The Agenda with Steve Paikin (Audio) - Will the Gaza Ceasefire Work?

Episode Date: June 19, 2024

The long-awaited ceasefire plan announced by President Biden for what he called a ,durable end to the war, between Hamas and Israel has brought some hope for an end to hostilities. For more on what this ceasefire proposal means for Israelis and Palestinians, Benjamin Netanyahu's future as prime minister, and the geopolitical implications for the region, we welcome: Hussein Ibish (Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington); Bessma Momani (University of Waterloo), and Janice Stein (University of Toronto).See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

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has brought some hope for an end to hostilities. For more on what this ceasefire proposal means for Israelis and Palestinians, Benjamin Netanyahu's future as Prime Minister, and the geopolitical implications for the region, we welcome. In Washington, D.C., Hussein Ibbish, senior resident scholar at the Arab Gulf States Institute in D.C. In Waterloo, Ontario, Besma Momani, professor of political science at the University of Waterloo and senior fellow at CIGI, the Center for International Governance Innovation. And here in our studio, Janice Stein, the Bellsburg professor of conflict management and founding director of the Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy at the University of Toronto. Janice, great to have you

back in that chair. And to our friends, Hussein and Besma, it's great to have you back on the program as well. Let me just do this quickly here off the top, reminding everybody what's in this plan so far. Three phases. Phase one would involve an initial six-week ceasefire when Hamas would release some of the hostages, including women, the elderly, and the sick or wounded, in exchange for Israel releasing an undefined number of Palestinian prisoners. There would also be a withdrawal of Israeli forces, quote, from all populated areas of Gaza and a surge in humanitarian assistance. Then to phase two, which would see all remaining living hostages released and the withdrawal of all Israeli forces from Gaza as part of, quote, a permanent cessation of hostilities, but the latter would still be subject to further negotiations. And then phase

three, where the remains of any dead hostages would be returned and a major reconstruction plan for Gaza would commence. Okay, let's get into this. Basma, how has Hamas responded to this so-called deal? Well, it's hard to tell. I mean, you know, in some media, it says that, you know, Hamas agreed to it, but waiting on the Israelis. And then I think in Western media, we get the impression that Hamas has rejected the deal. So it's really not clear. But I think what's interesting about this is it's the same deal that we've seen on the table for several months now. And we've even seen Biden come out on his own several weeks ago

claiming that this is an Israeli deal, only for it to be pretty much put down by most Israeli leaders yet again. So I think it's not clear. And there's so much, you know, unclear messages that are happening at this time. And it's not, to my knowledge, abundantly, you know, I'm using the word clear too much, but I'm sorry, it really just is, it's just not clear, who is the real hesitant party here to sign a deal. And I think it comes down to the reality that for most actors involved, they don't have an interest in having a deal. They very much want this war to continue.

And I think that's really the underlying problem. Hussein, we know that the Secretary of State for the United States, Anthony Blinken, has said Israel has accepted the proposal, Hamas has not. President Joe Biden has said Hamas is the biggest stumbling block to an agreement on this ceasefire so far. In your view, should we take that at face value? No, I don't think so. Biden also said this was an Israeli proposal. And then, as I said, Netanyahu came out very clearly and said,

no, I'm not accepting anything other than maybe phase one. But the whole thing, you know, it not accepting anything other than maybe phase one. But the whole thing, you know, it depends on phase one leading to phase two and leading to phase three. The thing Biden said, it was designed to end the war. Netanyahu said the war is going to continue until some unspecified, undefined and probably undefinable goals, certainly unachievable goals, are reached. undefinable goals certainly unachievable goals are reached so you know i i mean at this point i think israel's clearly rejected hamas also though honestly has said yes and no in the same way israel has said yes and no neither is giving an absolutely hard no but neither saying yes and i think best is absolutely right that there's there's Netanyahu has a personal and political interest in keeping this war going to remain prime minister. Even Joe Biden has basically accepted that in public.

I think Hamas thinks it's winning. I think Hamas thinks everything is going to plan, at least the Hamas leaders in Gaza. There may be a split, I think there is one, between the leaders, the more militant leaders in Gaza and some of the external leaders who are alarmed and unsettled by what's happening. But I think the internal leaders think this is exactly what we wanted, and especially because the insurgency that they were hoping for is starting in places like Gaza City and Jabalia and places like that, where they were supposedly eradicated. And all of a sudden you see these attacks starting. And I think that's the kind of war that Hamas was really looking forward to.

