The Bulwark Podcast - Jake Sullivan: Trump Is Making China Great Again

Episode Date: August 27, 2025

A year ago, China was globally isolated and its economy was struggling. But once Trump was back in office pursuing his own personal and political gain, the U.S. brand got tossed in the toilet and the view from Beijing got pretty sweet. Trump has allowed China to buy American microchips that could be used against our own national security interests, he caved on his own trade war with the country, and the divisions he's creating with allies in the West have made China's propaganda job a whole easier. Plus, the tragedy in Gaza, the evolving U.S.-Israel relationship, the one powerful way to squeeze Putin's war machine, and re-examining Biden's original plan to run for re-election. Former National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan joins Tim Miller. show notes Sullivan's piece on Gaza for the Israeli news site, Ynet Article about Sullivan's comments at The Atlantic Festival in Sept. 2023 Bulwark Live in DC and NYC at https://www.thebulwark.com/p/bulwark-events. Toronto is SOLD OUT

Hello and welcome to the Bullwark podcast. I'm your host Tim Miller. Quick reminder, it's Wednesdays. I'm also over on the next level feed. Sarah's back from vacation. And I'm going to make her talk about that New York Times article about the A-gays in the Trump administration. So, you know, if you want my views on that, make sure to check out the next level. But on this show, I've got a new guest, delighted to welcome him.

He was National Security Advisor to Joe Biden. It's Jake Sullivan. How you doing, Jake? I'm doing okay. Thanks for having me on. Just okay. That sounds right. That's a good answer. I was told you asked to win the podcast because you wanted a platform to formally endorse Donald Trump's campaign for the Nobel Peace Prize. Is that right? Do you want to do that right now? You know, I thought long and hard about it, but no, I definitely do not want to do that. Okay. Also, I feel like after yesterday's cabinet meeting where everybody went around and played the part of a Kim John Un documentary, we've just run out of praise for Donald Trump. It's all been done. It's all been given. So nothing more than. Any of your past bosses desperate for recognition at this level, kind of begging you to get them peace prizes or like put their picture on the side of buildings or anything? Is that something that you ever encounter? Honestly, I've never seen anything like it. And it's, there is a kind of. ludicrous, humorous quality to it, but it's also a little bit scary because it, you know, it reflects something deeper and dangerous about the president's autocratic tendencies and the fact

that these people around him are just so slavish that I don't think they would stand up to him on anything at any point. And without those kinds of guardrails, I think it's bleak what we may be facing here in the coming days and months. Yeah, I agree. I mean, even that sliver of Trump supporters who don't want autocracy, I think if you got them drunk and we're like, hey, do you think that this crew in the cabinet would stand up to him if he decided he wanted to stay in three years? I don't even think they would say yes, you know? And so that's a pretty bad place to be. I mean, obviously, as National Security Advisor, you know, dealt with a lot of countries sliding

towards autocracy that were already in autocracy. Are there parallels you're seeing? Are there things that alarm you in particular as you compared to what you saw around the world? Absolutely. I mean, you can just go institution by institution. Trump's effort basically to coerce and silence the media, these efforts to get these big settlements and to push them off of too much criticism. His taking on law firms, his taking on universities, his taking on anybody who he perceives to be either speaking out or financing civil society to speak out, this looks a lot like Erdogan. It looks a lot in Turkey. It looks a lot like Orban in Hungary, but with one big twist, which is, in both of those cases, it took a long time for them to play out their strategy. We've been at this now for seven months, and you just look at the breakneck speed with which Trump is moving to try to break down the various guardrails of our democracy. It's extremely concerning. And then layer

on top of that, this redistricting effort to try to lock in. permanent majority in the House, which I think Democrats are trying to mobilize to fight back against that, and next week it'll be something else, and the week after something else. This is a very concerted effort, and many of the elements of it come straight out of the playbook that other elected officials wanted to become autocrats have used in other parts of the world through history. So a lot to choose from here, a lot of things to be concerned about in the first seven months, as you mentioned. I guess we're just wondering for you, You use the word dangerous. What do you think it's been the most dangerous policy move of this

administration so far? I guess what I think is this may not be the most dangerous, but it's the one that really set the red flag flying, waving hard. And that was the move against the law firms. Because what that tells me is something deeply structural, which is that if you can basically scare, coerce, intimidate the legal profession as a concerted strategy. That's structural. That goes to so many different elements of the system, so to speak, being able to stand up and push back against your autocratic tendencies. But, you know, I actually haven't racked and stacked all of them to rank in an order because there's so many disturbing things. And the accumulation of them, one after another, after another, they end up having a compounding effect.

So each additional move is, in a way, not just incrementally worse, it's decisively worse because it's layered on top of so many moves he's already taken. Yeah, a couple in particular, I want to get your take on just because of your experience and, like, relationships. I feel like the purges from the administration have been a little bit underplayed, particularly at DOD and the intelligence agencies at state. You know, we've lost FBI. We've lost a lot of expertise over the course of the first seven months,

the director of the DIA, out Air Force Chief of Staff, you know, Tulsi, getting rid of the intelligence for people that did the intelligence reports that simply said that Venezuela was not invading us. I assume you know a lot of these people and worked with a lot of these people. Just talk about what your concerns are there and if there's anything that's been particularly striking or alarming as far as people getting pushed out. Well, first, what we're talking about here is a group of incredibly honorable, dedicated, capable public servants who have tried to devote their life to this country, who work for little pay and take a lot of grief because they're in the public eye and face a lot of stress. And they do it because they love America and Donald Trump trashing them in the way that he has, I think is just an absolute abomination. And there should be more people speaking out against that in a very personal way about these people and what they are going through. But then there's the broader implications of it. And the thing that worries me the most is that a through line here is that anybody who basically tells the truth, who doesn't put spin on the ball, who simply provides the intelligence assessment or the defense assessment or the diplomatic assessment, calls it as they see it, they get shown the door.

