The a16z Show - Marc Andreessen: Monitoring the Situation and the Future of Media

Episode Date: April 21, 2026

Erik Torenberg and Theo Jaffee speak with Marc Andreessen, cofounder and general partner at a16z, about the launch of Monitoring the Situation (MTS), a new, always-on media network on X. They discuss the rise of the “current thing,” how narratives spread in real time, and why internet-native media is reshaping politics, culture, and attention.   Resources: Follow Marc X: https://x.com/pmarca Follow Eric on X: https://x.com/eriktorenberg Follow Theo on X: https://x.com/theojaffee Follow MTS on X: https://x.com/MTSlive Stay Updated:Find a16z on YouTube: YouTubeFind a16z on XFind a16z on LinkedInListen to the a16z Show on SpotifyListen to the a16z Show on Apple PodcastsFollow our host: https://twitter.com/eriktorenberg Please note that the content here is for informational purposes only; should NOT be taken as legal, business, tax, or investment advice or be used to evaluate any investment or security; and is not directed at any investors or potential investors in any a16z fund. a16z and its affiliates may maintain investments in the companies discussed. For more details please see a16z.com/disclosures. Hosted by Simplecast, an AdsWizz company. See pcm.adswizz.com for information about our collection and use of personal data for advertising.

If an alien invasion happens later this afternoon, it will be turned into a social media meme, and it will go viral. If you track, like, how distributed is media versus how centralized is media. Like, centralized media sort of peaked somewhere around 1970, where, you know, literally, like, all the newspapers in every city consolidated down to, like, a single newspaper. And then you ended up with only three television networks and all the radio stations, independent radio stations, got bought up. Obviously, those days are over. The shape of the media determines the behavior, basically, from here on out. and until there's something that fundamentally displaces social media, like this is the world we live in.

Monitoring the situation, where MTS, launched today as a new always-on media network on X, covering tech, business, politics, and culture in real time. What happens when the news never stops? And detention becomes the scarcest resource. In the early 1980s, CNN introduced 24-hour coverage built around whatever mattered most in the moment. Decades later, the Internet,

has taken that idea to its extreme, where global audiences cycle through new controversies every few days, often without resolution. Now that shift is accelerating. Social platforms turn events into viral narratives, compressing time, amplifying emotion, and reshaping how people interpret truth, conflict, and influence. The tension is clear.

More voices mean more access to information, but also more noise, more manipulation, and faster cycles of outage. This episode originally aired on monitoring the situation examines how media evolved into this system and what it means for politics, culture, and decision-making. Theo Jaffe and I speak with Mark Andresen, co-founder and general partner at E16-Z.

Very special guest, Mark andresen. Mark, thank you for joining monitoring the situation. Good morning. I could not be more excited. Let's monitor some situation. Excellent. Well, first, we'll get a bit meta here. And we'll talk about media. We've been talking about this idea, moderning situation. We've talked about investing in it for almost a year now. And when we were first talking about the idea, you had brought up the book about the history of CNN. You talked about this concept that they had called randomonium.

What did you find so interesting about the founding or the history of CNN and how it could apply to what we're doing here or this broader media moment? So what is? I'm old enough to remember when CNN started, although I didn't actually have cable TV at the time, so I didn't see it. But I remember and the impact that it had. And then because I'm an obsessive, there's this book at one point that nobody's read, but the book is called Me and Ted Against the World, which is a great title. So it's the founder of CNN, is this guy of Reese Schoenfeld. And he's actually the guy who convinced Ted Turner to go to the satellite business,

which sort of created essentially modern cable TV, satellite TV, and then led downstream to streaming and everything else going on today. And so this has been kind of lost history. But Ted Turner was like a great, amazing example of like exactly the kind of great founder that we work with, like just this, like, incredible will-de-power, very controversial character. Like every other thing out of his mouth, like horrified, like, you generated a huge number of headlines. I can't believe Ted said that over and over again. So like one of these real characters in the history of the media business. And then this guy, Reese Schoenfeld, who was originally

the lawyer that wired up Ted's first satellite deal. So the two of them came up with this crazy idea. I forget, like 1981 or something. And they said, how about having a 24-hour news channel? Right. This at the time was like just completely loopy idea. Actually, Ted Turner wanted to be a 15-hour a day news channel because he assumed that there would be nobody watching the nine hours overnight. And Reese was like, nope, 24 hours. People are going to stay up all night to watch this thing. And the idea was, by the way, completely alien to what CNN is today. The idea was this concept that Reese Chonfeld came up with called Randomomium,

which basically says at any point in time, there is something happening in the world that is like the most amazing, interesting, controversial bonkers, compelling, transfixing thing that you can imagine. The current thing. The current thing. Exactly. The current thing. At any moment in time, there's the current thing.

And so he's like, what should a 24-hour news channel be? Obviously what it should do is it should lock onto the current thing. thing. It should then cover the current thing continuously, right, for as many minutes, hours, or days as that thing is the current thing. And then he called it randomonium because he basically said, for that period, you just put whatever you get, you put on screen. And so you get whatever fragmentary reports or man on the street interviews or, you know, whatever it is, you just slap the thing on the screen. And if you get it wrong, you apologize later, but this is real time. It's live. And then you just, people are just going to be glued to this thing. Okay,

so that was the original CNN business plan. They then took a while to get up and running, but then They actually did implement this. And for our older viewers, we'll remember, as I do, the real breakthrough point was the 1991 Gulf War, the first invasion of Iraq. And that was the thing that really caused the whole thing to punch through. And there was like a week there where basically people were just glued to CNN around the clock because they had it was like literally live on the ground coverage of it.

They were in Baghdad with like bombing raids happening, all kinds of crazy stuff in the Iraqi government, like just the whole thing. And so it was just like the most incredible show in the world. And then quite honestly, they spent the next whatever 20 years basically trying to repeat that experience. And they repeated it every now and then with the Monica Lewinsky thing was that for a while. And the OJ trial was that for a little bit. But it was just kind of hard to come up with the next thing like that. And then over the last 20 years, CNN has kind of become something completely different today, let's say.

That's not that at all. And then basically what's happened is the Internet reinvented randomomium. Right. And so, right, the experience of monitoring the situation on, especially, you know, on social media and especially, of course, on X. Right. Specifically, right. And then, by the way, also streaming, right? The other part of it is streaming.

And now there's obviously streaming on X. but also, you know, streaming on other platforms, you know, YouTube and Twitch and so forth. And so the internet reinvented this. Right. So, so randomonium turned into, you know, the current thing and then monitoring the situation, you know, legitimately, justifiably became a giant meme. And so it is time. Yes, it is clearly time to monitor the situation.

And why do we think the amount of current things or randomonium or situations just is continuously accelerating? It seems like it's, you know, just the. the amount, the zero velocity of, of these moments just keeps out increasing. How do we make sense of that? Yeah, so I think there's really two things that have happened that are really different and even, you know, different than of the days of cable TV and 24-hour news. So one is just like the internet, for better or for worse, like the internet plugs you into the world.

Right, like the global village, McLuhan. The global, yes, Marshall McLuhan. Okay, so let's cite Marshall McLuhan actually for both of these. So Marshall McLuhan, he was the great media theorist of the 20th century. Yeah, he had two key concepts. So that are relevant here. So one is the global village. And so he had this concept of the global village.

And the concept of the global village, by the way, he did not view as a positive. Like he was not endorsing it. He was just in his mind, he was making an observation of what was happening, which is basically, basically what he meant by that is you need to conceive of what he meant by village to start with. So village basically means a community with a small enough number of people where everybody knows everybody else. So like think about a small town or, you know, a literal small village and everybody knows everybody else. And as a consequence of that, there's no privacy. Right?

And basically everybody's up in each other's business all the time. And I grew up in a small enough town, you know, in a rural town where I, you know, I experienced this. I saw what it was like. And this is like that. Everybody knows everybody is. By the way, it's the same people year after year after year. You like get to know them like way too well.

