The Bulwark Podcast - Anne Applebaum: The Case for a Complete Ukrainian Victory

Episode Date: May 16, 2023

Ukraine's freedom is on the line, but America's role in the world is also at stake. And if a democratic Ukraine can win against autocratic Russia, the world's geopolitics could be altered for a generation. Anne Applebaum joins Charlie Sykes on today's podcast. show notes: https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2023/06/counteroffensive-ukraine-zelensky-crimea/673781/ Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

Welcome to the Bulwark Podcast. I'm Charlie Sykes. It is May 16th, 2023, and we are in Washington, D.C. As you know, we're going to be taking the Bulwark Podcast on the road Thursday night in New York City, and you'll be able to hear my one-on-one with my colleague Tim Miller on Friday morning. Also, we continue to have more breaking news for those of you who are tuning in and want to hear about what happened with the Durham investigation, which ended not with a bang, but with a whimper, or as Donald Trump would put it, total exoneration. There's a lot going on there, and we're going to be devoting tomorrow's edition of the Trump trials to going through that. I'm going to be joined by Lawfare's Ben Wittes,

and we're going to walk through the whole Russia story again. As you know, usually the Trump trials is on Thursday, but we figured with the breaking news that we would move it up till Wednesday. Also in the news, and we are going to be doing this as well on tomorrow's podcast, the latest stories about America's mayor, Rudy Giuliani. I think you probably know most of the top lines there. I mean, the former aide was suing America's mayor, alleging that he made her work naked, made her perform oral sex, drank all day and night, made racist remarks, made sexist remarks, made anti-Semitic remarks, didn't pay his bills, and allegedly was selling pardons for $2 million apiece and, according to the allegation, may be splitting it. Now, again, we don't know all of the evidence there, but this is one of those stories where the salacious details might distract from the weight. Rudy Giuliani was selling presidential pardons for cash. I mean, that might be a problem, don't you think? And so this will be another one of the topics that we're going to explore in more detail. But that will be in tomorrow's podcast,

because today we're going to be taking a deep dive into what's happening in Ukraine, including the pivotal moment that we are in as we wait for the counteroffensive, and whether or not this will lead to a stalemate or the possibility of Ukrainian victory, and what Ukrainian victory might mean for the world going forward. On today's podcast, we're going to take a deep dive into the new cover story in the Atlantic Monthly Magazine, The Case for the Total Liberation of Ukraine. And our guest today is Anne Applebaum, staff writer at The Atlantic, whose books include Red Famine, Stalin's War in Ukraine, the Pulitzer Prize-winning Gulag, A History, and more recently, Twilight of Democracy. Anne, welcome back on the podcast.

Thanks for having me. Well, you were on the show last year after you and Jeffrey Goldberg met with President Zelensky in his compound. And back then, you know, you had to take this train. There was no timetable. The center of Kiev was blacked out. There was only one restaurant in the city that was open. You met with the president again a couple of weeks ago. Give me a sense of how Kiev is different from your visit a year ago. It's fundamentally different. The city is open. There's traffic. There are restaurants. There are hotels, there appear to be tourists. I mean, maybe they're a special kind of tourist, but there are people there who don't look like war correspondents or aid people staying in the hotels.

And Zelensky himself is much more relaxed. He spoke English with us. His English is a little broken, but he didn't speak English at all a year ago. He said, yes, I've had a lot of practice. You know, it's more of a formal experience. He's got lots of English speaking aides now who hang around. That was also not the case. And the feeling of emergency is over. So the war is definitely not over. And in fact, as we're speaking, there has been a recent set of missile attacks on the capital, on Kiev. So the war is definitely not over. And in fact, as we're speaking, there's been a recent set of missile attacks on the capital, on Kiev. So even the threat to Kiev isn't gone. But the Ukrainians are much more self-confident about their ability to survive and about their ability