that is Xi Jinping stuff in my view. That's the kind of thing that, you know, a dictator does when they don't want to hear bad news. And what President Trump seems to have done is set up an entire apparatus where his henchmen or hench women, for lack of a better term, are essentially executing this playbook for him. And I think where it's going to leave us is less capable from the point a view of intelligence to assess and identify threats to the United States, less capable to be able to respond to them effectively either through the Defense Department or the State Department. And America's national security will suffer as a result. And I think that these chickens are going to come home to roost in terms of the lived experience of the American people. It's quite

disturbing. Are there any people that you know that listeners might not know that you're like, God, I mean, that was somebody I worked with. They've been in government for 30 years, weren't political, and now they're leaving? The top people at the National Security Agency, basically America's cyber warriors, the folks who are responsible at this vital moment with the advent of artificial intelligence and the acceleration of cyber threats, these are some of the most incredible, lifelong, non-political public servants kicked out with nobody really seemingly coming in behind them. And so I think we do have a massive gap in America's cybercate.

capabilities right now in exactly the wrong moment. The rationale for that was what? They didn't say that the 2020 election was stolen? Was that the rat? Like, what was their stated rationale? I don't even know. I actually don't remember what the asserted rationale was, but it's, it's, this is classic purge, loyalty test. It's just insufficient loyalty to dear leader. Can't be trusted, got to go. That seems to be the three line in all this, whatever the particular stated rationale is. You mentioned China and the AI stuff initially. I wanted to talk. I don't feel like he gets enough shit for being weak on China. I mean, like, he's sort of, I don't know, bipolar on it or something.

Like, in some ways, they want to, like, project, and there are people in the administration who are, like, Deep China Hawks and kind of want to project kind of a great power, struggle with them. On the other hand, you know, when you guys were in, you were blocking AI chips to Deepseek, they've now changed that based on what appears to be kind of a corrupt. up to deal to me. Trump was popping off yesterday about how there'd be 600,000 students from China and I'm kind of four Chinese students in colleges, a reasonable amount, but doubling that amount from what was here a couple years ago. I think it's a strange policy choice to this administration.

What do you think is happening with all that? Well, first, just think about the trade war. This phrase, Taco, Trump always chickens out. I think it's kind of a brilliant turn of phrase, but it's particularly apt when it comes to him launching a trade war against China and then turning around and backing down. Remember, he slapped 145% tariffs on, basically said, I hold the cards, China's going to have to fold. And China made him fold. So that gave China a sense that, hey, we actually can push this guy around a bit. And that's basically what we've seen since that. Second, as you said, in the Biden administration, we blocked the highest end microchip semiconductors from going to Chinese entities that are tied to the PLA, the People's Liberation Army,

basically so that our most advanced technologies can't be used against us and our allies. President Trump basically called in the CEO of NVIDIA, talked to him for a while, and decided, no, no, no, I'm just going to go ahead and ship these chips to China. It's one of the few areas where you've actually seen a few Republicans come out and say, what the hell is going on here. That makes no sense. Why would we give China this capability that they can use for national security purposes? against us. What do you think is going on here? I think this is just kind of classic Trump

listens to the last person who's in the room and he let somebody who had a financial interest in selling these chips to China convince him to do it and he doesn't see. He also folded on the TikTok thing though and there are a lot of Chinese investors in his crypto. I don't know. I just there's a lot there that is eyebrow raising. Well, the TikTok thing I do think is kind of straight up. He thinks that it helped him politically and I think he has friends who have a financial interest in it. And he's just blatantly violating the law. There is a law on the books that says TikTok has to be divested and President Trump is simply ignoring that law. I think that one is very much about a personal and political game. But, you know, it's interesting. Not long ago, I was talking to somebody

who had just been in China and seen senior Chinese officials. And they were saying, you know, it's very interesting to watch President Trump because we've had a long-term strategy to basically try to weaken and divide America's alliances to set America's allies and America against each other. And President Trump is just doing it for us. So all we have to do is sit back and watch. If you're a leader in China right now, you're watching the United States basically become less appealing as a place for talent to come, cut down on its own research, development, and scientific innovation agenda, start trade wars with its allies, all things that are core to America prevailing. Totally got our self power. And then sell us these chips. And to top it all

off, telegraph on the rare earth's issue, hey, we can't, we just can't deal with that. We're going to have to. China's got so much leverage over us that we've got to fold. You put all that together, and I think it's not surprising that actually in Beijing, they're sitting pretty comfortably right now, feeling like they're in a good position. And that was not the case a year ago, where I think China felt that the United States had aligned the rest of the world was taking tough, competitive actions, and their economy was struggling. So that's been a big reversal based on decisions this president has made. I think this is objectively true. Don't you think, shouldn't Democrats talk about that a little more? I know that one of your old colleagues,

Ron Claim, was big on this during the Biden administration, because I talked to him about that, about how Democrats should talk tough on China and be tough on China in various ways and point out the ways Trump has folded to Xi kind of undermines his bravado or whatever. But it feels like there's a little bit of hesitation sometimes of Democrats. They don't want to sound like they're the hawkish ones. Yeah, I think there are two things going on here. One of them is just the sheer number of targets. And every day there's something different in the news.

And there tends to be a little bit of running to the soccer ball. And this China issue is more of a long-term structural issue, less of something where you have like a Putin, you know, Trump summit kind of thing or whatever the case may be. But then the second is what you just said, which is I think Democrats are a little bit hesitant to sound like Uber Hawks on China. And I get that to a certain extent. We do not want a new Cold War here. what we want is just to compete vigorously, effectively in concert with our allies so that we are

shaping the world and China's not shaping it to our disadvantage. So I think there's a huge space here. And I hope that there will be more voices who step up and speak out on this without taking it obviously too far because I think the indictment here of Trump is extremely powerful. And you need look no further than the Chinese leadership itself who's sitting there going like, hey, this is awesome. This is working out quite well for us right now. I seem to get calls from, I don't know, assume you had Grappa or whatever with people at NATO summits or had some. You think it's Grappa? I don't know. What are you doing?

