The Bridge with Peter Mansbridge - Who and What Is Underwater in Canada's Arctic? - Encore

Episode Date: December 24, 2024

An encore of historian and author, Professor Adam Lajeunesse of ST FX University in Nova Scotia.

And hello there, Peter Mansbridge here. It's time for your holiday edition encore episode of The Bridge. For this, we go back to November 26, a story about the Arctic. Hope you enjoy it. And hello there, welcome to Tuesday. Welcome to another feature interview today. I'll tell you with whom in a moment, but first of all, Justin Trudeau yesterday made it clear at a conference in Montreal that Canada is on a clear path to hit NATO's defence target of 2% of GDP for each country that is a member nation of NATO. Canada has been taking a bit of a beating from some of its allies over the last while,

not just the United States, on the fact that that target has not been met yet. So the question is, how are you going to get there? Because it involves a lot of money. And one way of potentially getting there, and we were just talking about this yesterday with Dr. Jenna Stein, is the submarine program. Canada could be buying as many as a dozen new submarines. Takes a long time to get them, but it takes a lot of money to get them too. And that's a lot of

spending. But to understand this issue, you've really got to understand the history of submarines in Canada's Arctic. Because it's just sort of assumed that everybody knows it. Well, I don't think so. I like to think I'm kind of in touch with what's going on in the Arctic to a small degree, but I'm learning every day. I'm certainly learning on this issue of submarines in the north. Who has them? Who doesn't have them? Who uses them in our north? Who doesn't? Who might be?

There's a lot of good questions there. And today, to answer them, somebody who's been on the bridge before, it's been a while, a couple of years, since Dr. Adam Lajunas from St. of X in Nova Scotia has been on the program, but he's an expert, right? He probably doesn't like to have that phrase used, but he is an expert on these subjects. He's an author. He's a historian. He understands the Arctic.

He understands the submarine program. He's written on it. He's got a number of books out there. Technically, he's a PhD associate professor and coordinator of the public policy and governance program at St. of X University. Also holds a research chair in Arctic and marine security at the Brian Mulrooney Institute of Government at SFX. And he's a Fulbright scholar. So listen, he's got lots of credentials and they're all real.

They're not like me and my honorary degrees. These are like the real deal. Anyway, we're going to talk to Adam, the professor. Okay, I want to run Professor Lajeunesse without interruption. So as a result, we're going to take our break right now, and we'll be back right after this. And welcome back. You're listening to The Bridge for this Tuesday.

You're listening on Sirius XM, Channel 167. Canada Talks are on your favorite podcast platform. Our guest this week, Dr. Adam Lajunas, the Mulroney Chair in Arctic and Maritime Security at St. FX University in Nova Scotia. He's been on the program before. He's great to talk to about the subject

we have today, which is all about submarines in Canada's Arctic. So, stand by and listen because you're going to learn some history, and you're going to learn some basic facts about the situation right now. So, let's get started. Here we go with Dr. Adam Lejeunesse. professor i guess the uh the best way to start this is to try and you know define what we're talking about i mean obviously talking about submarines in the arctic but for the purposes of this discussion what's the arctic what do you what do you see as the boundaries for the arctic

in this discussion well i think you could ask 10 different academics and get 10 different answers about what exactly the Arctic is. From the perspective of submarine operations, from a Canadian perspective at least, what we normally mean are two distinct regions. The first, of course, is the Northwest Passage, which are the straits within the Canadian Arctic archipelago connecting the Beaufort Sea to the Atlantic Ocean, several different straits running through Canada. Now, of course, the second region is the polar basin, that area north and northwest of the Arctic Archipelago, the Arctic Ocean, which during the Cold War was, of course, a contested region with American and Soviet submarines moving back and forth and practicing the use of those polar waters both as missile launching sites and potentially as an avenue of attack. Okay it would help for a lot of listeners and I should have said this beforehand is if they got a map and had it in front of them. You know, your basic almost school map of Canada,

which always includes the Arctic. So basically what we're talking about here then is the Northwest Passage and north of the Northwest Passage. And the Northwest Passage is tricky because there are any number of different Northwest Passages. But if you assume the one that was first traversed and moved from there north. So what I want to try and understand is

when did submarines start going into that area and north of it? Well, the Americans started to experiment with under-ice submarine technology pretty much right after the Second World War, undertaking some very daring exercises north of Alaska with World War II era submarines, accepting a decree of danger and risk that we would never take today. And then, of course, they continued on throughout the entire Cold War and that technology and the capacity, the design of the submarines getting better and better. The Americans started working in the Canadian Arctic across the Northwest Passage in the 1960s. These were, of course, nuclear attack submarines with power plants capable of sustaining a submarine under the ice or underwater for months at a time. Essentially, they had an unlimited range that that's what made these submarines so capable for the Arctic.