And once it begins, Israel is going to find itself trapped there. And that's the scenario I think Hamas was looking for. Janice, those three phases as outlined in the introduction, are they, in your view, the basis of an end to this thing? Well, the real difficulty, if we get above the noise of what we call dead cat diplomacy, and that's what we're seeing, a wonderful phrase. What does it mean? What is dead cat diplomacy? The whole goal is to make sure the

dead cat is on the other side's door. So neither country is willing to come out and say no first. They want the other one to say no. And that's what's going on clearly between Hamas and Israel right now. And here's the essence of the dispute. Hamas says, I want a permanent end to this war. That is my overall goal. I want this war over because surviving the war is a victory, as Hussein just said. For Netanyahu, the goal has to be, I want those hostages back. And the argument is, what comes first and what faces. In Hamas's fantasy, Israel withdraws from the Gaza Strip entirely, and then the hostages are released.

In Netanyahu's fantasy, all the hostages are home, and then he'll decide whether this war is going to go on or not. So underneath all this noise, I don't think Hamas wants an end to the war. And I think they think they're winning not only because there is an insurgency, because how big that insurgency will be, how damaging is yet, it's hard to predict, but because the damage to Israel internationally is so massive that in fact it's a victory even were there not to be an insert Israel's unquestionably losing the public relations no question

about it and the damage is enormous and more is yet to come so it's from that perspective that you know yes and more allegedly said well we have two in correspondence we have Israel exactly where we want it. If you think time is on your side, you don't make a deal. And Netanyahu thinks time is on his side because he's going to run against Biden in the next Israeli election. Well, before we get there, we've got to get a better understanding, Besma, I think, of what's going on in domestic Israeli politics right now, starting with the prime minister recently dissolving the war cabinet that was tasked with prosecuting this war. Give us some understanding of why that happened.

Well, I mean, I think, you know, those who have been following Israeli politics and the inside drama, there's been a lot of disagreement within the cabinet, certainly. But I think what we need to take away from this and what I think I'd like to impart is that this is a very, very radicalized cabinet. The far right in Israel has gotten stronger and stronger, and they are increasingly the loudest voices. And I would even say, I mean, if you just look at public opinion polling within the country, we've seen an absolute turn to the right. I mean mean there's almost sad to say no more peaceniks left it's really hard to find uh the so-called left in existence anymore and what we're seeing

i think in terms of this cabinet now um and just yesterday i mean you know it was really quite startling um to see smart talk about you know if we need to wipe out gaza and to completely remove the entire population through immigration i mean there is no shortage of statements of ethnic cleansing being said today about Gaza. And I think that really stands out. And that's, of course, going to be the basis of what might be, you know, a cause or the accusation of genocide against the Israelis because of all of these statements that are being made by the far right. I mean, the challenge, of course, throughout history in Israeli politics is that often those far right parties, even though they're extremely small and they're not the majority, but they just have a way through basically having to prop up these governments that can't win a majority.

Basically, they become the swing makers. And this is what we see today in Israel. And I think it's really time for us to open our eyes and that this is this is a very different Israel today. What's coming out of that government is extremely troubling and very, very much to the far right. Janice, I just want you to pick up on that quickly in as much as I don't know if people understand. Try and imagine if Justin Trudeau had a cabinet and there were 10 different parties represented in that cabinet. Yeah. Right. That's what's going on in Israel right now. You haven't got one party governing. You've got one prime minister trying to keep 10 different parties happy. Well, there is a Likud party, which is a traditional right party, center right party.

But to the right of the Likud party are two particular parties. One, which is a religious party, and the other, which is a far-right nationalist party. Now, those, here's the, I think, ominous signs that the reason a war cabinet was created, and Benny Gantz, who is the, I would say, centre, if that exists. Opposition leader. Opposition leader. The

leader of the largest opposition party went in, was in fact to shut out those two far right-wing parties from making decisions during the war. So whatever they said, it didn't matter. They didn't have their fingers on the levers. He walked away from that cabinet because the political dynamics of staying in in the absence of what he thinks rightly is a complete lack of strategy are just too damaging. And so that now reestablishes the existing security cabinet in which those two right wing parties are present at the table in terms of decisions. I think from that perspective, the moment's passed for the Biden deal. I truly think it's dead cat diplomacy. I'm going to get Hussein to comment first on this clip that was posted on ex-Prime Minister Netanyahu with some strong words for his closest ally, the United States. Sheldon, roll it if you would. When Secretary Blinken was recently hereeldon, roll it if you would.