Everybody's completely up in each other's business. Like there's basically no privacy. And so, you know, and by the way, one of the reasons people leave small towns to go to to the big city is because they want to get, you know, they want to get away from that. They want to get to a level of anonymity and, and have a lot more, you know, you know, people running around. But the village kind of has that specific thing. And what he said was, basically, modern media is going to turn the entire world into a village. And so you're just going to be connected. And this is, you know, pre-internet when he said this, right? But, you know,

it's really happened with the internet where it's just like, okay, you're connected to everybody all the time. And by the way, like by default, you know, he would find this to be like a very entertaining thing that this is actually happening because he would say, of course, you're getting all the downstream effects that you're getting, which is by default, it's going to melt your brain, right? Like the human animal was not evolved. The human animal was evolved to have like, you know, there's a Dunbar's number. You can basically have a direct relationship with like 150 people, sort of famously called the Dunbar number in sociology. But the Global Village expects you to have a Dunbar number of like eight billion people, right? Like, like, because they're all

right there and they're all up in your grill, right? And they're all telling you what they think of you, and they're all like cursing at you and calling you names. Like, and so it's just like this like really, really brain melting experience. So that's part one. So we just, we just, we experience reality differently as a result of that. And so the thought experiment I always have is, you know, we talk a lot about the impact of the internet, social media, social media, on politics.

It's like, well, okay, like imagine having social media during World War II, right? Like, we would have had a completely different national experience, you know, had like Pearl Harbor happened with, like, Twitter. Like, it would have been a completely different experience than the way people live through, you know, Pearl Harbor and actually in 1941 with, you know, primarily with TV and radio. And so anyway, so there's a global village thing. And then there's this other thing that he said,

which he originally said about television, he made this key observation. He said, this is part of his thing where he said the medium is the message. So the actual medium of the media technology actually determines a lot of the message of what's received, a lot of the content. And specifically, he said this thing.

He said, if it's on television, it's a television show. And what he meant by that is, if something's going to be on television, it's going to end up being turned into the equivalent of like a half-hour comedy or an hour-long drama, right? Basically, you know, the two native media forms of television are the half-hour comedy or the hour-long drama.

And so you're going to get this basically very emotion, you're going to get this very polished and sort of glossy and produced thing that's going to be a story and it's going to run the way that a television story runs or a television show runs. And it's going to, and like, and every television shows like a morality play, right? Every television show basically tells a moral story of basically people behaving badly and then learning the error of their ways

and then, you know, and then famously you have like, you know, the happy ending, right, where everybody, you know, kisses and hugs. And remember, Seinfeld was like a huge variation of that because remember the motto of Seinfeld, Larry David's motto for Seinfeld was no learning, no hugging. And it was, it's what made Seinfeld so unique because every other television show up until Seinfeld

always ended with everybody learning and hugging, right? You learn the moral lesson and then you sort of reconcile with the people close to you. And so every, every real life experience would get wedged into the format of a television show and would be turned into like this, basically this morality play. Okay, so the internet version, I believe,

the internet version of, if it's on television, it's a television show, the internet version is, if it's on the internet, it's a viral social media meme. Right? If it's on the internet, it doesn't matter what it is. By the way, if an alien invasion happens later this afternoon, it will be turned into a social media meme. And it will go viral.

And that's what will happen, right? And it will be turned into a viral meme, and it will spread virally across the thing. and then, you know, human beings, what they are, that will turn into a moral panic. You know, that'll turn into full-fledged, like outrage and how dare you, and people will line up on each side

and sort of tribes will form, and then people will go to war with each other on social media, and you'll have all these, you know, basically back and forth, you know, all of this, all this, you know, both all the humor and all the rage of kind of how meme culture works. And so everything on the internet, basically,

whatever happens in the real world becomes like a social media, basically social media, viral moment, meme complex, and then, you know, basically moral panic and, you know, search for scapegoats, right? Like a moral emergency. And that happens to every single new event that happens, right? And so, and then you combine these two and it's like, okay, for better for worse, we're all in the same room now. We're like literally in the same global village. And we're sort of surfing controversial internet meme moments over and over and over and over again. And as far as I can tell, like,

if you look at the numbers, basically what happens is each viral social media meme explosion, It basically is this huge spike up, and then it's like this half-life decay, and it lasts about two and a half days. Right. And so each social media basically experience is like a two-and-a-half-day, basically panic cycle. And then what happens is the old one isn't necessarily ever resolved or reconciled, but what happens is a new one appears, a new current thing appears, right? And just takes over the, you know, takes over the outrage, right? And all the emotional energy that applied to the old one applies to the new one. Everybody forgets the old one even happened.

Like a week later, you can't even remember. Like, what was the social media like craze of like seven days ago? I mean, it might as well have been like a thousand years ago. Like lost to the midst of time. Nobody knows. Like seven days ago, whatever it was was the most important thing that's ever happened. And seven days later, it's like it never, it never, not even a peeped. Like nothing, it's like completely gone, right?

And so you're just going to have this like basically repeated sort of, you know, emotional shotgun blasts over and over. every two and a half days, you know, essentially forever. By the way, this is like, this is why one of my theories is like, it's now possible to predict the outcome of politics. So, like, it's, everybody thinks they know what's going to happen in the midterm elections in November. And I'm like, okay, it's now whatever.

It's April 20th. The, April 20th, the election is whatever, November 6 or whatever. All right, how many two and a half day cycles are there between April 20th and November six? And, you know, the math majors, you know, be able to calculate that in their head, but it's, I don't, 100 or something, right? Or 120 or something like that. Like, whatever is the thing that we think is the thing.

that's going to tilt the election today is going to be 100 social media meme cycles old. Like, nobody's going to remember anything that's happening right now. The election is going to turn basically on whatever's happening in the economy and then it's going to be whatever is like the viral meme panic that's happening like that day. Right. And so, and you can say like, is this good or bad? I don't know. Is this better or worse than television?

I don't know. By the way, is this better or worse than the days of radio or the days of, you know, I don't know, the printed, you know, the revolution that followed the, you know, the arrival of of the printing press, is this better or worse than the days in which, you know, we were all reciting epic poetry

around the campfire as our form of media. I don't know. You could have like a big value discussion about, you know, which is better or worse. I have an argument I will make

that this, notwithstanding all the craziness, this is better. But like, this is the nature of the world we live in. And it, let put this way.

This is, we're now an autopilot. Like the, the shape of the media determines the behavior basically from here on out and until there's something that fundamentally displaces

social media, like this is the world we live in. Hence, the need to monitor the situation. Amen. And is the reason why you think it's better is because even though there's more noise, there's more signal and as kind of a collective global brain, we get closer to the truth? So I would say this. We get, so a couple things. Yeah. So one is, look, I would say there, you could say this. There are more truth and more lies. Right. So I would say that it's both of the following statements are true, which is there's more truth on social media than we had in previous forms

of media. And they're probably probably, I mean, old media had a lot of lies, by the way. So it's, it's hard to say they're moralized, but let's just say there are plenty of lies in social media. Like there are plenty of, you know, plenty of ops. And, in fact, one of the, one of the native forms of entertainment of social media is trying to spot the ops, right? By the way, maybe I should pitch you a show for, on MTS, which is, you know, maybe every day we should do an hour on, let's spot the ops, right? Like, what, you know, which ones are real and organic, which ones are staged bullshit, you know, with somebody getting paid behind the scenes. And so, you know, and everybody, of course, focuses on the downside. And so they focus on the fact that there's all this, all these ops and bullshit, which is certainly,