You could stay underneath for as long as essentially your food held up. So in 1960, the Americans had the first transit of the Northwest Passage. That was a submarine called the Sea Dragon. And then again in 1962, they sent the USS Skate through. And then over the 1970s and 1980s, the Americans explored almost every channel of the Northwest Passage for different reasons, both to do hydrographic surveying, to figure out where they could go and how they could get there, and working with the Canadians to test our increasingly sophisticated under-ice detection systems, looking, of course, for the Soviets, should they begin to trespass in our backyard.

Okay, well, let me back you up on a couple of things there. As soon as the Americans started going into Canadian waters, underwater, did we know about it? Was Canada fully aware? Yes, absolutely we were. So the first voyages in the 1960s were built on a lot of the hydrographic work that was done by Canadian icebreakers, particularly HMCS Labrador, in the 1950s. And so as the Americans were building northern radar systems,

to-do line, looking for Russian bombers, they were, of course, surveying those waters because they needed to bring supply ships up to build these radar stations. So as they were surveying these waters, the American Navy was asking the Canadian Coast Guard to look for potential submarine routes. They were already thinking about this in the 1950s. And of course, the Canadian Navy, I should say Navy, not the Coast Guard at the time,

was very happy to do this. This wasn't a sovereignty issue. This is a continental defense issue. Both the Canadian and American governments recognized the need to begin exercising more control over these waters as part of continental defense. So in the 60s, when the Americans were sending these submarines north, there were Canadians on board. There was certainly Canadian involvement. The Canadians were fully aware of what was happening.

And of course, like I said, they were providing some of the hydrographic surveying to make these voyages possible. Am I right in assuming that at that time we had no submarines capable of doing anything like that? No, absolutely not. At the time, it was really the Americans that were working in the Arctic. Even the Soviets were really just starting to experiment with under ice operations, but it was really the Americans that were at the forefront pioneering Arctic under ice operations with their submarines. So as far as we knew at that time, the only other nation under our ice was the Americans. Yes, absolutely. Now, there's no record of the Soviets having ever sent a submarine into the Canadian Arctic.

But then again, we may not simply know about that. The Soviet archives were never opened to us. We don't have those records. We may suspect, we may assume, but the only records we have of foreign activity in the Canadian Arctic, at least, is of the Americans. Okay, in a moment I'm going to get to when we think that changed. But let me go back to something you said in your earlier comments,

which was the Americans recognized that Canada had a certain expertise in underwater technology in terms of listening and knowing what was going on. When did that start? When did we have that capability? That is a long, long process stretching over decades. It was really in the 1960s that both we and the Americans started to realize that we needed better situational awareness in the Arctic. Because, of course, if the Americans are moving through the Northwest Passage, there was at least the future possibility that the Soviets would do the same. And we were worried about two things.

And the first was that Soviet submarines might in the future use Canadian waters to bypass what was called the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom gap, Jayuk gap. So you could send submarines through Canada to bypass the heavy NATO defenses around the Greenland, Iceland area. So it was a backdoor, if you were. The second consideration was that at the time, shorter range missiles meant that a Soviet submarine firing either conventional or nuclear weapons on North America needed to get a lot closer. So we started to think, well, the Arctic, the Labrador Sea, the Beaufort Sea, even the Hudson's Bay area might be a firing location for Soviet missiles. So both we and the Americans realized more needed to be done to understand and monitor this area. So over the 60s, over the 70s and into the 80s, we were working with U.S. defense labs to build Sono Boys, under ice, fixed listening systems, set systems, a whole bunch of different technologies were tested out. A lot of American tech being used by Canadian defense labs with partnerships across D&D,

different American defense and civilian experts and labs. It was a huge project, series of projects really, designed to build some kind of under ice detection system. Now, how effective it ever was, we don't know. That's still classified. But we know that by the 80s at least, we were making serious efforts to try and track and identify any Soviet submarines that might come through. You know, at different times in explaining that technology, the Canadian officials have said, well, you know, it wasn't just to look for Soviet subs.

