The Ancients - Battle of Artemisium

Episode Date: August 23, 2020

Around this time 2,499 years ago the famous Battle of Thermopylae was raging. But it is important to remember that this clash was not happening on its own. At the same time, to the east of Leonidas' defence, another battle was underway at sea between Xerxes' great armada and a much smaller Hellenic fleet plagued with internal problems. This was the Battle of Artemisium, an often-overlooked and overshadowed military encounter of the Persian Wars. Its importance, however, was sizeable. I was delighted to have Dr Owen Rees back on the show to talk through this clash, explaining its significance and how it paved the way for one of the most famous naval battles in history: Salamis. Owen is the author of 'Great Naval Battles of the Ancient Greek World.'This episode is the second in a small series covering 4 key clashes of 480 BC, the 2,499th anniversaries of which we are celebrating this year. Some mildly-strong language.

Hi, I'm Tristan Hughes, and if you would like the Ancient ad-free, get early access and bonus episodes, sign up to History Hit. With a History Hit subscription, you can also watch hundreds of hours of original documentaries, including my recent documentary all about Petra and the Nabataeans, and enjoy a new release every week. Sign up now by visiting historyhit.com slash subscribe. by visiting historyhit.com slash subscribe. 2,499 years ago, around this time of the year, the Battle of Thermopylae was raging. But it is important to remember that this clash was not happening in isolation. At the same time as Leonidas, his 300 or so Spartans,

and the rest of his Greek allies were fighting at the hot gates, there was another vital clash occurring to the east on the sea. Now this was the Battle of Artemisium. It is often overlooked, it is often overshadowed by the Battle of Thermopylae and to be honest it is often forgotten as one of the great clashes of 480 BC during the Persian War. But as you will find out in this podcast, it was vitally important. It was significant in the defence at Thermopylae, but also in the events that followed. Now, joining me to talk through this battle is Owen Rees. Owen has recently been on the podcast talking about

combat trauma. That was a fascinating chat and you can find it in the recent string of podcasts released on the ancients. And it was great to have him back to talk through what happened at the Battle of Artemisium. Here's Owen. Owen, it is great to have you back on the show. Welcome back. Thank you very much. I'm really looking forward to coming back. I enjoyed being on here last time. Well, brilliant. That is very good to hear to start this off. So we're talking about the Bastavata Museum today. Of course, one of those clashes of the Persian War, but it's often overlooked as a naval engagement, but still vitally important. war, but it's often overlooked as a naval engagement, but still vitally important.

Yeah, yeah. I mean, obviously, if you talk to people about Greek naval warfare, or, you know, the naval encounters during the Persian wars, or anything, really, if you talk about naval warfare, ancient Greeks, people's mind immediately goes to Salamis, which people don't really consider as part of a longer naval campaign. It's not the first battle at sea. It's not the first, well, it's not actually a decisive battle, but it's certainly not the first decisive battle during this period, if we can use that term. So yeah, Artemisium deserves a place, it deserves a mention. And also, it is part of really big stories of the Persian Wars, stories that people know and don't realise Artemisium is part of. So I've mentioned Salamis, and of course, the other one is the Battle of Thermopylae.

Now, if you watch the film 300, you would be mistaken of thinking that there is no naval engagement that goes on at the exact same time. But there certainly was, and that is the Battle of Artemisium. So yeah, I'm really excited to be able to actually spend a bit of time talking about it and uh talking about its importance now first of all looking at the sources for this clash is herodotus our main source for the battle of artemisium yeah he is he certainly is our main source we can kind of supplement him with later sources um so for instance deodorus of Sicily mentions relevant aspects to the battle and to the campaign. And of course, there is Plutarch's life of Themistocles. Themistocles, the Athenian commander of sorts, great naval mind of the period. He actually has

his entire, he has his own biography written by Plutarch. Plutarch, writing many centuries later, sort of first, second century AD, but a fastidious researcher. He had access to sources we don't have access to. So he likes to embellish, but we can use that to kind of build a more colourful picture of Artemisium, shall we say. Brilliant.

Well, let's have a look at the background to the clash first, because Xerxes, the Persian king, he has amassed a huge fleet to accompany his land invasion of the Greek mainland. Yeah, I'm glad you mentioned his fleet before you mentioned his land force. People obsess over the size of his army. It's kind of like, oh, there's a million men and women and children and donkeys marching across Asia and Europe and an army of 300,000 strong, if you believe the over-exaggerations of Herodotus. And no one really focuses on the enormous flotilla he is said to accumulate. As with all numbers, especially in Herodotus, take these with a pinch of salt.

