The Breakdown - Lessons from the Financial History of Pandemics, feat. Jamie Catherwood

Episode Date: May 20, 2020

Jamie Catherwood works at O’Shaughnessy Asset Management, a quantitative long-equity investment firm. More importantly, however, he is the finance history guy on Twitter. His “Financial History: Sunday Reads” curation pieces and longer form articles on his site Investor Amnesia have become required reading for anyone who wants the historical context for current financial issues.  On this episode of The Breakdown, Jamie and NLW discuss: Financial lessons from previous pandemics, including the 14th century bubonic plague; an 1892 Cholera outbreak in Hamburg, Germany; and, of course, 1918  Strange parallels between 1918’s Spanish flu and the currentcCoronavirus crisis, including an increase in the price of oranges  The concept of “Minsky Moments, a key inflection point in bubbles where over-exuberant markets become unwound extremely quickly 

Welcome back to The Breakdown, an everyday analysis breaking down the most important stories in Bitcoin, crypto, and beyond. This episode is sponsored by ArisX.com, the Stellar Development Foundation, and Grayscale Digital Large Cap Fund. The Breakdown is produced and distributed by CoinDesk. Here's your host, NLW. Welcome back to The Breakdown. It is Tuesday, May 19th, and today we have something historical and fun for you guys. You may not know this, but I was a history major as an undergrad. I focused on colonial and imperial history, basically, from an American perspective, from a European perspective, I was always interested in the intersection of cultures, whether it was positive or whether it was forced, whether it was economic driven, whether it was whatever. The history of imperial and colonial

expansion is the history of globalization in many ways. So I spent a ton of time thinking about that, and that study has informed my perspective to this day. So when I came across in mid-2018, someone on Twitter who was doing financial history but via Twitter, these short little bursts of these are the most interesting original articles or case studies or literally snippets of newspapers from some past event that is relevant for some current context, I had to figure out who this person was. Well, it turns out his name is Jamie Catherwood. He works at Oshonnessy, Asset Manich, and but really what he's known for is being the financial history guy on Twitter. He does a weekly Sunday reads, which is not dissimilar from my Longreed Sunday, except instead of focusing on the

crypto industry and economics kind of more broadly like I do, he focuses on financial history. For the last couple months, that Sunday reads has been enormously more focused on the context and the history of both pandemics and economic crises, as we have struggled through the coronavirus crisis and the economic fallout from that. I wanted to invite Jamie on to talk about historical antecedents, historical analogies that he's come across, be it from the 1918 Spanish flu, where the relevant example that people bring up so often in the U.S. or even older, the plague in the 14th century in England, a cholera outbreak in Hamburg, Germany, in 189, So we get into some of those examples and then come around to talk about the idea of Minsky

moments where effectively mania takes such a hold and a speculative bubble grows so big that instead of financing debt to participate and buy more of whatever the speculative asset is, people just layer on debt over and over again to accumulate more of that asset, hoping that the asset price grows big enough to service all of that debt, right? So there's no connection to cash flow anymore. It's just an expectation of growth. This Ponzi financing moment always ends badly. And so we talk about that and whether we're in a Minsky moment in any way right now.

So I hope that you enjoy this conversation. It was a fun one. And I'll be back with the wrap-up in just a minute. All right. I'm here with Jamie. Jamie, what's going on? Not much, you know, just another day losing track of time. Thank you so much for being here.

I really appreciate it. So I started following you. It's funny, you and I share a Sunday reads type curation thing. In fact, that's how I followed you. So I started doing this thing I call Long Reads Sunday in mid-2018. And I think pretty similar timing, you started doing basically financial history, but via Twitter. And you would curate these really interesting articles, often contextual to things that were

going on. But I guess for people who don't know you, what's your background? How did you get into economic history and how did you become the economic or financial history guy on Twitter? Yeah, so thank you for having me, first of all. And I actually was a history major. I went to university at King's College London. And I knew that I didn't want to do history. I didn't want to go into academia or anything after college.

