The Comedy Cellar: Live from the Table - An Israeli liberal mugged by reality. Uncomfortable Conversations within Israel - Rafi DeMogge is the pseudonym of an Israel-based author and political demographer.

Episode Date: April 18, 2024

Voice was converted using elevenlabs.io You can follow him on Twitter @HeTows. Raffi's articles are published here: https://mosaicmagazine.com/author/rafi-demogge/

A friend of mine, who, by the way, is also anonymous on Twitter, alerted me to another anonymous tweeter who goes by the name of Rafi Damog. Rafi Damog is the pseudonym of an Israeli-based author and researcher who writes on political demography. You can follow him on Twitter at Hetos, H, H-E-T-O-W-S. And my friend, who I've met in person, but he's anonymous on Twitter, he recognized me, urged me to interview you because he felt that you are such a unique or such an intelligent voice on Israeli issues. And so that's what I'm going to do. I don't know who you are or what important position you have, but I know that you are an intellectual force to be reckoned with.

So welcome to the show, Rafi. Thank you so much for having me. It's a pleasure to be here. So I'm just going to go through some stuff. And of course, you know better than I do what it is that you're interesting for. So, you know, I'm going to let you lead me as well. But on Twitter, on your profile, you say an Israeli liberal mugged by reality. So why don't we start there? How has reality mugged you? Yeah, so my political journey, I don't know how count it is, but my political journey is something like this. You could say that socioeconomically, I'm associated with the so-called Israeli center-left.

The emphasis is on center. So I've never been a peacemaker. Let's put it this way. I've never been far left. But I've belonged to this very large, not always a majority, but very large camp that was very disillusioned with the peace process, but didn't have religious commitments to the whole land of Israel. but thought that the status quo is not something that could be maintained forever as some sort of separation, whether by consensus or human naturally it's necessary. You could say I belonged to this pragmatic center left, which typically calls itself center to distinguish itself from merits, let's say. I used to support a continuing Arya Sharon's unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza Strip.

I used to think that this is something that should be repeated in the West Bank. And because I don't want to force it by history, I should say that I've had doubts about this over the last few years already. I wasn't quite sure that this over the last few years already. I wasn't quite sure that this is the right way to go. But since the 7th of October, I've become completely promised that this is a terrible idea.

So I no longer believe in this. I no longer believe that it's a good idea to cede any further territory. In many ways, you know, in many ways, I'm still liberal. So I'm liberal on social issues, liberal, same-sex marriage, stuff like this. I don't share the socially conservative agenda of leaving out the whole of the Israeli government with very large parts of it. So when you say you became disillusioned with the peace process so that you no longer believe in a Palestinian state, I'm not sure how you put it. What do you mean by that, that you no longer trust the other side to be willing to make peace?

Or what exactly do you mean? I have not been trusting the other side for a very long time. So that's not new. That's why the so-called is very central, often distinguishes itself from the small part of the left that continues to call itself left. This is a bit confusing, maybe to America. Listeners, I think in the U.S., it's very difficult to speak of the death of the Israeli left, which shrank to canceeds. People like Yair Lapid or Benny Gantz are typically not whole left-wing.

They are constantly centrist. But in Israel, these porists, they're branded as being a natural extension of the left. Because really the main difference isn't in the desired outcome or the diagnosis of the main issues. It's more about exactly how to get there. Smooth, different, you tone, you know. So, sorry, going back, I'm rambling, but getting back to your question. Yeah. So it's not a recent thing that I've been disillusioned with the Palestinians. I haven't been trusting them for a very long time. to afford the unilateral withdrawal from the West Bank and to weather what come what may

when Falun Sinavitebri takes over the West Bank and starts launching attacks against Israel because even about this, I didn't have illusions. I just thought that even then, it's better to think of nothing the Gaza Strip than if it were. Likewise, it would be better if we were not in the West Bank or Judea or Samaria

than if we stayed there. And this is what I know and believe. I never had the illusions about the Palestinian side. You still there? Yeah. Yeah, yeah, yeah. All right so so what you're saying is that you thought that it would have it would it would eventually turn into a hostile enemy country but that israel

would be able to handle it and that would be a better scenario than the status quo, which is untenable, correct? Yeah, that's correct. I don't find the word untenable because one of the things I keep repeating as a mantra, what does the word untenable mean? You know, everything is untenable. Nothing stays the same way forever. If there's a Palestinian state, you know, who knows, maybe in 300 years there they're not going to

be nation states. Maybe we'll all live in intergalactic world government. So everything in the very long run is untenable. But I thought the situation would be better. Yeah. When I say untenable, you're right. That's a sloppy word. the image of Israel ruling over an ever-growing majority population is not the way Jews want to live. It's repulsive, I think, to us to be viewed that way. And we can explain until our faces turn blue, but it's going to fall on deaf ears to the world. And that's an untenable psychological predicament, I think, for most Israelis. That's what I meant.

Yeah, I think that's a pretty good way of putting it. That's where I was. That's where I was until quite recently. There's one small correction I should make. We aren't currently speaking of an ever-growing majority. There's no sense in which Israel is ruling over a non-Jewish majority. So, you know, between the river and the sea, the population distribution is very close to 50-50%.

According to last data I've seen, it's still like 52% Jewish, something like that. And given Palestinian birth rates falling, it's not clear that there really ever is going to be an Arab majority. I don't think that really matters to the heart of the problem. It's very far from ideal even to rule off, let's say, a 30 or 40 percent Arab population without citizenship and without rights. It's definitely not an ideal situation. And I used to think that it would be preferable to unilaterally end it because it works relatively okay in the Gaza Strip. That's what I used to believe. Yeah. Well, yeah, I'm happy that you corrected me.

