Tangle - Trump's new national security priorities.

Episode Date: December 9, 2025

On Thursday, the Trump administration released its 2025 National Security Strategy (NSS), a document outlining the administration’s priorities for U.S. foreign policy. In the document, the administration provides overviews of its policies in the Western Hemisphere, Asia, Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. Key goals include refocusing on regional relationships, increasing economic power while avoiding conflict in the Pacific, protecting freedom and security in Europe, pursuing lasting peace and economic partnership in the Middle East, and maintaining U.S. dominance in the technological sector.Ad-free podcasts are here!To listen to this podcast ad-free, and to enjoy our subscriber only premium content, go to ReadTangle.com to sign up!You can read today's podcast⁠ ⁠⁠here⁠⁠⁠, our “Under the Radar” story ⁠here and today’s “Have a nice day” story ⁠here⁠.You can subscribe to Tangle by clicking here or drop something in our tip jar by clicking here. Take the survey: What do you think of the 2025 NSS? Let us know.Our Executive Editor and Founder is Isaac Saul. Our Executive Producer is Jon Lall.This podcast was written by: Will Kaback and edited and engineered by Dewey Thomas. Music for the podcast was produced by Diet 75.Our newsletter is edited by Managing Editor Ari Weitzman, Senior Editor Will Kaback, Lindsey Knuth, Kendall White, Bailey Saul, and Audrey Moorehead. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

From executive producer Isaac Saul, this is Tangle. Good morning, good afternoon and good evening, and welcome to the Tangle podcast, a place where you get views from across the political spectrum, some independent thinking, and a little bit of our take. I'm your host today, Senior Editor Will KVak, and today we're going to be talking about the Trump administration's new national security strategy. This is a document that every presidential administration releases, and it outlines the administration's priorities for U.S. foreign policy for the term. So it's a pretty standard document, but Trump's second term, NSS, as it's referred to, has made headlines and sparked quite a bit of debate recently because of how it shifted some of those priorities. both from Trump's first term and from recent presidential administrations overall. So we're going to go into what some of those priority changes look like, what the consequences of those changes could be,

and how it fits in with the broader Trump administration agenda. Before we do that, though, want to flag that we have a new video on YouTube that we're really excited about. And this is the second in a series on primary reform that we're producing alongside United America. In this video, we look at the primary reform movement in its current state, which is really a crossroads. Reformers have notched some high-profile breakthroughs in states like Alaska in recent years,

but at the same time, voters have rejected other ranked choice voting and open primary efforts at the state level in 2024. So in this new video, we're going to take a hard look at the movement. Its biggest wins, its biggest setbacks, and some of the major battles that lie ahead. Again, this is the second in a three-part series on primary reform, and we have the link to the first video on that YouTube page. So if you want to check it out, go down to the show notes of today's episode and you can click the link there. Thanks so much for the support. All right, now I'm going to hand it over to John to take us through today's topic and the perspectives from the left, right, and writers abroad. And then I will

be back for my take. John, over to you. Thanks, Will, and welcome, everybody. Here are your quick hits for today. First up, the Supreme Court heard arguments in Trump v. Slaughter on whether or presidents can fire members of independent agencies, such as the Federal Trade Commission, for reasons outside of inefficiency, negligent of duty, or malfeasance in office. Court watchers suggested the court seems likely to rule that the president does have this power. Number two, Alina Haba resigned as U.S. attorney for New Jersey, following a ruling by an appeals court that she is serving unlawfully.

Haba said she will continue serving as Attorney General Pam Bondi's senior advisor for U.S. attorneys. Number three, Paramount Skydance launched a competing bid to acquire Warner Brothers Discovery after Netflix announced an $82.7 billion deal to acquire the company on Friday. Paramount's $108.4 billion offer is backed by the Ellison family, Jared Kushner's affinity partners, and sovereign wealth funds from Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Abu Dhabi. Number four, President Donald Trump said he will sign an executive order this week, blocking state-level regulations on artificial intelligence, saying that the technology should be regulated at the federal level.

At number five, a 7.5 magnitude earthquake off of the coast of northern Japan injured 23 people and caused a tsunami along the Pacific coast. On Thursday, the Trump administration released its 2025 National Security Strategy, a document outlining the administration's priorities for U.S. foreign policy. In the document, the administration provides overviews of its policies of its policy. in the Western Hemisphere, Asia, Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. Key goals include refocusing on regional relationships, increasing economic power while avoiding conflict in the Pacific,

protecting freedom and security in Europe, pursuing lasting peace and economic partnership in the Middle East, and maintaining U.S. dominance in the technological sector. For context, in 1986, the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act mandated the NSS, a report the president sends to Congress in order to communicate the executive branch's security priorities. These transmissions began under President Ronald Reagan in 1987, and every president since has issued at least one NSS to Congress during each of his terms.

