The Bridge with Peter Mansbridge - Inside Putin's Brain -- Why Is He Doing What He's Doing?

Episode Date: March 1, 2022

Many people think Vladimir Putin has, to put it mildly, lost his way, and he's become irrational in his actions.  One of the most internationally respected writers on the Putin legacy, Professor Timothy Frye of Columbia University in New York, joins us with his thoughts.  Then a different angle to the story that has the world's attention -- how the story is being covered.  My old colleague and one of the best war correspondents I've known in my career, Brian Stewart, is with us for that discussion. 

And hello there, Peter Mansbridge here. You are just moments away from the latest episode of The Bridge. Inside Putin's brain. What's really going on there? Why is he making the decisions he's been making? Today, we try to find out. Are you one of those in Canada who over the last month has been trying to determine exactly what it means when we use the word freedom? You've heard it tossed around over the last month in Canada for a variety of reasons, mainly tied to vaccine mandates, etc., etc. People shouting for freedom. Well, if you've been confused about what freedom means, listen to the speech made today by the Ukrainian president, Zelensky, in the European Parliament. He was in Ukraine, of course, when he made the speech,

but it was piped into the European Parliament, where Ukraine is desperately trying to get immediately signed up as a member of the European Parliament. He gave a speech, it wasn't long, five, eight minutes, something like that. But it was so powerful, and it was about freedom, and especially in the light of what has happened in the last hours in Ukraine, which was the bombing, apparently by Russian forces,

as part of their invasion, of a place called Freedom Square in Kharkiv. And in Freedom Square, when the missiles hit, according to Zelensky, dozens of people died, many of them children, in Freedom Square. As the Ukrainians are putting up this incredible fight

to save their country from a Russian invasion. Day six or seven, depending on how you count the days. And they're still holding out. And according to Zelensky, they will never stop their fight. And what did he say today about freedom? He said that he would name every square in Ukraine,

and there are hundreds of them, he would name every square in Ukraine Freedom Square, as a result of what happened today. It was a speech that gained attention worldwide, but in the room in the European Parliament, they all stood and applauded some crying as Zelensky made his case.

Which brings us to the first of today's topics, the first segment on today's episode of The Bridge, is about the man behind the invasion, the man who ordered the attack, Vladimir Putin. President of Russia. He's been either the President or the Prime Minister for more than 20 years now. It's not like he's a stranger to us. We know who he is.

But we seem to know even more about him as a result of the last week than we've ever known. But it has raised questions about his stability. Why is he doing what he's doing? Who's advising him? Who's close to him?

It's hard to say anybody's close to him when you see the pictures of his various meetings with cabinet ministers, security members in the Russian parliament. He sits at this table. I heard somebody describe it this morning as it looks as long as a bowling alley where he's at one end and everybody else is at the other end, like pins at a bowling alley.

He's isolated. Is it for medical reasons? Is it for health reasons? Is it for fear of being assassinated? Well, I don't know the answers to these questions. And so at a time like this, you reach out and you look for somebody who has an expertise in the area, in this case, of Vladimir Putin. And so where did I reach? I reached out to Timothy Fry. He's the Martin Schulman Professor

of Department of Political Sciences at Columbia University in New York. He's got a list of titles. He's the editor of Post-Soviet Affairs, the co-director of the International Center for the Study of Institutions and Development at the Higher School of Economics in Moscow. He's an author, a very successful author. His most recent book is Weak Strongman,

The Limits of Power in Putin's Russia so I told professor Frye that I wanted to talk about Putin and try to understand what was going on in his mind inside Putin's brain right now here's our conversation professor a lot of amateur psychologists and I include myself in that because I've been sort of rambling a bit over the last few days, have been making judgments about Vladimir Putin and his stability in terms of what he's been saying and doing in the last couple of weeks. Now, you're much closer to studying this man than the rest of us uh how would you assess his his actions in terms of um his stability in the last few weeks well i am judging this from afar and i i have not had access to the man nor his uh nor his inner thoughts uh and so that's important uh to bear in mind. He has been isolated. Most visitors have to wait 14 days before they visit him. And,