Of course, you're right. I mean, it's wrong for any population to be ruled over with no rights. But even I got sloppy there. I was under the impression that the Palestinian birth rates were a trajectory that was agreed on and was going to mean,

you know, significant majorities of Arabs. But you're right. What difference does it make? If it's a 50-50, it's still the same moral dilemma. So then, you know, it just reminds me when I was, I don't know, 20 years ago, my father, who was pretty right wing, was at a Passover Seder with people who were more, much more right wing than he was. And they were arguing in favor of the withdrawal from Gaza. And my father said, no, you cannot withdraw without a deal. It will blow up in your face. Everything has to without a deal. It will blow up in your face. Everything has to have a deal. This was his gut reaction to the kind of what he thought was just a dream, a delusion that

you could unilaterally withdraw and expect it to work out. And he turned out to be right. So given the fact that you think the withdrawal was a mistake. What do you think is the proper course of action now for the so-called day after? Reoccupation? What do you think? So one thing I should say is, you're right. As I said, I'm very skeptical of unilateral withdrawal at this point. I'm also very skeptical of bills. I don't think a lasting bill can be reached with the Palestinians. And, you know, I don't base this on prejudice. So one thing that I really want to emphasize to everybody who is waiting to listen is that a lot of the political arguments about the so-called day after, you know, two states solution, whether we can have a two-state solution, whether we can have human rights, whether we go. A lot of these things turn on empirical issues.

When the Biden administration claims, for example, that Hamas doesn't represent most Palestinians, the Mika and Empori complain. This is something that can be checked by social surveys. Social surveys resoundingly refute them. Hamas does, maybe not the organization, but the ideology absolutely does represent the vast majority of Palestinians. This is very clear from Halil Shikaki's Palestinian Center for Protestant Serbian Research. I'm an avid reader of this book, it's published every few months in English. It's available on the internet.

So basically the reason I don't think that an agreement is possible either is that it will completely lack popular electricity on the Palestinian side, it could in principle last as long as there's a Syrian dictator ruffling in the image of Mahmoud Abbas, who abides by the deal against the wishes of the vast majority of the population. But the catch is, the reason Abbas can't get in power

is that he's being progged up by this vast security army infrastructure that's in the West Bank. So as soon as Israel pulls out of the West Bank and no longer props off the Palestinian dictator, I'm pretty sure he's going to be overthrown within a week. I had a friend of mine who is a Palestinian Arab. I mean, I'm sorry, he corrected me on the way. He doesn't want me to say an Arab Israeli. He's a Palestinian Israeli who said the same thing. He feels that it would descend into violence very quickly. Yeah, I think that's an accurate assessment. So that doesn't answer your question. Not this, not that. So what should happen then? And I'll afraid my answer will be very disappointing. In the foreseeable future,

I don't see any alternative to the status quo, to the kind of status quo that's going on in the West Bank. I was hoping earlier on in the work that the board would end with the Medicare reoccupation of the Gaza Strip, which again is very far from ideal, but it's better than the Gaza Strip, which again is very far from ideal,

but it's better than the Gaza Strip being ruled by Haas. The way things look, it doesn't seem to me that this is going to happen. From what I can tell, the plan now seems to be to turn the Gaza Strip into something like Area A in the West Bank, which means that it's not under course of military occupation, but the IDF would have the freedom of operation there. And it's still unclear who would restrict that. They're talking about class. Unclear. But I don't really have a solution to propose

because a solution that, any solution that's consistent with the continuity of the existence of Israel as a Jewish state would require a side that can accept this, another side that can accept this another side that can accept this and can leave it and the outpacing

why is that very careful it doesn't even have to be a majority you know it doesn't even have to be a majority Israel has a steady in Egypt the vast majority of Egyptians

absolutely despise Israel but for now at least it's a stable dictatorship. And as long as this is the system of governance in Egypt, this court peace, at last. There was a lot of panic during the Arab Spring after Egypt's first democratic elections. There was very widespread speculation when the peace treaty would break.

Thankfully, it didn't last for long because Sisi restored the UN-Systemic Coup. But the problem is that the Palestinian has an old history of very big governance, very weak ability of state building. So it's kind of a funny thing because the frequent phrase that people use is

there can be two states when there is a peaceful democratic Palestinian state. And what I often say in response, there can't be a peaceful and democratic Palestinian state. It could be one of those things. It could be peaceful

or it could be democratic. It can't be both. And I don't see any way to guarantee that the Palestinian state would remain peaceful and therefore undemocratic. So I don't think there's a solution. Maybe there can be a solution in 50 years or 100 years. But I don't think we should even speak of a solution right now. My thinking, and it's pessimistic like yours, is along the same lines. I don't know if you've heard me. I've talked in terms of there needs to be a critical mass of people that want this. In a

democracy, a critical mass is 51%. And if the government makes a deal, it's a deal and no one's going to have their own independent militia. And in a strong military or authoritarian dictatorship like Egypt, a critical mass is the dictator and no one is going to have their own militia in Egypt. In some nascent Palestinian state, 10% disagree can be enough to start shooting rockets into Israel. That's exactly right. That is not Brooklyn. So how do they control that? So let's get into, there's a lot of things that go around. The unanimity that Netanyahu is a monster and wrong about everything is so great that I have to assume it overshoots.

Nobody is 100% wrong and bad about everything that they do. It reminds me of Trump derangement syndrome in America. So I want you to explain to me where Netanyahu is getting a bum rap. Is he getting a bum rap for the so-called propping up of Hamas? Would a different Israeli leader allow the Palestinian Authority to take over in Gaza? And would that be the right thing to do? Where is the rub between Netanyahu's political career and what's best for the state of Israel most conspicuous? This is such a difficult question. So I told you at review, BB the arrangement syndrome is real. And it cuts both sides. So, you know, I need to say, you know, at the very beginning, to be honest, you never introduced me as a right-thinking Israeli.