What are you drinking? You did some fancy wines with the Norwegians or whatever. I assume you've got buddies around the world from all your travels now. What do our allies, people that are still involved in foreign policy and national security in Europe and elsewhere? What do you hear from them right now? You know, I'll tell you something that's pretty depressing, actually. You know, over the last four years, we spent a huge amount of time aligning with our European allies and our Asian allies on a collective strategy to de-risk from China, reduce our exposure on supply chains, reduce China's ability to dump products that, you know, kill our

jobs and our workers, that kind of thing. When I go to these places now or I talk to leaders there, what they're talking about is de-risking from the United States. They now see the U.S. as the big disruptor, the country that can't be counted on. And you see to show up in opinion polling now, public opinion polling globally. China has moved ahead of the United States in popularity in a whole lot of countries. And that was not the case one year ago, where countries now are basically, you know, saying the U.S. brand is in the toilet and China's looking like actually in a bizarre way, a more responsible player.

So that's one of the big things that I hear from my friends who continue to work in these governments in Europe, in Asia. Take a look at India as another example. I mean, here's a country that on a bipartisan basis, we were working to try to build a deeper and more sustainable relationship with. And the China challenge loomed large in that. Now you've got President Trump executing a massive trade offensive against them. And the Indians are saying, well, shit, I guess maybe we have to go show up in Beijing and sit with the Chinese because we've got to hedge against America.

And you've got Scott Besson's out there threatening the Indians instead of the Russians. That's the big stick that they're using in the Russia negotiation. It's like, well, we're going to make sure India doesn't buy your oil anymore. It's crazy. Yeah, exactly. Hey y'all, I warned you. I warned you. Our Toronto show has sold out. The Canadians love Sam Stein so much that, you know, there are lines around the block to get tickets to it. But the good news is we still have tickets left for our live shows in Washington, D.C. and in New York, coming up in early October. So go get those tickets now at the bulwark.com slash events. I'm missing LSU or South Carolina for you guys. I'm going to be in New York for that. And so assuming that's an afternoon game, I might have a couple of birds. urban's in me by the time we get on stage on Saturday night. So that one could be a rowdy one.

So if you're looking for an excuse to get to the big apple, go see a show Friday night, come see us Saturday night. Could be a fun little weekend. Go get tickets. Like I said, thebork.com slash events. The borgic.com slash events. See you all soon. To the Russia, Ukraine negotiation.

Negotiation. I don't know if you want to call it that. Summit. Do we call it? I don't know what we call it. I want to get your biggest picture of thoughts, but I'm obsessed with the red carpet and the soldier. rolling out the red carpet and being on their knees in front of the Russian plane.

How do these things get planned out? Like, I've never been in a room for this. Like, it doesn't feel like that was an accident, really. Like, there was a discussion, I would imagine, between the Secretary of Defense, I guess, maybe whoever is in your job, and it's like, what are we going to do? Will Trump meet him at the tarmac? You have to call in the red carpet people, I guess. You've got to figure out where they are.

Yeah. Like, how did that happen? So the way this goes down is there's a team at the White House called The Visits Team, and they work closely with the Protocol Office at the State Department. And that's folks whose full-time job is just to think about the staging of these kinds of events. And that goes for everything from when a foreign leader comes to the Oval Office. What's that going to look like? Who's going to be in there?

How does the press come in? How does the president greet the leader? all of that to these big summits. Now, what made this one unusual is it took place on a military base. That very rarely happens. Usually, you'd find some venue. The last time President Biden met President Xi on American soil, it was at this old gold baron's house in Woodside, California.

You do sunny lands in Palm Springs or whatever. Or sunny lands, right? These places have these great looks. It's really rare to do it on a military base. You would never have soldiers around doing the red carpet thing. Like we don't have a detachment of Marines who just are at the ready to go roll out red carpets. This was unique to this. And what I basically think happened is they didn't think it through.

They didn't think, oh, the normal way we do this where we have State Department protocol people put down a carpet. So last minute they were like, who's around? Okay, get out there. You got to go do it. And I think they didn't recognize the just absent. terrible optics of it and that image. But the choice there, they had to think through the fact that Trump would sit there waiting for.

And that's the other thing. Like, they didn't have to do that. That's unusual, too. You rarely see that from an American president. Trump clapping. I mean, Zelensky came to America. He was not, and Trump waited for him at the White House. You know, he did greet him once he got to the White House.

We walked off the plane. He didn't have a cheering section for him. Yeah. One thing Trump does seem to do, though, is he does stand at that front door of the White house, right? When people roll up. I think he somehow sees this as a bit of a power move. Like, he's standing there, but. Maybe it's like a hotel guy, hospitality industry. General manager. Yeah. Yeah. General manager of the Trump Hotel kind of thing. Maybe that is what it is. Welcoming VIPs. You know, if a famous person was coming to the Mar-a-Lago, you'd want to be there.

Yes, welcome. Welcome. Let me show you the facilities. Yeah, exactly. Spas down this way. No, I think that may be right. Now, that's, that does seem distinctive and unique. to him, this kind of he goes out and stands there to do the greeting. But the overall vibe of the literal rolling out of the red carpet, the soldiers on their knees, the president, clasping Vladimir Putin, I mean, this guy who is a blatant and brutal aggressor, a thug, a tyrant, you know, I think it sent kind of shockwaves through our allies, sent shockwaves through the Ukrainians. And, frankly, sent a message to Putin, hey, actually, I'm in the cap-bred seat here. And that's basically how Putin played it from that moment forward.