The second Trump administration's NSS contained some notable shifts from recent U.S. national security priorities. While the document maintains long-standing policy on Taiwan and nuclear deterrence, it differs from previous administrations in its stances towards China and Russia. The administration also outlines its problems with post-examination. Cold War era policy, critiquing the prioritization of U.S. global dominance over domestic stability. The document also outlines the Trump administration's focus on the Western Hemisphere, which it calls a Trump corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. The administration defines this corollary as increasing

partnership between the U.S. and other Western Hemisphere nations while preventing external foreign influence. Additionally, it says its policy towards Latin America will be guided by a focus on U.S. border security and the use of military power to curtail drug trafficking. The NSS's stated policy on Europe also breaks from traditional U.S. policy. The document criticizes European countries' stances on Ukraine and warns that the continent faces civilizational erasure due to its migration policies, while also calling for European countries to increase their defense spending, improve their economic capacity, and pursue a more stable relationship with Russia.

The NSS drew sharp criticism from Democrats who criticized the administration's position towards Europe. On X, Senator Mark Kelly, the Democrat from Arizona, wrote, Donald Trump's national security strategy puts his families and friends' business interests with our adversaries, like Russia and China, over promises to our allies. Meanwhile, Republican lawmakers praised the administration for its shift in focus. The NSS is an important first step in reasserting U.S. hegemony in our hemisphere and to make Americans safe and prosperous, Senator Mike Lee, the Republican from Utah said. Today, we'll take a look at arguments about the NSS from the left, right, and writers abroad.

And then, senior editor Will Quebec will give his take. We'll be right back after this quick break. pivot to prioritizing the Western Hemisphere. Others say the document fails to capture the greatest threats to the U.S. In the free press, Nile Ferguson explored the truth about Trump's national security strategy. One can tell from the opening section of the document why both the Times and the Wall Street Journal hated it, for it is a succinct repudiation of the foreign policies of both the Clintons and the Bushes, not to mention the Kennedys. It rejects the notion of an indispensable nation with a duty to police the globe, Ferguson wrote. Since the early

20th century, the foreign policy establishment has held this truth to be self-evident, that all regions are not created equal, and Europe is the most important region of them all. The NSS rejects this. It firmly puts Europe in second place after the Western Hemisphere. In their rush to be offended on behalf of the Europeans, the mainstream commentariat has largely missed what a grab bag of fairly conventional ideas most of the new national security strategy is, Ferguson said. There is Nixonian realism, with its familiar insistence on the prehistory.

primacy of national interest, burden-chairing, and the balance of power. There is Reaganite peace through strength, but there is also the late Joe Nye's soft power through which we exercise positive influence throughout the world, as Harvardy a foreign policy idea as you could wish for. In the New York Post, Peter Doran wrote, Trump's new national security plan beats Biden's, but muddles our biggest threats. The best national security strategies accurately describe the world as it is, aligned finite national resources to potentially unlimited aims, and, most important, informed

decision-making in a crisis. The Trump 1.0 strategy largely accomplished all three of these objectives, declaring in no uncertain terms that China and Russia were overt challengers to American power and influence. The Trump 2.0 strategy is less clear, Doran said. Instead of decisive language and a bold new recognition of immediate dangers from China, Russia, or the clerical regime in Iran, the new strategy buries Trump's priorities under layers of befuddling rhetoric. Right now, China is flexing its military muscle in the Pacific, ramming ships and wargaming threats to Taiwan.

NATO generals warned that Russia could be ready to attack Europe in under five years. The clerics in Tehran are still in power and overtly antagonistic to America and its friends. Alas, the Trump 2.0 strategy gives these issues lower priority, focusing more on Western Hemisphere affairs, fair trade deals, and grievances about current account deficits, door and the United States cannot win a high-stakes rivalry with serious players like Beijing or Moscow if we don't adequately confront the severity of our competition and the complexity of the threats they present.