The idea being these are big numbers. So he is said to have brought together, just in terms of warships, so we're talking the trireme, 1,207, I think it is, triremes, which is phenomenal size. And he has in support of that another 3,000 vessels. We're not told specifically what. Presumably that would be logistics. If you think you're marching, quote unquote, a million people throughout Greece, you're going to need huge logistical support. And this is one of the major roles of the Navy. No land force goes anywhere without a naval support with it for obvious logistical reasons. So we're talking

enormous numbers. So enormous. And also why we should take this with a pinch of salt. You do not hear of an armada or a flotilla like this in European history until D-Day. D-Day's numbers, you know, the landing of the D-Day beaches, which brought in, you know, huge forces from the US and Britain, et cetera. Only like a hundred odd more warships,

only maybe 500 to a thousand more support ships, you know, not considerably larger than Xerxes' armada, allegedly. So if he's done this, if he's actually done this, this is a hell of an achievement. You may have guessed I'm a little sceptical of these numbers, but, you know, it just kind of gives you an idea. He was capable of calling upon the largest land empire, the Mediterranean in particular, I'd ever known. And as a result, his fleet was, comparatively to the Greeks, absolutely enormous. And where do these ships largely come from in the Persian Empire?

All over, really. So the Persian Empire is, of course, not this monoglot, monocultural place. The Persians themselves only make up a small number of their own army. A solid number, don't get me wrong, but a small number of their own army. They bring their forces from all over the empire. So in terms of navy, they call upon three really strong naval traditions. Persians or the Persian court, that kind of central focal point of the Persians, are well aware of their own limitations. So they call

upon the expertise of those they know are better. Now in the Persian empire, they can call upon three. Egypt, the Greeks themselves, and in the Mediterranean, and that is the Phoenicians. We are told categorically by Herodotus that the Phoenician ships at Artemisium, at Salamis, in the Mediterranean during this period, is the Phoenicians that are the fastest, and it is the Phoenicians that are the best. And he even includes the Athenians in that assessment. Phoenicians are superior to everyone else. This is made clear from the best. And he even includes the Athenians in that assessment. Phoenicians are superior to everyone else. This is made clear from the beginning. I mean, that's amazing when you consider the resources that Xerxes has at his disposal for his fleet. As you mentioned, the sailors, the sailors of the Mediterranean, the Phoenicians,

at his disposal. Yeah, absolutely. I mean, this is perfect. Often Xerxes is described or sort of portrayed in European literature and European sources as like an idiot. And, you know, just this kind of petulant child doesn't know what he's doing.

And it's just not true. He can often, you know, use a sledgehammer to crack a walnut sometimes. That doesn't make him an idiot. That makes him someone who's aware of the resources he has around him and he's aware how to efficiently deal with a problem. Whether it's his bridging of the Hellespont, whether it's he builds a freaking

canal to get around a promontory in the north of Greece because there are storms around there normally. He's thought these things through. um so yeah so he calls upon the greatest naval traditions in the mediterranean at his disposal and also because of the size of his empire because of the system his empire is built in is made up of he can reliably assume that they are able to produce enough ships this is the great limitation the greeks are always faced with it's all well and good having thousands and thousands of sailors. You need enough wood to build a ship. This is a serious problem for the Greeks throughout the entire classical period.

How do you get enough wood to do this? The Persians do not have this problem because ultimately it is not their problem. The Egyptians can solve their problem. The Phoenicians can solve their problem. The Ionian Greeks can solve their problem. If he centralised this, the Persians going, right, we've got to build 1,200 ships. Good luck with that. But broken up throughout the empire, this becomes achievable. From what you were saying earlier, I guess it also emphasises, just like

Sicily at this time as well, when the Greeks were fighting the Carthaginians, it wasn't just Greeks versus Carthaginians with the Greeks versus theinians. It wasn't just Greeks versus Carthaginians. With the Greeks versus the Persians, it wasn't just Greeks versus the Persian Empire. There were Greeks fighting on the Persian side too. Yes, this is where we need to start ignoring the popular conception of the Persian Wars, which was the Greeks standing for freedom and unity against these evil barbarians to the east. First of all, that conceptualization of the Persians is deluded. And secondly, the majority of the Greeks did not fight on the Greek side. You're talking even in terms of the land battles, you're talking maybe 30 Greek city-states, polis, as they're called. If you

include all the land battles, you have about 30 fight on the side of the Greeks, when there's roughly a thousand poleis to choose from. This is not the entire Greek people coming together. It's just not true. And even at Artemisium, we see a collective Greek force come together, but it's only 14 city-states, 14 city-states, to help support the land battle at Thermopylae. This is not what we envisage. This is not the Hellenic people. These are groups. These are small numbers in terms of political entities. So let's get on to the road to Artemisium now. You mentioned the Greeks just then and the preparations for the Bast of Artemisium. What do the Greeks do when they hear that Xerxes is amassing this powerful armada to march on the mainland of Greece?