but I don't think that he, we should think of him as somebody who is irrational or even overly emotional. I think he's feeling very frustrated that the war has not gone as he planned, that the Western response has been much more vigorous than he expected, that the Ukrainian government has not folded. And this is really frustration more than irrationality. And the move to go into Ukraine on one level does seem hard to understand, given that the West had sent signals about how it would respond. But if you think that what's

really motivating President Putin is a sense of historic mission, and that if he's thinking in longer terms than 20, 25 year increments of Russian history and thinks that he is, in his own mind, justifying a historic loss for Russia and that he is bringing back the lands that had been lost to Russia, I think then his moves make a little more sense of suffering this incredible short-term cost in order to fulfill what he sees as a historic mission. I don't think it's turning out that way, but I also don't think it's a good idea at this point to try to explain his behavior on some kind of irrationality or uh lack of information there might be biases for sure as there is in any foreign policy decision but i think a lot once we understand i think what putin's ultimate goals might be his behavior looks um a lot more comprehensible but why do you think he misread the situation uh so badly in terms of the way others would react not only the west but seemingly many of his own people yeah i think he's misread public opinion on ukraine uh beginning in 2014 i think he expected in 2014 and 2015

that there would be much more support for russian moves in ukraine uh and i think he's he's viewing this through the lens of history of the long brotherhood of peoples, the long friendship between the two countries. And he's really failed to recognize that over the last 30 years, Ukraine has just become a very different place. And for most Russians, too, they see Ukraine as a sovereign state. And why is he making this mistake? It's a good question. He fancies himself an amateur historian, and he may see that through the power of the Russian state and its socializing processes, that he can subdue the Ukrainians as past Soviet and Russian leaders have done so even if at the moment um uh there's great resistance he may in his own mind think that uh once they see the benefits of being uh on moscow's side rather than on the side of the west

that they will eventually come around now i don't hold that view i'm just trying to understand what might be his view of the situation could it be the end of his presidency the end of his the putin leadership in in russia the great uh claim that putin has made for the last 20 years to the russian people is that he has brought stability after the turbulent 1990s with its hyperinflation bank runs and massive political instability. That's all at risk. Today's news that the currency has collapsed, that there are bank runs, this all puts tremendous pressure on the Putin regime. Now, autocratic leaders have lasted through tougher situations than this. If the security services remain loyal and there are many Russians whose economic fates depend on the good graces of the Russian state and will be reluctant to protest. But I think one could say that this is the most difficult moment that President Putin has faced since coming to office in 2000.

You know, you mentioned a big if there in terms of the security services. And I guess in some ways also the oligarchs, those who are closest to Putin, if anybody's close to him, if they still maintain their loyalty. There's a feeling in some parts of the West that the tight screws that the West has put on Russia and on Putin in particular could, in fact, change that situation and that there could be behind the scenes an attempt to get rid of him do you see that possibility at all it's certainly possible um uh you know we've seen before where leaders turn to the security services to repress uh and they refuse to do so because they don't want to be judged for their actions uh should the efforts at repression fail.

I mean, East Germany is the classic example where the German dictator asked his famously hard line and tough security services to crack down and was told, you know, we can't kill 100,000 people protesting in the streets. You know, that said, Russia does not have the same kind of tradition and organizational structure of other countries where the military or the party are able to create a check on the leader. So in this way, the Russian situation is a little bit different. What has been most interesting to me has been the big business people in Russia who already question Putin's rationale for going into Ukraine. And we're seeing a battle for Ukraine. We're also seeing a battle for Russia between two groups,

one that wants to rally around fortress Russia and isolated Russia that is inward-looking, that is backward-looking, and a more forward-looking Russia that wants to engage with the outside world. And that is a really pitched battle at the moment, and it's difficult to predict how it will turn out. Is it an pitched battle at the moment. And it's difficult to predict how it will turn out. Is it an even battle at the moment or does one side seem to have the upper hand? Well, I think the problem for the fortress Russia types is the narrative needed in order to rally people around this effort has just not really been laid. And it's really not a convincing case. So, you know, as long as Putin remains in control of the media and the security services,