to talk to the outside world. Your article makes a very, very strong case for Ukrainian victory. And I want to get to that in just a moment. But I just want to walk through your piece, which is really, really remarkable. And you start with what I think can be described as a grave robbing mystery. Why the Russians stole the bones of Prince Grigory Potemkin, one of the great figures of Russian history. Why did the Russians feel it necessary to steal a long dead guy's bones? So we didn't actually get to the answer of that question. You know, it's ultimately a mystery. So Potemkin, for those who don't know, is famous for two things. In Russia, he's remembered as really the great imperial conqueror. He's the one who conquered

what's now southern Ukraine and made it part of Russia. It belonged to other peoples. There were Cossack settlements there. There were Crimean Tartars in that region, and he conquered it, made it Russian. Outside of Russia, he's most famous for Potemkin villages, and the Potemkin villages were supposedly something that he constructed on Catherine the Great's tour of exactly that region. She went around what's now Khorasan and Crimea, and supposedly Potemkin built these fake villages with, you know, fake peasants looking happy so that she would be fooled into not knowing what she was seeing. That may or may not be true. The great historian of, biographer rather, of Potemkin, Simon Sebeck Montaguir, thinks it's probably not true, but- Disappointing.

Yes, disappointing. But the legend sticks because it reflects something we do know to be true, which is that the ease with which autocrats are fooled by sycophants around them and the desire of those sycophants to fool them. And of course, something like that has happened again in Southern Ukraine, where Putin seemed to think he would win easily, he would run this region with no difficulty, because it was really Russia. And that turned out not to be the case. In any case, Potemkin was buried in Kherson in the St. Catherine's Cathedral there, which he had built. And we went to the cathedral on a Sunday during mass, actually, we went in between two masses, and asked to be let down into the crypt,

which was quite weird. It's a, literally there's a trap door in the nave and you walk down a little set of stairs and then there's an empty space and it's full of, it's just got a concrete slab because they took him away. And the question is, did they take him away because they're never coming back again? Or did they take it away to please Putin? Or, as President Zelensky says, they just took it away because they steal everything. They steal dishwashers, you know, and washing machines and cell phones. And they actually stole raccoons from the Kyrgyzstan Zoo. So, you know, they steal just whatever they can get their hands on. And they stole the bones of Potemkin. As you recount, you know, back in September, Putin staged that sham referendum in the citykin. As you recount, you know, back in September, Putin staged that sham referendum in the city and other occupied areas when, you know,

claiming that people were voting overwhelmingly to join Russia. But as you point out, Kherson did not become Russia, the partisans fought back. So by October, it had really become Putin's new Potemkin village, right, as Ukrainian troops were edging closer. Yes, no, Kherson was a kind of Potemkin village. It was made for Putin to look like it was pro-Russian. They staged a referendum there. We know from other parts of the occupied territory that Russian soldiers in that region would send home photographs and videos of events designed to show pro-Russian activism in the region, even when it wasn't true. So there was an attempt to portray to Putin that this was somehow Russian territory, but of course it wasn't, and the people who lived there didn't want it to be. And the Ukrainian army took it back last November. I mean, it has to be said that it's still

under attack all the time. Kherson is right on the Dnieper River. It's right across the river from the Russian army. So it's not peaceful and safe now, but it's also not Russia. You talked to President Zelensky about this, and he really wasn't that interested in talking about the grave robbing. He says, I don't love the past. We have to jump forward, not back. He really seems to be very, very focused on the moment right now. So he wanted to talk more about Silicon Valley than he did about Prince Potemkin. He really did. I mean, we asked him a question, a general question about Ukraine and tech, and he, it was like someone had opened the floodgates and he talked about a university that he wants to found. And he talked about Ukraine's famous digital ministry, which really

has created this amazing app so that all Ukrainians can have all their documents on a phone, which of course is very important in times of the war because, you know, people are moving around and refugees and so on. And he wanted to talk about what Ukraine would do after the war and what kind of country it would be and what it would look like. In a way, he doesn't even want to talk about Putin. He said something like, you know, people overrate Putin. He's not that interesting. He's a figure that will be passed. You know, we can move beyond him. And they really want to focus on what they can do now to transform the country and win the war. And this arguments about empire and Russia and so on are really, for him, boring. This conversation in your cover story really is marking that this is the pivot moment. This is the turning point.