But my dad's philosophy, right or wrong, I think it's right, was for undergrad, just do what you're passionate about. because if you think you want to do finance or business in some shape or form, then you're probably going to go back and get your MBA anyway. So you might as well kind of round yourself out as an individual during undergrad and do whatever subject you're passionate about, which for me was history. And so while I was at school, I was kind of trying to find what I wanted to do after college. And I thought that originally I wanted to go into management consulting or try to go into management consulting. And then I started reading more about kind of the markets and finance and became really interested in that. And so I graduated, stumbled into a job with a history degree in

finance at an institutional investment consultant. And then I had a friend who recommended I joined Twitter to try and network on there because I had been kind of really leveraging LinkedIn in or trying to to kind of meet people, take him out for coffee, buy him lunch, whatever, and just get connections. But I turned to Twitter to start doing that. And he was a member of this finance Twitter community. His name's Connor Witt. But so I started following the people.

He followed and noticed that there was a ton of people putting out content and writing articles, dropping podcasts, etc. And being a history major, I love to write. and I hadn't really had an excuse to continue writing after college and sort of that same vein of like essays and whatnot. And so this seemed like a perfect reason to kind of start that up again and flex that muscle. So I just figured what do I know about that maybe people in this kind of finance Twitter community don't know as much about. And that was history. And it was just a total stroke of luck and complete accident that what I happened to not be an expert on,

but know more about was something that no one else was really writing exclusively about financial history. So I kind of just merged my interests in history and finance and started writing articles. And then to my complete surprise, a lot more people than I thought actually cared about this stuff. And kind of went from there. And I just started posting and writing about it more. And kind of the following and readership has grown in tandem. So it's been an exciting ride in one that was completely unexpected. This is, I mean, there's a whole different episode that we won't do right now about why Twitter is the best LinkedIn.

And it has, but it has to do with this. It has to do with, like, one, finding your community and two, having a direct distribution channel for content, which proves your validity that's not credentialed, right? It's about, like, you are offering a different type of value for something that people are, you know, the thing about history, and we were just talking about this before, I was also a history major and it super informs my, my perspective on everything, is that it is whether you think you care about it or not, you are living with the implications of it, right? And so there is something that is relevant for you, any time you happen to take a chance to go back. And what I love about

the way that you curate financial history is contextualizing it with things that are going on right now. So it's not like you don't require someone to be interested necessarily in financial history to start with, it's more that when we're living through a particular moment, people are looking around and saying, have we experienced anything like this before? What can I learn in order to better inform what I think about, how I act next? And that's what a lot of this financial history can do. Yeah, exactly. And I think that finance and history actually go kind of very well together, because I think there are two areas where, like within both history and finance, you can explore so many other kind of industries within the kind of just broad bucket of finance. So you could be in finance,

but then end up studying and learning a lot about the healthcare industry because you're a analyst who covers that industry, you know? And you can do that with so many different areas of business and within history, you know, there's financial history, economic history, political history, et cetera. So I feel like there are two fields where there's so much you can do within them that they kind of share a lot of commonalities. Right. Well, in finance history, I mean, finance literally, it is the financing of other industries, of other pursuits, right?

So inherently, you know, you get into the health industry, you get into politics, right? It's not divorced. It's impossible to divorce it from politics as anyone who's hanging on Jay Powell's every word and asking about whether the Fed and the Treasury are a little too close for comfort, right? like we're having a political conversation, even though it's sort of an economic conversation. Okay, awesome. So that's a great way of setting up. And what I thought, you know, I've been watching the Sunday reads, I feel like over the last couple of months, have taken on an even more relevant turn for people.

So I saw you wrote a little while ago. I think this is on March 1st. I can honestly say that since I started doing my financial history stick online in June 2018, I have never received so many questions and requests for historical context than I did with the coronavirus. this week. And so that was before the market really started hemorrhaging. That was before the first Fed action. I guess that was about maybe a week after, I think on February 24th was the first day U.S. markets really, or equity markets at least, really started to react to the coronavirus. And so you dedicated that Sunday reads to pandemics and finance, right, the history of pandemic. So I know that this isn't an area where you were an expert and really what you did is you

went back and looked. But when you did do that kind of that first past curation, that first past research, were there any kind of interesting historical moments or analogs that you found? Yeah. So to your first point, it was crazy. And I'm sure you felt the same way because you saw a lot of what I was seeing with people looking for historical context is kind of, it was really awesome to see as a history nerd how much people were turning to the past. I mean, I just looked up I think two days ago, the explosion in Google search trends for Spanish flu over the last five years. And it's like nothing, nothing, nothing. And then absolute just like straight up era in people searching.

