The a16z Show - Oren Cass & Noah Smith Debate the True Impact of Tariffs

Episode Date: August 20, 2025

Do tariffs help rebuild American manufacturing or hold it back? In this episode, American Compass founder and chief economist Oren Cass sits down with commentator and author Noah Smith and a16z General Partner Erik Torenberg for a lively debate on the future of U.S. industry. They discuss the case for tariff-driven re-industrialization versus free-market approaches, the role of allies in trade policy, and what the numbers really show about manufacturing jobs, investment, and output. Along the way, they challenge each other’s assumptions and explore what it would take to actually bring more production back to American soil. Timecodes:0:00 Introduction & Framing the Debate1:27 Oren Cass: Economic Philosophy & American Compass4:02 Manufacturing, Family, and Community5:00 Free Trade, Comparative Advantage, and Policy8:30 Tariffs: US vs. China and Historical Context9:30 Do Tariffs Help US Manufacturing?15:00 Data, Indicators, and Economic Predictions22:00 Theory, History, and the Role of Economics28:00 Trade Deficits, Scale, and Global Competition38:00 Negotiation, Game Theory, and Policy Tools46:00 Trade Deficits, Scale, and Global Competition1:03:23 Negotiating with Allies and the Limits of Tariff Threats Resources: Find Oren on X: https://https://x.com/oren_cassAmerican Compass: https://americancompass.org/Find Noah on X: https://x.com/noahpinionSubscribe to Noah’s Substack: https://www.noahpinion.blog/ Stay Updated: Let us know what you think: https://ratethispodcast.com/a16zFind a16z on Twitter: https://twitter.com/a16zFind a16z on LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/company/a16zSubscribe on your favorite podcast app: https://a16z.simplecast.com/Follow our host: https://x.com/eriktorenbergPlease note that the content here is for informational purposes only; should NOT be taken as legal, business, tax, or investment advice or be used to evaluate any investment or security; and is not directed at any investors or potential investors in any a16z fund. a16z and its affiliates may maintain investments in the companies discussed. For more details please see a16z.com/disclosures. Stay Updated:Find a16z on YouTube: YouTubeFind a16z on XFind a16z on LinkedInListen to the a16z Show on SpotifyListen to the a16z Show on Apple PodcastsFollow our host: https://twitter.com/eriktorenberg Please note that the content here is for informational purposes only; should NOT be taken as legal, business, tax, or investment advice or be used to evaluate any investment or security; and is not directed at any investors or potential investors in any a16z fund. a16z and its affiliates may maintain investments in the companies discussed. For more details please see a16z.com/disclosures. Hosted by Simplecast, an AdsWizz company. See pcm.adswizz.com for information about our collection and use of personal data for advertising.

The question is, does free trade with China advance free markets, or does it distort and wreck our free market? We have treated free trade as the natural extension of free markets. If you attempt to be for free trade with a non-market economy, you are not actually advancing free markets in any significant way at all. You're actually dramatically hindering them. China is pretty much the only competitive threat we face, which all our allies are facing at the same time, and we're fighting. with our allies instead of pooling our resources to stand up to China. At the end of the day, if the goal is not to make America the assembly hub of the world, but to actually re-industrialize, you have to actually create incentives to bring back those

intermediate supplies. The U.S. is rethinking its economic playbook on tariffs, trade, manufacturing, and what it really means to support family, community, and industry. In this episode, I'm joined by Oren Cass, founder of American Compass, and Noah Smith, author of no opinion, for a debate on industrial policy, reshoring, and whether tariffs help or hurt American manufacturing. We get into the data behind recent trade policy, the short versus long-term effects on domestic industry, and whether the U.S. should double down on protectionism or scale up with its allies to compete globally. Along the way, we talk about factory construction, global

supply chains, economic modeling, and what both sides we need to see to actually change their minds. Let's get into it. We're really excited to have you on, because We've been talking about some topics over the past few months that you've been thinking a lot about, that you've been writing a lot about, that your thinking is in fact informed and inspired and encourage some of what's actually happened. And so before we get into some of the specifics, I wanted for some of our audience who may not be familiar, especially on the A6Z side, I wanted to just give you an opportunity to kind of introduce your platform, so to speak, or introduce kind of the main topics and ideas that you're affiliated with. We'll link to the book and some of the articles about kind of a newer conservatism, but maybe you can help define it in broadstrokes and we'll get to some specifics. Sure, yeah, I'll try to keep it short. Let me know if you want me to say more about anything. But I founded American Compass back in 2020 with the mission to restore an economic consensus that emphasizes the importance of family, community, and industry to the nation's liberty and prosperity. And I suppose from one perspective, you'd say, well, that seems self-evident and unnecessary.

But from another, I'd say it represents a fairly dramatic departure from the way economics has been conducted. Economic policy has been conducted, especially on the right of center, but probably including the center left as well, and therefore really given shape to our economic trajectory over the past generation. So our view is that I think we have seen a sort of excessive faith in markets and excessive assumption that whatever produces efficiency, whatever maximizes corporate profits, that too will be best for everybody. and that that has failed in two respects. First of all, that that is, in fact, not best for everybody. You can get very unequal and distorted outcomes. But secondly, that even if you had the economic system operating the way you might ideally wish it would,

that's not actually going to take care a lot of the things that matter most of people. And that pairing of family, community, and industry maybe seems a little bit odd. Those aren't three things that always get paired together. But we see them as three things that are incredibly important, to flourishing, both sort of human flourishing at the micro level, national flourishing at the macro level, that markets simply don't guarantee. Markets can uphold those things, but there's nothing in economics that says that markets will. And so the core of our argument is that if those are things that anybody, and especially conservatives, care about, then they have to be willing to

think about an approach to economics and markets that goes beyond just trusting that whatever comes out of the market is going to be good. And that then leads toward all sorts of interesting policy conversations, I think, have been absent in for about a generation now. I would like to know how restoring manufacturing, because I've been calling for restoring manufacturing for a long time for various economic purposes, higher growth, national security, things like that. But I want to know how restoring manufacturing would strengthen family and community in America. And that's a nexus that I really haven't seen much evidence on. and I know observing countries like Germany and South Korea

where the manufacturing share of industry has remained remarkably high, so I see them with extremely low fertility rates, low rates of family formation, skyrocketing, divorce rates, and in Korea's case, an extreme suicide problem. And so I'm thinking, if we could restore manufacturing, which I would like to do, how will that restore the family? I guess those are questions at very different levels of specificity. Let me say a little bit more about the broader question first,

and then if we want it to dive into the manufacturing piece, certainly we can. I think to your point, Eric, about this is Econ 102 that I find myself on. It seems to me that a lot of the gap is between the sort of, I think, quite oversimplified models that we teach in an Econ 101 or an Econ 102 and the set of factors that are actually relevant in a modern economy. So to give one example, if you are learning comparative advantage in Econ 101 and the wonders of free trade, you are almost. certainly talking about an economy with two markets and two goods. They're almost invariably