I'm a very atypical right-thinking Israeli, and I think many or most right-thinking Israelis wouldn't even agree to describe me as such. I see myself as a political home, as in between these two camps, in my ways. I think it's very, I mean, it might be a bit funny to say this. I still think it's early to judge Bibi's legacy. It might take another 10 or 20 years after he completely withdraws from critics when they get a career picture of his true legacy I think many of the criticisms against

Bibi are justified I think others are let's say disingenuous so I think Bibi can be correctly blamed for allowing Hezbollah to build up a huge arsenal

and becoming much of a strategic threat to Israel than it was 10 years ago. I think that's a fair criticism. And, you know, I can't be sure, but it's quite possible that somewhere else in the seat of the prime minister might have the difference with Hezbollah. The thing is, Bibi, even though he's leaving the right-wing bloc in many ways, he's been a very Dalit prime minister. He's been more Borebers historically than many prime ministers from the central left. More so than I would honor, more so than I would own it, more so than I would barack.

In the case of Gaza, it's a very popular talking point that Bibi made his D.O.B. Kamaz, and he's been paying protection money, and that's really bad. In my opinion, this trick is hard to take seriously, not necessarily

because it's not true, but because I'm very confident that everyone else would have done the same thing. And they did. They did. Both Lapid and Bennett did. Yes, exactly. So this is Maliki. You know, it's very one of the cheapest things is to sit in the center left opposition and criticize the Israeli government from the right. And maybe some of those criticisms are justified, but I have no illusion that it would have not been the exact same thing. And I also need to add, and to me, this was one of the eye-opening things. And it's actually one of the issues that caused me to turnl around and oppose any further territorial concession.

The Diploi responds to this war against Haas, which I think the vast majority of Israelis sees as a justified, necessary war. At this point, public opinion is divided on how exactly it's being handled, but the best point stands is that this is a just war. And the diplomatic backrash, to me, was very eye-opening because it shows two things, in my opinion. So what I think it shows is that it would have been completely put together realistic to enter Gaza anytime before the start of the book tour. Something as traumatic as death massacre had to happen for an invasion of Gaza to be more or less acceptable to international public opinion, at least during the first weeks or couple of months of the war. That changed, but there was a widespread acceptance that, okay, this was really bad. So no solution left other than overthrowing.

Kamas, I don't think such a war would have been considered acceptable even on day one. If any time earlier, but there really was no other, so, you know, other than that and basically the baby's voice, I don't think that was really a third option because. So that's one thing.

That's one reason that I can't really take those criticisms seriously. Like, you know, really? You would have entered Krakow and, you know, at the cost of killing thousands of civilians before 7th of October?

That would not possibly have flown. The other thing is... Or to make sure that they had less money while the world is already crying alarm and maybe just with justification that they don't have enough food, they don't have enough resources. Yeah. I don't remember a time when a humanitarian crisis was not imminent in the Gaza Strip.

It's like every two months I've read a new article about how just now another three months and the Gaza Strip will be uninhabitable. And I've seen these articles for like, I don't know, 15 years. But the other thing is, and maybe I should have mentioned this earlier, what made me kind of hawkish. In a weird way, it was actually the diplomatic reaction, the international reaction to the war in Gaza. Because I'm looking at what the reaction is to Gaza and what was the international reaction to

the status quo that prevailed before this war, the occupation of the West Bank. And well, it's very hard not to conclude, well, it wasn't so bad. Were there arms embargoes because Israel is occupying the West Bank? Were there arms embargoes and calls for unilaterally recognizing an independent Palestinian state because Israel built another few hundred settlement homes? No, there was nothing like that. And part of the discourse was it's a good idea to withdraw from the West Bank, because if in the terms of a peace agreement and the newly formed Palestinian entity states, call it whatever you want, the Texas, the beverage will be at least as bad as now. So, you know, this self-interested argument, oh, it's going to be, it's in order to prevent a diplomatic tsunami that we need to withdraw. The way I see the opposite is true. If we withdraw, there's going to be a much worse diplomatic tsunami.

There's some diplomatic backlash against settlements and the occupation too. But what ordinary people react to the most strongly, understandably so, is just a lot of Palestinians dying. Well, let's just play devil's advocate on that for a second. Do you think the reaction of the world would be the same if Gaza were not seen as being this embargoed, open-air prison, as it were, where people are essentially in a pen and being bombed. In other words, if Gaza were actually its own state and the West Bank were actually its own state and things went in and out freely, and then they attacked Israel,

maybe the international reaction would be less harsh. I can't prove this to you, but I'm extremely skeptical that the international reaction would be less harsh. And maybe one beta point that I could add prove this to you, but I'm extremely skeptical that the international reaction would be less harsh. And maybe one beta point that I could add on this note is, well, I've been spending a lot of time lately checking various changes to American public opinion over the past 10 years. Because I was really interested in this. The American public opinion about Israel has changed.

It's become a more pluralizing issue. Support among Democrats, Dari Sigmund Eiffel, decreased, as everybody knows. It's also went up among Republicans. So it's more of a partisan issue. There was also very curious, various events that happened during the past 20 years, did they have any observable effect? So you just look at changes between two years in the polls. And for example, it seems that there was a decrease also after the second Lebanon war in 2006.

Lebanon is a sovereign state. Of course, really the border was with Hezbollah, but still Hezbollah Opreyke is from a sovereign state. That was also something that caused damage, diplomatic support for Israel. So, you know, I can't prove this, but I think it's, you know, in a way, it's a very natural human reaction

that what ordinary people were not deeply invested in this react to is just dead, dead people and burning buildings

and not some dry news that Bibi is dragging his foods on the diplomatic process. Because as long as, you know, as long as there are no bodies hitting the floor, sorry to put it bluntly, who cares? Other than policy wonks.