And so I think that's the obvious comparison that everyone's looking at. But I was trying to go kind of as niche as possible with these posts. So I went back and looked at events like the plague in the 14th century. And that was interesting where you just see a complete. conversion with the population of England in wages, and that for how bad the plague was for peasants, it was kind of a good event for those who lived because their wages rose so quickly because the lords of the land needed people to work their land, and suddenly the population was decimated.

So they were willing to pay higher wages to get people to come until their land. And then in this post, I just looked at things like William Getsman, who's a professor at Yale, he is like the godfather of financial history. If you ever think you've come up with an original idea, you'll find out that he's already written an article on it. And he looked at the history of what he calls negative bubbles and what happens after a crash. And because March 1st was, I think that last week of February is particularly kind of brutal because that's when the markets kind of woke up to the impact that coronavirus is going to have. So he studied just, I think, like four centuries of stock market crashes and shows that, you know, after a market's experience a crash of 50% or more, they have a higher probability of a rebound with the average return being 14% higher.

And crashes with less than 40% declines are usually actually followed by another decline. And the magnitude of this decline is between 6 to 9%. percent in the following year. So that's kind of interesting. But in terms of more recent pandemics, epidemics actually in this case, the one really interesting parallel I found was actually in 1892. And it was a cholera outbreak in New York. And the reason I found this interesting is because when I wrote it, it was amid the, what was the name of that cruise ship? Was it the whatever that one Trump was always talking about in the media. I can't I can't remember what the name of it was, but it was like...

Oh, yeah, it was the carnival, whatever the Carnival crew, the Princess Diamond. Some combination of words like that, right? There's some reason I'm thinking monarchy, so that sounds right. And, yeah, so that cruise ship was like sailing around off the coast of California, I believe, because it wasn't allowed to dock because there were people on board who had coronavirus. And while that was all going on in the news, I found this series of newspaper articles from 1892. in New York about a, I think it was three ships from Hamburg in Germany. And in Hamburg, there had been an outbreak of cholera. And there was news that traveled to New York that these three ships

were coming from Hamburg with passengers on board who had corona, or not coronavirus, but had cholera. And similar to today, people in New York were freaking out in the media about how this ship would arrive and then everyone in New York was going to get cholera. And these newspaper articles pointed out that whether you were a bowl or a bear kind of influenced how you viewed this event. And all the bears were hyping up these ships as like, oh, we have, because again, news traveled slower in those days. So they would start drumming up stories in the media about how they have information that

like 90% of the people on board the ship had contracted cholera and that, you know, 50% of them were already dead. And that obviously made investors in New York freak out more because they were preparing for the worst. And so it's just interesting that you had bears trying to overhype the story in order to drive down markets where you had bulls saying that, you know, this actually wasn't that bad, et cetera. But the newspaper articles at the time were crazy.

They called it like the ship that, you know, the angel of death was approaching and stuff like that. Yeah, this quote was amazing actually. I pulled this out because I thought it was so good. So the headline that you pointed out, this is, you know, this is where clickbait was invented, right? William Randolph Hearst and the and Pulitzer of this time. Like, this is not a new phenomenon, even though we've created algorithms that supercharge it, right? So the headline was coming closer.

Vessels will be closely watched. And then a few days later, when it actually docked in September of 1892, someone wrote about how people were actually felt let down by how few deaths there had actually been. on board. So they said, this vessel had been talked of for days and had become in the imagination of the people, almost a phantom ship with the destroying angel on board so that when she finally arrived, it is not too much to say that it was a serious disappointment to some croakers of bearish tendency to find that she only had 11 deaths on the voyage. Also, I think that croakers of bearish tendency is the best way to describe bears that I've ever heard. And I just want to start calling people croakers. But yeah, I thought that was fascinating because I think that you can see,

Regardless of what one thinks about media response and whether things have been overhyped, underhyped, or flipped between them, that there is this interesting cycle or this interesting relationship between markets, media, and health, right? That this is not a new phenomenon. In fact, this is 130 years ago, and it's the same thing playing out. Definitely. And another parallel that I found interesting was because today we're experiencing it with cruise lines and airlines, they talked about the passenger receipts, the quote was, the passenger

receipts appear to show that some portion of the money which might have been expended in travel on the continent has, by reason of the cholera scare, been diverted to travel on our railways at home, and this may serve to compensate to some extent for declines in the goods and mineral traffic. American railways, despite that it is promising in their future and that large additions are being made to the receipts, do not command the confidence of investors here. So people were recognizing that there's going to be much less travel because people are freaking out about possibly contracting, contracting cholera if they went on these railroads. Yeah, it's super, super, super interesting. And you're, yeah, again, this is why I love history is the, you know, it doesn't repeat, but it certainly rhymes.