agricultural goods or something relying on natural resources. And you're going to see that if you change how much of each country produces and you trade some of one for some of the other, then both can be better off. And that's great. Totally agree. No issue with that. The problem in the real economy is twofold. One is that, of course, most of what's being traded is not natural resources where maybe you're a place that grows a lot of avocados, or maybe you're a place that has a lot of fish, but it's manufactured goods. And advantages in manufactured goods are a lot less likely to emerge from some sort of natural endowment of a country and much more likely to emerge from the explicit policy choices that the country makes. I mean, a good example is there's no special

silicon on Taiwan's beaches that make it the best place to fabricate advanced semiconductors. And so if you are expecting to just see everybody kind of have a natural advantage in something, and that's what we trade, you'll be very disappointed. You'll find that the countries that strategically attempt to develop an advantage in something get to excel in that, and some things are more economically valuable, have more spillovers, have more security implications than others. The second problem, of course, is that you don't actually have to trade goods for goods at all. You can have the situation we have in the American economy today represented by a trillion-plus. dollar trade deficit in which you are exchanging goods for assets. And so if you imagine going back

to your happy little, I guess in my econ 101 class, it was fish and sweaters, and you imagine that, well, what if one country catches the fish and makes the sweaters and the other country just issues treasury debt to buy fish and sweaters? It's not nearly as obvious to me that is actually a welfare-enhancing exchange certainly over the long run. And so that's one concrete example in the trade space where I think there's a big problem. But one other I think I'd have that's even more conceptual that I think we've really failed to grapple with until recently is, to your point about being free market enthusiasts, I too am a free market enthusiast. And the question is, does free trade with China advance free markets, or does it distort and wreck our free market?

And we have treated free trade as the natural extension of free markets. If you are for free markets you are for free trade. But I think what we've learned is if you attempt to be for free trade with a non-market economy, you are not actually advancing free markets in any significant way at all. You're actually dramatically hindering them. So that's one example of an area. We do a lot of work also on industrial policy, on financial markets and investment flows, on labor policy, on competition policy, but all of it ultimately follows the same template of asking, you know, if we look at the world as it actually is, if we look at what economics actually can and cannot promise, where are the places where policy is probably going to have to play a role if we want to get the kinds of

outcomes, we would actually say our good outcomes. Just to follow up in that point, your proposed policies of reduced immigration, trade protectionism via tariffs, policy to increase domestic industry manufacturing, policies to increase fertility. Is your policy, playbook actually similar to China's or kind of turning us into China or kind of mimicking or mirroring their strategy? I don't think so. I mean, I guess I would say just because China is doing something doesn't make it bad. But of course, a lot of, well, virtually everything you just described were also policies that were the American tradition until very recently. America had very high tariffs and built its domestic industry behind a wall of protectionism. America

aggressively restricted immigration. America had quite aggressive industrial policy and so on and so forth. And of course, conversely, China, I believe maybe just last week they announced they might be doing some sort of pro-fertility policy. But historically, China has been the poster child for extremely unwise anti-fertility policy. So I wouldn't characterize anything of what we're doing is saying we should become more like China. I would say to the extent that we are going to operate in a global economy, we need to have policy that accounts for the existence. of China, and that is unfortunately something that we have declined to do.

Or, and I have a question. Do you think that Trump's tariffs overall will increase U.S. manufacturing output and employment? In the long run, I think it definitely will because I think it How long is long? Hmm? How long? Well, let me kind of answer the question. I think if the long run is anywhere upwards of a few years, I think it will. I think the question is, how long does it take to actually change investment decisions and then how long does it take investments to come online? But I would expect to see the results of some of the investments were already seen being made come online in the next few years. I think a good proxy is how long did it take Japanese automakers to set up in the U.S. after their imports into the U.S.

were badly constrained. And then I think from there, a lot of it comes down to what we do on policy. Both, can we actually create a credible, long-term, consistent commitment to a tariff policy that makes people believe they should invest? And can we do the other complementary things? I think on kind of maybe I would call it the supply side, the industrial policy to actually support investment, the workforce development. I think there are other things that we need as well.

So to be clear, you know, since Trump, announced his quote unquote liberation day tariffs, we've seen deterioration in manufacturing PMIs, purchasing orders, you know, investment plans. Every indication of manufacturing you've had is slumping now and notably beginning directly after Trump's announcement of those big tariffs. And we have a pretty good idea. You know, when we do surveys of people who run manufacturing companies, what they say is exactly sort of what, you know, basic economic theory would say, which is they're having a very difficult time sourcing intermediate input. So there's all kinds of things that we get from supply chains. They can't source. And so as a result, they're cutting back

on building factories. You know, they're cutting back on investing and ordering more manufacturing, people aren't ordering as many manufactured goods, et cetera, et cetera. And so if I'm hearing you correctly, the idea is that this is temporary and that once we reestablish entirely within country supply chains, this will reverse and manufacturers will start investing a bunch and will have a manufacturing boom and that the manufacturing bust that we're seeing now, apparently as a result of the tariffs, is simply temporary pain for long-term gain. We just have to stay the course. Is that an accurate summary of what you're telling me? Well, I guess I'd prefer to sort of answer questions that you ask instead of try to sort of

give a yes-no to your statement of a case. The situation... Then let's say let's... I would like you to evaluate this, you know, tell me what you think about the fact that all the manufacturing indicators in the economy are flashing red directly after the announcement of Trump's tariffs. Well, so first of all, I would just be your characterization

that they're all flashing red. I think in general, the distance between the sort of overheated rhetoric we have gotten from economists and the actual performance of the economy has been pretty dramatic on almost every front. There have certainly been a number of manufacturers who have said this has made life harder. There have been others who have said, actually, this is inducing us to make substantial additional investments. You know, we've already seen TSMC as one example. In fact, say that they are slowing investment in Japan to invest more quickly in the U.S. We've seen there's a very

story on drug makers in the Wall Street Journal, I think it was probably last week saying that, yes, they actually thought the effect of the pharmaceutical tariffs under consideration would lead to significant reshoring of drug manufacturing. So I guess if I look at both the economy's actual performance over the last six months and I look at the sort of more anecdotal evidence, I would say I think it's absolutely too soon to tell one way or the other. But I would say that gives me a significant amount of optimism is that, in fact, I do think you're seeing companies, generally speaking, respond to the incentives in front of them by thinking about how they would adjust their businesses accordingly. And so I think, you know, the intermediate goods piece of it is

definitely an important one that creates short-term challenges. But at the end of the day, if the goal is not to, you know, make America the assembly hub of the world, but to actually re-industrialize, you have to actually create incentives to bring back those intermediate supplies. You can't just say we want cheap intermediate supplies so that we can, I guess, assemble for re-export. And so I guess I don't know, I'd be very interesting to know kind of what the, I guess you've said, all the manufacturing signs are flashing red. I haven't. that has not been my perception of the economic coverage over the last month or two. Or in what data sources are you looking at when you're evaluating the state of America's manufacturing

in the last few months? Well, I mean, there's manufacturing employment. There's, I guess, one number I'm very interested to look at that we won't have for a little bit longer is Q2 capital investment, which I believe will get longer in August, later in August. there is various manufacturing sentiment indications. There is actual kind of industrial output capacity utilization, these kinds of measures. I mean, we do an awful lot to measure the performance of the manufacturing sector. And I think certainly we saw in the immediate aftermath of the tariff announcements,

a lot of downturns, and a lot of concern. But I'm not sure how much of that has actually. been sort of borne out at this point several months later. Do you know what PMIs are, right? Yeah, but so what are, yeah. So, I know it's appropriate to educate me. The Institute for Supply Management, which is a, you know, a consortium kind of thing. They survey manufacturing companies.