What we get is a sense that the Greeks are aware that a large force and a large armada are coming. What they don't know is how big it is. They just know it's pretty damn big. So you have this original plan, which is to try and not stop the Persian land force to the north of Greece, but to basically attempt to resist it. Originally, 10,000 get sent up almost to Mount Olympus, and go, oh damn, that's a large army and actually retreat. And so Thermopylae is the second place they choose to make a stand with decidedly less men, but ignore that. So the idea of a Greek naval force going north was always to support the land force. So if you're going to send a land force up to somewhere like Thermopylae

and they're going to try and make a stand, this could go on for a small amount of time. You've got obvious logistical necessities. The army can't exactly move to get food, etc. So you need support by sea. But also there is the fear that the Persian naval force could board some of their ships with soldiers, come round Thermopylae and attack the Greeks from the rear. You could literally just bypass it by sea. So that was

always a concern. So a Greek naval force had to go north. Then the question was, how many do you send? Athens at this point has the largest naval force of the Greeks, but they're only building it, really. Themistocles, it's only a couple of years, 480s, only a couple of years after Themistocles has tried to convince the Athenians to start building a proper naval force. So, you know, they built like 200 tritons, which to a small state like Athens is enormous. To go and face 1200 ships of the Persians is stupid. So, of course, it always had to be a collective force. But ultimately, if Athens is at the head of shipbuilding and it's only got around about 1,200-ish,

this gives you an idea of how limited the Greek force is. However, they still managed to muster up over 270 triremes all in total. 271, I think you add up Herodotus' actual numbers, and you kind of think, okay, 271, that's quite a fair number. It's roughly the same number that they send to Salamis as well, give or take. But the makeup of that force, of the 271, 127 are Athenian. Some of them are Athenian built, but are manned by the Plataeans, who can't afford to build their own ships, because these things are expensive. Never forget, these things are expensive. And they actually also give 20 more ships to the city state of Chalcis. So again, you add 20 on to the 127. So you're now looking at 147 of the 271 triremes were entirely built by the Athenians.

That's half the force. And in addition to that, of course, you had the other city-states put forward. As I said, there were 14 in total. The Spartans do send a naval force as well. They send the grand total of 10 ships. The Spartans throughout this period, throughout this year, are very reluctant to get that involved. Even when you think of the great stand at Thermopylae, not a lot of Spartans actually go. They're very reluctant to get involved. That's also true on a naval basis. So 271 ships, half are Athenian or Athenian built. So 271 ships, half are Athenian or Athenian built. Sparta sent 10.

But Sparta also gets the honor of having the commander named, which is the man called Eurybides. So Eurybides, the Spartan, is the commander of the entire fleet, which is a bit weird when you consider, as I've said numerous times, that the Athenians have supplied half of it. But interestingly, the conversation occurred, who should lead the fleet? And when the Athenians said it should be us,

there was almost a mini-mutiny. They said, it can't be you. It must be the Spartans. The Spartans must have the command. And if you push for this, the rest of the fleet will leave. So coming back to my original point about the work made polis, Greek unity, there is not a lot of this going on right now. This is how much on a knife edge these decisions are. This is how just a slight wind of change and everything would be different.

If Athens pushed for command, everything would be over. So Athens had to step away. Themistocles himself, who then becomes the great hero of Greece in the future, has to basically bite his tongue and go, okay, fair enough. Euribides can have command. I mean, this multi-city state navy, from what you're saying, it sounds like the unity was hanging very much by a single thread. Oh, yes, it certainly was. Put this in perspective, there was a naval battle before this one, actually a few years before, during the Ionian Revolt. So there was a Greek allied fleet that fought a Persian fleet at the Battle of Lade, which is just off the coast of modern-day Turkey. So this is 494 BC. And actually, it was a larger fleet than at Artemisium,

and it was a larger fleet than at Salamis. It's the largest allied Greek fleet of this century. And the Athenians aren't particularly involved. Actually, it's mostly the Ionian states that are involved. Remember, Ionians, big maritime tradition. And actually, they could hold their own. We're told that when the Persian fleet, which is roughly twice the size, see the Greek fleet, they actually consider leaving because of how kind of intimidating it is, how large it looked, even though they outnumbered it, they had great respect for the Ionian maritime tradition. However, the Battle of Lade is entirely lost by the Greeks because as they line up for battle, for the assault, the crews had refused to train the week before because they didn't fancy it. They finally set out their ships for battle, and the ships from Samos, I think it is, immediately sail away in retreat. They were like, no, I don't fancy this. And this is it. So if at any point during Artemisium, any of the contingents decided to do this, the Corinthians, you know, or people from Calchas, you know, any of them decide, no, actually, I don't fancy this. That's it.

The Greek fleet falls apart. So you're absolutely right. Everything here hangs on a thread. Everything is primed to really fail, which makes the entire thing that much more exciting, that much more interesting, and that much more worthy of note. Absolutely. Absolutely. And you mentioned earlier how it works in parallel with the defense at thermopylae so where exactly is artemisium so artemisium is literally straight off the coast so if you if you're at uh on a map with thermopylae uh literally just go east and uh you'll see the uh southern coast of magnesia which is where the persian fleet was moored and then opposite that is

the island of eboea so artemisium is named after the temple of artemis which is at the top of the island and that's where the greeks were stationed one of the better words the distance between the two fleets the distance between the island and the mainland is only like nine miles. So yeah, they're in close proximity and they're also in pretty close proximity to Thermopylae itself. So yeah, that's where they're camped and that's where they're kind of staring off against each other. I mean, topographically wise, the narrowness of that point, it feels like that is the Thermopylae of the sea yes absolutely you're absolutely right in that regard the greeks were very aware of this um they were also very aware that while it was

very narrow the persians were more than capable of still exploiting it so it helped to an extent but the greeks had to still be wary of a long drawn-out battle because if there's a long drawn-out battle the lines between ships starts to spread numbers come into play um as does attrition so yes narrow um certainly useful so it's a lot harder to be encircled but not impossible as we're going to see so useful to an extent but still had its problems uh certainly still had its problems and the pers Persian fleets, you mentioned that it's now, let's say it's facing the Greek force at Artemisium, but of course the Greek force is just this 14 city-states combined together, hanging by a thread.