All right. So just to get back to the question that I asked, what is the downside of the Palestinian authority being asked to come in and take over Gaza? And why is Bibi so against it? Is that politics or is that patriotism? I think Bibi is... So there are two official justifications. Actually, there's one justification that you keep it with here

from the government, which is that the Palestinian authorities, they could fly. They also support power, maybe are a bit better than Hamas, but they're also terrorists of some sort and they incite against the school curriculum system.

That's all true. That's all true. That's all true. I don't think that's the main reason that Divi opposes their return to the Gaza Strip. And frankly, I also oppose their return to the Gaza Strip, and it's also some of my main reason. I learned to have very low expectations. I think the main reason is that once the Peres-Tingin and Z the Palestinians are under united leadership, it's just going to be much more natural and much easier for future U.S. administrations, especially the Democratic ones, to press for a Palestinian state. As long as Palestinians live divided, some of them under Haas rule, some of them are under Palestinian Astoner authority. The Palestinian state is basically impossible even if Israel agrees to it.

It won't be impossible, at least for that reason, as soon as the Palestinian has the other United. Sometimes this is pointed out that cynicism won't be beside, but frankly, I think it's a legitimate reason for opposition. If you think that the Palestinian state is a disaster, then it's reasonable to want to preempt steps that are going to make it easier for the U.S. to press for it. Yeah, and this point needs to be underlined because people are not understanding or not going to understand what you're saying. You would love, correct me if I'm wrong, you would love a peaceful Palestinian state.

It's not that you want to keep that land. It's not that you're religious. It's not that you want a Palestinian state would immediately become a military and security threat to Israel, only more formidable than what we saw on October 7th. Is that correct? That's exactly right. I'm always speaking in my name, so I can't deny that there's a very significant population in Israel who also opposes the Palestinian state for religious, not for religious reasons. I've gone, I'm secular. I do have a sort of historical,

emotional catch net to large parts of Judea and Samaria. I wouldn't want to give up on the old city in Jerusalem, but I'm not in principle opposed to a Palestinian state. I'm just completely convinced that it would be a security disaster. And I really should emphasize that, and it sounds paradoxical, I think, to a lot of American listeners. I think it would also be a deploy-acro disaster because it would attack Israel.

And, you know, for whatever reason, I don't know, the reflex to side with the weaker side, much of the world puts sides with what it perceives as the weaker side, would make things diplomatically worse for us. I'm completely convinced of that now. It would make our people standing really worse. I think we would be celebrating it for maybe two years. What an amazing concession Israel made. It would be very quickly forgotten. And when there's a war, the world would triumph against us and it would be much worse than now. I mean, there's just this fundamental,

I don't want to pretend it's limited to this issue, because it's a constant in politics all over the world, until the second migrants started going into blue cities, in which case this had to be stopped immediately. The notion that people should be looking to give a state to people who are preaching their destruction is not realistic until, I would think, until the party line of the enemy of the Palestinians was that we want a peaceful coexistence with you. We no longer want to destroy you. How could there be any political will to want to give them a state? They have to change their expression. They won't even even for PR purposes exchange change their public presentation of their goals. I mean, if they actually said it, many Israelis wouldn't believe it, but they won't even say it. Is that silly? No, I totally agree with you. I should say some say there's a goal of double speak. So this is also something that I think people should be

aware of when they're looking at polls. There are lots of posts of varying qualities published about Palestinian society. And one thing I kind of come back to is like a mantra. No poll mapping the popularity of a two-state solution in Palestinian society is credible if it doesn't even offer the eliminationist option. So there are lots of reported polls which say, oh, 60% of Palestinians support two states. But then you look at the poll,'s it's a binary option they can either choose one one democratic states one and one vote or an independent dynastinian states and of those two choices 60 percent choose let's say two states i i just made up this number but this is a very i think i've seen such a fall, maybe in Washington Post a few months ago. A credit but poor also offers... A credit but poor offers more options, the most obvious

one being we are going to liberate the empire historical past. I'm throwing the river to the sea, and it's going to be an Arab Muslim state. When you offer that option, the two-state solution maybe gets, I think usually around 10%. And this option gets between 70% and 85%. I think that I just now checked, it was 85% in the West Bank and some 70%. Interestingly, lower, 70% in the Gaza Strip.

When there's a further pause, again, these are pause made by Khadil Shikaki, 70% in the Gaza Strip. When there's a further pause, again, these are pause made by Kudgil Shikaki. I strongly recommend, I strongly recommend to everyone to really take a deep dive into these sports. He himself is a very, very respected political scientist. As far as I know,

he himself is pretty dovish. So it's not, I don't think he's happy about these results. But he also posed the question, for example, what should happen after a Tuesday solution? But what should happen after that? Again, a very clear majority of Palestinians, and I should emphasize, that's already just the subset of Palestinians who said they would support the two-state solution. A clear majority of those who said they would vote for it answered the question, whether the struggle to liberate the entire historic Palestine should continue after the two-state

solution. A majority say yes. So the share of Palestinians who don't just say they accept a two-state solution, but would be happy to just take that as a complete cessation of hostilities and the end result that is not going to change any further. That's minuscule. It's not even a small minority, it's a very measurable minority, it barely exists

now one thing is different we woke up to it basically yesterday, at least in my lifetime which is this reality that so many of the Sunni Arab states seem to have joined with Israel to defend and oppose this Iranian attack. Does that change the dynamic?