he's likely to survive this. And I think ultimately, in the end, he will survive. But the means by which he governs Russia will have to will will change. He'll have to have to either turn Russia into a version of Belarus, which is really a very repressive and coercive state. And that would be difficult in Russia, which has a highly educated urban population that's much more integrated uh into the west um so uh i wouldn't take a bet on this but um uh you know i think putin is likely to last through this um but the means for governing russia will have to change yeah i guess i'm surprised to hear you you say that and obviously you're much more knowledgeable on this guy in this situation than i am but i and i recognize these are early days in the in this conflict lots of things could change but it's hard to for me to imagine that if putin has to walk back with his tail between his legs

that he can survive yeah i mean a lot depends on what happens on the ground. If Russian forces are able to make advances with the addition of the Belarusian troops, that might give Putin an opportunity to say, yes, the war has been costly, but look at all that we've gained um uh and you remember him if he maintains control over uh state media you know that too is a powerful tool um so uh you know i and also you know autocrats you know if he's able to wield the repression still you know that's still a weighty stick. So I may be wrong. It's a very difficult call. But I think a lot will depend on what happens on the ground. Last point. I'm wondering what, you know, knowing what you do after your studies of this man,

are you impressed about, I mean mean everyone's impressed about how the ukrainians have dealt with the situation so far but are you impressed with the way the west has come up against putin in a way that you know for the last 22 years they haven't in any united Yeah, NATO is a group of countries that have disparate interests, but when pressed, are able to unite. And even the non-NATO countries, what's been remarkable to me is Finland sending weapons to Ukraine. You know, the German Social Democratic Party, you know, which has long been very friendly towards Moscow, you know, announcing that they will increase defense spending up to, you know, more than 2% of GDP.

I think this is where Putin has really miscalculated. And in part, it's not that surprising because his view of kind of global politics is that, you know, the U.S., although it is this fading empire that will soon be replaced by China, is still able to micromanage politics in Germany, Finland, across Europe, in Ukraine. And I think he's been surprised by how many of these countries have really just come out against Russia. And that will have a big impact with the Russian population when they see no Russian participation in Eurovision, foreign soccer teams not playing in Russia, when they see, you know, international athletes like

Alexander Vyachkin and Andrei Rublyov, the tennis player, coming out against the war. Those are all signs that might be able to counteract some of the incredibly, you know, kind of one-sided portrayals that are coming from state media. Professor Fry, thank you so much for this. You've given us a lot to think about. It's a lot more complicated than it seems to many of us who are joining this story, really, you know, for the first time in many ways, as opposed to the way you've been looking at it for more than a few years.

So thank you. Thank you you it's been my pleasure so that was uh professor timothy fry who's uh you know he's an expert on putin he's written books on putin he he studies putin he teaches about putin and uh getting his thoughts um away his thoughts away from somebody who has spent that kind of time observing this man, as opposed to those of us who sort of have observed him from time to time and made comments about him from time to time. I remember sitting behind him, well, 20 rows behind him, at the Sochi Olympics. And even then, he was isolated, not in the same sense that we see him now, so distant from other people,

but he was isolated in that cocoon of a strong man's leadership in the sense that everybody basically was bowing down to him. He had a motorcade as long as, well, as long as, you know, the U.S. President's motorcade. That was in the tunnels beneath the stadium in Sochi as I went down and watched him leave. But he had this aura around him, and this was just days before he made the decision to move into Crimea, right at the end of the Sochi Olympics.

Ironically, just like this, right at the end of the Beijing Olympics, he moves into Ukraine. So I thank Professor Fry for that insight and perhaps a different view than we tend to be hearing in a lot of the commentary that's being made right now that he's done, Putin. He may be done, but there's another possibility as well, and I think Professor Fry gave us that. All right, we're going to switch gears here and have a different look at the situation that's unfolding in Ukraine, a look about how we're learning about daily events,

hourly events, events by the minute. That's coming up right after this. Peter Mansbridge here in Stratford, Ontario, back with today's episode, the Tuesday episode this week of The Bridge. And welcome. You're listening on Sirius XM channel 167 Canada Talks or on your favorite podcast platform. We're focusing today solely on the Ukraine story. And for the second segment of the program today, I want to look at this from the point of how you're getting the information. And there's lots of different ways one can get information these days. You can, you know, most people seem to get it online in different formats. Whether on social media or whether doing their own research.

