stability for granted and rule out the prospect of a profound change in Riyadh. All right, that's different for what the left and the writer saying, which brings us to what

writers in the Middle East are saying. Some Middle Eastern writers criticize Trump for connecting Israel to the nuclear deal. Others say the agreement advances both Saudi and U.S. interests. In the Middle East, I, Ahmed al-Tuajri argued, tying a Saudi nuclear deal to Israel is a strategic mistake. If the United States conditions a civilian nuclear agreement with Saudi Arabia on the kingdom's immediate accession to the Abraham Accords, it would be collapsing two fundamentally different policy objectives into a single diplomatic test. Such an approach may appear to increase

American leverage. In practice, it is more likely to diminish U.S. influence while accelerating the emergence of a more multipolar Middle East, Altowajri said. The question is whether Washington can realistically expect Riyadh to abandon a position it has articulated with remarkable consistency for more than two decades, that formal normalization must follow, not proceed, a credible pathway towards Palestinian statehood. A civilian nuclear agreement should be evaluated on its own merits, its contribution to energy, security, technological cooperation, economic development, and nuclear non-proliferation. Tying it to an issue on which Saudi Arabia has consistently articulated a non-negotiable position risks sacrificing practical cooperation for unattainable political leverage.

diplomacy succeeds when it recognizes political realities rather than attempts to wish them away, Altowajri said. The task facing Washington is not to compel Saudi Arabia to abandon its stated principles, but to create conditions in which regional peace and strategic cooperation are both achievable. Conditioning one upon the immediate surrender of the other is unlikely to accomplish either objective. In Arab news, Abdul Rahman al-Rashid called the agreement a cornerstone of the strategic relationship between two countries. Among the criticisms leveled against U.S. President Donald Trump is that he favors Saudi Arabia at the expense of the supreme interests of the U.S. The facts, however, indicate otherwise. The deal itself is considered, from the perspective of

U.S. state institutions, part of those supreme interests and has been negotiated by three U.S. presidents and four successive administrations, Al Roshad wrote. Ten years of technical, legal and political negotiations represent a long history that leaves no room to claim the agreement was rushed due to the war with Iran or that the Trump administration ignored supreme American interests. Washington realizes that Riyadh is moving forward with its nuclear project and that refusing to cooperate would prompt Riyadh to search for an alternative partner, whether in Europe, China or Russia. This would weaken American influence and potentially risk losing a strategic partner the U.S. is keen to maintain over the next two decades. The same logic,

applies to the Saudi side. It is also in Riyadh's interest to maintain its partnership with the major global power, L. Rosh had said. Regardless of differing assessments, this war has proven Washington's readiness to activate the concept of defending its supreme interests rather than retreating from them. All right, let's head over to Will for his take. Here's my take. The obvious caveat overshadowing this deal is that, well, it may already be dead. President Trump's post-signing demand that Saudi Arabia normalized relations with Israel not only imperils the agreement, but the entire partnership. Now, perhaps the president tried to squeeze in the Israel provision

based on advice from the last person he talked to, a trend that Isaac and other writers have highlighted and observed with this administration. Perhaps it's a negotiation tactic to extract last-minute concessions, as you heard Kevin McCullough and Town Hall propose under what the right is saying. No matter the motivation, though, Trump's after the whistle about face casts the whole agreement into serious doubt. And furthermore, the actual text of the deal isn't public yet. So any discussion of what it does or doesn't accomplish rests on the Trump administration statements, anonymous sources, or just pure speculation.

That creates a weak foundation for a level-headed analysis, but one thing is certain. that discussions over a Saudi civilian nuclear program have even reached this point is a big deal, one that signals the country's further embrace of the West. It wasn't long ago that the U.S. relationship with Saudi Arabia was defined by anger over 9-11, criticism of military intervention in Yemen, and outrage about human rights abuses. But the relationship has grown friendlier over time, with President Obama visiting the kingdom in 2009, and President Biden proposing a grand bargain of sorts during the back half of his term,

one that may have actually come to fruition had it not been for Hamas's October 7th attack on Israel. That attack and Israel's response still looms over U.S.-S.-Saudy relations, but these nuclear discussions under President Trump suggest it won't be a permanent impediment. The risks of this agreement are easy to spot. Nuclear enrichment for an authoritarian regime,