So, so the, I guess the other, the comparative example that people have kept coming back to is 1918, right? We hear about 1918 all the time. And it's different people plumb for different parts of it, right? So right now it's about whether there'll be a second wave and what that might look like. There are a bunch of things that I thought were particularly interesting. But before I call out some of the ones that I saw in your writing, was there anything that stands out to you in terms of looking back at some of these articles from and about 1918?

Are there interesting analogs or is the comparison overblown or not as relevant as we think? I'm definitely not a health expert, so I'm wary of talking about the similarities from a health perspective. But what I can say and what I found really interesting is, as you mentioned, going through these kind of articles, the University of Michigan has a great archive of, I want to say it seems like thousands, but it's definitely hundreds of news articles from the day organized by different categories and themes or even by city and state. So if you want to, if you live it, someone actually messaged me the other day that they live in Pittsburgh. And they went through this archive and just read all the stories that the University of Michigan had compiled about the Black Death in Pittsburgh newspapers at the time. I'm not Black Death.

Spanish flu in newspapers at the time. And a couple of the interesting parallels I found there was the first is oranges, where people might remember a few months ago. I think it was in March that the prices of orange futures were just. skyrocketing and they offered a good return and that was because people were buying buying up oranges and the same thing apparently happened in 1918 where there's a article about because doctors were prescribing oranges to patients so much that the stores were running out of oranges and prices went up from like 60 cents to I think like a dollar 65 in some areas. So it's just funny to see that something as random as an oranges has proven to be a consistently strong outperformer during a health crisis.

But also there was really interesting articles about how their businessmen defying lockdown and quarantine orders to open their businesses before regulations had been lifted. And today we're obviously starting to see that more. There's been like cases in New York, Texas, where their business owners opening up their stores premature. and then getting in trouble with the law. And then also there were articles about how people wearing masks in public had reduced confidence. But then when those masks and requirements to wear masks were being lifted, that instilled more confidence. And retail kind of sales started to recover more. And then also there was examples of people being arrested for not wearing masks and police enforcing.

seeing these influencer rules very strictly. And today, I mean, I think maybe last week where there was that video of a woman in New York subway getting arrested for not wearing a mask. And I don't know, it's just so many direct parallels. It was crazy. Support for this podcast and this message come from Eris X. With ArisX, you can trade spot and regulated futures on cryptocurrencies through a licensed, U.S.-based exchange. ArisX believes in fair access for all. up today to take advantage of zero fees and learn more at erisX.com slash consensus. This episode is also sponsored by the Stellar Foundation. The Stellar Network connects your business to the global financial infrastructure,

whether you're looking to power a payment application or issue digital assets like stable coins or digital dollars. Stellar is easy to learn and fast to implement. Start your journey today at Stellar.org slash coin desk. Our final sponsor is Grayscale Digital Large Cap Fund. In times like these, diversification is key. consider Grayscale Digital Large Cap Fund, ticker symbol GDLC.LC. It's the only publicly traded investment product that offers diversified exposure to large cap

digital currencies, all from your brokerage account. For more information, visit grayscale.co slash coin desk. That's g-r-a-y-scale.cow slash coin desk. The other one that you found, which I loved, which was a little bit more tongue-in-cheek, was just the terrible commercials. So you share the mashup of every COVID-19 commercial. commercial being exactly the same and cringy. And then you shared like a theater bill, right? That was like, cheer up. Theaters are open. You can safely attend the following theaters.

They are all properly ventilated and constantly maintained a perfect sanitary condition. Yeah. Try the laugh cure. It was my favorite line from that. Yeah, try the laugh cure. Oh, God. Amazing. Okay. So you've obviously had been digging into the history of pandemic side in those parallels. But you've also spent a lot of time thinking about just market crashes more broadly, whatever the catalyst for. And you recently had a chance you hosted a show on Real Vision called History as a Compass, right? And so I wonder, as you were preparing for that or in those conversations, are there other lessons that you pulled out from, that are relevant for now from more of the