They call them up and they ask them, are you investing, how much you're investing, you have more orders, blah, blah, blah. They do these surveys. And, you know, it's pretty rigorous data. And so if you talk to them, you know, here let me read from a Bloomberg article from the first of this month that said, U.S. factory activity contracted in June for a fourth consecutive month as orders and employment shrank at a faster pace extending the malaise in manufacturing. Bookings contracted by the most in three months and have been shrinking for the past five months, an index order. backlogs, blah, blah, blah. Employment index, which measured manufacturing employment, has fallen

significantly. Then the purchasing managers index, the PMI, is also below 50, which signals contraction in the industry. And this is, you know, Bloomberg reports on this, Wall Street Journal reports. Everyone reports on this as a reliable first indicator of how manufacturing is doing. It's not perfect, you know, it's, but over the long term, it's, it's, it's, It's pretty correlated with, you know, government statistics on how manufacturing is doing. And so I'm wondering, where's the alternative statistics? Where are the numbers I'm not seeing that show good news in the manufacturing sector since Trump's tariffs? Where is it?

Well, again, I just gave you a long list of other economic indicators we have that all seem to be holding up quite well. I don't think that there's... They're not. Wait, no, they're not. I mean, like manufacturing, you know, like manufacturing employment. is not doing well. We're not seeing like a rise in manufacturing employment. We're not seeing a rise in manufacturing industrial

production. We're not Right. Right. No, those are just exactly the things I said. I didn't think you would expect to see over the initial months of a policy like this because you need to see, I mean, it literally takes several years to do capital investment and actually build things out.

I think, you know, one thing that really kind of frustrates me in a lot of these discussions is that I think back to the argument from the other side, right? When the argument was, you know, okay, we're going to aggressively expand free trade, we're going to embrace China. And, oh, we got a lot of initial negative results from that, but that's okay. Anybody who focus on those doesn't sort of understand the long run and the way that everybody's going to actually end up better off someday. But then when we go in the other direction and say, hey, actually, you know, reshoring is going to be a process. You have to

shift incentives, there's going to be disruption. Here's the better thing we might build toward. You just kind of get stuck on a podcast with somebody reading you the results of last month's phone survey data. So I do think we have to evaluate a little bit more kind of, well, what were the things that we did or did not expect to happen over the initial months versus what are the things we did or did not expect to happen over several years? And to say that most of the economists' predictions of everything that was going to go wrong initially have have essentially been wrong. I mean, that's not...

What about the data I just read you? What about that? I mean, that was an economist, economist predicted. You know, tariffs would interfere with supply chains, trade in intermediate goods, and this would lead to contraction manufacturing. That's exactly what we're seeing now. Yeah. I don't understand how that prediction has gone wrong.

Yeah, I guess I meant more broadly, everything from, you know, the direction of the dollars, to the performance of the stock market, to the level of retaliation we should expect, there was a sort of consensus model of here's what's going to happen if you impose tariffs and why it's extreme, it's all folly. And that world has not played out. So I do think it's important for those who were sure

they knew exactly what tariffs were going to do because they took Econ 101 to kind of actually step back and recognize that it does seem the world's a little bit more complicated than that. I agree that the world is complicated, and I agree that there's a lot of uncertainty over the impact that tariffs will have. I can also tell you the predictions that I know that economists got most wrong are about the direction of the dollar.

That is one prediction that went the opposite way. However, I do think that if we're talking about, you know, important effects of tariffs, the effect on manufacturing has got to be an important one. you know, because the whole idea of tariffs, of Trump's tariffs, you know, maybe not Biden's tariffs, but the whole idea of Trump's tariffs is that this is going to lead to a renaissance in manufacturing. And I understand that, yes, in five years you could see something different. And if that's the argument, if that's what we're placing our hopes on, then let's be explicit about that. Let's say we expect to see short-term pain for long-term gain.

But I will say that economists predicted pain in the manufacturing sector, and that's exactly what all the data are showing us now. Yeah, I've been extremely explicit throughout in discussing tariffs that there is short-term pain associated in various axes. I think, frankly, I'm surprised that we haven't seen more passed through to consumer prices than we've seen. I would certainly expect to see an impact there as well, and that the long-term gain here, a few minutes ago, we said, I said, I would expect to see this over the long-term

term. You said how long? I think I said three to five years. That's, I think, a reasonable range in which to expect to actually see a manufacturing sector that is performing differently. I think the good news is that there are other dimensions on which we should see things sooner, capital investment, construction, and so forth are going to be a leading indicator of that. But I'm not sure who out there was saying, like, if you impose tariffs, then like, manufacturing, manufacturing employment will magically materialize in factories that haven't been built yet. Maybe someone was saying that, but it seems a little bit unfair to take that as the pro-tariff argument when it's obviously not the actual basis on which the argument is made.

But I'm saying that economists were right about the problems in the manufacturing sector that we're now seeing, like it was a correct prediction by economists. That sentiment would turn down in the initial months? that I'm not sure that anyone gave a month timeline for it, but the idea that this would be generally bad for manufacturing would cause a contraction in the sector. That's what we're seeing. And we know the mechanism by which this happens,

which is disruption of intermediate goods trade. And there is obviously, you can't go ahead, Eric. I think Orrin is saying that, are acknowledging that there would be some short-term pain for long-term gain, Noah, as you described it. I think he's also acknowledging that, it's saying that, feel free to edit this,

that, yeah, it does make sense that economists predicted some sort of, you know, decrease in employment because the factors haven't been built yet, et cetera, but you're also saying, hey, economists didn't get right what would happen in the broader market and with the dollar, to which Noah also sort of acknowledged, especially the part around the dollar.

Feel free to edit any of that characterization. I have a broader question for both of you, which is, what would cause you to change change your mind about the long run? You know, what would need to happen or occur such that you have a different view of sort of what is the long-term effects of these tariffs? Well, I think for me, as I was saying, the sort of intermediate question that I'm most interested in is what happens to capital investment.