All right, that is it for what the right is saying, which brings us to what the left is saying. The left is critical of the plan's priorities, with many saying it will elevate right-wing governments. Some suggest the document's inconsistencies derive from Trump's variability. In the Atlantic, Thomas Wright argued, the NSS shows less concern for the American homeland than for building an illiberal world order. What the White House presented on Friday as a hard-headed, realistic assessment of the geopolitical landscape more closely resembles France's Maginot Line, a massive fortress built before World War II to stop a German attack that never came, while failing to anticipate the one that did, Wright said.

Trump's latest NSS is a blunt repudiation of the idea that the United States is in a strategic competition with rival powers. It prioritizes threats from the Western Hemisphere, European civilizational decline in over-regulation, and trade deficits, but says nothing about the Russian threat to U.S. interests and views China almost entirely through the lens of economic security. The strategy, therefore, does not explain what the government,

Congress, and the private sector should do to fix these vulnerabilities. right road. The reason may lie in what the Trump administration is trying to accomplish. Contrary to its protestations about reigning in America's ambition after decades of overreach, it does have a grand plan. The NSS is a blueprint for building an illiberal international order in which the U.S. can assert dominance unilaterally, strike deals with revisionist powers such as China and Russia, and work patiently to support right-wing populist parties in Europe in overthrowing centrist establishments. In Bloomberg, Andreas Kluth said, the U.S. quietly made a new national security plan out of whims. The NSS's authors did their best to navigate around

the many contradictions that riddled the president's foreign policy, and by extension, the document. A convenient translation. Strategy is whatever Trump says tomorrow on Air Force One or later in the Oval Office, Cluth wrote. All this preening shouldn't obscure a shift in some emphases. Several things are consistent. It was always clear that the president views Moscow, not mention much, and in part as a potential partner more favorably than did any of his predecessors since World War II. The rest is largely as predicted. The strategy heaps contempt on multilateral and international organizations, which Trump has been quitting, boycotting, or deriding, while appearing to bless a return to 19th century-style spheres of influence, Cluth said. And as ever, Trump's friends,

business, and golf partners do well. After the document harangues the Europeans for their way of life, it graciously promises to stop hectoring the Gulf monarchies into abandoning their traditions, which have rarely resembled Madisonian democracy. All right, that is it for what the right and the left are saying, which brings us to what writers abroad are saying. Some writers abroad say the NSS should be a wake-up call for Europe. Others argue the administration's criticisms of the continent's leaders are well-founded. In The Guardian, George Reikolise and Varg Folkman wrote, Trump's new doctrine confirms it.

Ready or not, Europe is on its own. Everybody should have seen it coming after Washington's humiliating 28-point plan for Ukraine. But the new words still land as a shock, Reckleson Falkman said. The security document is the clear signal yet of how brutally and transactional Washington wants to engage with the continent. It marks another phase in Trump's attempt to reshape Europe in his ideological image, while at the same time abandon it militarily. There are reasons to believe that the U.S. will not abandon Europe completely. Protecting roughly $4 trillion in U.S. investments on the continent remains a key interest. Yet the direction is unmistakable. Washington is stepping back, right Lism Folkman said.

If Europe wants to move from a defensive crouch to a posture of strategic agency, it must sustain its surge in defense investment and make it crystal clear that attempts at coercion from Washington or Beijing will be met with forceful countermeasures. Only then can Europe avoid being squeezed between a retreating patron and a mistrustful rival. In strategic Europe, Judy Dempsey said, Europe needs to hear what America is saying. Europe and the rest of the world now know how poorly this U.S. administration regards them, and they cannot keep pretending otherwise, Dempsey wrote. In adversarial language, the strategy goes on to decry the activities of the European Union

and other transnational bodies that undermine political liberty and sovereignty, migration policies that are transforming the continent and creating strife, censorship of free speech, and suppression of political oppression, cratering birth rates, and loss of national identities and self-confidence. Yes, Europe does lack self-confidence. Yes, it does lack a security and strategic outlook. Yes, it has far too long relied on the United States as a security guarantor. Yes, it has failed to listen to the grievances of the far right, Dempsey said.