Reading articles, reading opinion pieces. Reading commentary from the front. Or, of course, watching television. Listening to radio. And one of the great voices of Canada on the foreign stage for years, decades, has been Brian Stewart. He was my colleague at the CBC. He went to NBC. He came to CBC

from the print world, working in Montreal. And, you know, we first met in the early 1970s when we were both moving to Ottawa to cover politics on Parliament Hill. Me from the West. I'd been in Manitoba and Saskatchewan. Brian from Quebec. And it was a particularly challenging time. The Prati Québécois had just won their first election in 1976. There was a move towards a referendum on Quebec sovereignty that eventually took place in 1980. There was the end of the first part of the Trudeau years

by the 1979 election when Joe Clark won and Brian and I covered all these stories and then Brian moved into foreign reporting and was a correspondent in more than a few conflicts from Beirut to Buenos Aires from the Middle East to the Falklands War to Afghanistan. He was in South Africa. I mean, he was in the Far East. He was everywhere. And brought that particular style of the Brian Stewart reportage to stories that were the focus of the world's attention

because of the conflict that was inherent in it. So Brian now, like me now, we're retired, but we watch. And we watch, in many cases, with admiration for what the journalists, especially some of the young journalists of today, are doing. Because it's a different world for them than the world we lived in. The technology is different.

The demands are different. But there's been some remarkable reporting already. And I wanted to talk to Brian about it, what he's witnessing, what he's seeing. And so I tracked him down. Wasn't hard. i just called him so let's have a listen to see what brian stewart thinks of how we're learning about the ukraine story so brian you and i were uh we're part of the the many who spent a lot of time criticizing U.S. intelligence through the 80s and the 90s, the double O's and so on, basically up until the last couple of weeks, blaming them for everything for, you know, including not knowing about the fall of the

Berlin Wall before the Berlin Wall fell. I mean, there was a lot of room to criticize U.S. intelligence, but not seemingly on this situation where they seem to be far ahead of the game, not only far ahead of the game in knowing what was about to happen, but publicizing it as well. Absolutely. Of course, you have to wonder how many times they're right when they don't reveal the story that dies with them in darkness. You know, the curse of spies is a lot of the

times they're right are never known the times they're wrong become huge scandals but definitely you're you're 100 right this is an extraordinary absolutely amazing spy scoop an expose of the like of which it's hard to think of what to compare it with, actually. Maybe the Cuban Missile Crisis in 62, and the Americans, of course, overflights, and the rest of it found the missiles in Cuba, and were able to expose the Soviet move before the Soviets made the move. But this seems to be based on a close reading of the actual invasion plans of Russia, right from the Kremlin.

And that kind of scoop sure doesn't happen very often. That is absolutely extraordinary. Yeah, it doesn't happen often, and it leads one to wonder how it happened. I mean, there's obviously electronic surveillance. There's, you know, they're listening in on all kinds of things. But, you know, you also have to consider the possibility that there's a mold inside the kremlin i think you have to look that way it was interesting about a week and a half or so before the actual invasion there were some reports started to leak out of retired russian generals who had real reservations about the invasion plans.

Well, if they were seeing the plans and if they had real reservations, there's a fairly decent likelihood that somewhere down the line, a leak could have taken place and gone right to the CIA. Now, I would think that Putin after this will have the mother of all purges in terms of seeking out any leak, any spy, any traitor within his midst. So they'll do everything they can, of course, to cover that. But that would be certainly an area, knowing that there was dissatisfaction among the military itself, to sort of suspect there could have well have been a leak. But at this level, it could also have been something cyber.

Possibly they just sent a cyber mole in and got the actual papers. And they had to make this decision, I guess. Look, if we come out with this now, we'll never be able to use it again. It's a one-off shot. So you better be ready. You better be prepared that we're going to blow whatever source we have whatever corridor we have into the facts because i'm sure the russians after this will be making massive efforts to repair the damage you know hide any kind of future leaks really put the

fear of god into those having to do with plans so it's a one-off deal. It'd be hard to maintain this over a long period of time. Tell me what the advantage is to the American side on it. I mean, it's one thing to know what your enemy on the battlefield is about to do when you're on that battlefield as well. But the Americans aren't on that battlefield. They're sort of watching from afar, trying to manipulate and handle international reaction. But there is a difference between being on the battlefield and not being on the battlefield. Very much so.