I think he walked out of Alaska feeling pretty damn good about himself because he thought, basically, he'd walk Trump off what Trump had gone in to do, which is to try to get a ceasefire or impose consequences. And Putin left, no ceasefire, no consequences. You know, I'd call that a pretty big win for him out of Alaska. They don't even, like, what are, they're barely even threatening any consequence. There's no concessions. I guess they've threatened some economic consequences. But they're not even asking Putin for any concessions, as far as I can tell. You guys weren't really, we're not negotiating with them, I guess.

Is that fair to say? I mean, it's fair to say that we didn't host any big summits between Biden and Putin. But we had channels to the Russians at senior levels where we could talk to them privately to explore, you know, is there any possibility that we could all sit down? down together to do negotiations. Now, in our view, that would have had to include Ukraine. We're not going to negotiate over the head of Ukraine. But those conversations with the Russians always finished the same way, which is they were not seriously prepared to negotiate, which meant that we had to continue to support Ukraine and to try to increase the pressure on

Russia. And one area that towards the end of the Biden administration, we turned up the dial, was oil sanctions. In the first couple years of the war, it was tough to, to impose sanctions on Russian oil because the global supply was so tight that if we had done that, it would have spiked the price of gas like crazy for Americans. And also, it would have meant that even if Putin was selling a lot fewer barrels, he'd be selling them at a massively high price. So in a way, you wouldn't be taking that much revenue from him. That changed late in President Biden's administration. And so we began imposing sanctions on oil. That is the big lever that Trump has. Because right now, the global supply environment's pretty good. And if Trump wanted to,

he could really squeeze Putin on oil. And that is the main revenue source for Russia's war machine. That's what he should do. And that's what he apparently is not prepared to do. But I think that would be the logical next step to actually get the Russians in a position where they would be prepared to make some concessions. Were you involved in those conversations? Have you talked to Lavrov? I assume you've talked to him several times. Like, what's it like? What are you looking for in those conversations? Like, how do you read through the Russian style, if you will, which is, you know, their manner of speaking is, I think, a little less direct than we're used to? What are those conversations like? Yeah, I've dealt with Lavrov over the years going back, actually,

to the first Obama term, because, you know, Lavrov's been around for a very long time. The reset button, were you, is that your fault? The reset button is not on me, although I was working for Secretary Clinton at the time. That was, that was someone else's innovation, although I was there when that, when that happened. That may have been the first time, actually, that she met Lavrov. It was in, I think it was in Switzerland in 2009. Quaint, in retrospect, was not maybe the best, but in retrospect seems like a rather, you know, quaint, a little controversy. Quaint. Compared to where we're at now. Yeah, yeah, exactly. That's a good word for it. So as National Security Advisor, I wasn't dealing with Labroth, that he was Tony Blinken's counterpart. I was

dealing with senior folks at the Kremlin privately by telephone. Not, again, to be clear, I wasn't sitting there negotiating with them because that's something we would have to do with Ukraine. But we could communicate on things like escalation management or threats that Russia was making, you know, in Europe or beyond. And I could also ask, hey, you know, how are you guys seeing the war? And hear from them whether there was any opening to try to launch a serious negotiation. But basically all of that was conducted by secure telephone call. And we did not read out those calls because we kept that channel private during our time in office. On the escalation management side of things, I think my people, the, you know, whatever you want

to call us, the neocons, the former Republicans, the main critique of you guys. Are you a neocon? Am I? They're my people. I don't know that I am really, per se. I certainly am probably a more hawkish neoliberal globalist. How about that? You know, I think to be a neocon, you kind of have to be of a certain age. Right. And now it's kind of, now it's just sort of a shorthand for hawks that believe in democracy, promotion, and expansion abroad. And so maybe I qualify under that definition. But, you know, I guess we have a podcaster shield of the Republic Eric Edelman and Elliot Cohen. And those guys, like their main critique of you, would have been

limiting Ukraine in the beginning, not providing attackums and other long-range offensive weapons earlier, shackling them in various ways, being overly concerned about Russian escalation towards nuclear when it was kind of an empty threat. What would your response be to that? Well, I'd start by just saying that they've already pocketed the baseline, which is just a massive amount of military aid, intelligence support, deep integrated. into helping every aspect of Ukraine's effort to defend itself against Russian aggression. And I think you can't just pocket that. That was an enormous effort. That was not a foregone conclusion by any stretch. We went and got tens of billions of dollars from the Congress.

We spent every dollar Congress appropriated. And we went way beyond just providing weapons. I mean, we built an entire ecosystem to support Ukraine in this war. So it really comes down to just a couple of weapons systems. One of them, was F-16s, where the argument was we should have given them earlier. Well, President Biden authorized the provision of F-16s in May of 2023. It's now August of 2025. And Ukraine only has a small number of F-16s. Why? Because they just don't have the pilots to build a whole new Air Force around a whole new platform. So I think that that is not a serious, like the idea that if we had given F-16s a few months earlier, would have dramatically changed the war. Are you ready to see how big of a

Hawk I am right now, Jake. Should we have just been providing air support for Ukraine? You mean having U.S. pilots shooting down Russian planes? Yeah, exactly. Yeah. So that would have been the United States directly at war with Russia. You know, I think from President Biden's perspective, having the United States directly enter the war where we are blowing up and killing Russians and they're killing us. And then you have two nuclear powers on an escalation ladder. He felt our job was to support Ukraine by providing them the material, but not ourselves enter the war. I think that that was the correct judgment. And frankly, I also think if we were going to enter the war directly, you'd want to go to

Congress to get authorization to do that because then you'd be basically fighting Russia. And seriously, do you think the United States Congress was going to approve the deployment of American forces to directly fight Ukraine? I think it's unlikely. A lot of times people say, well, why don't you just have a lot of times? No-fly zone, you know, just have the U.S., but the problem with that is when you play it out, it is... You're saying a no-fly zone is essentially indistinguishable from actually directly involving the U.S. in the war. Yeah, I mean, it's enforcing a no-fly zone means U.S. on Russian direct combat and killing, and then you're off to the...