true, but there's also just like, the ability for somebody to tell the truth is like much more direct and clear than it was before, right, because of, because of the, you know, the collapse of the gatekeepers. And so I, I think both of those are true. So I think that's true. And then, but the, the slightly different argument that I would make is that previous forms of media were really good at generating physical violence. And so the, the, I mean, there's many, many examples that's in history, but the Spanish Civil War, which was kind of the, the war that kind of pre-forecast, It was going to, all this sort of tragedy of the 20th century that followed, you know, the Spanish Civil War was kind of basically the test bed for both communism and Nazism in the modern world. And, you know, its native media format was posters. And so you literally, it was like the idea, the ability to do printed color propaganda posters was like the new media technology at that time. Like, you know, right before radio. And the Spanish Civil War was like super violent. And then radio was the technology that led to, you know, radio was was the Nazi regime. native media format. Radio was the way that basically the fascist regimes got established,

as well as, by the way, as well as FDR, you know, was primarily a radio phenomenon, you know, kind of the rise of modern, you know, kind of modern liberalism. And then, you know, television, you know, was the native medium of like, you just, you know, television kind of kicked in starting around World War II, so it played a role. But if then, you know, television had a huge role to play in the Vietnam War. And then in all of the violent riots of the 60s and 70s, you know, which were kind of, you know, super crazy, both across the U.S. and Europe. And so, you know, television has a long history of leading to downstream violence. You know, the fact that we haven't actually had, like,

the fact that, like, political violence is like an all-time low in Western society is something that people really don't talk about. And it feels like we must be in this, like, super politically violent world because everybody's so angry about politics all the time. But, like, measured political violence is at, like, an all-time low. And so my theory is the ability to directly participate in online virtual combat is shunting away a lot of the energy than in the past would have translated to street violence. Right. And so it's sort of this thing as if the virtual world can become arbitrarily rhetorically violent without people actually getting physically hurt, and that gives people a way to exercise all of their anger and rage over politics and to be

able to attack, you know, the hated enemy without having it actually be something that translates to physical violence. And so, yeah, it's like, I don't know, social media wars up, you know, physical violence down. Nobody wants to hear that because everybody's so mad all the time about what's happening online. But I think that's character. Like if you're sitting at home scrolling social media getting mad, like, at least you're not under the street like hurting people. So that's my, that's my moral defense of the whole thing. Well, it's fascinating because there's kind of a different kind of ideological sorting happening because people, you know, you say things like, hey, you know, now they can't even talk to their own families because they've sort of found their

tribe online that agrees with them. And, you know, it's no longer the people they, you know, it's no longer their families. And back in the day, you know, you didn't have as much, sort of the logic goes, as much political polarization of the idea that I can't even talk to someone, not from the same side. Part of that perhaps is because the internet allows them to find their tribe so, you know, so strongly and so clearly that they're able to, you know, have an exclusionary tribe as well. But I guess one response to political polarization argument is that, hey, at least it's not going to, you know, leading to physical combat. What might you say more broadly?

Is it just overstated in general? Because people also have this idea of filter bubbles too. But, of course, in some ways, it's the opposite of the sense that the Internet exposes you to ideas that you wouldn't have seen otherwise. Right. Yeah. So I think people just have a really rose-colored glasses view of the past. The past gets sanded off, like, in part because we only interpret the past, you know, number one is we weren't there. And then the modern interpreters of the past, you know, are often quite honestly not telling us the truth about what happened because they have their own modern kind of, you know, gloss or spin they want to put on it.

And so, but just the edges of the past gets handed off in retrospect. But it's just like it's really significant. Like if you just like the easiest thing to do, these things is just go on YouTube and watch old episodes of a TV show called All in the Family, which was a very, a very famous successful TV show when I was a kid. And all in the family was a microcosm, a fictional microcosm of basically the culture. Wars, political wars of the late 60s into the 1970s. And it was, you know, so there's famously this character, Archie Bunker

who sort of represented, you know, is this white guy and he basically represented great, brilliant actor named Carol O'Connor played him. And he basically played a retrograde, basically, Republican, you know, Nixon supporting Republican, and this would be like, I don't know, 1972 or something, 1974, who just

basically was painted in the show as like the most backwards, like, basically archaic, you know, knuckle-dragging, racist, sexist, just like the worst possible person in the world. And then there was his son-in-law, played by young Rob Reiner, who, who, who, Archie Bunker nickname Meathead, which is what the character became known as. And Meathead was basically just the arch-progressive liberal, right? You know, sort of like, you know, think, I don't know, young Gavin Newsom or something, right? Where just like he had just like the exact politically correct approved view of the time. And so he's like,

you know, at the time, you know, the equivalent then of super woke, super progressive. you know, super liberal, super enlightened on all these issues. And the conceit of the show, you know, and the guy who did, created the show is this famous television producer named Norman Lear. And the conceit of the show was supposed to be a moral, it was supposed to be a moral lesson of Meadhead giving basically moral lectures to Archie Bunker every week to try to get Archie Bunker to stop being such a backwards-looking like 1950s retrograde, basically racist sexist guy and come into the modern world. And of course, what happened was Carol O'Connor, number one, the actor was just like super funny. But the other was the political environment was superheated at that point. And of course,

it turned out Archie Bucker ended up being the star of the show. And so the show ended up being the opposite of what it was intended to be. That happened later in the 80s that happened to the show called Family Ties, which was, again, it was a very similar thing, which it was these two parents, baby boomer parents in the 80s. And they were like super, you know, it was very left-wing producers who made the show and the characters were like super proper left-wing progressives. And then there was his character in the show Michael J. Fox, their son, it was this teenage kid. And he played the, I forget the name, if I'm blanking on the name of the character, but he played, played the son. And the son basically was a Reagan Republican as a teenager, right? And literally, the son would like wear like

sport jackets and ties to school and carry a briefcase. And they kind of wanted to make him into like a stereotype of like basically, you know, sort of a weird Republican, you know, kind of weirdo. And again, the same sort of weird thing happened, which is actually the Michael J. Fox character became, oh, Alex, Alex, Alex was the character's name, Alex B. Keaton. You know, he essentially became the star of the show. And so I bring up both of those shows because you can see in those shows, you can see the culture wars of the 70s, which were actually like super intense. You can see the culture wars of the 80s, which were super intense. You go back before that and you have the Vietnam War and all the campus protests and the civil rights movement and all the forced, you know, everything, you know, dropping 1001st Airborne into, you know, rural, you know, the rural south to, you know, basically, you know, desegregate the schools at literally at gunpoint.

You go back before that. You have the Cold War. you had the Red Scare, you know, it's now known as the Red Scare, but you had, you know, communists all through the U.S. government, and you had all kinds of freakouts about that. You had the risk of nuclear annihilation. You go back before that, you had World War II, right? Which was like this, like, just like incredible global orgy of violence. You go back before that, you had the Great Depression and the, you know, the New Deal,

which was hugely controversial. You go back before that. You had World War I, you know, and then you go, and then, you know, if you keep going back, it's like you have the Civil War and then you have the Napoleonic Wars, and then you've got the French Revolution. And, you know, and then you go back further than that. You've got the, you know, the Democratic revolutions all through Europe. and then you've got the, you know, the Gutenberg printing press kicking off all kinds of violence, you know, throughout Europe in the 1600s.

And so I just think, like, the history of Western civilization, American, European society is just like constant strife and warfare to like an absurd degree over this entire period. And we go back and we study the history and we're just kind of like, wow, like, those people were like really, really, really violent, like really crazy and really violent. And boy, do they really like killing, right? I mean, it was not that long ago. I don't think it's anybody alive now, but it was not that long ago that, like, grown men, like, in serious positions of power and authority in the U.S., if they got mad at each other,

they would literally have a physical duel. Right? Like, so, you know, you and I start going at it on social media, and we get to a point where we get really mad, and I challenge you to a duel, and, like, we show up in a fucking field on a fucking park, you know, at, like, six in the morning with guns, right? And we, like, square off and march off,

and we turn around and we try to, like, literally shoot each other to death. as like a thing that they did and that was like a normal part of life. Wait, Mark, I thought the past was all matriarchies and everyone just so peaceful. Oh, everybody was so wonderful. Everybody got along.