I think the effect can be seen very clearly that we have a response from NATO now, from the West generally, of governments that have been prepared by these advanced stories, knowing what was coming, knowing the gravity and extent of what was planned in the invasion, have had that extra time to really prepare their reactions for it and allow the White House and other countries, France and Britain,

to put maximum pressure on Western allies to say, it's coming, We know what's coming. We can give you the actual hour if you want it. But there are no excuses now. I'm needing a week to figure out what was going on, taking two weeks to perhaps run over all the options. You know what's coming now. Be ready on the day it happens. And this is why I've never seen it in my lifetime. The West has responded so clearly to such a major challenge as this. I mean, you might say 9-11. Yes, it did, but there was no further action from allies necessarily after that point. Here, the action by allies is huge, costs a lot, has a risk, puts them in the sight lines of the Kremlin as well.

So the added moral pressure of knowing what was coming, I think, has made all the difference in this scandal. I'm sorry, this affair, this is a scandal, an international scandal of invasion, but it's made all the difference in this case. I want to talk for a moment about the journalism involved so far and what we've seen in the opening days of this conflict. And there are few people better than you in terms of experience around the world, in dicey situations and conflicts of the past.

But it was a journalism of the past, in a sense that things have changed so much in a very short period of time in terms of what is available to media organizations to cover a war from access to equipment to you name it even from just a couple of years ago so what's your initial impression of how we are witnessing the world's media? And I know it's, you know, you've got to be careful about overgeneralizing here. But what's your initial impression of how this is being covered? I'd say it's been covered very well. I'm extremely impressed by the reporters in the field.

There are just an extraordinary number of them. I would call future greats or greats already. They're doing remarkable jobs from the field, and they're doing it with a precision and timing that is just awesome to follow. But there's a lot that goes into this journalism mix, isn't it? There's also the studio interviews that keep the viewer up to speed with the in-depth story, the diplomatic story, the logistical story, the maps and all that. Much more sophisticated now than we could have employed 15, 20 years ago. We were doing some very, very good jobs.

I sometimes go back and look at an archival piece of work on the Gulf invasion, Gulf War, things like that. We were doing an extremely good job then. It's just become so much more capable of doing it to the minute, not only to the minute, but having these different sources pouring in on you from Moscow, from Brussels, from London, from Washington, then in the field, Not only in the field, but they even have reporters over in Belarus watching the Russian columns going into action, crossing the border. I mean, they're announcing what weapons are going over. The kind of thing we've never really seen before. Now, that has its advantages and it has its disadvantages. And the advantages, of course,

are you can go in and sit for an hour and watch television and leave it feeling pretty well up to speed on what's going on in the world. You might want to look at some think tank pieces and special analysis, but you're getting a really good look at what's going on at that particular hour in the moment. The downside is that there's a kind of overflow of information. You have to feel at times sorry for the hour in the moment. The downside is that there's a kind of overflow of information. You have to feel at times sorry for the reporter in the field, who not only is

inundated with facts of every conceivable description, but minute by minute, information is pouring in from Pentagon briefings, Whitehall briefings, Paris briefings from home office. And at the same time, he's trying to get his narration for that night's story or that hour story with refugees or what have you in place. He's got to keep up with the whole war rather than just the picture right in front of him, which I can go back several decades to a time when you would go out in the field, you were kind of lost to home office for sometimes days at a time. You know, you'd have two days to do a report, three days, maybe four. And home office didn't really know where you were.