I'm guessing up to that point, the Persian fleet, it's been playing mainly a logistical role, supplying the army as it makes its way through Thrace and Macedonia and Thessaly. Yeah, that's exactly what it is. So they're just playing a basic logistical role as and when needed. So for instance, when Xerxes famously crosses the Hellespont, a strip of water that connects the Mediterranean to the Black Sea,

he does it by building a bridge. And that bridge is built entirely of ships. So he lines ships up abreast. Herodotus goes into massive detail on the rope that is involved in doing this. So, yeah, so ships are used like this. Of course, famously, the first bridge was destroyed. The ships got broken up, and then he built it again

after allegedly whipping the sea, as you do. But, yeah, you can see how ships are multifunctional. They offer this opportunity for basic logistics. They offer it obviously for carrying of food, carrying of any necessary supplies for animals and the such like. So yeah, all the way around Thrace and down Macedonia. Not an easy voyage. In the 490s, the Persians had attempted something similar and they'd actually lost a lot of their fleet around Mount Athos, sort of towards the north around sort of Chalcedony area. They'd lost a

large part of their fleet to a storm and Xerxes was very aware of this. And as I mentioned earlier, he has a very much sledgehammer approach to these things, but it made sense. So he actually constructed a canal to cut through the land. So basically this storm, because it is very stormy seas around there, he negated that problem. He got rid of it by doing this. So on the one hand, yes, of course they help you logistically. But on the other hand, they themselves bring logistical problems. So there's a lot of give and take and Xerxes has really spent a long time or his commanders and his advisors spent a long time planning this so don't just think of

this as oh you know the ship's just poot all around this is a serious undertaking and you've also got to plan things like um beaching the ships drying out the holes things like this repairing as you go serious investment and gives you an idea of just how important this was to the Persians for their invasion. As they finally make it round Magnesia, they actually are hit by a storm just before they get to their final point, Afotai. They are hit by a storm. They lose 400 ships. So a sizable storm. Frustratingly, for as much as I love Herodotus, he has an annoying habit of not giving us enough detail, 400 ships. And you really want to go, what ships? Were they triremes? Because that affects their fighting force.

Are they logistical ships? Because that affects other things, but not their fighting force. And he doesn't tell us, so we don't really know. So when we talk about the Persian fleet at the battle, we can't really talk in firm numbers. This is one of the many reasons why. So that's how they've got there. They've been hit by this storm, but they are ready. So the Greeks have heard, well, they've obviously seen the storm. They've obviously then got reports that Persians have lost ships. That's exciting. I wonder how many ships they've lost. I wonder how this affects. You've got to think of the morale of the men. This is good news. And that's pretty much the moment where we can start to say

the Battle ofemisium is beginning it does go on for more than one day this is not just three days of battle which mirrors thermopylae but this is actually four or five you know talking almost a week of intelligence of uh planning replanning undoing your plans because they're not working yeah so you've got to think about this don't think about this as a single day, a decisive battle. It's not. It is a sustained campaign. Right. Well, let's go through those days now then. Day one, the opening moves, what happens? Well, day one, or I suppose really day minus one, if you think about it. So what happens is, as I say, the Greeks have received notification about this storm and its effect on the Persian

fleet. Very exciting. What then happens is a very strange moment where the Greeks are obviously putting together their plans. How are we going to deal with the Persians? They've got a lot of things to consider. Are they going to try and face the Persians head on? Do they intend to defeat the Persians outright? Is that actually what they need to do? Is this just hold the position? And very much like Thermopylae, we're not trying to bring an out-and-out victory or a decisive moment because we could lose that. Can we just hold it and reassess? The Persians themselves, considering how on earth do you take out this Greek fleet? It's in the way.

You need to get rid of it. And also, they know it's a sizable Greek fleet. If you take out this Greek fleet, you have basically hamstrung the Greeks because the Persian Empire is powerful and massive because of its successful military campaigns. Its intelligence systems

are very good. It knows what the Greeks are capable of producing. And they know it's not capable of really reproducing this fleet again, if you can destroy it. So you've got that. So the Persians are considering this, but also the Persians have another problem. They know that they outnumber the Greeks sizably. So if you attack the Greeks head on, the Greeks will just sail away, and they know that's going to happen. So they're planning, how are we going to deal with this? As all this is going on, the Greeks notice a very strange sight around the Cape of Magnesia to the east, or the northeast, and it's 15 Persian ships heading

straight towards the Greek position. And the Greeks are kind of watching this bemused. You know, what on earth are they doing? That's just stupid. And basically what's happened is the Persian, the 15 Persian ships are kind of late. So they've been following the mass armada and they've just come a couple of days late. They've probably taken shelter during the storm and now they're just coming round. So they come round the Cape of Magnesia and see a large fleet that is moored in safe land.