Count me as a maybe on that, but, count me as a strong maybe, but okay, let's go through the rest of the weapons. So then the second was the Abrams. And on the Abrams, and by the way, on the F-16s, you know, I was an advocate for providing the F-16s and think it was right to do. And, you know, we have given some, and they are not useless. They just have not been a game-changing weapon. The Abrams tanks was a big focus in the early months of the war. Our military guys basically said the Abrams is not right for this battlefield.

It's got a special kind of engine trying to maintain it. it's unwieldy, et cetera, we gave them a bunch of Abrams, and they never really asked for a lot more. What they wanted were Bradley's, which we were giving them from very early on, because Bradley's are a highly effective tool in the war. Now, the war has evolved basically to be more of a drone war than a tank or infantry fighting vehicle war, but I don't see how the Abrams would have made any kind of difference. And then there's the Atacombs. And it's true in the early months, the concern about long-range missiles was, you know, what is the likelihood that this is going to lead us into a potential direct conflict with Russia? But that got set aside reasonably early on. And the real

issue became, do we have ATACOMs? Do we have enough of these things to make a real difference? And the military was basically saying, we need to keep the ATACMs we have for our own war plans. We can't give them to Ukraine. And so that was a case that was coming from the Pentagon. And eventually, we figured out a way to get more ATACOM so that we could provide them to Ukraine, which we did. And Ukraine was using them for many months. And I think they're a useful weapon, but the idea that they're a silver bullet that would have fundamentally changed the overall trajectory or outcome of the war, I don't think

that that has been demonstrated. And, you know, we see now that the single biggest and most important dimension of the This war has been the evolution of the drone program. And we were in there on the ground floor helping build that behind the scenes when no one was calling for it. No one was out writing up ads like they were about ATACOMs. That's what we were building out to put Ukraine in a position where they could hold off this massive military machine of the Russians and impose huge costs, costs both in Ukraine

and in Russia, by the way. So my view on this is you can look at any given decision and say, well, you know, should we have calculated that differently here or there? I think in the end, what the United States did in mobilizing a massive coalition of countries and a massive military effort to support Ukraine made the difference between Russia overrunning Kiev and not overrunning Kiev. And now we have to continue to double down on that support so that Ukraine ends up with the just peace. What about your conversations like Zelensky and his team? I'm just curious you of any kind of color on that. People might be interested in what it was like dealing with them and kind of related, like, how you think he got into that just horrific, like, situation in the Oval Office and how he was treated by Trump and Vance. Yeah.

I mean, so Zelensky's younger than I am. I mean, he's a young guy, former actor. How old are you? I'm 48. Okay. You looking good. All right. Former actor, younger than you, got it.

So think about it. Like, this is a guy who, you know, was not elected as Winston Churchill to run war. He was elected, you know, to try and help bring Ukraine and Ukrainian democracy into the future. And then all of a sudden, here he's facing the audience. It's kind of like a Jesse Ventura type figure when he was elected in Minnesota, you know? Yeah, Arnold, maybe. Like Arnold. Arnold's and maybe nicer, Arnold.

Yeah, okay. I'm actually from Minnesota. So I remember very well when Jesse DeVati was elected. I'd say Zelensky, a little more Arnold than Jesse. Good at it. I think Jesse was on RT actually for a while. So maybe an offensive comparison. I think Jessica ended up being a Russian stooge.

So we'll call him an Arnold. Arnold is definitely not a Russian stooge. That guy is a freedom fighter. So I think the, yeah, the analogy is that. So there was a real question, I think, in the days leading up to the invasion. how is Zelensky going to react? Is he going to become the wartime leader? And we didn't know and the Europeans didn't know, especially because in the weeks and

months leading up to the war, he was pretty dismissive of the idea that there would be a massive invasion. But man, in the first 24 hours, he came into his own. And you could almost see like a physical change in Zelensky from seeing him in 21 to seeing him after February of 22, just the way he walked, the way he said. sat the way he spoke. He really kind of ended up inhabiting the fighting spirit of the nation. And you could physically sense that when you were in the room with him. And then, you know, for a guy who basically was living at the office, working 24 hours a day, under the most

enormous stress, he was funny and he was calm. And he, you know, was able to converse like in a very natural human way all the way through the Biden administration. And he and Biden, you know, butted heads from time to time on things, but ended up having a very good relationship. And, you know, they would get quite tactical about the kinds of support that we were providing or a particular initiative that Zelensky wanted to pursue right down to his proposals, his kind of negotiation proposals that he brought in the fall of 24. So that was Olensky. The Oval Office thing, you know, it's interesting because the Europeans were kind of saying to Zelensky. You don't want to walk into that.

That's a trap. It's a mistake. So people saw it coming. But I think even the people who saw it coming didn't expect it to be that ludicrous. I mean, Shady Vans demanding thank yous. Yeah. I think Zelensky thought by the time they got to that moment, he had kind of, you could kind of see it.

He had thought, okay, this is okay, it's going to work out. Okay. It was right towards the end of the back and forth. Right. And so I think Zelensky thought he was kind of in the clear. And then the hammer just dropped. And I think he was kind of floored and dumbfounded by it. Rightly so, because it's flooring and dumbfounded.

Yeah, well, too nice to JD to call him a hammer. I don't know. Just condescending prick dropped on him. Yeah, good point. Good point. All right. Now we're getting to the fun part. Let's see here.

This is what happens when you're right for the Atlantic instead of the bulwark. All right, Jake. October 7th, 2023, the Middle East. region is quieter today than it has been in two decades. Jake Sullivan, do you think you jinxed us? You know what? I actually kind of worry about that. I'm a superstitious person. Yeah. Knocking on wood, black cats, the whole thing. So as an Irishman, never say, possible you're cursed? Do you think you're cursed? Now, to be fair, to be cursed? To be fair, I also said for now and this could change at any time. I don't think

you're expected like later that day to be the time. Well, it wasn't that day. No, no, no, no. That in late September. I mean, it was close in time. It was not on October 7th that I did that. So I made a statement in a in a conversation and basically pointed out that you didn't have the wars, the civil wars, all the other things that have been going on essentially through the 21st century. But I noted very explicitly emphasis on for now because all of this could change. And the two things in particular I pointed to as wild cards were Iran and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. So bad sentence, superstition, jinks.