At the end of the day, the sort of sequence of events that you're trying to influence with tariffs is to induce relatively more capital investment domestically to expand domestic production capacity. I think if we see that, and frankly, in a lot of ways that that was already at elevated levels because of other things that Noah and I agree on, like the Chips Act that I've often highlighted was dollar for dollar an extremely effective way to start boosting investment. If we start to see those kinds of investments now in other sectors of the economy also if we see that at a sustained elevated level over an extended period of time, that would be the kind of over the next year to three years sign that this is actually doing what we want it to do. And then the benefit that we would get

if it actually works out is that we would see then in the longer run a significant expansion of manufacturing capacity. We would see that in output. We would see that in. Output, we would see that in in manufacturing as a share of GDP, we would see that in employment. And then in a lot of ways, what I'm most concerned about if it's working, we need to see it in the productivity data. Because manufacturing productivity has actually been falling

over the past decade, which is a huge problem. And so if we are actually seeing investment in a renewed and revitalized manufacturing sector, that absolutely is going to be, and we better expect, will be much more automated than the kind of manufacturing

we've had in the past, that should show up in the productivity data as well. So I have another question here, which is that you've often talked about what you see is the shortcomings of economics, you know, as a discipline for predicting the effects of tariffs, you know, in economic policy in general. When you're predicting the effects of tariffs, what do you rely on? How do you make those predictions? Do you have, some theories, do you have some, you know, other countries' examples are going on historical examples, some other discipline like sociology, or perhaps just some stuff you thought of on your own? Like, where are your predictions coming from?

Well, I guess I'm happy to answer that in detail. I want to, I figured, know, that you were going to touch on the prior question also, but I'll just add. What's the prior question, sir? Oh, it was basically, and then let's circle back to Noah's question after this, but yeah, Noah, let's hear your take on what would cause you to be excited about the long run for tariff? Like what would need to change or you need to see for you to be like, oh, actually, you know, it's actually having a long run positive effect. Boom in manufacturing investment, for sure. If we see that, if we see the U.S. manufacturing sector actually get revitalized in a major way, that'll be exciting. So far, we're seeing the opposite. And if that turns around, that's a lot.

some point, that'll be great. Imagine a world in which it does turn around. What needs to happen for that to happen? Oh, you mean what I think would actually cause that to happen? I think one thing would be industrial policy. I also think that in terms of tariffs, we should have essentially entirely free trade with allies. I think that that would be a wise thing to do because, you know, Japanese manufacturing

and European manufacturing don't actually threaten America. In fact, we gain much more. more from pooling our markets so that we can attain scale similar to what China enjoys, because China is pretty much the only competitive threat we face, and which all our allies are facing at the same time, and we're fighting with our allies instead of pooling our resources to stand up to China. But that's a bit of a sidetrack for me right there. I wrote about all these things pretty extensively during the Biden years,

and I thought this is what we ought to be doing. But I think industrial policy is a big missing piece. And also there are various capacity-building policies like infrastructure, you know, education, you know, we train manufacturing workforce. One really reliable thing we see is when we have like really good vocational schools, you get better factories, just train people to work in factories. Tim Bartick has done a lot of work on that. And then, yeah, pretty much, I think that it's pretty clear what to do to affect a manufacturing

revival right now. So one of the big indicators that I look at is factory construction. And factory construction has to be adjusted for the price of building new factories because we don't want to just, you know, make a chart of inflation, right? But when you look at factory construction, real, real factory construction, you saw this enormous, you saw it basically flat at a flat level for decades and decades at a fairly low level. Then you saw this enormous boom during the Biden years. And all the factories concentrated in the areas where Biden's industrial policy was, you know, sort of incentivizing factories, chips, batteries, batteries, and other things like that. Just this enormous boom.

And now, since Trump got into office, you've seen that boom go into reverse. You're seeing the pace of new factory construction falling since, quote-unquote, liberation day. And that's a bad sign to me, but I accepted that in five years we may see something else. I'm just, sorry, genuinely curious, which, because that was when I mentioned,

I'm very interested to see in August what the Q2 factory construction data looks like, what data is out there already on that? It's called total construction spending on manufacturing in the United States. And you can look at that on Fred. You can look at that anywhere, and it shows the, you know, just in dollars, right?

You can also look at a percent of GDP if you want, but I prefer to look at in dollars. And then you have the producer price index for new industrial building construction is the price of factory construction. PPI for new industrial building construction. And you can see that under Biden, this, you know, just increased a huge amount. And then under Trump, it has decreased a bit so far. And we'll see if it keeps decreasing. But it's a, to me,

that's a bad sign so far. Okay. Yeah. I mean, I think the, I would just echo some of what, you know, what, what Noah had just said about some of these other factors that, that I think are really important as well because, you know, I think both in terms of what it takes on tariff policy, if you really want these tariffs to work, stability and certainty is incredibly important. And this is a criticism I've had of the Trump tariff since the beginning, that if what matters is not what people think the tariffs are going to be this week versus next week, what matters is if people actually believe these are what the tariffs are going to be three years from now, when the investments would start to pay off or not. And so that's where I think both sort of stability in the

tariffs, ideally needing to actually legislate some of this instead of having it both subject to legal challenges and a lot of changes in executive orders are both really important. And then as Noah said, I think the industrial policy side, I think the workforce side is, is incredibly important as well. So, you know, if, if, as we've been talking about, if you ask me, do I think tariffs are an important positive step toward reshoring manufacturing, I would say, yes, absolutely. If the question is, you know, how far are we toward the policy package that's going to get us maximum bang for our buck? I would say there's, there's certainly a lot of work still to do. And, you know, and that maybe connects then to knows other question about sort of, well,

how do you evaluate these things? And, you know, in my mind, I think the way, the right way to evaluate them is, I think a lot of the frameworks that economics provides us in terms of thinking about incentives, particularly thinking at the margin and so forth, are exactly the right way to assess economic policy. I think where economics as a discipline has really gone off the rails is in over-reliance on a set of assumptions that don't necessarily hold and then overreliance on a set of models that sort of requires those assumptions.

And so, you know, this is where I think we've seen, frankly, a lot of very bad forecasts come out of, for instance, the prediction that, you know, free trade with China will benefit American workers and will be making and selling more to them than ever before and so on and so forth. when that sort of assumed a certain policy environment in China that did not exist. And so I think, you know, in a sense, the right perspective is to look at things from the perspective of a business owner.

Look at it from the perspective of capital and ask, what are the best opportunities to earn a lot of money? I mean, this goes all the way back to Adam Smith and the wealth of nations and the invisible hand, where his argument about the invisible hand is not that this kind of somehow automatically works by magic. His argument is that if you actually have incentives aligned, and in fact, the first one he lists is if you have people preferring to invest domestically over investing overseas, then their pursuit of private profit will also advance the public interest. And so for me, for me, the question is, what are the incentives for people pursuing private profit? And if we have policies that make the incentive to offshore, to, you know, try to bring in cheaper labor, to try to use financial markets to kind of extract additional capital out of firms, then those are the things that people will do. And so at the margin, I think we have to ask are the policies that we're pursuing ones that are pushing incentives in better directions or putting them in worse directions? So let's go back to this idea of where you get these ideas.