So they think that must be our fleet. So that's exactly what happened. They think the Greek fleet is in fact their own. So they're heading towards, and of course, the Greeks just send out a small squadron to take them, first blood to the Greeks kind of thing. And when they capture them, they obviously capture not only the people, not only the ships, but also information. So the crews, the captains bring with them information of just how big the Persian force is. And it's at this point that we realise the Greeks did not know. They knew it was big, but they didn't know the numbers.

And the reason why we know that is because the Greeks immediately panic. Euribides himself basically makes the quick decision, oh, we're going home. Now, this is rather problematic for many many reasons i mean we've talked about why they're there in the first place but in particular the people of your boa uh you know the island itself plead with your bodies please do not abandon this position because we're the next port of call you know they're just going to annihilate all of us and they plead with them and they plead with them and yoururybides, as any good Spartan would, says, no, we don't care about you. We want to go home, which is kind of a thread in

Spartan politics. So the people of Euboea basically realize they can't convince Eurybides to change his mind. So they go to the next best thing. They go to the person who commands the majority of the fleet. They go to Themistocles, the Athenian. And they talk with Themistocles and they try and convince him of this Hellenic identity. They try and convince him of the military importance of it. And they realize that that ain't going to work. So they bribe him. And they bribe him with 30 talents, which is serious money, huge amount of money. And Themistocles, like any good Athenian, accepts the bribe. But of course, as I said, Themistocles accepting the bribe, the Athenians are on side.

That's only half the fleet. You've still got to convince Eurybiades. So Themistocles does this himself. Themistocles goes to Eurybiades and talks with him and convinces him the only way you can convince commanders in this period, he bribes him. So Themistocles was given 30 talents. He bribes Eurybiades with five.

Eurybiades accepts the bribe. We're also told he had to bribe the Corinthians as well. It's kind of an aside. It doesn't make a lot of sense in the narrative, but Corinth had one of the largest contingents within the fleet. Corinth itself was a very sizable maritime force, but also a major rival to Athens for the entire century. So there might be some games going on there, sort of politics at the time of Herodotus writing this book. But it is interesting that he's just bribing Eurybiades does not solve the problem. He also bribes the Corinthian commanders as well. Three talents, done. And then of course, you're left with, what's that? 22

talents left. Well, he keeps that. That's Athenian money. So that's all fine. So yes, technically this is kind of like day minus one of the proceedings. The Greeks have already got hold of a small Persian detachment. They've accumulated more intelligence and now they're starting to make appropriate plans. The Persians are also making their plans. As I said, they knew the Greeks would flee. That was their problem. They knew they had the size advantage, but that doesn't help if the Greeks run away or sail away. So the Persians make a decision. You need to block off the Greek retreat. The Greek retreat was

always going to be down the strait between Euboea and the mainland of Greece, because to go the other way is to be chased, and it was just never going to work. So they always knew that was the way. So the Persians send a detachment of 200 triremes to circumnavigate Yerboa and come into it from the south. So that channel is now entirely cut off. So they send the detachment and they wait. So the Persians are now waiting. As soon as they know that the detachment is all the way into that channel, they've cut off the Greek retreat, the Persians can now attack. Now, if you know the Battle of Thermopylae, it actually sounds quite familiar. The idea of circumnavigating the position to deal with it.

So this is the Persian plan. They're now sitting, wait, and wait for word. The Greeks actually receive an informant. A rogue Greek from the Persian forces, swims the nine miles between the two fleets, so we're told, swims the nine miles and tells them what's happened and tells them about this detachment. Now the Greeks have to react because they know if they don't react quick enough, they're going to be cut off.

So you've got to think about this from the point of view of Eurybides, or Themistocles. You've got this problem. The force in front of you is enormous. How do you fight that head on? You've got to do something because the force is coming up behind you and it's going to cut you off. So what do you do? His first plan was a bit reactionary, and it was that the 200 strong fleets coming around Yilbara is the serious problem. Let's go fight that. Thankfully, he realizes that's a stupid idea because he's going to turn his back on the major Persian force who will then just come and smash them. So he does rethink this and he makes a plan. But his plan would be the following day, shall we say day one proper of the battle.

And his plan relied as much on the time of day as it did on his tactics. Right then, that was a good explanation of the preparation of day minus one. Let's get on to day one. What happens? So day one itself, first things first, you've still got this problem of numbers.

You've still got this problem of attrition. The Greeks believe they could hold their own for a period of time, but they can't let Persian numbers come into play. So we've already talked about the landscape, the seascape as well of the area helps to an extent. It's very narrow. But ultimately, even in a narrow space,

if the Persians can keep putting ships out to sea, the Greeks will just run out of ships before the Persians do. So on a really basic level, this cannot go on for very long. So they decide that they're going to attempt a skirmish. This is what the Greeks plan. We won't fight head on. We'll try and induce a skirmish. More than anything, to gauge Persian commitment to this fight, engage their capabilities. So they decide to do that, but they decide to do it very late in the day. Basically, as night falls, all fighting will stop. So if you fight later in the day, night will fall. You're only out for a couple of hours. If all hell breaks loose and it's all going wrong, you at least have a natural end where you can regroup.