Anyway, obviously, I wouldn't say it again. It was eight days before. You're right. The Atlantic updated it on October 7th is a nice little, it's a nice little favor to you. So that was the date that's on it now. So when it comes to the Israel-Palestine war, I think that honestly, this might be damning you with a faint compliment.

I think the bulwark, like, are we're about as supportive as the Biden posture towards Israel in the early months as anybody, right? I think that you had even more hawkish pro-Israel crowd, you know, that wanted you to do more. Obviously, the folks who are concerned about the Palestinian humanitarian issues, we're going after you for the left from basically the days after October 7th. As you kind of see how things landed now with the benefit of hindsight, like what would you say would be your top regret about how it played out? I mean, my top regret is just the immense human tragedy that is October 7th and everything that followed, the death, the destruction, and it just going on and on.

And that's like, that is hard to sit with. And, you know, I lay awake at night thinking, could we have done something differently? Could we have gotten this stop sooner? Could we have gotten it stopped in a way where it didn't restart? Because, of course, remember that when we handed things off to the Trump administration, there was a ceasefire in place, massive surge of humanitarian assistance, and a timetable for negotiations to fully end the war. But, you know, could we have gotten it done so that we were handing things off differently?

Yeah, I wrestle with that. And what else? What if all the time? But it's not a specific thing that you think you should have done with the benefit of I'd say? I mean, the case that people make is you should have cut off weapons to Israel sooner, you know, at some point, you know, before the ceasefire and hostage deal was in place at the end of the Biden administration. And, you know, just without trying to mount a case for the defense, I would just say the thing that we were grappling with throughout all of 2024, which is not the case today, is that Israel was under attack from multiple fronts. It was under attack from Hezbollah, from the Houthis, from Syria, from Iraq, obviously from Hamas, and from Iran itself. And so the idea of saying to Israel were, you know, we're not going to give you, you know, a whole set of military tools in that context.

It was challenging. That was a very real consideration that we had to grapple with. But, you know, I'm talking to a lot of people about this who worked on the file, both in the U.S. and in other countries. I am reflecting on it. I'm turning it over in my head. I don't know kind of what my ultimate answer is. to what specific thing and when should we have done it differently, but it's something I'll keep grappling with because at the end of the day, like, just it's a god-awful tragedy and

it continues. Now, I think what is happening today is different from what was happening in the early period. And my view is that people who, you know, thought this was wrong from the start didn't stare squarely in October 7th, and people who think it's just and righteous today are not staring squarely at what is happening in Gaza right now, you know, with the killing and the starving of innocent people. So, you know, I wrote an op-ed for an Israeli paper speaking directly to the Israeli public saying, this war has to end. It has to end. It should be over. Yeah. I agree with that assessment on both points about the initial reaction and where we are today. I guess so just

to kind of go back a little bit more on that question of because you've stopped giving Israel weapons. Wasn't there space between what you did and cutting them off as far as leveraging and leveraging weapon sales, pressuring BB more in public? And I kind of

feel like you guys ended up in the sour spot where you were going to pressure Bibi privately, you know, based on reporting that we see and the kind of pro-Israel side felt like, well, that was too much actually and I heard from a lot of

back to my neocon friends who are pissed at you guys for like for doing that and should have you know let Bibi do whatever to respond October 7th but on the flip side because there wasn't public pressure and because Bibi was kind of able to do whatever he wanted

like with some maybe you want to dispute that but directionally he was able to do whatever he wanted you know I think people on the left rightfully were like well you guys are fully complicit in this. Like, you guys are fully, you know, involved. Was there not a way to be more public about your critiques and pressure him more from a public standpoint rather than going along with, you know, where he was taking you? Look, I'm open to that argument that

over the course of 2024, there was increasing public criticism and statements about what Israel was doing, both with respect to humanitarian assistance and civilian casualties. But I'm open to the argument that we could have adjusted our public posture in some way. I'm not sure if your argument is that if we had done so, it would have dramatically changed, you know, the conduct of the war. I find that somewhat unlikely a change in public posture, but maybe. So I will, you know, give that some thought. But I would like to point out one thing that I think is really important,

which is, you know, you said BB could pretty much do whatever he wanted. we're seeing B.B. Dude pretty much whatever he wanted now with respect to a three-month full blockade of all food going into Gaza and then this totally screwed up Gaza Humanitarian Foundation set up. That was not the case last year. We didn't get enough in as much aid as I would have liked, but we pressured Israel in ways that opened crossings and moved trucks to the point where I I believe that we did prevent the famine that was warmed of last year, and the famine we have now is a direct result of a different U.S. policy that has let Israel basically get away with not allowing aid to go into the strip. I mean, obviously it's worse now, but there was still children dying from the weapons, but also of starvation and like the efforts to get food in. I mean, like, the Gaza Pier just didn't work was a total disaster, right?

And so, I mean, I agree that it's worse now, but I mean, it wasn't, and you can't say you're satisfied with how it was before. No, and in fact, I started by saying I wasn't satisfied, and I would, I mean, okay, well, not satisfied, but that has to be, you have to fight back of that and say, well, and clearly we could have done more to get food aid in. And if the plan was the Gaza Pier, like, that didn't work. The only point that I'm trying to make, because I agree with all of that, that we, you know, you look in hindsight and you say, not enough, you know, what could we have done to get more?