Everybody all, yes, until social media, everybody thought the same thing. Yes, exactly. And everybody was all, yes, everybody was all calm and happy all the time. And so, you look, the way the world is conflict. I just historically, the way of the world is conflict. And anyway, not to beat a dead horse,

but there was plenty of confidence. conflict in the past. There were plenty of heated disagreements in the future shape of society. There were plenty of political wars. By the way, just politics itself was much more violent. Like, if you go back and you read about political movements 100 years ago, like, they would literally form up in the street and like, fucking, you'd try to kill each other. Yeah. It was like a common thing. You know, strikes. I mean, even the history of the labor movement is full of this. Like, strikes became super violent. And, you know, management would literally, you know, the strikers would try to attack their plants. And the management literally would have like machine guns and they'd be like

machine gunning their striking workers. Crazy, crazy stuff. And so. So like we just, we live in a much crazier world than we want to give ourselves credit for. And the idea that like the current level of conflict is something new is just not true. And just to that end too when people say, oh, ever since 2008 or, you know, your smartphone sort of, you know, profligating that it's led to increased depression or things like that. Is that also another example of, hey, we were underestimating how depressed people were prior and it's kind of a measurement thing? Or is it, oh, but lots of other things happened in 2008 too, like, you know, political extremism. and other things that make people more depressed. How do you engage in that topic?

So the funny thing is different Western countries show different data on the quote-unquote rise in depression. And it basically turns out it correlates to social benefits programs. And so basically if you get paid or if you get like special dispensation in school for having psychological issues, all of a sudden you see a massive spike in those psychological issues, the countries that don't have that,

the other Western countries that don't have that don't show the same results. And so I actually think that's a statistical artifact. of literally like government benefits programs. So like I don't even, yeah, I would, I would say I don't, I don't even, I don't even, I don't even, I don't even, I don't even concede the, you know, concede the premise of the question, but that's, that's, that's, that's a longer debate. Um, I would just say, I'm, I am prepared to say that basically call it since, I don't know, 2014 or something. I'm prepared to say, like, it does feel like things have intensified, right? It, it does feel like things are like wilder, you know, than they were before that. I think the most that I would be willing to say, though, is I think we might have lived through an era of what you might call suppressed volatility.

And call that maybe from like the end of the Cold War through 2014, where basically it just looked like the West had won everything. And then also it was sort of, by the way, it was sort of the peak heyday of centralized media. So if you just like, if you basically track, if you track like how distributed is media versus how centralized is media, like centralized media, like centralized media, like centralized media, like centralized media, of peaked somewhere around 1970, where, you know, literally like all the newspapers in every city consolidated down to, like, a single newspaper, and then you ended up with only three television networks and all the radio stations, independent radio stations, got bought up. Let me give you an example. So historically, so historically, like if you go back to the days of the American Revolution,

it was common in even like mid-sized cities, you would have like 10 or 15 different newspapers. And each newspaper would represent like a different political point of view. And then the newspapers would have these like furious, you know, they've just like you would do today online. They would just have these furious, constant political, you know, fighting and accusations back and forth and arguments. And of course, the newspaper owners would be trying to egg all that stuff on because it sold papers. But it was, like, very common to have, like, many newspapers per city that would all fight with each other. And then the economics

of centralized media method that those all rolled up into a single newspaper. And then, and then that single newspaper, you know, at least for a while, tried to be nonpartisan and tried to be even handed because it was trying to appeal to everybody. And then, and so, and again, same thing of just like, you know, like when I was a kid, it was three television networks that were all basically the same. They were all trying very hard to be even-handed, at least, you know, kind of as best they could. There were like three national news magazines. You know, there were like, I don't know, there was a small number of national radio networks. You know, there were two, you know, newswire services. And so I, like, I will concede, like, I think we live through a period

of suppressed volatility as a consequence of the fact that we had overly centralized media. I think if you go back before that, like, if you go back to before that, if you go back to, like, the 1930s and before, like, media was much more fragmented. It was much more like it is to And then if you, like I said, if you go all the way back like 200, 250 years ago, it was like extremely fragmented. Like if you read the accounts of like Ben Franklin as a newspaper publisher and like the stuff that he got up to with his newspaper. So, okay, great story. So Ben Franklin ran one of the newspapers in Philadelphia originally as a printer. Okay. So what would happen is Ben Franklin wants to become a pretty much commercial printer. He buys a printing press. He advertises that whatever. It tries to get like all the local businesses like print pamphlets in the printing press.

But he doesn't have enough business for the printing press. And so he starts a newspaper to have something to print. And so he starts this newspaper. There's like, like 15 other newspapers in Philadelphia at the time. But he's got to fill the newspaper with something. And so, and he's been Franklin, he's very creative. And so he creates basically sock puppets. He does basically ops. Altz, he does alts.

Yeah, exactly. And they're all under pseudonyms. And so he does, I forget that all the names now, but he had, you know, he had all these different, different names to them. And I think at one point in his own newspaper, he had like 15 different alts going at it. And he wrote them all, but under different names. And they all had like very different points of view.

and then he would basically set them off to have these like raging arguments with each other in his newspaper. And people would buy his newspaper to cover this. And then that culminated in the election of 1800, which was the famous election of Thomas Jefferson versus John Adams, which was sort of this newspaper-centric election, which was characterized by a level of slander. Like the degree to which partisans of Thomas Jefferson and John Adams attack each other in the 1800 election is like way beyond even what we see today on social media. Like they accused each other of the most horrible shit you can possibly imagine. and it became like this giant scandal. And so like this is not,

the idea that there's like whatever rhetorical combat or like that there's like this virtual environment in which there's lots of points of view and there's lots of, you know, again, both lots of truth, through lots of lies. Like this is not new. In fact, this is the natural order of things.

We just live through a period of artificial volatility and that artificial suppression of volatility with media becoming over centralized. And obviously those days are over. I want to return back to, we're talking about the current thing and how that's accelerated over time. We previously had a conversation a while ago where we're talking about sort of the attributes of a current thing. And I remember you had this one theory that

it can't be something too believable. It has to be almost surreal. I'm curious if we just talk kind of what are the attributes of something that becomes sort of the current thing or sort of the topic that people can't stop quote tweeting, sharing, et cetera. Yeah. So again, it's kind of this thing, it kind of reverse engineer it. It's like, okay, to be a current thing, it has to, Again, to be this thing of, if it's on the internet, it's a viral internet meme kind of outrage cycle. So it has to be something that activates outrage. Like it has to be something that activates the emotional kind of valence of, you have to get like the emotional reaction off of it. And so it's just like, by the way, this is just like also the history of the press in general.

It's just like whatever, you know, I always say, the news is called the news, not the importance, right? Like, you can imagine a version of the news that's called The Importance. And the newspaper is like, here are all the important things that are happening today. Right. And, of course, nobody would buy it because nobody cares, right? Because people want the news, right? They want the new thing, right? They want the new thing.

They want the exciting thing. They want the outrageous thing. And so the Internet version of that is, right, they want the outrageous meme. And so it's got to be something that provokes. And, you know, and there's something about this, you know, this is, you know, other people made this observation. But, you know, it's like, you know, kind of the ultimate. male-coded version of this is professional wrestling, right?