You know, like the idea that tariffs will do this and that to help manufacturing. Where does this idea come from? Where did you get this? Did you just sit there and think common sense-wise? It makes it sort of sound legit? Or, you know, are you using an analogy to say America's early growth in the, you know, 1800s when we had high tariffs? and just sort of saying, well, we grew fast then and we had high tariffs then, so high tariffs will increase growth now.

Or where do you get this idea that tariffs will help manufacturing and the incomes and prosperity of the average American? Well, I guess there are a few ways to answer that question. I mean, I think one, as you noted, there have certainly been times in the past when we have used a much more. robust tariff agenda, and conversely, our decision to drop tariffs and forego them has conversely produced a lot of the things that I think we've been a lot less happy with. You know, I think if you look at somebody like Paul Samuelson's work, I often point out that in his seminal textbook, economics, he kind of goes through the arguments for and against tariffs. And, basically at the end of day acknowledges that any country could pursue a beggar thy neighbor's

strategy. And it, you know, I mean, I'm sure there's a whole field of kind of optimal tariff theory, but that the core case for the United States to embrace free trade, and Fred Bergston makes the same point in the 70s isn't actually an economic case. It's a foreign policy case. And so, you know, I think you can also. look at the policies of a lot of other countries around the world today that have obviously had a lot of success promoting manufacturing and industry. And they certainly tend to do it in a more

protectionist way. And so, I mean, I guess it seems to me there are a lot of signals all pointing in the same direction. I might ask you kind of the converse, what would be the reason to believe that, you know, free trade with, certainly with a country like China was going to be good for our manufacturing sector? Well, I don't necessarily know people who did predict that because I was a kid. And when I look back at economics papers on the topic, I don't see much like there, I don't see many, you know, economic papers saying free trade with China will be good for the manufacturing sector specifically.

But then is the implication that tariffs on China would be better at the manufacturing sector? What I'm saying is that I don't know. So when you're asking me to justify the supposed predictions of people, I don't know who made those predictions. And so I don't know economic models that do predict that. For example, if you take the dumbest, simplest, econ 101 model of trade in existence, which is, you know, the comparative advantage model, of David Ricardo, that would predict that trade with China would be bad for our manufacturing sector because the idea is if China special, you know, has comparative advantage in manufacturing, we have compared to advantage in services, you know, or maybe agriculture, I don't know,

we'll trade the things that we're good at for the things they're good at. It's not a very smart model. It's, you know, pretty basic. It describes some things that happen, but not a lot of things. Right. And then if you use a sort of a slightly more advanced model called the Hexor-Lean model, which predicts, you know, that capital-intensive countries like America will do capital-intensive things, labor-intensive countries like China in the 1990s and 2000s, will do labor-intensive things. That predicts that we'll lose lots of manufacturing jobs to China.

So those basic models would predict that the U.S. manufacturing sector, or at least U.S. manufacturing employment, would do poorly in the face of China due to free trade with China, but that America overall would become enriched because of other effects in the service industry, in other industries. And so when you're talking about these predictions that free trade with China would be beneficial for a man. manufacturing sector, I have to say, I don't know where they are. I don't know who made them. I don't know

why they would have made them. Yeah. I guess I'm and I guess I'm just making the point more sort of thinking about as a counterfactual. We could either take the view that yes, tariffs are probably helpful in in protecting a manufacturing sector or know they're counterproductive. And you were sort of asking me, you know, why would you believe that these things help? And I'm saying, well, I think there are a lot of sources that that would point to them potentially helping. What I'm less clear on is what is the argument from the other side? What is the argument that, no, actually, if you have, you know, that we should get rid of our tariffs to help the manufacturing sector. Because presumably one or the other has to be true. Either tariffs are good for the manufacturing

sector or tariffs are bad for the manufacturing sector. I'm suggesting they're good for the manufacturing sector. I took you to be saying you think they're bad for the manufacturing sector, but I'm not sure that's where it breaks down for me, right? Because at least vis-a-vis China, as you were just saying, I don't know who is saying they're bad for the manufacturing sector. So tariffs, whether tariffs on China could have been used to help the U.S. manufacturing sector in the face of Chinese competition in the 90s or especially the 2000s when the China shock

happened. Whether that's true, I don't know any analysis of that. There's definitely reasons why tariffs would have hurt the manufacturing sector, and there's reasons why it could have helped. For example, if you had used tariffs as a kind of bargaining tool to force China to stop undervaluing the yuan, which it did to a significant degree in the 2000s, that might be. I'd worked. In fact, I think we should have done that. But then notice that that's using tariffs not as a policy in and of itself whose direct effects encourage manufacturing, but as a sort of bludgeon, a tool, you know, a threat, a tool of economic warfare to force China to stop doing something that harms our manufacturing sector. And the best outcome would have been us using the threat of tariffs to

force China to not undervalue the yuan, but then not actually falling through the threat because the threat worked. So I think when you look at Paul Samuelson's, you know, work on strategic trade, he talks about this, basically, using the, you know, threats of something that would harm, you know, game theory, right? Something that would harm both countries, but harm them more than us. Right. Using the threat of that, but not the actual thing because the threat works. Right. And so I think that, so using tariffs as a threat and using tariffs as an actual policy, you know, protectionist policy to, like, grow our own manufacturing industry. behind protectionist walls, which is the thing lots of people talk about, which Alexander Hamilton

certainly did talk about, those are two very different things. And so I think, you know, if you're asking me what would I personally have gone back and done if I could do the 2000s over again, I would have said, threatening China into not undervaluing the currency would have been a good idea for our manufacturing industry and for us in general. But that doesn't mean that tariffs are a policy that, if actually implemented, help manufacturing. But surely you can't use tariffs as a credible threat unless you're willing to actually impose them. I mean... That's right.

The idea is they hurt us, but they hurt them more. And so that's why they are a credible threat in the strategic trade idea. Right. So if we... But it hurts ourselves. It hurts us. But if we take China today, which clearly is not sort of playing by any of the rules of free trade and shows no openness or... willingness to do so, how then are we supposed to react to that in your framework?