So they sent parts of their fleet out to meet the Persians, and the Persians in turn send out a detachment of their own. So it's not the whole Greek fleet, and it's not the whole Persian fleet. The Persians perform a lovely maneuver where they create a circle. They sail around in a circle, a line of head formation, and it's circling round and round and round the Greeks. This is what I'm saying. Just because it's narrow doesn't mean you can't encircle.

So this is what the Persians do. They create this circle round and round the Greeks, and the Greeks react quickly. When you're being encircled like this in trireme warfare, you perform a maneuver called the kouklos, which literally just means circle. So the Greeks turn their ships around

and form up in a circle with their rams pointing outwards, almost like a hedgehog. The idea being that you can't be picked off by these encircling ships going round and round and round. The Persians,

no doubt anticipated this is a normal thing to occur. And so what their tactic is, is as they circle round this hedgehog, they tighten the circle more and more. They keep tightening it, keep tightening it. And then the idea is that the hedgehog starts to crash into itself and they start to destroy themselves. And then you pick them off afterwards you know so there are two tactical games at play here and the question is whose nerve will hold out the greeks have to wait they have to pick their time they have to work in unison if they do not work in unison this fails if they do not act quick enough this fails so they've obviously used a

signaling method probably flags um to create the circle. And now they're waiting carefully for Uribides, presumably, to give the next order. And the next order is very dramatic and explosive. As the flag goes up, every single ship basically erupts from the circle and they shoot out in every direction. And what this does is it causes absolute pandemonium in the persian fleet as basically uh their the side of their ships are now just being crashed into by these basically massive battering rams on the sea it causes absolute chaos it is just uh the fighting is predominantly ship on ship.

We don't hear much about the Marines. We don't hear about hand to hand. This is just ramming, splintering of wood, the bending of all, and the Greeks win the day. They take 30 ships as prisoner. They get to bring them back to the island. A huge morale boost for the Greeks. It wasn't really the skirmish that the Greeks had

planned, but there's no question they had properly drawn first blood. Morale was theirs. This was their victory for that day. And that's sort of the end of day one, sort of sizing each other up, almost like two boxes throwing jabs. And accidentally one jab hit rather well and the large persian is on the is on the mat getting a short count you know uh does it matter for anything probably not but just imagine how you know the greeks on the mainland who are watching imagine the rowers the sailors the marines what this means to them day one and they've already taken 30 ships today, 15 ships yesterday. That's 45 ships already taken. I mean, absolutely. And that increasing morale must be such a significant factor that we sometimes overlook. And when you were mentioning those tactical manoeuvres, that circle breaking

out all at the same time, in a time way before radio, as you said, possibly using flags to signal each other, That's an extraordinary tactical thing to do in the heat of a naval battle. Yes, it's phenomenal. It's one of the great kind of mysteries of ancient naval warfare, which is how do they communicate? And of course, I talk about flags. You could also do it by sound, presumably, but there's not a lot of detail on this. So historians often speculate. But you've got an immediate problem. If you think of a land battle, and you think about one side of a Greek phalanx to the other side of a Greek phalanx, what actually is that distance? When you think thousands and thousands and thousands of men, what actually is that distance? A land battle could be a couple of

kilometers wide, if not more, realistically, depending on what's going on, depending on if it's sort of an Alexander kind of battle or a Spartan battle or whoever it is. Roman battlefields are even bigger. When it comes to naval warfare, this grows exponentially because ships need distance between themselves. So actually, if you've got a single line of ships, line abreast, and say you've got 300 ships,

and 300 ships need a turning circle of however many meters, you add all that up and you think, actually, that's a really long distance between one ship and the two ends of the flanks, shall we say. This is phenomenal. I actually was at a talk where someone went through the logistics of this and just how big the distances involved are, and we just don't really comprehend them. So when I say there's a flag, there's no telescope or anything like that to help see that

flag. So you're not talking intricate flag systems like we see in the golden age of British naval traditions, Trafalgar and things like that. Nothing as intricate as that. You're probably talking one flag, two flag at most, but it's enough. It's enough to give the basic order, which is time to do this, time to do that. Presumably this would be prearranged. So once this flag goes up the first time, it means this. When you see the flag second time, it means this. Nothing too intricate, but enough, as you say say to do quite intricate maneuvers for the technology of the day absolutely so day one a victory for the greeks a moral victory for well for the united city-state force of 14 city-states let's just say it like that day two what happens next day two is a day of um i'm sorry if people get bored of this but it's a day of

logistics and it's a day of intelligence um so day two day two starts with them um through the night actually um a huge storm comes and the two forces around artemisium aren't particularly affected by it they're obviously you know anchored down take, as you'd expect. But in terms of morale, we are told that the beaches on the coast of Magnesia, so the Persian side, are washed up with corpses and the parts of

wrecks of ships. So think about the morale on the Persian side, as they see their own dead washed up on the shore, as they see parts of their own ships washed up on the shore, as they see parts of their own ships washed up on the shore. The reason why I keep talking about morale, because obviously it's important, but as you said earlier, this all hangs on a thread for the Greeks. And morale is an important reinforcer of that thread, shall we say. So the storms bring with it this demoralizing