The ultimate female-coded version of this is like real housewives, like, you know, reality TV, like, you know, I don't know, and then The Apprentice, maybe somewhere in the middle. It's just like reality TV, like there has to be, there has to be sparks. Like it has to generate a level of emotional intensity driven by some level of outrage. And then I think it has to be the kind of thing where you can have tribes that form up and square off against each other, right? So, so, you know, there's a little bit like West Side Story dynamic to it or something, right, where it's just like, okay, you can imagine, you know, there's, there's some, something that's worth arguing over, where there's a real argument to be had. Like there, you know, there's, there's some underlying thing that actually, like, really matters. Maybe this event

doesn't matter as much, but like the actual underlying issue matters a lot. And then it's going to, it's going to activate this tribal effect where you're going to be able to basically, you're going to become part of what they call a moral tribe. The people on the other side are become part of a moral tribe, and then you're going to go to go to war with each other. You're going to have a rumble, what they would have said in the old days. You're going to have a rumble in the streets, except you're not going to have a rumble in the streets. You're going to have a rumble online, right? You're going to go at it. And so you have to lend itself to that kind of basically tribal formation and, and kind of that beating back and forth. And of course, you, you, the tribes

then attack each other, you know, on the issues, but then they also attack each other's values and they accuse each other being horrible people. And then when it gets really into it, they start to docks each other and try to get each other fired, right? And it all becomes, you know, very exciting. And so, so, so it's got to have, it's got to have the, it's basically it has to have the formation of a moral tribe effect. It's, it's a, the, the, the, the, the, psychological logical lens on this, they call moral tribes, and then there's this concept right of moral panic. It's got to lead to a moral panic. It's got to lead to this kind of thing of like this is indicative of how society is going to shit, right, in like some important way. And by the way, this is why you can have like many, many, many, many different examples of current things that end up revolving back around the same handful of like underlying political or moral questions, right? Because it's really right. It's really not about the, you know, what happened, you know, I don't know, Jesse Smollett. I just want to say there's this new, there's this new, um, there's this new Keanu Reeves movie on Apple TV where Keanu Reeves plays a movie star who gets canceled

and his crisis lawyer played by Jonah Hill it turns out during the course of the show I'll just spoil it in course of the movie. It turns out his crisis lawyer set up the Jesse Smollett was an op. It was a produced op. So in the movie world, the lawyer came up with the idea that there would be a black celebrity

who would get attacked in the street by white racist and that would be like a viral social media outrage thing and then literally the lawyer says, Well, then, of course, we went out and cast, and Jesse Smollett had the best pitch for why he should be, he should be the black guy. And then there was one of his underlings he's still mad at because the underling was tasked with the assignment of going out and hiring, you know, the attackers. But, you know, this is in the Haiti of diversity. And so he hired two black guys to be the attackers. Right.

And he's like all confused because he's like, am I supposed to hire black people, not hire black people? And it's like, well, not in this specific case. You weren't supposed to hire black people to attack Jesse Smillett. But anyway, so the Jesse Splett thing is fresh in my mind. But it was a great example, which is like, what happened on the street in Chicago that night during the whatever, whatever Blizzard Cyclone thing it was? Like, kind of matters, kind of doesn't matter. Whoever really knows, who knows, whatever, we've got weird greeny video, whatever, people

say different things. I mean, I think we now know what happened. But like in these events, like what actually happened in the street? Who the hell knows? But the fight, you see what I'm saying? Like, the moral tribes that were able to form up on, you know, one side where people are like, of course, this is what, you know, this is what happens to people all the time.

And the people on the other side that were like, of course, this is all fake and bullshit. Right. You had this chance for these moral tribes to pair up and fight.

And so I think it basically has, I think it basically, it basically has to have that. Yeah. And sometimes it's very serious. And the stakes are very high. And sometimes it's just an episode that's so, you know,

funny. And the astronomer, CEO, HR as an example. Okay. So, well, this, okay. That's a very important point. very important point. So I would say two things. So one is the truth or falsity of the actual event doesn't seem to matter at all. And I think this is, I think this actually throws people,

because you start to think these are all fake and they're not all fake. Like actually, actually bad things happen, right? Actually bad things happen. And it's actually like fully legitimate to get outraged about those things. But also people are going to get outraged about a lot of things that actually didn't happen. And so for the purpose of the discussion of the media, again, this is Marshall McLuhan thing. If it's on the internet, it's a viral social media outrage cycle. Like, whatever are the facts of the thing, it doesn't really matter. In fact, it's probably best, to your point, it's probably best if it's actually hard to tell what actually happened. Because that makes it something that you can more easily argue about. And so

that's one thing. And then to the point that you just made, I really agree with that also, which is the degree of importance of the actual issue doesn't matter that much. Right. And so if if something happens to a single person, you can, and then something happens to 10,000 people, you can have the same level of outrage in each case. Like, the outrage doesn't scale with the number of people affect it. Right? And in a lot of ways, maybe the outrage is even higher when it's a specific person because it's because then it becomes personalized, right? And then you get in the old, what is it, the old Stalin thing, which is the single death of the tragedy, million deaths is a statistic. Like maybe it's even the small scale horrible things that happen that are the most

emotionally intense, because they're the things that you really, you're going to, you're going to, you're going to react to a person, you know, kind of the most intensely. And so, so, and I think that's the thing. If you're, if you're doing the meta observation of this, it's like, okay, you're just going to, you basically, you just have to expect this same phenomenon. This out-race cycle to play out every time, regardless of truth or falsehood, and regardless of the actual magnitude of the underlying issue. Because, again, what's being argued about is not the specifics about what actually happened. That's not the point. The point is the ability to form up immoral tribes and then, yeah, and then have the rumble. Yeah. There's a,

George Orwell, actually has a great thing on this, because George Orwell famously covered the Spanish Civil War, which is, as I said, is kind of the original, where a lot of this stuff sort of played out for the first time in the 20th century. And he did he did this thing one time where he talks about his version of this. He talks about the role of the atrocity. And he said basically the key point of propaganda in any war. So you get two countries that go to war. And, you know, they've each got a moral claim of like why they're the justified, you know, it's like nobody ever attacks. Everybody's always defending. Like, and I only attacked him first because he was going to attack me otherwise. And so each side in a war, each country has its own

basically moral position, why the war is justified. But he said, he said, basically, Orwell said, like, it's hard to sell like high, it's hard to sell like these high-blown, you know, these high-flying kind of abstract ideas of like why we need to go to war. And so he said what happens is the propaganda efforts of each government in a war become basically looking for atrocities. And so specific point events. A famous one is the Ma'lai massacre in Vietnam. But we can name many, many other examples. And so you're looking for these very specific events where something very specific and concrete happened that's clearly over the moral or beyond the realm of moral acceptability, right? Just clearly, like, you know,

usually involving innocent people getting killed, right? And in the Spanish Civil War, it was like, you know, nuns getting killed or something like that, right? And again, is the point of the atrocity, the point of the atrocity is not that it affected 100,000 people. The point of the atrocity is, in fact, maybe the best atrocity only affects a small number of people because you want to personalize it. And then he said, he says this, he says, the truth or falsehood of the atrocity, it doesn't matter at all. Like, the atrocity, if the atrocity, if the atrocity, The atrocity is made up, the political value of the atrocity is just as high. Right.

And so it doesn't matter. Like, once the atrocity cycle gets running, it doesn't matter whether the underlying thing is true or false because the point of it is to have the atrocity be a propaganda win for moral justification and then for moral demonization of the other side. And by the way, less people think that I'm being cynical when I go through all this, I'm not saying I think this is all good. Like I'm not saying I think that this world is great. I'm not saying that this, I think that this is all positive.

I'm saying something different, which is I think it's very important to understand how this actually works. Because when you find yourself in the middle of one of these things, I think it's very useful to have at least a slice of your brain that's basically saying, all right, I need to be aware of the fact that I'm getting pulled into something, right? That I'm being triggered by emotion and I'm being triggered and I'm being slotted into a moral tribe. And I'm mounting up to go to war with the hated enemy. and it's on the basis of something that very well might not be true. Right? And this is a René Gerard thing

which is the scapegoating cycle always works because people always forget that there's a scapegoating cycle. Like whenever you have to crucify the scapegoat, it's always the most morally important thing that's ever happened for the duration of that cycle, right? Until it's forgotten by the next one. And so a big part of what I'm trying to do

is explain why, like, as we surf all of these current things, that we like at least keep part of our brain and basically says, look, this is the state of the world we live in, this is the state of humanity, this is the state of the media. Like, this is what's happening. We can like it or hate it or we can debate the pros and cons, but it is what's happening. And all objective events are going to be filtered through that.