And you point out, I mean, this was a much more polished visit this time. There was videographers and English-speaking aid. But then you write behind the polished presentation, the tension and uncertainty persist, fueled by the sense that we're once again at a turning point, once again at a moment when key decisions will be made in Kiev, of course, but especially in Washington. What are they thinking and feeling about what is happening here domestically, the debate that we are having? Are they concerned? Are they confident that America is going to be a reliable ally? So I would say they're confident at the moment. They are, I think, genuinely grateful for the

support from America. It was more than many Ukrainians expected. They're equally grateful for the support from Europe. Actually, as we're speaking, Zelensky has recently returned or he's on his way back from a trip to Paris and London and Berlin where he got more support. And I think they're feeling pretty confident. And I think they're right because at the moment, there's no serious challenge to Western support for this coming there is a great deal of concern about what happens if President Trump, not just if he wins, but even if he's the candidate, because he's so clearly anti-Ukrainian and pro-Russian. And he will therefore have the influence to shape a part

of the political spectrum and its views. So they're worried about that. And they're worried about another thing, which is that they don't quite say this on the record, but they're a little bit worried that the United States doesn't really want them to win. You know, we want them to have a draw. We want them to take back some territory, you know, but do we really want them to take back all of the territory and inflict a real defeat on Russia? So, you know, take back Crimea, you know, to destroy the Black Sea fleet, one of those scenarios in which Russia truly loses. And this is a difficult point because it's, you know, our contention, you know, my contention, that it's only if Ukraine can inflict this kind of victory that we have a real shot at ending the war forever. So one of the

things I'm worried about is that the war, there's some kind of stalemate, there's some kind of ceasefire, you know, they agree to some kind of temporary situation, and the war, there's some kind of stalemate, there's some kind of ceasefire, you know, they agree to a some kind of temporary situation, and the war doesn't really end. And so instead, we have some ceasefire, and the Russians retreat, and they rebuild their weapons, and they restock their army, and then they invade again in two years, which is what happened in 2014. And so it's really only by really defeating Russia, and by convincing the Russians that the war was a mistake and creating that kind of political change in Moscow. But I didn't mean regime change. I just mean change in their attitude towards the war and towards Ukraine. It's only then that we really end the war.

Let's jump ahead to this because this is the heart of your article here, which is the case for actual Ukrainian victory. There are a lot of Americans, I think, or a lot of people in the West who are down with, if we defeat Russia, that will be sufficient. You make the case that we need to start thinking about what an actual Ukrainian victory would look like. So again, there is this debate. So what would victory look like to you? But you write that that's not a difficult question for Ukrainians. So let's just walk through that. So what does victory mean in this for Ukraine? I mean, obviously retaining sovereign control of all of the territory within its set of borders, and that includes all of eastern Ukraine, so Donetsk and Luhansk, this area that was occupied in 2014, and it includes Crimea, that was also occupied in 2014. And so, yes, they want to return to that. And their argument, two arguments about Crimea, one is that it was the occupation of Crimea that gave the Russians the idea that they could continue their invasion. You know, it was the failure of

the world to react to that shift in borders. And second, that Crimea has been profoundly changed. It's been militarized over the last eight years. It functions like a kind of aircraft carrier stuck onto the bottom of Ukraine. It's full of soldiers and weapons and actually prisons. This is where a lot of Ukrainians from the occupied territories are in prison. And so it's become this kind of militarized zone focused on the southern Ukrainian coast. And so it's just dangerous for Ukraine to have it there. It's not just about, you know, we need more land because we want to be a bigger country. It's actually about the people who live there. It's about the security situation. It's about the precedent that was set by allowing Russia to absorb Crimea.

But there are two other things the Ukrainians talk about as well. One of them is some kind of justice. So some kind of recognition that there were war crimes, that there was damage done, then some kind of compensation. That could take a lot of different forms. And then the third thing is that Ukraine be part of some kind of security system after the war. So probably it will not be NATO because NATO membership requires the votes of every NATO member. And that probably wouldn't happen at this point.