Is there a chance that the Sunni states could impose and enforce a two-state solution in a way that was unthinkable years ago? Does that change anything in your mind? I think it's hard to say. I think one question that should be asked is impose on whom? On the Palestinians. On the Palestinians, yeah. I mean, I don't know. It seems, you know, like how? Presently, the way they talk, they want to impose it on Israel. They claim to support it at two states. I don't think such an imposition is really possible. I just don't see what kind of mechanisms could be built

that would prevent the Palestinian popular will from overcoming any such deal, if given in the medium term. I just have a very hard time seeing it. I think part of the problem, and again, I should say we are venturing into territory that I just have less firm opinions about, but I think these student states have their own problems with unpopularity at home. So these states have some measure of regime-legitimacy, but they're also dictatorships. The vast majority of their populations

don't want to see any independence, Jewish and linear, that are perestinious. I think for them, it's less of an existential issue. So when people ask, why is peace with Egypt or the Emirates possible if you think it's not possible with the state of Paris that well? Because theoretically, they have the same views, but I don't think it's the number one political priority for those people. But yeah, these regimes have to deal with the unpopularity of their own official stance toward Israel at home.

So I'm skeptical. I'm skeptical. I think they will be happy if such a solution could be imposed and this conflict could be solved finally. But I don't think – I just don't think they have the power to really achieve that. Well, so getting back to, because it's related, this thing about clans and Palestinian authority and who would take over Gaza. I mean, just the notion of clans to me just sounds like an immediate civil war. That's what the word clan almost implies. You can't have clans with sharing power. And if you can't have the Palestinian Authority, is there an option for the other Sunni states to be involved in ruling Gaza?

I mean, I figure that's pretty great. So it would be possible. I think everyone is fleeing from this like a hot potato. It's not exactly appealing to rule Gaza. This is why I was hoping that this war would end with the military occupation of the Gaza Strip, which is an extremely suboptimal, it's not even a solution. It can be a suboptimal result, but of all the possible results that I can think of, it would be the least bad one. I don't think it's going to be in that direction. It's been on November 1st or December 1st when people were screaming, what's the plan for the day after? I kind of rolled my eyes and said, it's a little soon. They have other things to worry about now.

But here we are coming up on May and they really do have to come up with a plan, right? I mean, the time is now. So what's it going to be? What's your best guess? It's hard to, I think it's hard to say. So when this discourse about the day after started, at the time I was convinced that this is a rhetorical device to pressure, to... Visibly this is

a rhetorical device to cause the government to explode. Because parts of the government would want to permanently... You know, I mean, parts of the government would want to permanently, you know, I mean, parts of the government wanted expulsion of the civilian population, which was completely unrealistic. How much?

How much? People bring that up all the time. So how many people really want that and how feasible is it? Just as a little detour. I don't think it's feasible. I don't think it's feasible. It don't think it's feasible. It's not let's put it this way. Explosions happen throughout history.

They happened in 1948 during Israel's war of Fina Panas. But the way they happened was under very special circumstances. It was not exactly centrally planned. To a very large extent, it was reliant on panic.

So the Arab population in what's today the state of Israel, in large territories, entered panic and fled. This sort of thing can occasionally happen spontaneously. It's not a sort of thing that can be just planned and prepared and carried out. Because I should say I'm intentionally refraining from discussing this through moral lens. I'm strictly speaking about this as a policy. I don't think this is realistic policy because you can't really plan, you can't really plan suing panic in the civilian population, especially when you announce in great dramatic words that this is what you're planning to do,

that's not, you know, the element of surprise is lost and there's not going to be panic when the civilian population doesn't panic and resist. At that point, well, at that point, we are talking about genocide. I don't think anybody of any importance wants that despite whatever people say. That's not something with any significant populist support.

And my question is whenever anybody brings that up is, well, first of all, expel them to where? Jordan's not going to take them. Egypt is not going to take them. Well, the people, so again, I'd never from day one, even when the whole country was in a rage,

I never said this should be done or could be done. Can I just say something? Just let me say, what you said before is worth underlining. You're not speaking through a moral lens. I think we both agree that it would be an immoral thing to do to expel 2 million people from a land unless you had extreme justification. Nobody thinks this is a moral thing to do, correct?

So, yeah, I think the clarification you added is important. It would not be moral in this war, you know, in very extreme circumstances. So I think in 1948, it was permissible because that was an existential either-or-as situation. And I don't think any other country would have done anything different if it wanted to survive. In the present situation, no, I don't think so. I don't think for us, in the short term at least, it's not an existential threat to Israel. I think the various regional circumstances that could turn them into an existential threat. I think if there were a two-state solution, they really would become an existential threat, partly because of the changing diplomatic environment.

But yes, but I'm strictly speaking of this just in terms of whether this is realistic poesy. And I've always thought this this is realistic poesy, and I've always thought this is not realistic poesy, but what I wanted to add, the people who supported it, of course, they didn't think Egypt would take them. They thought they would free to Egypt whether Egypt wants them or not. And they gambled that Egypt wouldn't start the regional war for that, you know, wouldn't treat this as a causal study for regional war, which is, of course, a big gamble. They didn't think Egypt would willingly take that. They thought Egypt would not have a choice.

But this is, as I'm thinking, this is madness. This is not 1948, which is post-World War II and kind of the Wild West. This was always the illusion. I don't think it's just realistic. Yes. You have nations. You have the United States of America's support.

You have the UN. You're not just going to – it's crazy talk. You're not going to expel millions of Arabs and expect Israel to have any kind of future which is better than the status quo. That's for sure. I think it's a good way to put it. I think that's a good way to put it. You know, it comes to allow sometime in the distant future,

Israel, God forbid, becoming, you know, being in such an existential situation that it sees no other way to save itself. But thankfully, we are. I think we are very far from this. Yeah, look, you know, I deeply am against expulsion. It's not even something that would ever even come into my head.