Yet its leadership in the institutions and the member states won't take the leap to deal with these major issues that reflect the post-Cold War era. These failings weaken Europe as a credible global player. That makes criticism of the NSS a rhetorical exercise. All right, let's head over to Will for his take. Thanks, John. All right, here is my take. The NSS's demands for Europe to do more in its own defense,

while prescribing a renewed focus on Latin America and confronting our enemies through negotiation as well as deterrence, don't really come as a surprise. But they also don't represent the value. of the NSS as a statement of priorities that highlights what we can expect from the White House in the next three years. Trump's NSS highlights a familiar set of goals, reducing illegal and legal immigration, leveraging U.S. influence to resolve conflicts abroad, establishing dominance in critical fields like artificial intelligence and more, and these are all to varying degrees

sensible, and I agree with them. But as a cohesive plan, it misdiagnoses the hierarchy of threats that the United States faces. The document distills the America First philosophy to its essence. The U.S. will not strive to be the world's police force outside of circumstances where it can receive a direct material benefit, nor will it maintain alliances based on historical relationships alone. It will approach global conflicts from an explicit position of self-interest. That may sound blunt, but that's because the NSS is blunt on these points.

but I also think it's an understandable response to decades of failed foreign policy that has pulled us into costly wars in the Middle East, spurred migration crises, and done little to tamp down on emergent threats. In short, I can appreciate the appeal of a reworked foreign policy that refocuses our priorities on benefiting Americans first and foremost. In practice, though, the America First agenda laid out in the NSS has just as many flaws as the old strategies. Take its ambitions in the Western Hemisphere, which the document refers to as the Trump corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. It describes a refocusing on regional partnerships as a means of security and economic opportunity. Again, on paper, I think most people in the U.S. can get behind this.

Our relationships with our neighbors have a myriad of direct and immediate impacts. But look at how the Trump administration has gone about this goal so far. Wide-ranging tariffs dubiously justified by a national economic emergency and unevenly applied. Just as an example, think of the 50% tariff on Brazilian imports over the country's prosecution of former president and Trump ally Shire Bolsonaro, and then compare that to the $40 billion bailout for Argentina to boost President Javier Malay. There's also been a military buildup near Venezuela, along with reports that the U.S. will attempt to oust President Nicolas Maduro.

Then there's the ongoing strikes on alleged drugboats in the Caribbean, prompting condemnation from several Latin American leaders and concern from legal experts domestically and globally. Trump's NSS says he wants to bolster our, quote, own nation's appeal as the hemisphere's economic and security partner of choice, end quote, but these actions seem far more likely to antagonize and alienate than foster stronger allegiances. Execution of policy aside, the very decision to place the Western Hemisphere as the top national security priority is, it's self-suspect. Certainly, greater emphasis on the region is sensible, and the document accurately outlines the strategic benefits of things like nearshoring or supply chain, reduced economic

migration, and access to critical materials. But the war in Ukraine and ascended China with hegemonic ambitions and ongoing instability in the Middle East remain far more immediate and substantial national security concerns. And I would note that the first Trump administration made this exact assessment. Threats from Russia and China were the focal points of Trump's 2017 NSS, and it identified the two countries as a, quote, challenged to American power, influence, and interests, attempting to erode American security and prosperity, end quote. That assessment, which the Biden administration shared, hasn't really changed in the last eight years.

If anything, it's even more accurate now. Since 2017, China has ratcheted up its attacks on key U.S. infrastructure. structure and seems increasingly likely to invade Taiwan in the years ahead. A March 2025 report from the U.S. intelligence community stated this clearly, quote, China presents the most comprehensive and robust military threat to U.S. national security, end quote. And obviously, Russia has since invaded Ukraine, and Putin continues to threaten Eastern Europe. The Trump administration may reject the notion that Russia's invasion of Ukraine poses any direct threat to U.S. national security

but Russia has amply demonstrated itself a major threat, even outside the war. The same 2025 U.S. intelligence community report I just referenced highlighted Russia's ongoing efforts to train its, quote, military space elements and field new anti-satellite weapons, end quote, while partnering with China to develop cutting-edge artificial intelligence tools both on and off the battlefield. Elsewhere in Asia, beyond just China and Russia, hostile governments in North Korea, and Iran remain an ever-present threat of regional or worse destabilization. But Trump's NSS doesn't mention North Korea at all and only mentions the threat posed by Iran in the past tense.