When Secretary Blinken was recently here in Israel, we had a candid conversation. I said I deeply appreciated the support the U.S. has given Israel from the beginning of the war. But I also said something else. I said it's inconceivable that in the past few months, the administration has been withholding weapons and ammunitions to Israel. Israel, America's closest ally, fighting for its life, fighting against Iran and our other common enemies. Secretary Blinken assured me that the administration is working day and night to remove these bottlenecks.

I certainly hope that's the case. It should be the case. During World War II, Churchill told the United States, give us the tools, we'll do the job. And I say, give us the tools and we'll finish the job a lot faster. Okay, Hussein, let me get your take on how the prime minister is supposed to negotiate a situation where on the one hand, he's trying to make nice with the United States. And on the other hand, as our other two guests have suggested, he's got some of the most right-wing figures in Israeli history that he has to keep inside the tent as well. How do you do both those things?

It's very hard. And you sort of need to be the kind of political magician that Netanyahu has shown himself to be in the past. And I'll give you an example of how he's managing it. There was a recent announcement by the Israeli military that there would be daytime pauses in military attacks in Rafah. And Netanyahu said, I didn't know anything about that. I was out of the loop.

Now, on the one hand, he gets to say to the United States, look, I'm trying to address the humanitarian issue. We're doing pauses. On the other hand, he says to other Israelis and to his cabinet colleagues, oh, you know, I have nothing to do with this. This is the military. I'll talk to them. Don't worry about it. So he has this way of kind of playing both sides against the middle.

He's very good at it. both sides against the middle he's very good at and there is a fundamental contradiction between where israel is going in terms of its self-image how do israelis imagine their their society what do they think of when they imagine the word israel and it it really is starting in the big majority now to to normatively include most of the West Bank or all of it, on the one hand, and then American interests on the other hand. American interests don't include annexation and probable expulsion of Palestinians from the West Bank. And since Israel is on a fast train in that direction, and you can see the contradiction showing up in the future of the war in Gaza, where Biden is saying it's time for the war to end.

And Netanyahu is saying, in effect, this is no time for this war to end. And as a matter of fact, I have no idea when it might end. You can see the contradiction growing in very large proportions. growing in very large proportions. Janice, I know that many months ago when you were on this program, we were talking about some of the constitutional reforms that the Netanyahu government wanted to make. And I suggested to you that the prime minister's political career had been predicted to be over so many times. He was like a cat with nine lives. I said, what life's he on now? You said his 10th. And that was many, many months ago. So what life's he on now?

You know, as Hussein rightly said, I think so many of us, including me at some point during this war, have predicted that his back was against the wall. And it's not a reasonable argument to make when you look at the growing thousands and the size of the crowds are growing in the streets, which is something we often miss in the middle of all this noise that are actually calling for an end to the war because they want the

hostages released. That's why. And for the end of his prime ministership and for elections, you look at that, you look at how furious the Biden administration is. It's been angry, but now it's furious after that clip that you showed us, Steve. I'm amazed that it took them that long to get furious, frankly. So the combination of an international domestic pincer movement would be enough to finish most people off. Well, you look at this,

and the experts are betting that his whole goal is to stay in office until November. He's made a huge bet on a Trump presidency. I thought Trump didn't like him. Trump is still mad at him because he called Biden to congratulate Biden in winning the election three and a half years ago. He did, but you notice the invitation that Mike Johnson gave him to come and address.

The speaker, yeah, he's going to address Congress. In July, I think actually this is a misread of Trump, but this is the bet that Netanyahu has made this time. Let's talk shifting alliances here. And Bess, I'll go to you first on this. To what extent do you think the war in Gaza has realigned who the key players are in the Middle East right now? Well, somewhat. I mean, certainly I think it's elevated the regional power of the Saudis, undoubtedly, and shifting away from the United Arab Emirates. And that's partly because the Saudis feel like they have a big carrot still, which is normalization with Israel. And in many ways, I think they're looking at the UAE as though they made a mistake.