But when the subject comes up, like you, I think, I don't want to be a simplistic or virtue signal. I understand the world is a rough place. It can't be ignored that much of the pro-Palestinian advocacy talks about expelling the Jews, right? It's not like expulsion is not on the table. Of course. This is the centrist, I would say this is the centrist option in Palestinian society because the leftist option is the subjugation of the Jewish objects and the right-wing option is something worse than genocide, something worse than expulsion. So yes, this is publicly mainstream there, yes. On college campuses all over America, you hear, well, this is what decolonialization looks like. They're talking about expulsion. Yes, of course.

I mean, I should say the whole pro-Palestinian discourse is completely disconnected from the discourse of Palestin as themselves. I don't think they think of Elie Kampner. This whole talk of decolonization is kind of ridiculous because I think the mainstream Palestinian view of Israel is not it's not through those colonialist class. They see it as a shame

and most glory of the civilization that they once had. It's kind of the opposite. They polarized the slant, but they're proud of it. They had empires here. I had thought recently to myself that the human ability to get used to things, which is an adaptive ability that we have, is sometimes very, very good. But it's also the cause of terrible things.

We get used to living in a violent culture, like we get used to living in a culture that's not violent. And this psychological problem, as I see it, which is to have the Palestinians believe that accepting the humiliation of this 22% and having them to think that that humiliation is preferable to the status quo. When they're used to the status quo, they, it seems to me, prefer the status quo to that humiliation. And that is the psychological nut which doesn't seem crackable. How do you get them to want to see that humiliation as preferable to their futures and their children's futures? I don't see it happening. So I should say so. You agree with my analysis?

I agree with your analysis. I don't think there's a solution. So I'm going to say, I'm going to say something very dark. Because until now, I said there's no solution, not that I'm soon. We should stop speaking of solutions anytime in the near future. And we should just try to make incremental improvements and make life bearable to both sides and see how it goes, which is very disappointing and uninspiring. But I do see... So if I'm pressed for a vision, something that completely ends the conflict... So here's what I have to say.

I don't think this is realistic, I don't know, the next 50 years. Maybe it's going to be realistic in 100 years. But here's the way I see it. And this is, again, this is a very dark thing to say, but I've become convinced of it. I don't think that the Palestinians as a collective are really capable of changing because this feeling of humiliation, the historical experience of the Nagpa, the catastrophe, which is on the one hand their own exile en masse from this land. But on the other hand, it's just the very creation of a Jewish state in what they see as their land. I think this is such a central component of Palestinian national identity.

If you remove this, there are no Palestinians. I think this is completely essential and central to it. It's very hard. I mean, I think the Protestant has a kind of unique in this regard. So, you know, people sometimes speak of denazification. But the Germans as a people had at least, you know,

a hundred year long history by the time that the Nazis took over. A hundred years long history of collective consciousness and the culture in which, you know, Nazism wasn't a central component. So there was something, you know, when you kind of peeled off the Nazi ideology, there was a core behind it

to which it was possible to fall back. In the case of the Palestinians, I don't see that. And I need to really emphasize there are people on the Israeli right who claim there are no Palestinians, there is no such people, they are just Arabs. I'm not claiming that. I think there really are Palestinians. They are unique. They are separate people from the Arab Ummah. But the experience of the Nakba and the eliminationist desire to get rid of any Jewish presence in historical Palestine is just an inseparable core component

of their national identity. And when you remove that, then there is very little that distinguishes them from neighboring Arabs in the Levant. You know, it's not religion. It's not language. It's not the cuisine, which is pretty much the same

if you cross the border to Lebanon or Jordan. It's not the cuisine, which is pretty much the same if you cross the border to Lebanon or Jordan. It's not the Dabka dance, which exists in many Levantine countries. So, you know, what is it? It's the Maghba. It's the Maghba. There's nothing more to it. So the way I see it, if this conflict is ever solved, ever, the only way I can imagine it is by the Palestinians becoming reintegrated into the Arabuma and becoming Egyptians and Jordanians and Lebanese

or what have you. And I should emphasize, I don't see this happening through expulsion. I don't think this is realistic. I don't think in any normal circumstances this is justified. But I don't really see any way of achieving regional stability that's not by just dividing these territories. I think this is a pipe dream now, but I also think the two-state solution is a pipe dream. So this is why I prefer to just not speak of solutions. But I think the Palestinian,

you know, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the very existence of this conflict, I see it as essential to Palestinian national identity at the collective level. Of course, there are individuals who would want peace. But to be extended, they want peace and accept the Jewish state. They compromise their national identity. And I think it's very hard to accept. But this

is the way I see it. And this is why I'm extremely pessimistic of any diplomatic solution with them. Yeah, I imagined, let's say that things got very, very bad in Israel. They're living very, very badly. And they had to give up the Wailing Wall. You have to give the Wailing Wall and the Old Temple back to the Arabs in order to end this conflict. I don't know if they'd do it. It's too central to them.

They would live miserably for a long time before they would give up something so central to their identity as that wall, even though they didn't even used to have it. So, and this is probably even 10 times more intense than that. Anyway, so, so you agree with that? I think so. I mean, you know, Israel existed for 19 years without the old cities. Right.

So honesty demands of me to add that what was wise doesn't seem impossible. No, I said that. It would be impossible now. They didn't always have it. Yeah, yeah. I think it would be impossible now. Yeah, yeah. But that even makes the point more interesting.

It's like they even didn't used to have it. But at this point to go back, they would suffer a lot. Maybe in the end you could bash them into it. But and if Israel were not a democracy that could control its militia, you don't know where that could lead. So and these are, you know, Jews with a Western tradition. Anyway, so there's a guy on Twitter. I don't know. I never had to say his name out loud.