kind of economic fundamentals perspective of crashes versus just comparisons to pandemics past? Yeah, so during that special, I spoke with Scott Nation's Jim Grant and Jim Chanos. And one principle that I are kind of concept that I've learned from Jim Chanos in the last two years is this idea of Minsky moment. And so Jim Chanos teaches a financial history course at Yale. And I had the great honor of giving a guest lecture on a 17th century IPO bubble. because the size of lectures that can talk about that topic is definitely very small. So I was happy to fill that role. But he taught me about this concept of the Kindleberger-Minsky model is one of the models

that he teaches in his financial history course, which looks at the kind of lag of the fraud cycle and the market cycle. So when it's a bull market, people are much more willing to suspend their sense of disbelief. So when you're making money, you're much less likely to question why you're making money. If the business is producing strong returns, there's not as strong of an incentive to question, well, maybe that doesn't make sense. Or is this going to continue? Or maybe that accounting looks a little shoddy. But then when people start losing money, they get angrier. and that's when they start looking at their portfolio is a little closer.

And it's often then that you start to find out which businesses are not necessarily full, full blown frauds, but have bad business practices. And so there's this kind of lag in the fraud cycle compared to the market cycle. So what I found interesting, and we talked about in that special, is this idea of a Minsky moment is kind of the trigger that, it's kind of. causes speculative financing and usually in debt to kind of collapse where business expectations and investor sentiment gets so kind of divorced from reality. And there's so much leverage in the system that eventually some event brings it crashing back

down to earth. And then you have this kind of unveiling of fraud. And so I think it's going to be interesting to see if we have a similar dynamic play out because of the coronavirus kind of downturn where who knows where it's going to spring up. But Chanos and I talked about, he sent along an article that's really interesting about. It's called it, is private equity having its Minsky moment? And the argument in that paper was that all of this kind of leverage in private equity and the problems that people have been talking about for a couple of years now may now be brought to the fore because of

this unexpected, complete, just slowdown and in some cases, shut down in businesses that private equity is owners of. And so I think that's going to be interesting to see how it plays out and see if this is going to be a Minsky moment. And we are going to see this kind of steady unveiling of frauds in areas of the economy that were previously investors' favorites. So it's super interesting. This idea of Minsky moments, I think, is really fascinating.

for a couple reasons. First, Hyman Minsky, who is the economist who coined this term, was like one of the only economists, I feel like, who he basically did the starving artist thing where his ideas weren't recognized in his time or like a novelist, right? It was only after he died that they came into the forefront. And he wasn't particularly popular during his life, I think in part because no one really wanted to, when things are good, you don't really want to consider his argument effectively. And it really wasn't until he died in the late 90s, I think, and it wasn't until the 2000s, and particularly the housing bubble, right? As the housing bubble started to happen, that's really where the

Minsky moment got this idea, this definition that moved into the spotlight, although the term had been coined like a decade earlier. And I think it's worth kind of spending some time on what the Minsky moment actually refers to. Yeah, so Minsky identified three types of financing. And the first is hedge financing, which is the safest. And he defined that as firms rely on their future cash flow to repay all their borrowings. For this to work, they need to have very limited borrowings and healthy profits. And then from there, you have speculative financing, which is, as it implies, riskier. And that's when firms rely on their cash flow to repay the interest on their borrowings, but must roll over their debt to repay the principal. This should be manageable as long as the

economy functions smoothly, but a downturn could cause distress. And then finally, you have Ponzi financing, which is dangerous, as the name implies. And that's when cash flow covers neither principle nor interest. And firms are betting only that the underlying asset will appreciate by enough to cover their liabilities. If that fails to happen, they will be left exposed. So as kind of these definitions imply, especially the last one, things are fine if the underlying assets do appreciate enough to cover their liabilities. but if there's something like an economic downturn where that is not the case, then trouble ensues because you can't cover your liabilities and you are left exposed.

And the economist was writing about this concept of Minsky moment, and they wrote that if asset values start to fall either because of monetary tightening or some external shock, the most overstretched firms will be forced to sell their positions. This further undermines asset values causing pain for even more firms. Over time, particularly when the economy is in fine-fedel, the temptation to take on debt is irresistible. When growth looks assured, why not borrow more? And to that point, they were talking about the fact that the easy response is, oh, well, then why doesn't everyone just do hedge financing?