They normalized with the Israelis, a lot of fanfare, and that bought them nothing in terms of persuasive power over the Israelis to stop this war against Gaza. And so I think they're going to hold out. They're going to hold out to the last moment. I think those who, and including myself, perhaps misread Mohammed bin Salman, thinking he would sign the minute that his father passed. I think that's actually looking less and less likely because of October 7th. And now what we're going to see is the Saudis holding out. And what they're asking

from the Americans is immense. Everything from a security pact to also a civilian nuclear program. I mean, it's pretty high stakes for them. And I think that's really the biggest takeaway. The challenge, I think, with some of the other parties in the region is just that they're facing their own challenges. I mean, Sisi in Egypt might have looked a bit strong because he's able to be an important interlocutor in the whole sort of getting humanitarian aid into Gaza. But the reality is the country is suffering economically and immensely at the moment and doesn't really have a lot of clout regionally as a result.

So I really think it's the Saudis at most. Iran and a little bit in some way has been able to, of course. And we think we need to talk about Hezbollah and Lebanon, because that really is, I think, where... We'll get to there in a second. I'm going to go to Hussein on that in a second. But let me follow up, actually, with Hussein on the Abraham Accord partners right now. We do remember under the Donald Trump administration, the Abraham Accords were signed. Egypt, Jordan, the Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco, they all now have ties with Israel that they heretofore had not had. What is the status of that relationship now that this war has gone on so long? It's holding steady because it brought, especially for the UAE and Bahrain,

which were the two main countries that were involved in the Abraham Accord framework, bilateral relations with Israel has brought a lot of benefits, and they were relatively satisfied with the benefits that they got. They found that they've been able to manage the public opinion blowback, even though it's been difficult, and so steady as she goes, but they're not expanding to East Israel in an aggressive way or in a fast-track way, but they're not pulling back either. And that's basically where it is.

I think all eyes are on Saudi Arabia, as Besma was saying. Okay, now let me go to Janice on the issue Besma brought up, which is we certainly have been hearing the most about the war in Gaza. What we are what we're hearing more about lately, but what has also been going on is a second front in this war up in the north between Hezbollah operating out of Lebanon and the Israeli Defense Forces operating in the north of Israel. And there are hundreds of rockets coming out of Lebanon towards Israel in that time. If there's a ceasefire in Gaza, and I know you don't like the odds on that, but if there is,

would you anticipate a ratcheting it up of that second front? No, I think it would be the reverse. If there were a ceasefire in Gaza, I think it's overwhelmingly in the interests of Hezbollah not to escalate at this point and that is because there's a long-standing pattern here that Iran this is the forward defense Forces for Iran it is their most effective deterrent weapon against Israel is Hezbollah because it could inflict So much damage by orders of magnitude on the infrastructure and civilian population inside Israel. It's a very effective deterrent, frankly. And Iran does not want to sacrifice that deterrent. So were there to be a ceasefire, and Hezbollah has said explicitly, were there to be a ceasefire

in Israel, the leadership, there would not be a war, and that, I think, both sides would stand down. The problem is, of course, that the prospects of a ceasefire are grim. The prospects for, we should say this, the prospects for winding down the intensity of the fighting in Gaza are, on the other hand, very likely for the wrong reasons, but they are nevertheless. I think it's a matter of weeks, a month, until the pace of fighting in Gaza drops. And that may take some of the heat out of the situation. But if it doesn't, we are on a Gaza, as horrific as it is, would pale in comparison to what we would see

if an all-out war broke out between Hezbollah and Israel. Let me get Besma on that. The northern Lebanese-Israeli border, do you see a second front developing there regardless of what happens in Gaza? It's possible. Every day looks more and more likely, partly because there has been so much tit for tat on this so-called blue line between these two countries. And I think in many ways there is a rationale, particularly on the Israeli side, that we need to finish all of our so-called enemies surrounding us. And as we all know, the northern part of Israel currently is evac you know, evacuated and people want to go back and their school's starting. So there's even some rumors within the Israeli, I would say, media that this is the desire of Netanyahu at the moment. And some interpreting that, in fact, Netanyahu's, you know, call to Washington to supply him with more arms or not to hold back is foreshadowing, suggesting that they want to open a front with the Lebanese. Again, I think it would be absolutely disastrous, more so, I think, for the Israelis. Lebanon, or I should say Hezbollah in particular, has 200,000

perhaps long-range missiles. I think it would absolutely be a disaster for the Israelis, and it would be very painful for Lebanon. That is without a doubt. And that, again, is a country that is teetering on the edge of economic collapse. And that's what's holding, I think, Hezbollah back, ironically, is that it can't afford to have a Lebanese public against it at the moment when it is already teetering on economic collapse. Well, OK, let me follow up with Hussein on that, because I did read something in The New York Times the other day about the fact that perhaps some of the voices not quoted as often in Gaza are those who believe that Hamas has led the local Palestinian population into untold misery because of the October 7th attack and what they knew would be the blowback from Israel thereafter. OK, play that same scenario

out on the Lebanese-Israeli border. What do you think people in southern Lebanon are thinking right now about the potential of Hezbollah ratcheting up attacks there and Israel responding in kind? Well, it's not just southern Lebanon, it's all of Lebanon. And I completely agree with Basma. Hezbollah doesn't have a leg to stand on in terms of willfully launching an aggressive war against Israel in terms of Lebanese public opinion.