It was also, you know, tracking fish movement and weather trials and all of that. Was it a combination of all these things or was it mainly this is a defense mechanism? That's what we're using it for. You know, it's hard to say because, of course, understandably, so many of these records are still classified. I would say from my reading, this was purely a defense issue. I mean, some of these sensors you can use to access the Atlantic Ocean from the Arctic Ocean. And these were the choke points that Canadian defense labs were working with the Americans to deploy these prototype sensor systems. So I would say that, you know, this was, this is purely, or at least largely a defense consideration? I want to move gradually towards where we are in the present.

But on the way there, I want to totally understand the difference between conventional subs, which is what Canada has and has always had, versus nuclear-powered subs, and their abilities in a region like the Arctic. Am I correct in assuming that conventional subs are basically for above surface? They don't really go under surface if that surface is ice. Well, it's a little bit more complex than that. So at the heart of the difference is the reactor core. So what is the power source for this submarine? Now, a nuclear power powered submarine, a nuclear attack submarine or ballistic missile submarine has a power source that is essentially infinite for practical purposes. And so this submarine can stay under the water or under the ice for as long as it needs to. It only needs to surface in order to reprovision the crew. As long as you have food, you can stay under the water. Now, a conventional submarine has a much

shorter lifespan under the water. It has to surface in order to recharge its batteries. So it runs on a diesel engine. Which has exhaust. Which means it needs to be on the surface. Or it runs on batteries. Under the water. And those batteries need to be recharged on the surface. So modern diesel submarines. Can still stay under the water.

For weeks at a time. But their power level is rather limited. Which means if they're underwater. And they're looking for an extended stay underwater, they're moving rather slowly. So for the Arctic, what this means is you cannot project power deep under the Arctic ice with a conventional submarine. It simply doesn't have the range and the staying power to move under the ice. It also often, depending on the type of submarine, is going to have a much harder time surfacing through the ice because these are traditionally much smaller submarines. They don't have the same weight as a big American nuclear attack submarine, so it's much harder to surface through the ice. From a safety perspective too, you need to be able to

surface through that ice in case something goes wrong. And so it is very dangerous to send a conventional submarine deep under the ice. So what Canada is looking at, all of the different designs from the different countries that we're looking at right now, they all have an Arctic capability to a certain extent. They can go under the ice. Any submarine can do that. Like I said, the Americans had submarines in the 1940s that they were testing under ice. The question is, how long can they stay under ice? How far can they go safely before they have to return? So what Canada is looking at is not an Arctic submarine per se.

They're looking at a submarine capable of operating along the ice edge, something that is operating in the blue water in the open ocean, but with the capacity to pop under the ice for a little bit and pull back. Well, that sounds great if the ice keeps retreating, but it doesn't sound like you've got much penetration into the region that you're concerned about if it doesn't. So I think here's where we need clarity not on the submarine itself but on the mission that it is meant to achieve and i think when people talk about an arctic capability they are sometimes talking at cross purposes about two different things so on the one hand you have these american nuclear attack submarines that have been operating in the polar basin for generations now.

These are the kinds of submarines. These are the weapon systems that the Americans and NATO more generally would use to secure that region and to project power through the Arctic and even against Russia, God forbid, in the event of war. What D&D and the Canadians are actually looking at when they're talking about Arctic capability is a guard for those back doors that I talked about earlier. So in order to get into or out of the Canadian Arctic, at least from the east or the west, you need to move through some strategic choke points. You need to move through either Bering Strait on the western coast, or you need to move up the west coast of Greenland in the east. You can't access the Canadian Arctic, except from the Arctic Ocean, without going through those choke points. So I believe D&D,

when it talks about an Arctic-capable submarine, wants a submarine that can guard that front and back door to our Arctic. And of course, if you're moving through the Canadian Arctic from the Arctic Ocean, trying to get into the Atlantic, you have to go through that door. So that is just a vital contribution to continental defense and to the Arctic more generally, because even if you can't be in the Northwest Passage safely for an extended period of time, we're talking about, in this case, basing the submarines at the two doors, the two back doors on east and west. You don't have to go through the Northwest Passage. You don't have to be in through the Arctic Archipelago. You're just on either side watching who's coming in or leaving.