And as they point out, when things are so good and business is good, it's kind of impossible to resist the temptation of getting a little bit more speculative just because things seem like they can't go wrong. And when you keep pushing yourself further out, kind of in the risk, on the risk spectrum, though, then eventually some businesses will find themselves on the kind of wrong end of those three types of financing and be brought kind of crashing back down to earth in an eventual downturn. Yeah, I think one of the things that's really hard and why this sort of look back at history is so important is that, uh, it becomes very difficult to fight the incentives for short-term gains by telling the lessons of history

when everyone isn't thinking about that history or wants to intentionally not think about it, right? And the farther we are out from recent examples, the more disincentive to focus on kind of resilience and more incentive to focus on, you know, keeping up with the Joneses, where the Joneses are the firms down the street, right? And it's interesting. I mean, it's, we're in this strange moment where, you know, the economy is recovering and is betting on, uh, on things getting back to, to some semblance of normal and or maybe is betting on the fact that the Fed is making it very clear that they will backstop the entire economy. Uh, but, but either way, it feels like we, it's too early to tell whether this is,

uh, a real Minsky moment, uh, or whether it is going to be, can, there's, There's some exogenous force, in this case, most likely the Fed, that's going to kind of prevent it and keep the party going for a little bit longer. Yeah, that is the question. Whether he's right or wrong, I would definitely encourage people to read this article, as I mentioned before, called his private equity having a Timminsky moment because it at least lays out some pretty interesting arguments. For example, the guy says, I think his name's Matthew Stoller, Stoller. But he writes, now what happens with Ponzi financing is that at some point, a Minsky moment causes the bubble to pop. And there's mass distress as asset values fall and credit is withdrawn mass bankruptcies ensue.

He says, I think you can see where I'm going with this. Private equity portfolio companies are heavily indebted and they aren't generating enough cash to service their debts. The study increase in asset values since 2009 has enabled funds to make tremendous gains because of the use of borrowed money. But now they're exposed to tremendous losses, should there be any sort of disruption? And oh, has this ever been a disruption? The coronavirus has exposed the entire sector.

And he talks about how you can, like, no matter what you do with kind of creative financing, you can't make up sales if people can't. I mean, not that they are making up sales, but like if there's no sales period, because if a private equity portfolio company is in retail and all stores are shut, like there's nothing really you can do. You know, you can't come up with some solution if there's literally no revenue because people aren't able to open their stores and sell to customers. It's the great fear of a game of musical chairs.

Except that the longer that it goes, the more painful the drop when the music stops. So by way of wrapping up, you now, you know, you have this financial history interest. but you work in finance now. How do you try to keep lessons from history in mind as you go about your day-to-day? I think it's definitely given me a better perspective on things. I'm sure you feel the same way as a fellow history major. But when times are kind of tough in terms of just returns and investments in markets, I think that I am less likely to panic.

just because after reading about centuries of bubbles and crashes and market downturns, that you realize everything's going to be fine, you know, eventually. It's easier to say, obviously, when you're a younger person like me who has time for markets to recover, and it's not really going to affect my portfolio at this stage if I'm not going to touch it for decades. But I think, and the same goes for the opposite side, we're getting swept away by some new fad and mania. I think that you're a little more skeptical because, again, I've spent so much time reading about the fads of different eras and they tend to not pan out too well. But I would say that I'm a kind of daily basis or in my career. That's the kind of most useful product of my historical adventures.

That makes sense why your site is called Investor Amnesia. we've been here before. Jamie, thanks so much for hanging out today. I really appreciate it. We'll have you on again the next time there's a historical context that we need for whatever it is that we're experiencing. Awesome. Thank you so much for having me.

All right, thanks, man. Reflecting on that conversation, the thing that I think is so right on about the way that Jamie diagnosed it is history has this way of turning down the volume on everything. It turns down the volume on joint, you know, eubilant optimism about new things. that turn into bubbles, which couldn't mean missing out on some short-term opportunities,

but it also turns down the volume on the fear of total disaster and crisis, because you've seen the market work its magic and become resilient over and over and over again. I do think that we're in a moment right now. We're about as fragile and about as least resilient as we've been in a very long time, and I do have concerns. But I think that the reality is that everything will adapt. It just might take a little while and be painful on the way. I'm going to to continue to study my economic history. I encourage you to go follow Jamie on Twitter or follow his investor amnesia newsletter for his Sunday reads. That's really great stuff, and I really appreciated having Jamie on. Anyways, guys, that is it for today. Back with another

awesome guest tomorrow. I'm really excited for. So until then, be safe and take care of each other. Peace.