a lack of political realism, and the potential for more presidential self-dealing here at home. But the upside is also visible, if you're willing to look. Deeper ties with Saudi Arabia create immediate economic opportunities, but the strategic offerings are even more important. I see deals like this, which link economic and security interests, as the most realistic path to stability in the Middle East. The United States already has a nuclear agreement with the United Arab Emirates, and a similar deal with Saudi Arabia

would further tie Gulf interests to our own, while giving the U.S. a singular influence in how the Saudis develop their civilian nuclear program. Saudi Arabia will likely pursue such a program, regardless of U.S. involvement, and we aren't the only country that could help them to do so. However you feel about our current government, I would rather the United States be the country at the table

rather than allow China or Russia to take our seat. Even bigger picture, achieving a long-sought vision of a more stable, peaceful Middle East requires strong partnerships with its leading countries. And that means dealing amicably with countries like Saudi Arabia, despite their divergent values from our own.

Optimistically, it could also mean tempering their worst impulses. Atrocities like Jamal Khashoggi's killing could become far less likely if Saudi Arabia's nascent nuclear program and its broader economy were reliant on U.S. companies and technology. And the economic benefits of

access to Western markets could guide the region away from constant conflict and toward a more prosperous peace. The U.S. benefits from all of that, too. In the near and long term, moving forward with this deal would bring economic opportunities to American companies and technological advancements to our economy. Contours of those advancements may not be evident now, but the potential for billions of dollars in contracts over a multi-decade timeline would, in theory, strengthen the U.S. nuclear industrial base, promote competitive innovation, and elevate the leading companies. That all might sound like a given whether or not we strike this deal, but it's not. Nuclear technology development in the U.S. is stagnant, and the appetite for greater adoption

of nuclear energy domestically is uncertain. A motivated, deep-pocketed partner like Saudi Arabia would be a boon for our industry. Of course, the risks of this deal are still significant. As Matthew Kronig and Henry Sokolski said in the Wall Street Journal, Saudi Arabia hasn't agreed to IAEA additional protocols for safeguards or to abstain from domestic uranium enrichment, which are key provisions in the United Arab Emirates Agreement. Without those provisions, assurances about what Saudi Arabia will or won't do in the future are really just words.

Relatedly, an agreement with these terms would likely prompt other Middle East countries to seek out their own deals to develop their own nuclear programs on the assumption that the Saudis will eventually build up the capacity for domestic enrichment. That's exactly the kind of an arms race that a deal like this is meant to avoid and that safeguards are necessary to protect against. Then there's Iran. The Trump administration doesn't seem currently capable of halting Iran's nuclear ambitions through force or diplomacy.

But any hope of an Iranian deal becomes even more distant if the U.S. sponsors Saudi Arabia on a path to its own nuclear program, especially with flimsy oversight. That kind of a deal would all but ensure Iran doubles down on its pursuit of a nuclear weapon, short of its complete surrender to the U.S., which again is unlikely. Lastly, consider the potential for self-dealing. The New York Times reported that the Trump family and its associates, as well as its political allies, could stand to benefit from the explosion of investment and business opportunities in Saudi. Arabia if the deal goes through. For example, one company that is expected to play a central role

in designing a reactor for the Saudis just so happens to be majority owned by a frequent business partner of Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnik's sons. Those links aren't inherently corrupt, but the Trump administration doesn't deserve the benefit of the doubt on its motives, especially when it comes to deals with the Saudis. Separately, the potential for cronyism would also mean that the U.S. companies winning contracts to work on the program aren't necessarily the most deserving or equipped for the job. Taking all these concerns into account, I still think the core provisions of the deal are worth pursuing, but only if Saudi Arabia agrees to the same gold standard as the United Arab Emirates, which means independent oversight and a commitment to permanently

forego domestic enrichment. With those guardrails in place, the agreement would have teeth, and its benefits would be more likely to be realized. Ultimately, the upsides of such a deal would outweigh the risks of another roadblock with Iran and another opportunity for self-dealing. To mitigate the risks of the latter, my best case scenario would actually be for President Trump's erratic posture and negotiations to scuttle any agreement during this term, but allow a new, less opportunistic administration to later finish the deal. For now, we can only wait for more details and to see how each side navigates Trump's last-minute demands. It'll still be a while before any action is taken, too.