But some kind of, I don't know, coalition of the willing or some group of countries who are willing to guarantee Ukrainian security just so that they can begin to rebuild the country. Investment can come back in. the refugees can come home, and that there's a feeling that the war is over. Not that it's been delayed for a few years, but that it's actually over because that's really what Ukraine needs to recover. And those are the sort of basic building blocks of some kind of secure peace as far as they're concerned from their point of view. Hey folks, this is Charlie Sykes, host of the Bulwark podcast. We created the Bulwark to provide a platform for pro-democracy voices on the center right and the center left for people who are tired

of tribalism and who value truth and vigorous yet civil debate about politics and a lot more. And every day we remind you folks, you are not the crazy ones. So why not head over to thebullwork.com and take a look around. Every day we produce newsletters and podcasts that will help you make sense of our politics and keep your sanity intact. To get a daily dose of sanity in your inbox, why not try a Bullwork Plus membership free for the next 30 days? To claim this offer, go to thebullwork.com slash charlie. That's thebullwork.com forward slash charlie. We're going to get through this together. I promise. So they're going to be under pressure, even if the counteroffensive is successful, too. If you drive the Russians out of what they had taken in the last year,

that we could have a ceasefire. But you point out, you know, the negotiations that leave a large chunk of Ukraine under Russia's control, that's a non-starter for them right now. They're going to resist that. So we are now talking about, at some point, there's going to be a conversation, right? That we need to take Crimea back. And, you know, this is very symbolic for Russia, but it's also that way for Ukraine. Is that going to be the real flashpoint in the discussions of when do you end this war when the Ukrainians say we must take Crimea back? And is the West going to tell them that's a bridge too far? A lot depends on the progress of the war in the next few months. There is a Ukrainian preparation for a counteroffensive.

They are training troops in Germany and Poland and elsewhere. They are learning how to use new weapons that they've just got. I mean, it may not look like tanks streaming across the countryside. It may be in little bits and pieces. I'm not quite sure what it's going to look like. But there will be. It may be in little bits and pieces. I'm not quite sure what it's going to look like, but there will be an attempt to take back territory. And some of this conversation will depend on that. I mean, once the Ukrainians take back more of the southern coast, if they can, then they are in shooting reach of Crimea anyway. And I don't know

how we stop them. We say, what, you're not allowed to keep going? I find that conversation hard to envision, you know, without them being given something in exchange for that. But yeah, there could be a change since the beginning of the war in most Western capitals. There was a lot of fear and worry about the Russian use of nuclear weapons at the beginning of the war. It's abated for a couple of reasons. One is that we crossed supposed red lines and there was no reaction. Secondly, it's pretty clear that both our deterrence and China's deterrence have had an impact in Russia.

Thirdly, it's not clear how the Russians could use nuclear weapons in a way that would make any difference to the war. I mean, you know, wind blows to the east in that part of the world, and you know, they want to hit their own population. I'm not sure they do. And so there's been a little bit of a sense that that was a, you know, it's something that Putin does to scare us, but it's not as realistic as we thought it was. And so that fear has relaxed quite a bit. As you point out, though, in Western capitals, the preoccupation with the consequences of a Russian defeat has meant far too little time

spent thinking about the consequences of Ukrainian victory. You make a very interesting observation about whatever happens to Putin, because I think there are a lot of people who think, well, okay, at least he is the devil that we know who's going to take his place. I understand your point. You're saying that the worst possible successor imaginable would still be preferable to Putin. It can't get worse. At this point, anybody's preferable. I mean, first of all, whoever comes next, however evil or ugly or vicious they might be, is instantly less powerful. They don't control the same patronage networks. They don't enjoy the same legitimacy. They're instantly the focus of a power struggle. So instantly, it's a much weaker leader. And secondly, whoever comes next