effect for the Persians. But more importantly, for the tactics involved, for the strategies involved in particular, we are told that the Persian detachment, remember them? Circumnavigating Yoruba are caught out. They couldn't find shelter quick enough and are destroyed. Every single ship is smashed up against the rock face on the Yoruba coast. So that's 200 ships gone, just destroyed, of the Persian fighting force. We also know that during this day, 53 triremes were sent from Attica,

which is the region run by the Athenians, kind of like their district, so to speak. So 53 more Athenian ships arrived, reinforcing the Greek position. So again, morale boost. You get the information and actually you're no longer being cut off. The 200 ships are destroyed. So you can escape if you need to. We also are told really quickly and in passing that a small Greek force decides to go and create a small skirmish and wins a small

battle. Nothing more than that. So again, minor success, nice morale boost. News 200, big morale boost. The demoralization of the Persians on the mainland coast, again, big morale boost. Day two is not a big day for grand battle narratives, but it is a vital day for understanding why the Greeks do what they do next. Well, you're running into what the next question will be then. As you said, not a big day for battles, but a big day for morale. What happens on day three? what happens on day three? Now, day three, I have to remind you that this is going on on the three days of the Battle of Thermopylae. So day three for the Persian fleet

is day three for Xerxes' force at Thermopylae, which for those of you who already know it, and if you've already listened to the podcast on it, is the day that the Spartans are destroyed. The Spartan-led force, the Greeks, are entirely destroyed. They are beaten, so to speak, at Thermopylae. Spoiler alert, if you didn't know. So the Persians are actually under a lot of pressure.

They're aware this is going on. There's always communication between the land force and the naval force. They are well aware that Xerxes is doing this. They're well aware that the tide is about to turn on land. And they're also aware that Xerxes does not suffer fools well. So he is not going to be tolerant of any perceived failure at sea. So they're under a lot of pressure now to do something decisive, to either defeat the Greeks outright or remove them from where they are, however they do it. from where they are, however they do it.

The Greeks, buoyed by this morale boost the night before, the day, or day two, they do something which, on the surface of it, looks rather stupid. And remembering what we talked about earlier, which was the tactical considerations on day minus one, the Greeks just ignore that now, and they actually send out their entire fleet line abreast, so in a massive line.

And so the Persians, under the pressure they're under, decide to do the exact same. This has gone from a tactically nuanced game of chess to a slogging match, winner takes all. So the Persians come out, and of course, because the Persians have more ships, their line is longer. So they start to form a crescent shape, clearly planning to do similar to what they did on day one they intend to encircle the greeks again because of course a trireme is at its most vulnerable to the side and to the back so that's the intention of course the greeks can't let this happen they're well aware of that they have no intention of trying to form 270 odd i actually know we're more than that now, over 300 ships in a circle.

That would be ridiculous. So they give the signal to do a direct frontal assault. The one thing neither of us thought was possible three days ago. They go for it. And ultimately, the day descends into chaos and mayhem. Rams crashing into each other, head-on collisions. The speed of the Athenian triremes trying to maneuver around the bigger Egyptian ships, the faster and more maneuverable Phoenician ships, the superior Phoenician ships,

all vying for space in what becomes a very crowded seascape. And if it's not rams smashing into the sides of ships, it is arrows from the four archers every trireme has flying along the decks aiming for either other archers or the Marines or even killing rowers. Now the rowers aren't particularly safe in all this and if it's not them it's the captain, it's the pilot, it's all the crew. And if it's not the archers and the arrows being loosed throughout, it's the marines fighting each other on their decks. It is trying to board each other's ships, trying to take control of each other's ships.

Space narrowing throughout the seascape, all this chaos on the decks. Needless to say, as you're fighting away and as your life is in peril you stop paying as much attention as you should to what's around you and so we actually hear that allied ships start bumping into each other so this is not a pretty event this is not a classic almost Rome total war style where everything is done in a particular way and there are algorithms that make sure that nothing silly happens. This is chaos. This is mayhem. This is carnage. We are told that the day goes on. The fighting continues till nightfall and both sides are relentless in their pursuit for victory. And at the end of the day, there is no clear winner. We are told specifically the Athenians and the Egyptians bear the brunt of most of the fighting.

They also bear the sort of the honor, the kleos, the undying memory and honor that comes from such expressions of masculinity in the ancient world. It is Egypt and Athens who are singled out as the ones who perform best during this battle. But ultimately, when nightfall does come, there is no clear victor. If you're looking for a decisive battle, this is not one. But it is a very important battle. So in the aftermath of this, if you're going to sort of pick, well, who won overall, you kind of look at, we're told the Persians lost the most ships in the three, four days of battle.

But of course, they had the strength to reinforce. Say they've lost 100 ships. They've got 100 more. They lost 200 going around Yoruba to a storm. And it didn't really affect their ability to fight on the day. I mean, you take 200 out of the Greek force, and you've destroyed the Greek navy. You know, that's it.