And to the extent that you care about objective truth, you have to get through that and you have to get to the other side and be able to actually still deal with objective reality. But to do that, you need to understand the cycle. And it's also important to understand because if people are ever involved in the cycle or implicated in it, they typically say, oh, but I'm innocent. once everyone finds out the truth, they're going to exonerate me. They're going to clear me. And they, of course, don't fully appreciate the people don't give a shit.

People are, you know, predisposed to hate you and they'll just find any sort of reason, you know, or certain people, perhaps. Yes, yes, yes, if you are actually innocent and if you're caught up in one of these things, it's horrifying. It's terrifying. I mean, look, cancellation. I mean, this happened a lot of people over the last decade. Yeah. People would get canceled for things they literally never did. And for, you know, for people then imputing beliefs or, you know, some, I don't know, straight comment or misreported comment, and then it gets imputed into, you know, this person is a horrible racist and often a way it goes, and they have to get fired and purred from society and, you know, have no way to come back or, you know, or whatever the issue was, right? And, you know, there were these, you know, these viral videos or viral video, you know,

oh, that's the other thing is like, okay, the viral videos, right? Viral videos, it becomes so much, like, by the way, the first viral video that mattered was actually a Roddy King. And it actually, you know, and I'm not going to litigate, Roddy King, good or bad, or whatever, the whole separate conversation, but the writing king video starts with the beating. So it doesn't show everything that led up to that. And that set the pattern. And again, I'm not, I'm not excusing anybody for anything or whatever. I'm just saying, like, the video started midway through the event. All of the really effective viral videos basically since then, including

the ones that have been really important over the course of the last decade, they've all had that characteristic. They all start halfway through the event. So you don't see the run-up. And so, you know, the Central Park Birdwatcher was the famous, like, you don't see the run-up of what happened before the video started. What was the other one? Who was the other person who got like brutally canceled based on a video? I can remember. I mean, there have been a whole bunch of them.

But this is the things. Right. And so you get a viral video and it kicks off halfway into the event. Why does it kick, by the way, why does it kick off halfway into the event? That's because that's when the event became interesting enough to be able to put on a video. Like, that's when people don't just like walk around their phones out. That's when they pull the phone out. But by that point, you've lost all the contacts.

Right. And so again, this is one of those things where, okay, you're watching a viral video, you can feel yourself getting outraged. The key question ought to be, all right, what happened before that? Right? And that takes work, right? Because it's not right there on the screen. And you have to, like, really try hard to, like, go back and, like, figure out eyewitness reports.

And by the way, like, if it's a criminal thing, half the time you don't find out what happened until the actual trial happens. So you don't find out for, like, another year because they don't put the evidence out until the trial. And so that's another thing where people get, basically, people get used, basically. People get ginned up into these outrage cycles without actually having the content. for what happened. Yeah. The, I want to go back to this conspiracy. You know, we have a friend who thinks everything is an op and maybe I'm naive and I miss out

on the ops that are actually there. But I'm curious what a mental model one might have to think about how much is coordinated versus not. I've been inspired by the idea of decentralized or emergent collusion, just sort of this, this idea that a lot of people have incentives to go in the same way that even if they're not coordinating. explicitly, they almost might as well be, or it might explain why so many things seem coordinated. But ever since joining A16Z, so many people have impugned onto us things

that we're not doing. And so it's made me skeptical of people calling for conspiracies. And so I'm curious what sort of mental model you might have for the idea of ops and how that might help one understand the social platforms today. Yeah. So I think as best I can tell, and it's tricky because it's hard to tell. And there are, you know, some real experts in this that really, really focus on this. But as far as I can tell, like, there's, there's, there's, there's some truth on both sides. The answer is, the answer is messy. And it's messy for two reasons. So messy number one is just like, there are a lot of things that I think are happening that are truly organic.

And then there are a lot of things that are happening that are ops. And I think, I think there's a combination. And then, and then, and then, I think maybe you're alluding to this. And then there's this thing, which is like, something can start as an op and then become real. Right. which is kind of the point of the op, right? The, right, the, if you, if you and I were going to be McAvelli and we wanted to start a movement, right? And we wanted to start a moral outrage cycle because we had some underlying goal because we're either trying to win an election or trying to get a political something, you know, law passed or something like that. We were going to like, we're maximum like macchavillian deviousness and we're going to like have a black budget, you know, and we're going to pay influencers to, you know, all this stuff that people say, you know, we're going to have our bot army and so forth. Like the point of it is not to just like have a bunch of propaganda online with it with a bot army behind it.

the point is to get people to actually believe it. Right. That is the goal. Right. And so, and, and, and, and, and, and then, you know, you don't want to have to pay for like every post, right? At some point, you want them to be happening organically, even just out of, out of self-economic interest. And so you actually, you're actually trying to generate, uh, you're actually trying to generate, uh, the thing. Actually, there's, there's a great paper on this. Um, there's a, um, there's a, uh, Timur Karan and, uh, who's the famous, uh, sort of a guy who talks about, uh, preference falsification and then Cass Sunstein, um, wrote this thing years ago, uh, uh, or they, they talk about this phenomenon relevant here. They call it. They call it. They call it. availability cascade. So, so their term for this kind of thing that we've been talking about, which is like a viral outrage cycle, their term for it they call availability cascade. And what they mean by availability cascade is sort of cascade means basically the process, it's the sociological term for sort of an idea or concept kind of cascading through society, kind of building momentum as it goes. And then availability, they call, based on the idea of availability bias, which basically is we tend to overfocus in the thing that's right in front of us. And so we tend to overfocus in the thing that's basically precedent in our mind

at that time, which may or may not be as important as other things that we're not focused on. But in the paper, the significance of it is in the paper, they identify the role of a specific kind of person they call availability entrepreneur. And the role of the availability entrepreneur is to try to inject into the public consciousness availability bias as a deliberate exercise to basically say, this is the specific thing that you should be focused on right now. Like, this is the specific person who's been hurt by something. This is the specific whatever, you know, moral event that's happened. This is the specific issue. This is the specific issue. This this specific thing. And basically what they say is like every time you see an availability

cascade, if you trace it back, there was always what they call the availability entrepreneur, which was basically the person who was like, aha, I am going to put, I'll give you the classic example. And again, this is not a value judgment. And, you know, this was like, you know, fantastically good that this happened. But Rosa Parks was a classic example of this. Like Rosa, like, the story that we all got told in school was Rosa Parks was just like another, you know, sort of a random person, you know, with the thing on the bus. Rosa Parks was like an actually, she was a trained activist. Like that she went to like there was this whole like school of activists and they like she was like a specifically trained it was it was there was an

availability entrepreneur uh who set up an availability cascade targeted on Rosa Parks that ended up causing fundamental and obviously very very positive changes to American society but like it started as an op like she started as she started as an op but the point of the op was not to be the op the point of it was to be what happened which is to become a nationwide movement that ultimately led to fundamental change and so anyway the point is like just because things start as ops doesn't mean they're not real right? And if the op leads to real outcomes, then you might as well consider, you know, it's like at some point it's just a matter for historians of how it started. Like it's a footnote to the Rosa Park story today that she was a trained activist. It doesn't really matter because

that op unlocked a broad-based actual movement in American society that led to actually profound change. And so this is the problem with this topic, which is, oh, that's just an op is basically like cope. Like, okay, right? It might have started as an op, but if it ends up in a real thing, it doesn't matter. You see what I'm saying? It doesn't matter that it started as an op. And then by the way, conversely, it also doesn't matter if it didn't start as an op. Because, again, it's the same outcome.