I will fully acknowledge that. My point, Tim, is that you said, you know, you guys, BB could do whatever he wanted. You guys had no influence on him, no impact on him. And if you just look, go month by month on how much aid was going into Gaza from an asserted Israeli position at the beginning of none. We're not going to allow food in to what we did over the course of last year. I'm not trying to sit here and beat my chest about it by any stretch, but what I am saying is that we worked hard and we did impose forms of pressure on Israel to get more food in. And I do think it had an impact. Again, not satisfied, not enough. But I think

that that has to be part of a full telling of this story. You're talking about the forward-looking element of this and what you wrote in the Israeli paper. You still talk to Democratic politicians, like you asked you for your advice on foreign policy. And what do you think about the Democratic Party evolution on this? I mean, you're seeing many more Democratic electives now, you know, saying that we shouldn't provide weapons to Israel at all. Some of the Obama administration foreign policy folks have talked about completely reorienting our relationship with Israel from how it is. been in the past over this. What do you think about how Democratic politicians looking ahead should talk about this and what the right kind of policy should be? Well, I think a couple things.

First, I think the case for withholding weapons from Israel today is much stronger than it was one year ago. One, they don't face the same regional threats. Two, there was a ceasefire and hostage deal in place and the ability to have negotiations. And it was Israel who just walked away from it without negotiating seriously. Three, there is a famine, a full-blown famine in Gaza. And four, there are no more serious military objectives to achieve. It's just bombing rubble into rubble. So I understand why you have an increasing number of Democratic members stepping up and saying, my position on this has changed because the situation, the facts have changed. Do you agree with that? Has your position changed? Well, I have in fact told a number of

of members who were thinking about the votes on these resolutions, that the situation as it stands today, following the breakdown of the ceasefire in March, means that a vote to withhold weapons from Israel is a totally credible position. That is a position that I would support. So, but for me, the bigger question you're asking is about the future of the U.S. Israel relationship. And here, I think it's, it comes down to what is the future of Israel? Are we going to be dealing with the prime minister and a right-wing government for years on end, or is there going to be political change in Israel? Because I think that would have an impact on what the nature of the U.S. Israel relationship. What is the democratic

character of Israel two, three, four, five years from now will have a huge impact on what the nature of the U.S. Israel relationship will be. If nothing changes in their government, if it continues to be a far-right government, that continues this sort of policy, then it won't be the Israel as we've known it and I think a lot of Israelis would say they wouldn't recognize Israel then and obviously that should have an impact on the relationship One more thing on this

I should ask because I do feel like when we focused on looking back for good reason there was focused on the humanitarian issue like what about the hostages again I understand you guys are working in a very in a situation that you know there's a lot happening there's a lot developing in real time

it's easy to look back retrospectively. Do you think there was a way to focus on giving the hostages out earlier? Do you think it's possible that BB kind of didn't even really want that goal because there was some political advantage? You do hear that. I mean, just thinking specifically about the Israeli hostages, is there anything you look back on on that and think, you know, I feel like maybe that there was a way to do this differently. Well, the fact that we didn't get all the hostages out means, you know, we didn't succeed. And, you know, can I point to a particular tactic that would have produced an outcome that got all the hostages out? I don't know, because the challenge I see

that we dealt with all year last year was, yeah, Bibi was not particularly interested in prioritizing the hostages, but Hamas also was not really coming to the table to do a hostage deal in a serious way, at least until after his bullet struck the ceasefire. And that was in November. And that's when serious negotiations really got going. Because before then, Hamas kind of thought, well, the cavalry will come, Iran, Hezbollah, others. Why should we do a big hostage deal? Why should we stop the war? So on that one, I think we were in a tough spot because of challenges on both sides, both the BBC side and the Hamas side. Yeah, Hamas side almost goes without saying. Sometimes it's important to say it, though. Sometimes people forget to say it. It's important to say it.

The Hamas side was not interested in providing the hostages either. Of course. All right, the fun stuff continues. You said on a panel recently that Joe Biden's debate performance was a shock to you? Come on, man. Really? What? It was a shock? Like, you didn't, like, there was no, you weren't worried about it?

I was fucking panicked. I was, going into the debate, my palms were sweating. I wasn't even working for him. I was like, can this old man make it through this next two hours? And I don't know. Anybody, any watcher of him was concerned? about this. And we would have focus groups where people would tell us that they just want to hold him to make sure he can stand up straight. Like you were really, you were really surprised.

Well, Tim, I did not expect what we saw at the debate. If I had or if, well, I'm, you know, I was on the national security side, not the political side, but you think people expected that out of the debate? I mean, I didn't expect to be that bad, but I wasn't, I don't think people were, I don't think people that were observing it were like shocked. They were like, oh, yeah, this is the sum of all fears. Like, I was worried that this might happen. We've seen signs of this. You had never seen anything that made you feel like that type of performance might happen?

I will tell you. You went away more than me. Yeah, and I've, you know, I've said this repeatedly because it's the truth, which is the Joe Biden I dealt with every day in the Oval Office in the Situation Room with someone who was well and faithfully executing the duties of his office. It was making decisions. He was involved in crisis. management. He was involved in strategy.

And I did not expect, by any stretch of the imagination, a performance like that at the debate. Why do you think it happening? Hunter was doing a podcast recently. Hunter's not, hasn't accepted our invite. Hunter is doing a podcast recently where he blamed it on the foreign trip that you were on with him. It was like a week and a half before. It's like what, how did it happen then? If it was totally a surprise, I don't understand. Like it was just a one-off block. I would just put it this way. I mean, on that, just take that foreign trip as an example. He did a press conference with Zelensky, you know, go back and watch it. That was the Joe Biden I was dealing with. And on the, you know, the stops before that, he did a sit-down interview with ABC on the D-Day anniversary. So he was out in public, engaging, meeting with foreign leaders, doing interviews, doing press conferences.

And then he turns in this performance at the debate, which was, you know, by his own admission, just terrible, everyone could see it. And I think that that had that people were not expecting to see something like that, which is why it had the dramatic impact that it had. It was not something that was like, oh, yeah, yeah, we kind of expected that. That was not my experience. Yeah, I'm not saying I expected. I'm just saying that, like, there were signs and he was shaky in other press conferences and interviews. Like, he didn't do that much. And he was out, he was working as president.