Well, so the idea of game theory is that actors are rational and that if you have a credible threat, the threat doesn't need to be used in equilibrium because if you make the threat, then the other person will back down because they're rational actors who give a best response to a best response, right? So, however, if you have irrational actors and you make a threat to harm them by, you know, double the amount they harm us, but to harm both people,

and then you end up carrying through in the threat, the fact is everybody gets hurt. And even if they get hurt more, you know, in a war, that's what you want. You know, in a war, you take casualties in order to inflict greater casualties upon the enemy. If we're looking at economics as a war, where hurting China is more important than helping ourselves get rich

or have higher living standards, more prosperity or whatever, then fine. That's certainly an argument you can make. But if we're talking about helping our manufacturing sector, helping our people's living standards in general, hurting them double the amount we hurt us is not a particularly attractive proposition, as I see it. People realize, you know, Americans, you know,

they don't think of trade with China as like a war. We're hurting them is more important than helping us. They just want stuff. You know, they want prosperity. And I think so far, you know, the short-term effects of tariffs have been bad. And again, if we're going to say stay the course five years, ten years, you know, eventually things will get better. Okay. But that's what the communist said.

And it didn't end up working down. Edit this is wrong. But my understanding of your view was that you were more sympathetic and maybe even in support of some targeted tariffs towards China, but that the tariffs towards our allies to. just didn't make any sense. Is that right? Exactly. That's right. And the reason is very simple to explain. It's the reason of scale.

Now, there is a, you won't get this in Econ 101 or even 102, but you will get this from Paul Krugman's Nobel Prize winning work, where he talks about the importance of scale for manufacturing industries, and for industry in general, but manufacturing is the most important industry that this works for. Whereas the more stuff you can sell, the more units you can make, the lower your costs go. So if you can make, you know, a million cars, you can make cars a lot more cheaply

than if you only make 10,000 cars. The more you can make, the more, the better you get at making stuff. Now, China has unprecedented internal scale because there are a country four times the size of America, right? So they can make just tons of units of stuff. America can't match that with just our domestic market. We can pay more per car,

but in terms of the scaling effects, the scaling effects depend on how much, much you make, you know, how many things, how many cars roll off your assembly line. And we are just such a small country compared to them or one quarter of their size. This is like us trying to match China is like Germany trying to match us. You know, Germany can make really high quality stuff, but they can't match us volume for volume. And so they'll never be able to get the scaling just from only their internal market that we get. And so that's why Germany focused on exports, experts, exports. So what we need to do is find some other countries where we can say,

our manufacturers get scale from exporting to you, and your manufacturers get scale from exporting to us, and we both get scale. And then we have this mutually beneficial agreement to scale our manufacturing industries such that we're not playing only in this tiny domestic market, such that we have a large market too, so we can compete with the Chinese because we can match them for scale. Now, the only way to do that, given our small size, is to get other countries to pool their market with us so we can get scale. We need Europe and Japan and Korea and maybe India, which is the biggest country of them all, to partner with us so that we can scale. But that requires some reciprocity, right? We need to have our manufacturers be able to scale by using their markets, but their manufacturers also need to be

able to scale by using our markets. And then, as Krugman showed, we make, you know, our manufacturers and their manufacturers make similar things, but slightly different things. slightly different versions of the same things. We'll make Harleys, they'll make Kawasaki. So then competition happens by differentiation. That's fundamental to Krugman's model, and it's what we actually see in, for example, U.S.-Japan trade. We make broadly similar stuff, but not exactly the same, and both can flourish. So that's drawing from advanced economic theory, not the basic stuff you get in Mekon 101. That's what I would do to resist Chinese manufacturing. I would get scale by pooling our markets with our friends. And if you look at what,

example, Elon Musk has said, Elon Musk said, we need a complete free trade zone with Europe so that we can all scale. Now, if there's one American who actually does know about manufacturing, it's Elon Musk, and who's the only entrepreneur has been able to successfully scale manufacturing in America, you know, even in the face of international competition. And it's been pretty incredible because its supply chains are far more domestically sourced than most manufacturers. But when he says, we ought to combine our markets with, Europe's market so that we can all scale together, he's, that's directly out of Krugman's theory. it's directly out of lived experience in manufacturing. So that's what I would do.

And then, you know, penalize China. I mean, I should say I agree with almost all of that and would like to see that as the American trade strategy. I think the concern I would have is that, you know, those three countries that I think don't are rightly focused on, Germany, Japan, and Korea, you know, relative to their GDP, our trade imbalance with them is, as large as it is with China.

You know, when you describe Germany's strategy as export, export, export, that is, of course, Japan's strategy and Korea's strategy. Certainly vis-by the U.S., vis-a-vis the U.S. And so, I mean, just talking about the size of the trade balance and goods between the U.S. and Japan, you know, Japan in turn imports from a – certainly a lot from China and others. But it seems to me a fundamental problem that the U.S. is dealing with in ideally constructing that sort of trade model is that these key countries that we want to be our allies and scale are themselves pursuing this kind of export and export and export but don't import model. And that's why I think it was very interesting to see the EU in the start of the agreement that they've been announcing with the U.S. you heard the EU Lears say quite explicitly,

you know, we acknowledge that we are going to have to do some rebalancing here. So I don't know, I mean, Noah, maybe you just disagree that there is an imbalance there, but it seems to me that as we move toward that model that you're describing, if it is going to work for the U.S., there is going to have to be a significant shift in the behavior of these trading partners. Right. Okay, so I actually have an important response to this, which is something I think that almost everyone in,

in these trade policy discussions gets wrong, which is they focus on net instead of gross exports. So let me give you a concrete example here. If we export zero to Germany and Germany exports zero to us and then we go to exporting $10 billion to Germany and Germany goes to exporting $12 billion to us, we have opened a trade deficit with Germany, right? We now have a $2 billion trade deficit,

but our exports have gone up by $10 billion. And this is a good outcome for us because it allows our exporters to scale, scale, scale, because what matters is the gross amount, not the net amount. People focus obsessively on the trade deficits and surpluses, on the imbalances, on the net amount. But basically, if our, and of course only the people watching on video can see this, but if, you know, here's Germany, here's us,

if they both grow and Germany grows a little bit more, that's actually a good outcome, even though we have a trade deficit from the perspective of scaling our manufacturing, and, of course, increasing GDP. But scaling our manufacturing industries and getting manufacturing power, the deficits and surpluses matter less than a total market size available to our manufacturers. And so I think we, you know, obviously trade deficits are always a sore spot because people

have an inherent sense of fairness and they worry about this stuff. And that's fine. I understand that. We need negotiations and we can try to rectify those things. It's complicated because there's also financial effects on trade deficits so it gets hard. We can talk about that later, how to fix trade deficits. But if you're just, I think the more important effect is the gross, the total, the total amount of exporting that we're able to do. You know, and so in that sense, trade between us and Europe is positive sum without trade, you know, being balanced.

Like, trade is positive sum. And I'm not talking about comparative advantage, you know, your standard econ 101 stuff, right? I'm talking about advanced Paul Krugman stuff. I'm talking about what Elon talks about. I'm talking about just manufacturing and scale. scale, scale economies. And I'm saying the total amount we export to these allies is more important than the delta at the edge.