And so I do think, I don't think both things are true. I do think there's this furious fight. I do think there are serious operators. And, you know, you can go online and you can find out about these things. This is a big issue, by the way, in political influencer world right now. This is actually a big thing. So if I want to run an advertising campaign to sell shampoo, legally in the U.S., if I hire influencers to say good things about the shampoo, I believe this to be true. They have to disclose that it's a paid commercial.

They can't just like pretend that they just happen to stumble over the shampoo. If I donate money to a political candidate, I have to disclose that as part of federal election law. if I pay an influencer to take a position on a moral topic that is not a product that is sold or a political candidate, but it's just like a position on a moral or political thing, that doesn't qualify either as an advertisement or as a political donation. It's fully legal to do that in the dark. Yeah. Well, right? Right. A lot of a lot of paid doom out there. We were just talking about AILA's, you know, a new media fellowship for DOOMers. And yeah, it is a perfect example. And it seems to be having a real impact.

This is a great example. So this is the thing where they're living the meme, right? They're living the meme. So I don't know if you may have covered all this already. But yeah, so like we know we're in this AI. We're in this pitched AI policy battle. And we know through that and we're deep into this. We know that there's dark money in AI.

Like a lot of the AI Dumerism stuff is basically bought and paid for. Like so there's these influence operations that are happening. And they fall into this bucket. of it's it's it's neither an advertisement to say a i's going to kill everybody nor is it a political candidate and so there are organizations and companies that are paying the you know there's this and again it's like not not everybody who says that is is being paid but there there is a lot of dark money in that in that world right now and so and of course you know the partisans in that world insist full on of course that there's you know that of course is absolutely not happening until

yesterday when they just go ahead and like live the meme and they just like announced the program and so they announced the program in black and white right there on a website and it's like a influencer camp in which you're going to go and by the way it's free which means you know you're being paid and then they say

where's the money coming from and they say oh we're a nonprofit being funded by in this case Miri which is one one organization with its own kind of interesting funding history and then they say and other donors right right and it's like it's literally like

it's literally like I don't know is it a conspiracy if it's in place sight but I'm just I'm picking on that one because that's the one that happened yesterday but like that that for sure is happening all throughout politics it's for sure happening on lots and lots of social issues you know it's it's a thing and so yeah and so like

but again it goes back to this thing of like okay yes there are ops yes you can't believe what you see by the way there there are bot farms like there are obviously bot farms and there are obviously bot farms that are being deployed you know, there are online influencers, some of them very controversial, where, you know, there's clearly a bot army behind them. By the way, you could be an influencer online and have a bot army behind you and have nothing to do with a bot army.

No. Right? Like, somebody could be paying for the bot army and you might not even know about it. Yeah. Right. And again, today, it's totally legal to do that. Because, again, if you're not selling a product or you're not donating to political candidate, like, it's actually in this great thing.

It's actually fine to do. And so I think it's 100% in the case that, like, there's ops all over the place. And quite frankly, like, the longer, the more deeper I get into it, the more like, yeah, there's probably more ops than I've been, that I've been, than I've been willing to acknowledge. But I would just say on the other side, it's like, I don't know, does it really matter?

Like, is that really the thing that's, because the ops are only going to work, it'd be another way to put it is, the ops are only going to work if they resonate into something that people are going to pick up and run with, you know, anyway. Like, to become a mass movement, this is like what Timur Cron says about the role of the availability of entrepreneur,

like, it's not enough to just like have your cause and then just like expect that you can kind of trick people into running with your cause. There has to be something to it that resonates with them, you know, kind of in them already that causes, that causes them to look. And if maybe they pick it up and run with it based on a paid op, and by the way, maybe in the counterfactual they would have picked up and run with it anyway, you know, without the op and, you know, you'll never know. Yeah.

The, um, that's a great mental model for it. Think about a last topic for today. I want to close them to say sort of the bridge between. legacy and new media because we see just give some examples obviously in New York Times business they've made the adjustment to the new world very well from business perspective you know we had CBS acquired the free press and so there's some you know acquisitions there uh strategic exhibitions for legacy media companies who are trying to innovate you know on MTS ourselves we're sort of experimenting with with players from both worlds you know we have new school podcasters

and Twitch streamer you know Theo is there you 21 years old yeah 20 you know he's born to be a twist streamer, but we also have... I mean, 21, I mean, over the hill. Yeah, exactly. You know, has been by now. Gray hair, gray hair. Lost. Yeah, washed.

But we also have Mark Halperin, who, you know, as, you know, legacy and legendary, you know, commentator and host, who, funny enough, you know, we've talked about how Trump is the, is the bridge figure in that he was successful both in legacy and in this new media, media climate. And it's rare for people to do both. Halpern, of course, interviewed, did a very famous interview with Trump when he was talking about the Bible verses and, you know, getting him to mention some specific ones. And, you know, Trump, of course, didn't want to pick favorites. Anyway, I'm curious how you think about the sort of the bridge, either analysis of Trump as the bridge or more just how do you see legacy players and new media players sort of, you know, playing out or even the styles of what will work. in this new format.

Yeah, I mean, so I guess, I don't know, you maybe start with data, right? So the data shows that basically, just focus in American data because of what I'm most familiar with. So just in the data, you basically see a couple things. So one is trust in centralized institutions of all kinds is collapsing in the U.S. So basically any kind of legacy or incumbent institution, you know, trust is collapsing fast. by the way, that collapse in trust didn't start with the internet. It's actually started around 1970.

It actually, it's part of this, it's part of this WTF happened in 1971 meme. It is when basically trust in centralized institutions in the U.S. started to fall off a cliff. That's true for many kinds of centralized institutions, and it's been true for, you know, basically 55 years. But media is included in that. And so trust and centralized media is collapsing and, you know, keeps hitting new record lows, basically every time they run the survey, it collapses further.

And so that's certainly true. And then the business version of it is just very clear, which is, you know, we've talked about CNN later. Like you earlier, like, you know, ratings for all the centralized media properties are in full-scale collapse. You know, cable news is collapsing. You know, almost every newspaper has collapsed. Almost every magazine has collapsed. You know, basically all the legacy formats have collapsed, you know, with only very rare exceptions. And so, you know, just – and then, by the way, correspondingly, it's just sort of obvious, you know, the rise of podcast.

obviously is obvious now. And by the way, it's amazing, like the election of 24 was the one where podcasts kind of flipped the, you know, went from being like, I don't know if this matters to like all of a sudden everybody's like, oh, wow, this matters like a lot. And so the rise of podcasts, of course, is undeniable at this point, the rise of social media, the rise of live streaming, you know, these things are clearly happening. And so like the changing of the guard, reordering of the businesses and of the cultural and social phenomena are clearly happening and I think are undeniable. You know, if you extrapolate it forward, like obviously, you know, essentially all of the remaining old media properties that don't figure out a way to adapt to the new world are going to, you know, they're, you know, going to get basically run by private equity and that'll be that.

You know, which is kind of the story of the newspaper industry these days. So, so I, you know, that like, it's almost like not even interesting to say that anymore just because it's like it's so obvious that that's happening. And then, you know, obviously social media, you know, continues to grow as a phenomenon. continues to be very important. And so, yeah, and, you know, look, we're still, we're still living in this. We're still living in a hybrid world today, right? And so we're still living in a world in which, like, you know, to some extent, it still matters what's on TV, but like not nearly as much as it did. But, you know, pretty soon it's not, it's not going to anymore. So, you know, so that world is changing fast. Yeah, I just think, yeah, the main thing is going to be, you know, the people who adapt to that are, the people who adapt to that are going to adapt to that.

and they're either going to adapt or they're not. You know, you mentioned Mark Halper, and, you know, he's a good friend of both of ours, you know, I think he's doing like an amazing job adapting to that. And in a way that's just like, I would say, shockingly different and better than, you know, most of his former colleagues. You know, there's great examples that, you know,

the New York Times has adapted to that in an interesting way. You know, the Hassan Piker apology newspaper has fully committed itself to the future, let's say. So, you know, they're doing their thing. Yeah. You know, most legacy properties won't adapt. They, you know, they never do. There's going to be lots and lots of new things that emerge.