Yeah, it's pretty much as simple as that, Peter. Now, if you want to add a layer of complexity, you have to remember that the Russians today have inherited Soviet capabilities. They can operate in the Northwest Passage. They can operate in the Arctic Ocean. And if they so choose to do so, then there's nothing that we could really do. And so it's not simply a case of working independently, watching those two doors. We're doing that, but we're doing it as part of a much broader continental defense initiative with the United States. And so while we are doing that, it's the Americans with their somewhat unique Arctic capability able to work in the Arctic Ocean, the polar basin, and monitor that area. And these activities shouldn't be done in isolation or in silos. They have to be integrated into that bigger continental defense picture that I talked about. And during

the Cold War, this is something most Canadians don't understand, is we worked so closely with the Americans on that big continental defense picture. I think we sort of reflexively think of American operations in the North, American submarines as a violation of Canadian sovereignty, somehow threatening to us. The reality is, even as governments were sometimes arguing over the politics

and the legality of Arctic sovereignty and the existence or non-existence of freedom of transit rights, the submarines were operating there in a very well um in a very neighborly fashion for lack of a better term the dnd and the american navy were working together these operations were taking place and it was you know it it was non it was not damaging to canada's sovereignty claims in any way. And of course, we were there because we had that bigger picture in mind.

We knew that the Soviets were a threat. And we knew that regardless of political or legal questions of sovereignty, this was a cooperative endeavor that needed to be undertaken. And we did. Have we ever had any firm proof that the Soviets have been in our Arctic waters? No, no firm proof at all. That's not to say it doesn't exist, but I think it's safe to say that this is one of the more classified defense subjects

that you can look into from both the Canadian and American governments. They're quite reticent to release documentation on submarine operations. Because, you know, it's not just the Soviets who have these capable submarines, right? The British have them, the French have them. I assume the Chinese have them. Russians obviously have them. Would any of those countries have to have or would they ever ask permission have they ever asked permission of the brits or the french being in the arctic to the best of our

knowledge the french have never been there but once again very classified subject that's not to say they haven't been the brits we know do have a history of operating in the polar basin in the arctic ocean we know that they've been there we in the polar basin, in the Arctic Ocean. We know that they've been there. We have pictures of them surfacing at the North Pole. Now, whether or not they've been in the Canadian Arctic, well, that's a little bit hazier. We know that in 1979 and 1981, the Brits, the Americans, and the Canadians were working together on what were called the Canada-U, US Arctic exercises, which was a combination of polar deployments of nuclear submarines and tests of Canadian

listening systems. So we know that they were there, but it seems from the available evidence that they were there as part of a broader NATO alliance framework. So they were there, but they seem to be working with us. Let me just go back to the backdoor thing again. I should have asked this at the time, but could either conventional or unconventional nuclear submarines work in that role? Yes, you can really monitor space with any kind of submarine and that seems to be the role that the the navy is looking to fill with these submarines that we're looking to procure still early days we're still divining defining the concept of operation but really any submarine

can hold and monitor and defend a space. Now, despite being generally less capable than their nuclear cousins, conventional submarines actually have some important strengths. Because they don't have a nuclear reactor, which needs to be on all the time, cooled and pumped, conventional submarines underwater are actually quieter they're smaller they're stealthier they are actually more capable of silent listening and defense of a of a fixed region year-round operation on the back door thing is that possible it is so it depends what time of year you're going to be operating in a different space because of the ice. However, the exit from the Canadian Arctic, from the Northwest Passage, you know, there will always be a relatively confined area that moves into the Arctic that is ice-free. Now, whether or not that's the sort of west coast of Greenland

or more off the southwest coast of Greenland into the Atlantic, depending on the time of year, your defensive line, if you will, will move up or down. But there will always be a place where a conventional submarine can operate to watch those doors. What about cost? Is there a drastic difference between the cost of the kind of conventional subs that Canada may be looking at versus your basic nuclear-powered sub,

if there's such a thing? Yeah, there absolutely is, and that's the reason we're not looking at nuclear power. Is that the reason? Is it all about cost, or is it about our kind of thing about, you know, nuclear on the military side? Well, I hope it's not about preconceived notions about nuclear power more generally. I would say Canadian society is actually falling back in love with nuclear power. If you look at the media trends, if you look what the government is talking about, I think climate change is driving us back into a reconsideration of how dangerous nuclear power is relative to the alternatives. A nuclear submarine is not nuclear armed. It does not have nuclear weapons. That's merely the power plant. It's the cost. So nuclear submarines are going to be much more expensive.