Congress has 90 days to review the terms, and if the sides do enact the agreement, then the first uranium enrichment technology won't be transferred for at least two years. If the past is prologue with this administration, expect more twists and turns before any kind of resolution is reached. All right, that's it for my take. First up, we have a dissent from Associate Editor Audrey Moorhead,

and later on we'll have a concurrence from managing editor Ari Weitzman. For now, I'm going to pass it over to Audrey. This is Associate Editor Audrey Moorhead with a staff dissent. I think Will's take focused on a hypothetical scenario wherein Saudi Arabia agrees to provisions it has consistently refused, still underrates the risks of nuclear proliferation as a result of this deal. I want the U.S. to invest in nuclear energy,

but deals with Saudi Arabia have failed repeatedly because the Saudis have proven themselves untrustworthy actors who are fundamentally misaligned with Western ideals. I'm not sure I trust the Saudis to adhere to safeguards of the deal as writ, much less to the additional safeguards that will caveat to support for any agreement on. Fundamentally, giving nuclear energy to anti-Western theocracies seems like a bad move that will encourage their more aggressive neighbors like Iran to accelerate the nuclear arms race. This is Tango's managing editor Ari Weitzman with a concurrence to Will's take.

Like Will, I'm generally pro-nuclear deal with problematic country. I might have some minor disagreements with some of what well said, but I concur that getting an authoritarian regime to agree to a nuclear development with strict guidelines and having influence and control over those guidelines is the best, most realistic path towards mutual prosperity. Consider this, too. A nuclear deal with Saudi Arabia looks to me like another instance of Trump's Obama derangement syndrome. Under that theory, our current war with Iran is downstream of Trump's

fixation on President Obama's Iran deal as a bad deal. After campaigning hard against the joint comprehensive plan of action or the JCPOA in 2016 and then 2020 and also 2024, the war on Iran was Trump's effort to wipe the slate clean and strong-armed the Islamic Republic out of a nuclear program entirely. That's not exactly going great. So Trump is once again trying to outdo Obama's Iran deal, but with Saudi Arabia. And if you think the JCPOA was better than any compact with around that came before or since, then you should probably support a Saudi Arabia deal for the same reason. We'll be right back after this quick break. Here's her under the radar story for today, folks. Alaska's division of elections recently removed 3,048 registered voters

from the state's active voter list on suspicion that they were non-citizens or were incorrectly registered. However, on Wednesday, Director of Elections Carol Beecher said that many of those removed may have been citizens erroneously flagged by the Alaska Division of Motor Vehicles. Beecher suggested that the unusually large number of flagged voters could have come from old data in the DMV, but she added that her office is required to act on the information provided. Anyone affected by the review will now receive a letter asking them to confirm they are citizens by contacting the division of elections. Alaska Beacon has this story and you can check it out with the link in today's episode description.

And last but not least, our have a nice day story. Cape Cod Ponds are often full of trash, beer cans, wine bottles, cracked golf balls, cinder blocks, wooden pallets, and tires. Many years ago, Susan Bauer started removing trash from the ponds while swimming. She recruited friends and eventually formed a nonprofit

called the Old Ladies Against Underwater Garbage. Members must be at least 64, able to swim half a mile in 30 minutes and be able to free dive to eight feet. The group cleans about 20 ponds a year and has hauled out an estimated 6,000 pounds of trash from Cape Cod Ponds. Lisa Weiss, 65 said, you're exhausted, you're maybe a little sunbird, you're filthy, and it's the best feeling. The New York Times has this story, and you can check it out with the link in today's episode description. All right, everybody, that is it for today's episode.

As always, if you'd like to support our work, please go to retangle.com, where you can sign up for a newsletter membership, podcast membership, or a bundled membership that gets you a discount on both. We'll be right back here tomorrow. For Isaac, Will, and the rest of the crew, this is John Law signing off. Have a great day, y'all. Peace. Our executive editor and founder is me. Isaac Saul and our executive producer is John Wall.

Today's episode was edited and engineered by Dewey Thomas. Our editorial staff is led by managing editor Ari Weitzman with senior editor Will Kovac and associate editors Audrey Moorhead and Bailey Saul. Music for the podcast was produced by Diet 75. To learn more about Tangle and to sign up for a membership, please visit our website at Retangle.com.