Considering this broader picture, I just don't see reasserting American dominance in the Western hemisphere as what our top national security priority should be. Now, in fairness, the NSS still does say plenty about China and Russia. The section on China is robust and accurate. outlines the military threats the country poses. But its argument places all its weight on the idea that, quote, maintaining American economic and technological preeminence is the surest way to deter and prevent a large-scale military conflict, end quote. What is not addressed, though, is how our economic and technological preeminence has not meaningfully deterred China's military aspirations to date. Again, China has not slowed down its military buildup, its intrusions into U.S. infrastructure

or its efforts to broaden its spheres of influence since Trump returned to office. On Russia, the document primarily focuses on establishing, quote, strategic stability with the country. But it doesn't address any of the military threats it poses in detail. The Trump administration essentially argues that dealmaking alone can resolve these issues, which is certainly hopeful, but also evidently ineffective. Since Trump has started his second term, dealmaking has thus far failed to produce a breakthrough in Ukraine, and it's done little to alter China's course either. Separately, the NSS's section on Europe also feels out of place for a national security strategy

document. Here again, the document's words are unsurprising. The administration has not been shy about criticizing European leaders for their approach to migration policy, defense, free speech issues, and more. And many of these critiques are well-founded, and there are also critiques that we've covered and criticized ourselves entangle. But a pressing national security concern worthy of elevation in a document like this, while the NSS constructs an elaborate projection in which overregulation and liberal migration policies hollow out European economies and militaries leading to, quote, the loss of national identities and self-confidence, end quote. The national security issue then follows from Europe's eventual diminishment as a reliable ally for the U.S.

in, quote, 20 years or less. That hypothetically could be a future concern worth discussing, but by centering this criticism of long-standing allies, the Trump administration again overlooks much more immediate threats. To return to Trump's NSS in his first term, the shift in language on Europe in the past eight years has been striking. In the 2017 document, quote, United States remains firmly committed to our European allies and partners, end quote. In 2025, quote, our goal should be to help Europe correct its current trajectory, end quote. In 2017, quote, the NATO alliance of free and sovereign states is one of our great advantages over our competitors, end quote. In 2025, it is, quote, an open question whether some NATO states

will remain reliable as they become, quote, majority non-European. Priorities and circumstances can change in eight years, of course. But what is the strategic benefit of turning up the heat on Europe now, while seeking to negotiate an end to a brutal war on the continent and relaxing our focus on China and Russia, which each pose more immediate and non-hypothetical national security threats? Bluntly, it's a benefit to our geopolitical rivals, and just look at how Russia responded to the NSS when it was published. The document is, quote, largely consistent with our vision. Kremlin spokesperson Dimitri Peskov said. To reiterate one more time, the NSS contains plenty of worthy goals,

things like strengthening the U.S. industrial and technological base, modernizing military readiness and deterrence capabilities, and building more supply chain resilience. But these redeeming qualities are overshadowed, frankly, by the failure in prioritization. The document demonstrates how President Trump's flexible worldview, which elevates an open-for-business attitude with a, willingness to call out friends and foes alike can translate poorly to a high-level vision of national security priorities. Trump's 2025 foreign policy is an exemplar of the conception of

America First that I talked about at the beginning, and that clearly appeals to large swaths of the country, and I understand why. But I think Trump's second NSS lays bare this America First's foreign policy's own equally significant shortcomings. In effect, it shifts the U.S. gaze inward, without a clear strategy for approaching national security issues that past administrations, including Trump's, correctly identified but failed to address. It all adds up to something that might feel like a breath of fresh air, but leaves key concerns unaccounted for, and the United States less prepared for the dangers that truly define this moment. Hey guys, Isaac here. I'm jumping in today actually with a staff dissent.

So I appreciate Will's take, but I believe the Trump administration's focus on Latin America is actually warranted. I would agree with Will that the threats from China, Russia, and Iran are more serious threats of kinetic warfare and cyber intrusions. These are traditional national security concerns. But economic instability, mass migration, the import of narcotics and gang activity are also national security concerns. The immediacy of those threats from Latin America as apparent and, I think, more urgent. Plus, the very actors will identify as China and Russia primarily. They are making inroads in Latin America. This is not an accident. They recognize the region is an open door to increase their influence in the Western Hemisphere, making it all

the more important we focus here now, too. Further, I think in order to make Will's argument, you'd have to show that the preceding policies, those deployed by Biden, by Trump One, or Obama, actually worked. Have our past policies toward China, the Middle East, and Russia deterred these nations, prevented war, stopped trade imbalances? And if not, is it really fair to frame a reset as a wrong turn? All right, that's it for my staff to send today, I'm going to send it over to Will for your questions answered. We'll be right back after this quick break. Now let's jump into today's reader question.

Today's question comes from Charles in Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania. And he asks, I have seen a lot of trade agreements described as a framework of a deal. Can you guys do a follow-up on the status of these deals and agreements? Are they still in the works? Are they still frameworks? Or are they actually fully fleshed out deals? Here's our response.