They're twice as large, much bigger crews, and there's really only a couple of countries that make them. Now, the reality is, even if we wanted to procure nuclear submarines, if we went to the Americans tomorrow and said, you know, we'll take 10 off the shelf, please, the Americans don't have shipyard capacity to build them because the American Navy has ordered their own. I mean, no country really has the shipyard capacity to build them because the American Navy has ordered their own. I mean,

no country really has the shipyard capacity to get us these submarines. The real question, however, is the logistics. To build a nuclear submarine, you're not just looking at the added cost of the submarine. You need different port facilities, specialized port facilities, a lot of very specialized logistics, nuclear handling technology. You need a lot of training. facilities, a lot of very specialized logistics, nuclear handling technology. You need a lot of training. You need a lot of equipment. About two thirds of the cost of a nuclear submarine acquisition would not be the submarines. It would actually be specialized port facilities, equipment, logistics just to maintain and manage these submarines.

So quite frankly, I think the cost is prohibitive for nuclear submarines for Canada. And I think the Navy did the smart thing, pushing them aside right away and defining our requirements as conventional submarines. And it's not as if the conventional ones are a bargain, as you say. That would be a huge expense. Absolutely.

The conventional submarines, like any complex military equipment, they're going to be very, very expensive. That's just the reality of procuring modern warships. What does your gut tell you? I mean, you study this for a living. The talk is of 12 when they could be, what, mid to late 30s before you see them delivered. What does your gut tell you?

The thing about defense is things change all the time in terms of what's the right thing for a defense strategy. And when you're looking 10 to 15 years down the road, that's a challenging prediction to be making. So if you're asking what my gut is saying, Peter, I think I'm quite worried. I'm worried because the procurement environment that we have today is not conducive to the threat environment that we have today. We don't have 15 years to build this. This isn't 2010, 2005. We don't have decades to select, procure, build, train, bring online. We need these submarines

yesterday. The idea that, frankly, the Russians or the Chinese may wait for us to have gone through this lengthy process, 2030s, early 2040s to bring this fleet online. Well, that's ridiculous. The threat is today. It is absolutely today. I mean, we look at Europe, we look at what's happening in Ukraine. We look at the near weekly threats as the Chinese government are making over Taiwan. We need these as soon as we can possibly procure them. So there's different directions that we can go. So there's several different countries with different design options that we can procure. And the Navy has been very good in saying that we want something that is in service or very nearly ready to go. We're not designing our own. That is a whole can of worms that would create a disaster.

There are several European options which are about to be built. They're just at the beginning of construction. The one option that is ready to go with the hot production line is the offering from South Korea. And that is probably the fastest submarine that we could bring into service. So the considerations here are how quickly can we get these? Are we bringing them online in 2030 or are we just starting to bring them online in 2035? That is a very important consideration. The next consideration is crewing. So we want 12 of these or up to 12.

Today, the Canadian Navy has enough crew for maybe two submarines, give or take. So we would need to not only bring these submarines online, we need to train the people to operate in them. That's a serious consideration. We need to start bringing them online as soon as possible, not just to get the submarines themselves, but we need to start training new crew. Well, if the South Koreans build subs as well as they build cars these days, that sounds like one pretty good option of the options that are out there. We don't have a great track record on subs in terms of the ones we've purchased, their serviceability. I remember when the latest ones, one of the Victoria class that we bought used from Britain.

I remember back in the day when I was working for the CBC, we traveled on the first voyage of one of those subs as we were coming to Canada. It has sprung a leak halfway across the Atlantic, which was not a great start. And it hasn't really been followed through with great finishes either. Well, the thing to remember with the Victoria class is this was never meant to be the next class of submarines that we would drive into the distant future. The Victorias were meant to be a bridge

of sort between our Oberon class, which we were retiring and whatever would come next. And so the Navy procured the Victorias as a, that's what was out there. We can find these, we can get them right away. So we're going to, we're going to use these to maintain our capability until we can transition to the next thing. We just let the next thing drop. And we used the Victorious far longer than I think we had originally intended to use them. And the reason we got those was because we didn't want to lose all of the Arctic submarine capability within our crews. You can't just go five years in between submarine

fleets. If you lose a submarine class, if you have to retire them, you can't tell all of the crews to just hang out for a few years until the next boats are online. They'll go away. They'll go do other things. And then when you have your new submarine class coming into service, you can't put an ad on, you know, monster.ca for submarine crew. This experience doesn't exist. You need to maintain it. If you lose it, it's an extraordinary difficult process to get it back. So when we're talking about timing of the submarines, it's not just that the threat is today and we need these now. We need them as soon as possible so that we don't lose all of that capability.

Right. You need a commander of a submarine with 20 years of experience and you can't hire someone with 20 years experience. You need to build these now to not lose that corporate knowledge. Of any of the existing, it's four, right? The Victoria class submarines. That's right. As you say, two are operational.