You had this degree of freedom. Now they know you'll be getting a call saying, we noticed that most of the reporters have gotten through to this besieged city, number X, but we see that you're still in the, you're off, you're still back in the hotel. I mean, how is that possible? I mean, you really, there's nowhere to hide now as you're a foreign correspondent. And of course, the risks are horrendous now. They were always bad. They've gone worse, I think every a decade since Vietnam um and I think now we're in the to a arrow when uh working the field is extremely

dangerous not just because of the weapons being used but the different factors factions are likely to run into the Ukraine is is almost a blessing in a way because you're almost back again to front lines you know where you're behind one line or behind another line in many of the conflicts we cover now there is no front line you can run right through your hotel room you know really I mean it's there's no safety there are all sorts of different elements, guerrilla elements, Baffi elements, thug elements, kidnapping groups, all those manner of threats you have to be careful for. Now, at least you can move with some degree of safety from what I can see from the reports coming in behind one line or another the difficulty is going to become i think if the russians are going to open up with their much more lethal weaponry that they've held back using that is going to become a hellhole for everybody concerned and including any reporters still

in the field near near the action points we should uh we should mention before we leave one other difference between now and back then when uh you were out on the front lines and I was in the safety of the studio. a training and a preparation by legitimate and real news organizations who put their people through these various training courses to deal with situations on the ground. I mean, I had to do them for, you know, Afghanistan and Iraq. I know you've been in the same kind of situations, but in the early days, it was basically you got on a plane in Toronto and off you went. Absolutely. You know we didn't have even have first aid training before going to a place like el salvador civil war and you know journalists and anchors like yourself had to fight pretty damn

hard with management over the years not so bad at cbc but in some networks really hard to get these reforms like how about a helmet What about decent flak jackets? And what about this training for war we hear that the BBC is doing and a few others? And now they have it and they're much, much better prepared. I mean, there were times when I think back and I get sweaty upon thinking, you know, if my sound person, my camera person, had had a leg half blown off or something beside me, I wouldn't have had a clue what to do.

Nothing. I had no first aid. Of course, I got my own training in time. But nowadays, people are prepared for the very worst scenarios, right up to they give them training on what happens if you're kidnapped, which I think is a wonderful thing. The reporters should all go through very seriously. Yes, we're better

prepared for that better prepared for the amount of information they go into the field with we used to have an old folder with seven or eight wire stories sometimes flying in to a country in a hurry now they go in with masses thousands of words of research and the rest of it um so they're better prepared in so many other ways and also the deaths the anchors are much better prepared you were always prepared of course peter but you know they're always very careful to say to reporter now listen if things get difficult you know we want you to go to shelter i'm not sure how that would message would go with joe schlesinger no there were very few messages that went over with joe's a few old style reporters and if you had told them hey we want to make sure you're safe you

go on your shelter now if you feel at risk i think the incoming to you would have been pretty spectacular exactly uh brian listen as always great to talk to you, and thanks for this. Oh, my pleasure, Peter. Brian Stewart. You know, I remember the first time, I remember one of the first times I met Brian. We were both on a course in Toronto. I'd come in, flown in from the West. He'd flown in from Montreal.

And it wasn't a preparation for war reporting. It was a performance kind of thing. And this guy was like a drama producer, a very well-known one and one of the best, was working on our control of our voices. And I remember I'd arrived late from Winnipeg and I came in, I walked in this room, and opened the door,

and there was Brian Stewart lying on the floor doing some kind of exercises with his voice. And, you know, he was lying on his back, and he had his hands on his chest, and he was making strange noises coming out of his voice box. And this was something you were supposed to do before you did it on camera so you had good control of your voice.

It seemed bizarre at the time, but not as bizarre as a couple of years later when Brian called me from the bar at the hotel in Beirut where he'd been covering the Lebanon War. And it was nighttime for him. It was early in the evening for me. And I said, how's it going? It looks just unbelievably dangerous. He said, I was out today near one of the front lines, and we were being shelled.

And I was about to do it on camera, and I thought, you know what? I'm not going to be able to lie down like that producer told us we're supposed to with my hands on my chest coughing so I could get my voice ready. He was joking, of course. But it was a great memory. I won't forget either parts of that story. Just like I won't forget today's episode, important notes to make about Putin,

but also about journalism. And we'll keep tracking this story, obviously, through the week. Tomorrow is Wednesday, Smoke, Mirrors, and the Truth. Bruce Anderson will be by. And I'm not sure what we'll talk about yet, but I'm sure whatever it is,

you'll find it interesting because you always seem to do that. All right, I'm Peter Mansbridge. This has been The Bridge. Thanks so much for listening. We'll talk to you again in 24 hours. Thank you.