Right. But it seems to me that that assumes that the active trade itself is somehow expanding total demand for manufactured goods. Right, it is. But certainly not by one-to-one. I mean, if we talk about cars as an example, and you ask, like, in which case does U.S. car manufacturers have a bigger market in the zero-zero case or when the U.S. is exporting 10 billion of cars to Germany, but Germany is exporting 12 billion of cars to the U.S., unless you've created an extra $2 billion of demand for cars, you've just reduced U.S. car sales, right?

So if, no, well, I mean, the point is that you do, so if you, if we export 10, if we export 10 billion dollars worth of cars to Germany, I'll talk in numbers, but I'll talk in dollars, but let's assume it's all the same price. Okay. Of course. So if we export 10 billion more to Germany and Germany exports 12 billion to us, right? And, you know, so then what matters for, for the total amount of cars we can make, that our manufacturers can make, is whether the induced reduction in domestic sales is larger than the induced increase in exports to Germany. So if Germany exports 12 billion cars to us and our domestic car sales go down by 6 billion, let's say, right?

Our domestic car sales go down by 6 billion, our exports go up by 10 billion. Our total car manufacturing has gone up by 4 billion, even though Germany's, even though we're running, a trade deficit and Germany's car exports to us have destroyed some domestic demand for American-made cars. But the amount they destroyed was not sufficient to balance out the amount our exports gained. Right. And so the point is that when you have two countries and they start trading, does the number of cars that people consume go up, absolutely. does it go up by more than the number of cars, you know, than the imbalance, then the trade

deficit? Pardon? Why does the number of cars? Oh, because cars are just, because cars are cheaper. Because remember, we're scaling, scaling, scaling, that allows us to make cars more cheaply. And when cars are cheaper, people buy more, you get that second car, that third car for your family.

And even people who don't own a car could now have a car. You can also get more expensive cars, but that's another story. But scaling, just in terms of scaling, if we drive those costs down by increasing the size of the market, then people are buying a lot more cars overall. And so if you look at vehicle ownership in America, you know, during the time that Detroit was facing this incredible competitive pressure, right? like you actually saw Americans buying more cars and you saw people in these other countries buying more cars and then you know. But you also definitely saw a decline in demand

for the American-made cars, right? You saw a decline in domestic demand for the American-made car. No, total. Right? But if you look at GM total vehicle production. While you're looking at up, let me just make two related points.

One is that this strikes me as a classic example of what goes wrong in our economics dialogues. Oh, yeah. GM sales were going up and up and up. Yeah. Total sale, even despite the competitive pressure from Japan, from Germany, GM's, you know, total global sales were going up. No, no, domestic production in American factories. Domestic production in American factories.

That's final assembly, by the way. You know, you've also got to look at computer production. But, yes, total output. If you look at total manufacturing output in American auto industry. It seems to me there are two problems here. One is that, you see, we have the intuitive view that if you have a trade deficit, that's probably bad for domestic producers. You have the seemingly thoughtful and nuanced economist view that, no, no, no, we have to focus

on gross, not net, because we're expanding the pie. And then you realize that, well, actually, that was relying on a bunch of assumptions about expansion in total demand and so forth, which aren't necessarily actually true. And here in particular, I would highlight in the aggregate, they are definitely not true. And the way that we know they're not true is just by looking at the trajectory of U.S. industrial output, which has essentially flatlined since 2007. Since 2007, that's right. But during the time of the China shock, it didn't actually flatline, it actually rose.

Yeah, there was still a period of increase there. But if we're talking about... That's during the time when we lost the most jobs to China. Oh, I agree there were a number of different things going on. I'm just talking about in the actual trajectory of the American manufacturing base, it is not that demand for manufactured goods suddenly fell off. It is that virtually all of the increase in demand that historically a substantial share would have gone to domestic production has instead gone to imports. And so that huge trade, hang on, so that huge trade deficit we see does, fact map directly to a decline in domestic output. And that's the thing that people are,

I think, rightly quite concerned about. But if you look at when our trade deficit was big, so our trade deficit was much bigger before 2008 and then shrank dramatically after 2008. However, that's true. That's just a fact. Our trade deficit shrank enormously after 2008. However, that is when our manufacturing productivity flatlined, okay, and that is when our industrial output flatlined is after 2008. Okay? Now, when we're looking at, you know, the 90s and the 2000s, this era of hyper-globalization, we see industrial output rising, manufacturing, productivity rising, but we see the biggest trade deficits we've ever had. So that's a big fly in the ointment of your thesis. The timing there just doesn't line up at all for this sort of naive idea that trade deficits destroy U.S. manufacturing.

Now, when I'm looking at, you know, I searched and found an Economic Policy Institute report on the U.S. auto industry, and I see a chart reproduced from Gould's Bean, Kruger, 2015, showing seasonally adjusted lightweight U.S. vehicle sales. okay, and I'm seeing an increase over the course of the 80s and 90s. And, you know, employment fell here, but output appears to have risen and risen as you got, you know, robots and machine tools and stuff like that. But U.S. manufacturing grew and grew during the era of hyperglobalization. and during the increase in competition from Germany and Japan in the 80s, and even during the initial increase of competition from China

and the new Asian industrialized countries in the 90s and 2000s, our manufacturing even grew a little bit during the China shock when our manufacturing employment fell. Our industrial production actually rose a bit, and that was during this era when trade deficits were much larger than now. That timing doesn't fit the naive story that, that we're dealing with, the trade is a zero-sum game,

and that trade deficits destroy American manufacturing output. It just doesn't line up. And so I think this is a case when, you know, actually thinking about the economic ideas deeply is a little more helpful in explaining some of these patterns than simply doing the common sense thing of saying, well, you know, we're selling 10 to them, they're selling 12 to us, we're losing,

and therefore a manufacturing industry must be getting destroyed. And that said, I do think trade deficits present a problem. If they're too large, if they're for the wrong reasons, if we're just borrowing to consume, it's a short-termist consumption loan, basically, that we don't need. So I do think trade deficits are a problem, and also it violates people's innate sense of fairness and reciprocity. So I think that when we have trade with allies, we should work to make sure trade imbalances are minimized. How would you do that? How would I do that?

Yeah. Oh, just negotiations say, you know what? We'll open our markets to you if you help us rectify some of these imbalances. But what if our markets already open and that, in fact, is contributing to the imbalance? I mean, what? Well, we can offer a lot of other incentives to these countries. So, but there's tons of other stuff we should offer. Yeah.

I just want to understand the logic is, okay, so we agree their imbalances. We agree that's a problem. We could defend them militarily. Well, it seems to me we've been doing that. Right. We could say, all right, we'll step up our commitment to your defense if you help us do this. Or we'll, you know, various other things. You know, our markets, you know.