It's Straw X-Man is the way I always. It's S-T-R-X- it's S T R X W M X N. He's a friend of mine. He, um, he's the one to turn me on to you and he picked out some choice tweets of yours, but he also wanted me to give you his best regards. Um, if you know who he is. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. Well, hi, I remember him. Do you know who he is personally?

No, not at all. But I think if I love Popuzic, I remember Rick Punz from him, among other things. Yes, yes. I met him. He's a terrific guy. Maybe someday we could all have a secret meeting. Anyway, so the tweets that he picked out.

Yeah. It's worth noting at this tense evening that the Biden administration's false mantra, Hamas doesn't represent the Palestinians, is true of the Islamic Republic of Iran. This was from April 13th. You have any comment on that one? Yes. So this is something that I've heard being said a lot. And I was very skeptical. It's very tempting and popular to say that various horrid dictatorial regimes don't represent their population. It's more often false than true. But I did see social surveys about Iranian society and especially among Iranian youth deducing the point in this direction.

So I've still had at least two such polls from the past one or two years. They point in the direction of very rapid secularization among Iranian youth. I think some three-fourths of the Iranians would want some kind of a secular regime, but it's not necessarily a democracy, but maybe something like the return of the Shah. I think the majority of women in Tehran don't abide with the Hatskar Buzai anymore. So there's, I think, with respect to Israel, opinions are more divided.

But, you know, I'm not after the illusion that Israel is popular among Iranians. But I think the way most of them see it, it's not, this is not a conflict in which they should have a dog. How is it their concern? I think they would just prefer to stay out of it. So I think I stand behind this. Yes. Yeah. I mean, it's a kind of simplistic notion in my opinion. First of all, there was many Americans who would say, Trump is not my president. Trump doesn't represent me. So there's this notion that the government doesn't represent a large number of the people. It can be true as far as it goes. But what they mean is that the Palestinian people are a hostage, are captives of Hamas, then maybe we should be more robust about regime change. But the fact is that, and I don't know any way out of this, in history, citizens suffer,

for better or worse, for the political unit that they are a part of. And that's the way it's always been. I don't know if Imperial Japan spoke for the Japanese or there's, I'm sure the Nazis didn't speak for some Germans, but that's the way it is. You have a government and if America, you know, we tried that, we tried going into Iraq, we tried going into Afghanistan. If we want to undo this notion that the government doesn't represent or only represents a fraction of the people, then we should go in there and free them, especially for something as unchallenging as Gaza. But otherwise, I think it's a meaningless statement. They elected Hamas and we don't know what another election would find. It probably would be re-election of Hamas. And there's a million dictatorships all over the world that people could say don't represent their people. So you can't make policy. It can't affect policy in any way, is my point. They are the government.

It would be so. I think, I hope I have, I hope I'm not misremembering it. I'm not sure if this was in the Wall Street Journal or the Washington Post. It's something that started with the W. So I apologize if I'm recited, but that was an extremely entertaining poll

that they cited in order to show that the majority of Palestinians don't support Hamas in an election poll. And what they forgot to add was that that's because there was a significant shift of voters from Hamas to the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, which together they've gotten a majority. So, yes. Yeah, I wasn not advocating for regime change in Iran

I know I'm saying the logic is you know so another tweet we're just about out of time oh wait I have to expand it the tweet is I describe this further factor as transcendent longing for finality. Let me explain.

It's psychologically very hard to accept when a problem has no solution, when there's nothing but plaster, better or worse. Oh, well, this is basically what you've been talking about. It's just how do you deal psychologically with something that has no answer. Yeah, I think this is a big driver. I think this is a big driver. In a way, this is a big driver of both left and the right, both in Israel and abroad. This conflict has been going on for very long. And people want it to be over, which is a very natural reaction.

They want to see the end of history, at least in this small region of the world. And they think the end of history can be achieved. The Reich has a vision of the end of history. You know, ex-Falschen, horrible asik may sound, that's a way in the rights, the hard right, I should say, most of the Israeli right doesn't advocate for this, but in the white rights imagination, that would be the end of history in the land of Israel for the left, achieving two states and a peaceful people be the end of history.

And I think people have this strong, the way I see it, people have this strong psychological urge to believe or to want to believe that the end of history

is possible, that conflicts have, conflicts always have solutions. And yeah, I'm just dark. You know, it's an unparalleled question that a real conflict has a solution. I think every solution to war is really even made steps

in the long run, just made things worse. And I'm not even claiming, I'm not even claiming exactly who was responsible for collapse of peace talks, let's say, between Barak and Garafat, but an attempt was made.

You could always argue it wasn't a searing up attempt, but stepping that eruption was made. It always made things worse. So sometimes maybe the American audience knows this analogy less well, but Naftali Bat was briefly Prime Minister

of Israel during the change government. He had this inzimous analogy of the shropler in the box when he mentioned a friend who got injured from a shropler in her operation and it was

explained to him that because remove the remove the shrapnel because it could crinkle him. They can't really do anything with the shrapnel. It always hurts. But probably the best thing for the foreseeable future is to just leave it as is and go to medical checkups every once in a while. And in my opinion, this is where we are in the Palestinians for a very long time. I think any attempt to change the status quo in any way,