When the U.S. and another country reach a trade deal, they typically announce it as a framework rather than an official agreement. Both entities often need to take further action in order to implement the different facets of the trade deal. And the process for doing this can be slow and drawn out. The clearest example might be the U.S. European Union deal, which we covered as a framework deal back in July. A month later, the EU and the U.S. released a joint statement outlining the official provisions that the two entities had agreed upon. And since then, both sides have begun slowly implementing

those provisions. For example, a recent European Council press release detailed how the U.S. had issued adjustments to its tariff rates, while the European Union recently began adopting some of the regulatory guidelines that were included in that deal. But the situation, and the deal does remain fluid. The Trump administration later announced that it was threatening new safeguards on steel imports, which hadn't been part of the negotiations over the summer. The U.S. trade agreement with China is another example of this kind of ongoing fluidity. In November, the White House announced that it had reached an agreement with China,

in which both countries would reduce tariff rates and China would purchase agricultural exports, including soybeans, from the U.S. While both countries have adjusted their tariffs as promised, Bloomberg reported just this week that China's agreed upon soybean purchases have stalled, though Treasury Secretary Scott Besson said he expects China to fulfill its commitments by the end of the crop season. Additionally, President Trump recently announced a framework deal allowing Navidia and other U.S. chipmakers to sell some of their most advanced artificial intelligence ships to, quote, approved customers in China, with the stipulation that the U.S. government would receive

a 25% cut of the profits. For a more detailed look at the status of these various trade deals, the law firm Reed Smith has a tariff tracker on its website that includes information on the tariff status of each country, whether the U.S. has reached a deal with them, and if any other progress has been made on that deal. And we recommend checking that out if you want to learn more. All right, with that, I'm going to pass it back over to John to take us home on the rest of the newsletter. Thanks, as always for listening, and we'll talk to you soon. John, over to you. Thanks, Will. Here's your under-the-radar story for today, folks.

On Monday, the developer of Iceblock, an app developed to track reported signs of immigration and customs enforcement agents sued the Trump administration, alleging that it had improperly pressured Apple to remove the app from its app store. In October, Apple pulled Ice Block and other similar apps for violating the company's policies on apps that provide location information about law enforcement officers that can be used to harm such officers individually or as a group. However, iceblock creator Joshua Aaron claims in the lawsuit that the Trump administration's efforts to remove the app violated free speech protections and asked the courts to confirm that he cannot be sued for creating the app. The Associated Press

has this story and there's a link in today's episode description. All right, next up is our numbers section. The number of times China is mentioned in the second Trump administration's NSS is 21 times, while in the first Trump administration's NSS, it is mentioned 33 times. The number of times of times Russia is mentioned in the second Trump administration's NSS is 10 times, while in the first Trump administration's NSS it is mentioned 25 times. The number of times Europe is mentioned in the second Trump administration's NSS is 49 times, while in the first Trump administration's NSS, it is mentioned 28 times. And the number of times Iran is mentioned in the second Trump administration's NSS is three times. While in the first Trump administration's

NSS, it is mentioned 17 times. And last but not least, our Have a Nice Day story. Randy Phyllisfold managed a large farm near Antler, South Dakota that grew soybeans, canola, and about 1,400 acres of corn. In September, Randy tragically lost his life in a crash, leaving his wife Kara grieving and his fields unharvested. That is, until Randy's neighbors stepped up. Led by Wyatt Thompson and Andy Gates, 75 volunteers running 12 combines worked together to bring in Andy's last harvest in a matter of days. The love and friendship that made this harvest possible are impossible to put into words. The day was full of emotion, but I found so much peace in watching it unfold, Kara Phyllisfold shared on Facebook. Sunny Skies has this

story, and there's a link in today's episode description. All right, that is it for today's episode. As always, if you'd like to support our work, please go to reetangle.com, where you can sign up for a newsletter membership, podcast membership, or a bundled membership that gets you a discount on both. We'll be right back here tomorrow. For Isaac and the rest of the crew, this is John Law, signing off. Have a great day, y'all. Peace. Our executive editor and founder is me. Isaac Saul, and our executive producer is John Lull. Today's episode was edited and engineered by Dewey Thomas. Our editorial staff is led by managing editor Ari Weitzman with senior editor Will Kayback and associate editors

Hunter Casperson, Audrey Moorhead, Bailey Saw, Lindsay Canuth, and Kendall White. Music for the podcast was produced by Diet 75. To learn more about Tangle and to sign up for a membership, please visit our website at reetangle.com.