didn't start the war and so has at least theoretically, theoretically, a better chance of ending it. You know, they can blame it on Putin, say it was a terrible idea, and they can end the war. It would be psychologically easier for someone else to do it. That doesn't mean it would happen, but it's a possibility. You know, we have this problem with Russia going back decades, actually, of always preferring whoever it is that we know and we've met, however bad, you know, he might be. I mean, there were commentaries when Stalin died saying, oh, you know, well, now we have to worry about the hardliners waiting in the wings. I was talking about Stalin, one of the worst criminals of the 20th century. And I think letting some of that go and thinking, you know, that there

could be something better or something different. And I'm not saying that there's going to be a democracy or it's going to be a liberal society or anything. You know, I'm not trying to imagine futures that I would like to see. I'm just saying that whoever comes next is weaker and that's better. And also one of the consequences of Ukrainian victory might be that it would inspire people around the world. I mean, this would set a fire. Talk to me about that, the consequences of a victory. This is something I've been told. I mean, this would set a fire. Talk to me about that, the consequences of a victory. This is something I've been told. I mean, I'm told this by other people. So whether it's Venezuelans who know that Russia backs their government and helps keep Maduro in power,

or whether it's Iranians who know there are close links between their government and Russia, you know, the Iranians have lent drones to Russia. It looks like Russia advised Iran on how to put down those extraordinary demonstrations that we saw there a few months ago. You know, people in other places are aware that Russia plays a role in backing autocracies, in supporting illegitimate regimes. And there is a genuine feeling that a loss for Putin, you know, proof that, you know, autocracy doesn't always win, would be good for democracy movements and activists in other places. And some are very obvious, they're much closer. I mean, Belarus, obviously, if something happens to Putin,

Lukashenko is immediately the next target, because he's totally held up and totally propped up by, you know, Russian police and Russian journalists and Russian operatives of different kinds. So, but even in much further places, you know, where Russia plays a role just in backing this dictator or that, the loss would be really important, even if just psychologically, I think it would be very, very important in many countries, many countries that you don't think of. I'm almost sensing an outburst of optimism here. I mean, it wasn't that long ago that it felt like the autocrats were winning, that the authoritarians were on the march. Give me your sense now, looking back, because I mean, there was a time before the invasion, when you looked around the

world, you looked at Poland, you looked at Hungary, you looked at Turkey, and it was this global resurgence of authoritarians and the retreat of democratic forces. So I think we're still in that surge. I'm not so optimistic as to think it's over. And in fact, I think one of the reasons why Putin invaded was because he believed in that surge too. I mean, he felt buoyed by his own successes and by the successes of his imitators and friends around the world. And that was one of the sources of his belief in victory. And that's precisely why a setback would be so important and so useful. I mean, it doesn't necessarily end this growth of autocracy. It

doesn't reverse everything, but it does give some hope to people who believe in alternatives. I don't want to be utopian here. I'm just saying, you know, because Putin and because Russian support for autocratic regimes in so many different places has been a part of that story of rising autocracy, and especially about the links between different autocracies that don't have much to do with each other historically or ideologically, but have worked together in so many ways, I think it would be good. It would be helpful. It would be an inspiration. And this is our moment in the closing line of your piece, which people can read in the cover story of the New Atlantic magazine, is you write, this spring, this summer, this autumn, Ukraine gets a chance to alter geopolitics for a generation,

and so does the United States. This is quite a pivot. And your case is that it's not just the fate of Ukraine. This will have global implications for a generation. I think it very well could. It has clear implications in the region. It has clear implications in Europe. It has clear implications for all the countries around the world where Russia has played a role in backing the regime. And that's a lot of disparate countries. Not if there's a stalemate. That's your case for this is why Ukraine has to have an affirmative

victory. I worry that a stalemate is not the end of the war. A stalemate is a cease in fighting to be followed some years down the road by another invasion. Okay, so let's go back to what you saw there. You know, one of the concerns, one of my concerns is, look, we know that there's a lot of propaganda. There's a lot of, you know, putting happy faces on things. So I want to get a sense of what you have seen. This has been a meat grinder of war. There have been massive casualties on both sides. We don't really know. I don't have a sense, you know, how badly has the Ukrainian military been mauled? I mean, they clearly still have morale, but give me your sense of where we are at right now, how long Ukraine can sustain all of this. I mean, after the fighting in Bakhmut, what is the status right now of the Ukrainian military?