And maybe I should say here again to not sound cynical about this. Like, it is really striking. I would say the following. So, like, what are the two like mega, mega, mega trans in video? And by the way, also in politics over the course the last like five years. It's basically two things. It's short form video in the form of TikTok, Instagram. and X, you know, short-form, you know, reels or short-form video.

And there you get, like, the full battery of accusations of, like, you know, destroying attention span and everything's trivial. But on the other side is the rise of the three-hour podcast, right? And so on the podcast side, you have this incredible phenomenon with three hours. And by the way, some of these, you know, Joe and Lex and others are now pushing this to the point where, you know, Lex now has, like, in some cases, seven or eight-hour podcasts, right? I think, was it, Bologi did, like a seven-hour one on Lex. Yeah, yeah, so Bology went for 10 hours of Lex.

And so, and it's actually interesting because if you talk to those guys, they get data on completion rates. And it's actually a very large percentage of their, of their listeners or viewers who actually listen to the whole thing. So like many, many, many, many Rogan podcast or Lex Podcasts, people actually listen to the full three hours. And so it's the thing I really rejected this idea that like, and I don't want people to think that I believe this is like this idea that everything is going to become just like trivial, short firm social media bullshit like that. No, not at all. You have this correspond. You do have a lot of that. but you have this corresponding thing, which is you also, it's like a barbell.

You also have this, you have this massive rise in substance. And on the substance side, I would point to the long-form podcast. I would point to substack. By the way, you know, there's a big push on X to have long-form essays. I would push, you know, online, you know, online, you know, courses on every topic are available. And you just, yeah, you have this ability. But even AI, my favorite feature of AI is what they call deep research, which is a feature on both, I think it's on, particularly on chat chPD and on Claude, but like you said it loose and it will write you like

literally 30 pages, a 30 page answer. You know, this is basically like a textbook on any topic. And so, so I think there is this other side, which is you have this, you also have this growth in, you have this growth in, oh, the other thing is just, and we're an example of this, the rise of the practitioner media, practitioner driven media. So people who are actually doing a thing showing up and talking about it. Right. And of course, you know, that leads to howls of outrage of that's journalism if you don't have somebody asking like whatever super you know snipey critical questions about it or whatever but like the idea for somebody who is actually doing a thing i mean you know i Andre carpathian ai right who just like shows up and like explains like here here is how this all works um is just like amazing and and you know in in in old media like basically like when i was younger like charlie rose did that but so i grew up actually listening to charlie rose uh watching charley rose but charley rose literally was on at fucking midnight like he was on cb at midnight, and he would have these hour-long conversations with these super-interested people doing super-interesting things. But he was on at midnight, and you had to stay up to midnight

to watch Charlie Rose, right? It was like, it was one of the great things about getting a DVR, so you could record, you know, Charlie Rose and watch it during normal daylight hours. But, you know, we lost that or we didn't have that for a very long time and we have that now. And so I do think it's worth noting, like there is this incredible, in my view, clearly, incredibly positive, informative, educational, super helpful, super-constructive thing on the other side, which is, of course, a lot of what we try to do. Yeah. And if 2024 was the podcast election, it'll be interesting to see what 2028 will be.

People have been very concerned, you know, or sort of predicting, you know, deep fakes for a while and how that might influence things. But we haven't really seen anything there is super material, it seems. But it'll be interesting to see what media formats or just how the 28 election is different than the 2024 one in terms of this conversation. We've had deepfakes forever. Yeah. Like, people who believed all kinds of crazy bullshit. I mean, you know, it was the Gulf of Tonkin incident, and they kicked off the really kicked off the Vietnam War.

Like, I think we now know that that was a fake. Like, it's actually quite well established. And then some people might say, rush a gate. It turns out we now know it was quite elaborate fake. So the defake thing I find very funny because it's like, it's not like we've been swimming in truth all this time. And all of a sudden now there's going to be defects. anyway that maybe that's a separate conversation the um i think the the the the the the the the substantive

comment i would make is um so uh so i actually think we had people talk about like famously talk about the 1960 election uh kennedy versus nixon where tell famously where television took over from radio uh where if if you they had their famous debate and if you listen to it in the radio you thought nixon won and if you watched it on tv you thought that the the the kennedy won so so so you know the audio versus audio plus video. And so people have been talking for a long, you know, that was considered like the first television election where television was like the determining factor

and who won or lost, along with, you know, maybe some shenanigans in Chicago. Anyway, speaking of deep things. So anyway, people have been talking for a while about when will there be the first internet election? And, you know, people like to point to 2016 being, you know, Trump using social media or maybe 2024 being the podcast election.

I actually think the first internet election hasn't happened yet. Or by the way, people even point to 2008 with Obama fundraising. So, yeah, 2008 Obama fundraising online. 2016, Trump using social media as a broadcast method. And then 2024 podcasts. So we've had three examples of internet mattering for elections, for sure. But I think we haven't had the true internet election. And as a consequence of that, and by the way, we therefore haven't really had the true internet

candidate yet. And actually, it's interesting because people talk, this is not a pro or negative, pro or con comment on Trump himself for the purpose of this discussion, but people talk about Trump as the internet candidate, but he's really, he's really a hybrid in that he cares, he cares enormously about what's on TV, and

he's on TV a lot, and he watches TV all the time famously in order to, because TV is basically how he gets a read on the pulse of sort of of what's happening and of what people think about things and what people. So, like, I think, I think Trump's kind of underlying theory is the things that are on TV are the things that the people

running the TV network know that their viewers want to see. And so therefore, if you watch us on TV, you can get a sense of what people actually think. And I, you know, and when as TV has been the dominant medium for the last 60 or 70 years, you know, that, you know, it's a pretty good theory, obviously, it's pretty well, you know, quite well for him. And then he, and then he also, like, cares a lot about, like, affecting what's on TV. And there's this famous Trump story that lots of people have told where he'll be in a meeting and there will be a TV on in the background. He'll be watching it. And he'll, he'll have it with the sound off, but he'll be watching the Chiron, the thing at the bottom of the screen, the text that shows what they're saying.

And if he doesn't like what's on the Chiron, he'll tweet something to change the subject. Right. And so he'll tweet and then he'll literally watch and the Chiron will change. and he'll be like, ah, you know. So, right, he's able to cause, right, he's able single-handedly with his power of his Twitter to turn one current thing into another current thing, right? Okay. So, but my point is like, he's a hybrid. So he's very social media fluent, but he's also very television.

And of course, his entire career was made on television. So he's very television fluent. He's one of the best, you know, television programmers in history, and he's, and he's a social media native. There will be an internet candidate. There will be an internet president who gets elected, I believe, entirely. based on the internet, where they don't pay any attention at all to what's on TV, because it doesn't matter to them one bit. And they're going to be entirely online, and they're not going to care what's

on TV, and they're not going to care what's in the newspaper, and they're going to be 100% a creature of the internet. And I think we haven't, I believe we haven't seen that yet. I don't know when we're going to see it. I'm pretty sure it's possible it's 28. Probably, my guess is 32. Yeah. And so I think we all have, yes, for better or for worse, we all have that to look forward to. Yeah. The, well, I think that's a great note to, to wrap on. This has been a great discussion on all things, media. Mark, thank you for coming on the first day of monitoring the situation.

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