Have they ever been up into the Arctic as we defined it earlier? Yeah, they have. I think a couple of times. There's one famous photograph of Stephen Harper up north with a frigate and a submarine and a few aircraft. But like any other conventional submarine, they have capability. They can go under ice. Anything that can go underwater can go under ice. But they're not designed for that. They don't have the sensors. They certainly don't have the hull strengthening to surface through ice. This is not what they're

meant for. So the Canadian Navy has only ever sent the Victorias up north for a few almost symbolic voyages, to the best of my knowledge. Professors, it's been a fascinating conversation, as it has been the other time you were on the bridge, and we really appreciate your time. Obviously, we're going to be following this story and see what headway not only the current government makes on this, but the very likelihood that there could be another government

within another year and what approach they're going to take on this same question. It's going to be a challenge for whoever's sitting in the seat of power in Ottawa. Professor, thanks again. Thanks, Peter. Always a pleasure to be here. And always a pleasure for us to talk to Dr. Adam Lejeunesse

from St. FX in Nova Scotia. Hope you enjoyed that conversation. And, you know, I love submarine stories. I love submarine movies. You know, I've seen them all. at least I think I've seen them all. Going back to, you know, Second World War movies about U-boats and British boats and American boats and of course

current movies as well. I should mention, you know, I mentioned during that conversation about the time CBC traveled across the North Atlantic with one of the new Victoria-class submarines, new to us, old to the Brits who sold it to us, and the problems they encountered. I didn't want to leave the impression that I'd been on that trip. I wish I had been on it, but I wasn't on it. It was Dan Bjarnason, great reporter, good friend.

We worked together in Winnipeg in the 70s. Anyway, Dan was on there with, I think it was Brian Kelly, who was a freelance cameraman in London, but did a lot of work, or did in those days a lot of work with us, the CBC. And I think he was the camera on that shoot with Dan. Could be wrong on that, but I think he was. Okay, before we go today, tomorrow's an encore edition, remember that. Before we go today, though, we've got time for a little end bit.

I like this one. It was in the New York Times. It was a newsletter about thinking about your health before you get on a plane. And this was based on research with Dr. Paolo Alves, who's the Global Medical Director of Aviation Health at Medair, which provides remote medical assistance to airlines. Anyway, here's a couple. I'll just give you these quickly.

If you often get motion sickness, look a seat over the wing, because that's more stable than anywhere else on the plane, fore or aft, okay? Over the wing. Reconsider your trip if you have an ear or sinus infection. When you're in flight, congestion can make it harder to adjust to changing air pressure,

which could result in pain, bleeding, even a ruptured eardrum. Yikes. Untreated toothaches and postponed root canals can be similarly painful during flights. You notice any pain or swelling? Get it looked at before you fly. Here's Dr. Alvarez's number one tip. If you're not feeling

well in general, avoid flying or clear it with your doctor first. Many of the heart attacks that we see happening in flight, for example, retrospectively, the person will say, you know what, I wasn't feeling well before boarding. When you pack, make sure you put your medications in your carry-on luggage, not your check luggage. A check luggage is not going to do you any good if you suddenly need your meds, and that check luggage is down in the belly somewhere. Bring your own water on board, not just because it's important to stay hydrated.

Ideally, the suggestion here is you should drink eight ounces of water each hour. So that, you know, on a long flight, you're going to, not only are you going to drink a lot of water, you're going to make a lot of trips down the aisle too. If there's flight turbulence, flight attendants must stay seated so you could be thirsty for a long time. That's why they're saying bring your own water. And here's another little tip. You can also bring peppermint or ginger tea bags

which can soothe your stomach. If you get stomach trouble, ask a flight attendant for some hot water. At the airport before you board, avoid carbonated drinks with meals for at least an hour before boarding. Eating a large meal increases the chance of swallowing air, he added. This is Dr. Alves. And all that gas will expand in high altitudes. That can hurt sometimes so badly

that people think they've got appendicitis. Before you board, take a second to run through a checklist of everything you need for the flight, including snacks, over-the-counter meds. Ask yourself, what would make this flight better, safer, and healthier? There's more. Go to the New York Times newsletters. What to do to get ready for a flight. There's lots of little things in there.

Anyway, you might find some of that interesting, even if you just find one of them. Learn something every time. I haven't realized drinking that much water on the flight, especially long flights. You know, you do those transatlantic flights, which I do, you know, a fair number of times a year. That's a good thing to know.

Well, I hope you enjoyed that Encore episode of The Bridge from November 26.