President Zelensky, does he think that he has the tools and does he think he has the army that he needs to win this war? So the difficulty with answering that question is that the Ukrainian army is very unlike any army that we know or are familiar with. So it's not as if it's a single thing with a single leader. It contains different battalions and groups. Some parts of it are supported by civil society, by civilian organizations. We saw in the course of one day, we were, this is near Kherson, or anyway, in southern Ukraine, we saw on the one hand, an unbelievably sophisticated drone workshop where they were building from, you know, little bits of wire and metal, you know, building, you know, these lethal weapons. I mean, so they did, they don't have enough long range missiles. And so they are building

these kamikaze drones that you've seen actually in action over the last few days, that can strike long distance targets. And they do that with, again, Ukrainians who have come home from Silicon Valley or who were working in the tech industry and are now working for the army. You know, that's on the one hand. On the other hand, we were also taken to see an infantry brigade. We saw the artillery that they were using, and it was pretty primitive. I mean, it looked like stuff that the Soviet Union used in Afghanistan in the 1980s. And they run the gamut from the most high-tech equipment you've ever seen, including some of

the most high-tech military software that has ever been used. You know, it does algorithmic warfare. It takes in huge amount of information and, you know, helps people target and prioritize targets and so on in a way that, you know, that's really extraordinary. And at the same time, they have huge, it's a very long frontline. There's an enormous lack of sophisticated weapons in large parts of it. And so it's very hard for me to give you a clear estimate. All I can tell you is that Ukrainians are self-confident. You know, they brigades of men. They have not lost everybody. They believe they can keep going. It is important for them that the war not go on indefinitely. I mean, not just for the sake of the army, but for the sake of the society. They too are trying to think

about how it can end this year. As I said, it's hard to rate it because it just doesn't look like the American army or even like the Russian army. Well, this is what I was struck by in your piece, the way you described this, this unusual nature of this grassroots fighting force. I mean, it helps explain why it's hard to describe and why Ukraine was underestimated at the beginning. And just read one of your paragraphs. one that is both stronger at the grassroots level and more deeply integrated with Washington, Brussels, and Silicon Valley than anyone realized, is fighting a very large, very corrupt, top-down state. And so you describe farmers defending their land, 20-something engineers building eyes in the sky against the country that thinks that the way to fight a war is to send waves of poorly armed conscripts to be slaughtered. I mean, you get the sense of two completely different societies at war here with completely different metrics of success.

Yeah. I mean, that was the mistake we made at the beginning of the war. We thought this was a big Soviet army fighting a little Soviet army. And in fact, Ukraine had become something. And there's still Soviet elements in Ukraine, and I don't want to over idealize Ukrainian society either. But it's pretty clear that the most advanced, the most active, the young generation, the next leaders, you know, are people who think very differently from the way Soviet Ukraine thought in the past. And we missed that moment. We didn't see that that had happened there. And so that was why it was hard to understand. And so you do have, again, people who are using sophisticated technology, people who think flexibly, people who organize for themselves.

I mean, you have a lot of these kind of almost self-organized brigades in Ukraine against an army, a Russian army, whose soldiers are mostly just trying not to die. I mean, they don't particularly want to be there. Most of them don't understand why they're there. And so their goal is to just stay alive. And that creates a different fighting dynamic. that, you know, Patriot batteries have been deployed. The British just decided to give them a very advanced missile system. Can you talk to me about that? Because that struck me as a ratcheting up of Western support, that finally the Germans and the French are becoming more engaged. The British are willing to give them more sophisticated weaponry. Why is this happening now?