And they have to operate within the Lebanese context, right? They don't exist in a vacuum. They do tend to try to do what they want, but they can't afford to have the whole country infuriated with them. That's one of the main reasons. That plus the fact that Iran does not want to spend its regional trump card on a place that's fairly irrelevant strategically and culturally and religiously to them like Gaza, and an unreliable ally in Hamas. Hamas is a Sunni fundamentalist party, and it broke with the Iranian alliance during the Syrian civil war. So they've got no interest in doing this.

But I do think that there are people in Israel, including the defense ministry of Galant and the national security advisor, Tzahi Hanegbi, who are thinking along the lines of, yes, let's finish all our enemies. along the lines of yes let's finish all our enemies but they're also hoping maybe for a recuperative victory for israel a clear-cut win in lebanon which is not available in gaza that would be the height of folly i obviously there's a lot of people in israel who don't agree with that the biden administration has given a hard no to it so it hasn't happened but I do think it's Israel that has been it was accelerating and and escalating at every stage on the Lebanese border and if there is a war it's going to be because Israel decides it must have one Hezbollah definitely doesn't want one at the under current circumstances at all Jan, you want to comment on that last part?

No, you know, other than just to say this is a really dangerous moment at a time when there is deep fatigue in the Biden administration among the senior advisors around the president who are pessimistic. And, you know, they share blame across the board here. They spread it. It is not focused only on one party, but they are deeply pessimistic about the capacity to get an agreement in the near term.

Okay, let me jump in here for a second, because we're down to the last couple of minutes, and I do want to get you on the G7 meeting that just took place and how unified or not you think Western leaders are on what ought to be done next. You know, the G7 meeting bit the low-hanging fruit, right? Easy to say, every one of them, that we support the Biden administration, we support a peace plan, and we support a ceasefire. Do they support Netanyahu being taken to the International

Criminal Court? No, there is real division around the International Criminal Court. There's no question about it. And the leader of Hamas, I should say. They wanted... Yes, yes. Calls out for both of them. But I think there's, you know, states are signatories to the court and Hamas does not qualify. And so there's a built-in asymmetry there. And you saw it in our own government, which was a founder of the court and has a deep attachment to it. I think it's very uncomfortable with the decision,

despite the public record. And I think it's uncomfortable with the timing. You know, there really is something quite remarkable about a prosecutor going on CNN, your competitor network, to announce that they are seeking warrants which have not yet been approved by the judges. I mean, it is unprecedented. Most international legal experts will acknowledge that.

And it raises a larger issue. What is working for what here? and most international legal experts will acknowledge that. And it raises a larger issue. What is working for what here? There is a built-in trade-off sometimes between justice and peace, unfortunately, as much as people don't like to talk about that. And when there was a real push for the ceasefire, what I can tell you is the frustration inside the Biden administration

and what Karim Khan did when he did it was through the roof. That is separate from their issues with the court. They were livid that he intervened in that way at that time. Esma, I've got 30 seconds left. Do you see any hope for any stability in the short term in the region? No. There's your short answer, unfortunately.

That seems to be where everybody is. Hussein, yeah, you agree? Yeah. Yes. I agree. That's three for three. We're a long way from the finish line here. We're a long way from the finish line. Gotcha. That's right. Okay. Well, that's a sad place to leave this, but I do want to thank the three of you for your expertise. You're always so good to us and taking our calls to come in and help us understand what is arguably the worst place in the world right now. Yeah. Hussein Ibbish, senior resident scholar at the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington. Besma Momani, University of Waterloo and CG in Waterloo.

Janice Stein, once again, back at the head of the Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy at the university of toronto thanks to the three of you much appreciated thank you thank you the agenda with steve pakin is made possible through generous philanthropic contributions from viewers like you thank you for supporting tvo's journalism