I just been publicly speaking compared to other presidents. Like, he wasn't out there in a lot of those, you know, public kind of venues quite as much. It defies logic. I don't believe you that, like, you were totally surprised that there was not, that you weren't worried about it, that there weren't concerns. Well, I guess all I can say is that from my point of view, I expect. I expected Joe Biden to go and turn in at least an okay performance in the debate. That's what I expected, and he very much did not do that. Now, does that mean that I didn't, like, see him have moments in his public communications that weren't great?

I'm not saying that. What I'm saying is that I did not expect the kind of thing to happen at the debate that happened. And that's what I said to Politico. That's what I believe. And the Joe Biden I dealt with as president was somebody who I thought did a good job as president and handed off a good hand to the incoming president. And I guess the other point that I would just make is that there's a division between two issues that I think have gotten conflated. One is, should Joe Biden have run for reelection? and here he ultimately didn't run for re-election.

So that pretty much kind of answers that. The answer is obviously not. He shouldn't have run, right? You can say that now? Like, obviously not. Well, obviously he dropped out, so it's axiomatic. But, I mean, you don't think that he could have been president in 2027. I mean, this leads to the second issue.

So there's the should he have run for president? And then there is the, did I have concerns about him doing the job as president? Yeah. And the answer to that question is, I did not have concerns. I watched him do the job as president. Halloween, 28. But he's running for a four-year term. We had a terrorist attack in, you know, in August of 2028?

You think that he was going to be at the top of his game? But, Tim, I'm trying to divide between should he have run for re-election and did I have concerns watching him do the job as president. While it was in the job, right? Yeah. But when you're running for re-election, he was going to have the job still for four more years. You would have had to have concerns. Did you see signs that would have made you felt like maybe I have concerns about this guy in three years from now?

I think that what is being cast out there right now, what is being proposed is that somehow he wasn't capable of doing the job as president in 2024. And that is what I'm pushing back on. Got it. The Havana syndrome thing is interesting for me. I thought it was a conspiracy theory. And then it seems like maybe it wasn't. When Michael Weince was on, he was telling me that there was like some reports about how Havana syndrome, it seems like they were assessed that this was a real thing. It was a real attack on some of our folks.

And you guys didn't want to put it out or had cross views on that. What was your thoughts on the Havana syndrome story? We put a huge amount of effort and energy into not just trying to get to the bottom of it. Was there a foreign nexus, you know, was this being conducted by a foreign intelligence service? but also how do you support the people who had very real health effects? And I'm very proud of actually the work we did. And we had a coordinator at the White House who was working that. Now, ultimately, it was the intelligence community with no political interference whatsoever

from the White House that reached certain conclusions about their, from their perspective, not being a foreign nexus. Right to the end of my time, I was continually calling folks in to say, let's keep looking at this. We should not close the book on this. So I'm not sure. So what do you think the real story is? I don't know. I mean, honestly, I think it's a completely confounding issue.

I think people suffered in a real way. And those people deserve our support and we gave it to them. I think in an extremely credible way, with support from the Congress, by the way, who provided resources for that. But what the source of all this was, I really don't know. What I believe is that we shouldn't shut the book on it. We should keep looking at it. All right.

When I have Democratic Foreign Policy People and we end with the pop quiz, Tommy Vitor's done pretty poorly on this. I want to say Ben Rhodes did better when he was on recently. And the pop quiz is based on the fact that when George W. Bush was running for president, he got received a pop quiz from a local reporter that he did not do very well on about foreign leaders. And this was great fodder for Democrats in the ensuing years. And so we get to turn the tables on you. The first question Bush was asked was to name the head of the Chechen Republic. Can you name the head of the Chechen Republic?

Kederov. One for one. Better than Bush. If Ben Stiller made a Zoolander reboot today and was told to kill the Prime Minister of Malaysia, who would he be targeting? I don't worry, Brahim. I feel like when people talk about the threats of Russia

going into other countries, there's a lot of countries that come up. One that doesn't ever come up is Lithuania. And given how many great Lithuanian athletes there were, if Putin was really going to try to bring back the Soviet Union, I feel like Lithuania would be a target. who would the president of Lithuania be? I have to pass on that one.

All right, we'll give you one more. About Estonia. I think a more common target is Estonia, our friends in Estonia, our great allies. So this is where I'm, because I'm out of government, it was Kayakales, who is the prime minister, but she's now the chief European diplomat and the new prime minister is somebody who came in after I left the down. She's great, Kayakalas, by the way. The new prime minister is Christian. Michael. Michal, Michael? I don't know. One of the others. We're to give you a half point on that. Two and a half out of four. You and Ben Rhodes get a tie, I think. You beat Tommy Vitor. So

congratulations on that. Jake Sullivan. Do you have anything else? I didn't ask you about anything you're hot to trot on? Any broadsides against Pete Hegseth or Tulsi Gabbard or, you know, anything you want to get off your chest? I think we've covered a lot. I'll look forward to doing it again at some point. All right, Jake, man. I appreciate you coming on the show. and the next time we're going to pretend like the Biden 2024 campaign didn't happen so we're not going to talk about

anything that happened in 2024 the next time you're on and I hope you'll come back soon, all right? Sounds good, thanks a lot. All right, we'll see you, brother. Miss regrets, I believe that you don't know. Miss regrets, can you please exit out my own? Miss regret, I think I'm better off a little.

Miss regret, miss regret, I got these deep regrets some things I can't forget, Lord knows I try my best. You said it's not my best. I came about my flesh. Some things I must confess. Spoke my truth, paid my debt. Can't you see I'm a wreck? Let me lose. I digress. This is me and I'm blessed. This is me. And I'm blessed. This is me. And I'm blessed. This is me. And I'm blessed. Anybody fighting through the stress? Anybody fighting through the...