I think it's happening now because the Ukrainians continue proving that they can do it. You know, there was a lot of skepticism about Ukraine in the beginning, including about their ability to learn new weapon systems and would they really know how to drive our fancy tanks and would they be able to use this stuff responsibly. And as the war has gone on, people have begun to have more faith in their competence and in the possibility that they might win. And they have been asking for longer range missiles because that enables them to hit Russian, whatever, ammunition dumps or logistics bases behind the lines, which helps them win, obviously. That's why they've been asking for it from the US and now they seem to have got a version from the British. I mean, I think that Europe has made a really important turn. As you know, there's even a German word for it,

you know, Zeitentwende, both in Germany and in France and in the UK, but also elsewhere in the Netherlands. And, you know, even Spain and Italy, which have very little direct interest in this part of the world, have so far gone along. And they've understood some of what we were talking about before, you know, the political significance of the war, you know, the defeat of Russia is very important for the security of Europe, and also for the success of democracy in Europe over the next decade. As people understand better that the Ukrainians have competence to do these things, they're more willing to give them weapons. None of this guarantees victory, but there has already been a kind of sea change in Europe. Well, and this was one of, obviously, Vladimir Putin's major calculations, that he thought that the West was weak, that it would be divided, that it would not

step up, that NATO would not come even closer to his borders. Among the more surprising things for me as an outsider, and I know you know this intimately well, give me your sense of what happened with Poland, which was one of the countries that had been heading toward an authoritarian, anti-Western political culture, and yet really did step up. And again, this is one of the things that I did not have on my bingo card when this war began. And again, this is one of the things that I did not have on my bingo card when this war began. What happened in Poland is that Poland universally felt that the invasion of Ukraine was a security threat to Poland. It looked to everybody like 1939. It looked like there was a joint German and Soviet invasion of Poland in 1939. Even the photographs looked like that. I mean, even the women in headscarves at the train stations, it looked like that. And so there was a kind of

national shudder, bipartisan across all political parties and a desire to help the Ukrainians and to fight back. Unfortunately, I have to tell you that the anti-Western, increasingly authoritarian tendency of the Polish ruling party is not gone and has actually gotten rather worse. And Polish politics are very ugly right now. The media is of all kinds is under attack. I just read a couple days ago that there's one big independent radio station, which might not get its license renewed. There are all these fake investigations of political leaders all across Poland, you know, the sort of fake corruption investigations, almost everybody's being harassed somehow. And actually, I'm worried

about there's an election in October, and the whole run up to that election campaign is going to be very ugly. And there's even talk about whether they might suspend it or declare martial law, something else. So you have the Poland security interest, which is in sticking with the way, by which, by the way, they mostly mean the United States. They're still not speaking to the Germans. They don't get along with the French. American weapons are coming through Poland and they're happy about that. But so they have their security interests, which are about pushing back against the Russian invasion and the political interests of the ruling party, which are still in trying to establish a one party state. So I'm afraid it's not as transformative a situation as you might hope. So let's go back

to the beginning about this counteroffensive that we're waiting for. You write with Jeffrey Goldberg, the future of the democratic world will be determined by whether the Ukrainian military can break a stalemate with Russia and drive the country backwards, perhaps even out of Crimea for good. So how optimistic are you as we sit here today? I'm an optimist who worries a lot. So I think it is possible. I believe in the possibility of it, but I'm, you know, I'm sanguine about the many challenges. Let's put it like that. It can be done. And much of this depends on whether we are willing to help make it happen. So the United done. And much of this depends on whether we are willing to help make it happen. So the United States uniquely, actually, I mean, although we've been talking about European weapons and so on, the United States is uniquely in a position to make sure

the Ukrainians win. And so part of the point of writing the article was to explain why it's so important. And the article is The Case for the Total Liberation of Ukraine in the Atlantic. It is the cover story by Anne Applebaum and Jeffrey Goldberg. And thank you so much for coming back on the podcast and for this rather remarkable piece. Thank you. Thank you so much for having me. And thank you all for listening to the Bulwark Podcast. I'm Charlie Sykes. We will be back tomorrow and we will do this all over again. The Bulwark Podcast is produced by Katie Cooper and engineered and edited by Jason Brown.