So yes, they've lost the most ships, but it probably impacted their numbers least. With the Greeks, Greeks are an interesting one the greeks have lost a lot of ships we're told the athenians in particular lose half of their available ships they lose the ability to use them so don't envision ships sinking in the sea that doesn't happen in the ancient world um you disable a ship basically by ramming it and then you drag it off more often than not um so even if you get to keep control of your damaged ship it's still not usable you know it's still going to be fixed or you know replaced so the athenians in particular

paid a heavy price for this battle and yet to the greeks g Greek victory doesn't come from killing more of your opponent than you lost yourself. Greek victory doesn't even particularly come from keeping hold of the battlefield or the seascape in this situation. That's not really how a Greek defines victory. More often than not, Greeks define victory by who controls the bodies of the dead. So to the Greeks, if you said, well, actually the Persians are still as strong as they ever were, they're still going to cause trouble, you haven't solved anything,

they're responsible, but we control the war dead. So we've won. So to the Greeks, this is a victory, no question. To the Persians, this can be spun as a victory, because ultimately they haven't been removed from where they are. Their wider strategic goal, which is to support the land forces and marches south, is still a go. And, you know, some clever words to Xerxes in court, and he'll agree with you. So the Greeks are at this moment where they've had this big clash.

It's like, what do we do next? And this is when they receive word from the mainland. This is when they receive word about what's happened at Thermopylae. They finally heard that Leonidas has died and that the Greek force at Thermopylae has fallen, which means Xerxes now has an open route all the way to the south of Greece. He has an open route to an unprotected Athens in particular. So it is at this point the Greeks decide to retreat from of Greece. He has an open route to an unprotected Athens in particular. So it is at this point the Greeks decide to retreat from their position. They need to regroup.

So they do. They pull back and they sail all the way back round towards Salamis. At this point, this is when you realise the Greeks never actually had a plan. Everything is very reactionary. This is why they need to regroup. They clearly never really considered what would happen if Thermopylae fell, what would happen if you had a stalemate at Artemisia, what they should do next at all. So on the one hand, I'd love to tell you that Artemisia was this great victory for the Greeks. And then they made the logical decision to pull

back to Salamis and then to plan fastidiously their great victory at Salamis. That is not the case at all. Artemisium was necessary for the logistical reasons we've talked about. It was necessary for the morale boost that it gave. Of course, you can only say that in hindsight. It was an important battle, but certainly not a decisive battle. It's at this point that the Persian Wars, or should we say the invasion of Xerxes, really steps up a notch. And ultimately, a lot of things start to go very wrong for the Greeks. I mean, from all that you've been saying there, and it does feel today that the Battle of Artemisium is overshadowed by the legends at Thermopylae with the Spartans and their allies.

But from what you've been saying, it really does emphasise how that defence depended on the naval theatre just as much as the land theatre. Absolutely that. The naval theatre in Greek warfare, especially in classical Greek warfare, gets really underplayed. It is vital. It is constantly vital. And I guess the reason why it's underplayed is because more often than not, our sources don't give us great detail. Artemisium is actually quite unique in this. Salamis is done in quite a lot of detail because of the kind of myth that grew up around it. To the Athenians, Salamis was their great defining moment. It is their second marathon, basically. And of course, because Athens then

goes on to become this massive maritime empire of horrific carnage and destruction, Salamis then is an important part of that myth, or the myth of Salamis is an important one. Artemisium doesn't have that respect in the Greek sources, but it is given the space it is due. Whereas if you read Thucydides' accounts of the Peloponnesian War, if you read Xenophon's accounts of the Peloponnesian War, the Corinthian War, stuff like that, naval warfare is just not given time, presumably because neither Thucydides or Xenophon were naval men. It didn't particularly concern them. So in that respect, yeah, it is really underplayed. Artemisium was vital. That entire area was vital for the logistics involved. And I guess that's also

the other reason why I think naval warfare gets underplayed, because logistics are not sexy. Apologies to anyone who loves logistics in warfare. But it's just not. It is not an exciting topic. But it is so important to understand the commitment that goes on in these positions. So both Xerxes and Leonidas needed their fleet in that area. They needed control of the seascape, even for just a short amount of time, they needed it. It was important to both plans. And as I said earlier uh you do not see really any sustained campaign in ancient warfare especially greek warfare uh where a fleet is not involved fleet is always involved even at sieges you know even a um sort of standalone battles if you actually look through

the narrative where the battle occurs a fleet is is involved, always involved. So yeah, Artemisium is vital. I suppose one of the things that makes Artemisium particularly appealing, as opposed to other naval battles, is the long narrative we're given on it, the fact that it mirrors Thermopylae quite nicely, almost too nicely, and because it is a battle in its own right, and we can see the importance of that in its own right. It certainly does feel like the Thermopylae at sea. Owen, that was a lovely overview of the Bast of Artemisium. Thank you so much for coming on the show. Thank you so much for having me.

Thank you for letting me discuss Artemisium. It's not a topic I think a lot of lovers of history get to hear about. And I think, like you said, it often gets swallowed up in a thermopolitan narrative. So, yeah, thank you so much for having me on. No problem.