This fascinates me, right? Because it seems to me that we're like, if you think about, okay, what the Trump administration posture has been. Are you giggling because you're imagining a world of free trade between the U.S. and its allies and you're very enticed by the possibility of the scale this would offer our manufacturers? No, I love those things. I'm giggling because it is an interesting inversion of what we are seeing happening today

where the Trump administration argument is, wait a minute, we have an extraordinarily open market, we have been defending these countries, and the result has been these imbalances. If we are going to sit down and negotiate with them over that, know exactly to your earlier point about game theory, we should use market access and our commitment to their defense as tools to force them into a position that we like better. And based on everything you'd said up until the last minute or two of the discussion, that would seem to me to be

a position very consistent with your views. But then when we got to the point of actually saying, great, what should we do about Europe? It was sort of like, well, what else can we bribe them with? Can we offer them even more market access? Can we promise to spend even more on their defense? And I'm just not sure why that's the approach we would take. I don't know. So if we're saying that we're going to use the threat of tariffs to establish a free trade zone,

you know, that's – but that because of game theory, because the idea that actors are rational and we won't have to use the threats and hurt both us and our allies, you know, if that's the idea, then I have to say, well, it's not really a credible threat. It's only a credible threat if we're nuts. You know, the idea that we would hurt ourselves and China, you know, the idea that we would use tariffs as a threat against China, a country that, you know, we wouldn't mind seeing

taken down a peg, seems rational to me because you could use that as a credible threat. If we follow through and hurt China more than we hurt ourselves, that's a problem. that's a credible threat. But hurting Japan and Europe more than we hurt ourselves, but hurting both of us, actually just lets China win. So it doesn't seem like a credible threat to me. I don't feel like putting, first of all, it doesn't seem like a credible threat,

so this doesn't seem like a good negotiating tactic to me, because if we go through with the tariffs, as we currently are going through with many of those tariffs, not all of them, but 15% or something on our allies, okay, if we go through with that, even as we surrender to China, but that's another story. Even if, you know, if we go through with that, okay, it just means China wins. And so it's not a credible threat.

So that's my first point in response to this idea. The second point is if this is your argument, we're back in the realm of tariffs are bad, but they're a good threat because we're threatening to shoot ourselves in the foot, you know, in order to get this free trade equilibrium that we like. So the idea is tariffs are bad, you know, free trade is good with our allies, but we need tariffs. We need tariffs as this tool to threaten them to sort of, you know, get to free trade with allies through the back door. That's very different than saying behind these sheltering protective walls, American manufacturing will regrow because economists don't know what the fuck they're talking about. And so those are two important points.

The fact that this is a non-credible threat and the fact that that. that tariffs as a threat are different than tariffs as a long-term actual policy, and we appear to be doing the latter. So those are two important counter arguments, I think, to what you're saying here. Yeah, I guess I would just say on the first point, first of all, it apparently, at least at the moment, is a credible threat. I mean, the administration is using it, and I think certainly the reporting on the EU negotiation indicates that they were quite frustrated by how credible the threat. was and the extent to which it therefore forced them to make a lot of concessions. I do think the sort of other way of looking at it, which is like, well, the U.S. has to kind of first and foremost be thinking about everybody's well-being so these other countries can

adopt policies that really are beggar thy neighbor and, you know, we can't do anything about it. That was certainly the kind of post-World War II we must preside over a liberal world order argument, I don't know how much it makes, how much sense it makes now, given the costs that the U.S. is sustaining under the status quo. And so I do think the negotiations are, it is not as sort of clear-cut a game theory as you were describing. And then on the second point, I would just say it's interesting and quite satisfying, perhaps, to the extent to which we are landing in a very similar place at the end of this, which is, you know, my view about certainly the so-called

reciprocal tariffs and the way the administration has spoken about the reciprocal tariffs is that they, in fact, see them as negotiating leverage, and their goal was to strive deals with these countries, but to have these countries commit to balance trade. I mean, that was quite explicitly you go, but, you know, I think Stephen Mirren's remarks on this, the Hudson Institute are clearest. We seem to agree that tariffs on China do make sense and that our relationship with China. Not all, but tariffs on, I would say, strategic industries with China. I don't think we, you know, need tariffs on Chinese clothes because if China makes clothes, that's not a national security threat to us. Okay, but that China is sort of a...

Toys. I don't give a shit if China makes our toys. Let them make toys. I think that's fine. And I think there remains a balance question there and a question of sort of what core inputs still do and don't matter to us. But point being, China is sort of in a separate category. I think maybe where we would probably end up disagreeing the most is on the question of a sort of baseline tariff. And that's where, you know, my view has always been that a baseline tariff on the order of 10% is a sort of skewing. of the playing field in international trade

in a way that helpfully reflects a preference for domestic production and that if you could do it in a way that actually had long-term certainty and predictability and if you could actually also then use it as a revenue source which meant that relatively speaking

you also need less revenue from elsewhere that it would be a very good element of what is otherwise a quite skewere global trading system. And so, you know, that's sort of how I look at it. I think, you know, certainly we don't agree on all the pieces of it, but it seems to be there are a piece of it that we do agree on and also that the intuition of those who are pushing for this kind of approach, myself included, I think there's a lot to debate, but also

that it is not the kind of, you know, baseless and unfounded and incoherent way of thinking of things that it sometimes gets presented. Assuming tariff policy gets pretty much continued and that we have somewhere around the 15 to 20% tariffs that we're going for right now. Suppose that continues. And suppose our manufacturing sector continues to not flourish. Manufacturing investment continues to weaken and deteriorate. Manufacturing orders continue to weaken and deteriorate. at what point how many years will it take for you to say oh maybe i should have read an economics paper or two maybe economics isn't all just hooey and bullshit you know maybe the economists were on to something how many years must i wait for you to sort of update your ideas there assuming that all that

continues yeah i think it's an unfortunate way to end the conversation given that we both know that I've read lots of economics papers on these topics. I was being, you know, figurative. Yeah, well, you also wrote a very long substack that wasn't at all figurative making the same accusation. So I don't think that's a constructive way to conduct the conversation. On the substance of the question,

what I would say is that I think we need a year or two to see whether or not you actually get the investment response. Secondly, and related to that, I think it's very important to see whether you get the useful accompanying policies. That is, if what people are saying is we really want to invest, but we can't because of workforce, we do need to actually address the workforce stuff. If a couple of years from now you are not seeing the investment response and either we can't do the workforce stuff or for political economy reasons, it is not feasible for us to do that stuff,

then I would be the first to admit this is apparently not an effective strategy. for pushing toward reshorring. Got it. Well, that seems reasonable to me. Eric, take it away. No, I was going to ask if any of you wanted a last word, but I feel like this has been a constructive conversation as someone who's not an expert in these topics.

I feel like being able to hear the discussion and debate kind of in real time and understand both positions better has been edifying, and I really appreciate you guys coming on and having a discussion. This was a lot of fun. Thank you for having me. Thanks for listening to the A16Z podcast. If you enjoy the episode, let us know by leaving a review at rate thispodcast.com

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