I need to emphasize this. This doesn't just apply to two-state solution. The various visions of the right that are being looked at, you know, annexation, giving citizenship, you know, expulsion, of course. Any anything, any way could touch it would just make it worse, in my opinion. So I got one thing to say and one last question and you're done. First of all, listen, I know Israeli. Both my parents were Israeli. I spent my whole life around Israelis. And it's both, I'm laughing, but it's also upsetting to me that the prime minister it's it people are going to see he doesn't mean it disrespectfully i know he doesn't he says what so it's it's a you know it's an analogy but but

anybody who's compared to that says how dare you compare me to something in your butt i don't know i it's well it doesn't help if we want to take the analogy seriously if you don't upgrade the palestinians to his body or get these were to this bot, Palestinians are the shroknom. Yeah, I get it. I get it. But you understand that. Yeah, of course. Of course. Yeah, you're right. And I recognized immediately what we were about to see was a psychological war on the Jewish American psyche. I had written to somebody, you know, when they were crowing about all the support in the world for Israel. I said, it's not going to last five minutes. You're about to

see what I said. You're about to see daily George Floyd videos and a worldwide defund the police reaction. It was very clear to me that as soon as Israel did what it was going to do, that the world was going to turn. And this is having a corrosive effect on Jews all around me who are even now afraid to stand up against the charge of genocide, which I think is just the most outrageous thing. It's like I compared it. It's like acid rain on Jewish psychology. And it's even filtering down, flowing down to my children who are too young to really understand the conflict, but they sense it loud and clear that being Jewish is going to reset to what it was when I was a kid. And I don't know how that's going to affect my children.

And it's, it's very, it upsets me and concerns me in a way more than the war in Israel. If I can be selfish, I don't know how you've, if you have just have any wisdom on that or any comments on that, it's a return regression to the mean of the world's attitude about Jews that someone about my age in their 60s has never experienced. Yes, I've heard that opinion.

I should say that I'm, you know, I can't claim to be an expert on American Jewish diaspora affairs, but I've been speaking, you know, I have our friends in the U.S. or from the U.S. and are unhearing similar things from down there. The golden age of American Jewry or a golden age of acceptance is coming to an end. Of course, the memory of the Shoah is fading too. So there's that too.

So that seems realistic. My hunch, and I'm also basing this on demographic trends. Demography is one of my interests, and I've been tweeting about it, writing about it a lot. I've seen various predictions about the effect of this war and the surge of anti-Semitism on American Jewry.

One of the optimistic predictions I've seen, especially in Israel, was that this would cause some huge Aliyah wave. And I need to say that, I mean, I can't think of a nicer word to use. I think this is delusional. I just don't think it's, I think people don't, you know, let's be frank. Sadr is much lower in Israel than in the U.S.

Israel is a more dangerous country than the US there's no way of denying this it has to be extremely extremely bad to cause people to take a 40 person salary cut and to learn a foreign language so I don't think that's going

to happen. And they see themselves as Americans. I mean, I agree with you. I don't expect anybody, I mean, some number of people will, but not a wave. So there is a rise. So there's this whole industry,

you know, there's a very violent people. So I feel bad about making fun of them, but there's this whole Hasbara industry surrounding all the out. There's like a hundred percent rise of interest. Stuff like 50% rise

of interest making all the out to Israel. And, you know, that's true. And there could be a 50% rise in the number of American Jews who immigrate to Israel. But what they forget to add is that 50% rise in the number of American Jews who immigrate to Israel, but what they forget to add is that the 50% rise now is that instead of 3,500 American Jews who moved to Israel, there may be going to be 4,800.

They're not talking about game-changing numbers. What I think is more realistic, and I'm very sad to say this, but this is the historical experience. What's the reaction to low-key anti-Semitism historically? I'm not talking about general side and pogroms,

but the kind of anti-Semitism that's surging in the US. Well, let's be frank, the most common reaction is assimilation. And I think there's going to be more of it. I think this is just my

gut reaction, and it's also based on demographic surveys. I think this split that we are seeing in American Jewry, which doesn't exactly align with Orthodox and no Orthodox, but there is actually all that spirit. I think that's going to be stronger. I think there's going to be a group of American Jews whose assimilation is going to speed up because it's inconvenient. It's going to be increasingly inconvenience to be Jewish in America,

and they'll see less and less point of being so. And on the other hand, between Orthodox or more traditional Jews, or I don't know, maybe, maybe, yeah, like, cannot be more religious. Groups which are going to be more, I don't know, more

closed, you know, more closed into their communicates. This is what I'm more realistically see, but this is just the way things seem to me. I don't keep

talking about some big Jewish shift to the republicans. I don't keep her at talking about some big Jewish shifts to the Republic cast. I don't see it. I don't see it happening. I just don't see it. I think they're going to begin to shed their attachment to Judaism. Yes. They're becoming shy about it.

And it pains me. You know, we have a restaurant above the comedy cellar that has an old stained glass pane from some synagogue from the lower east side in manhattan that was torn down it's a star of david it's been there my whole life and i had taken note that in the last five years or so and you know when i was a child nobody commented on it it was like an italian flag in an american pizzeria or something. It's like an ethnic symbol in any ethnic restaurant. Yeah.

But over the last five years or so, people would come up to me and say, good for you, like taking a stand. It became seen as a defiant political symbol. Yeah. I heard a story, just somebody who I know goes to Columbia University Journalism School who told me that she got invited to a Shabbat dinner. And she's not particularly religious or she's not religious at all. And the people inviting her were whispering because they didn't want it to be heard that they were inviting somebody to a Shabbat dinner. Now, when I was in college, I could wear an Israeli flag on a T-shirt and walk around campus and nobody would even give it a second look. I can't even imagine doing such a thing today. So it's very sad.

That's depressing. That's depressing. Yeah, that's really depressing. be the real collateral damage or the real damage of this war, the lasting damage may be that that I'll feel more than the terrible loss of life in Israel. Anyway, all right, Rafi, I really, really appreciate your time. We're going to, of course, convert this to an unrecognizable version of yourself. And if that works and turns out to be a viable way to allow you to talk to the world, maybe in a couple of months, as there's more things to talk about, we can do this again, if you had a good experience. What do you say? Sounds great to me. And thank you so much.

Thank you so much for having me, especially in these weird anonymous circumstances. I don't take it for granted. The pleasure was mine. All right. Good night, sir. Good night.