The Comedy Cellar: Live from the Table - Former Shin Bet Chief - Ami Ayalon discusses the Gaza War, Peace, Hannibal and more.

Episode Date: July 15, 2024

The former chief of Israel's internal intelligence agency discusses all things Gaza, Hamas, Israel, peace talks, and more. Buy his book Friendly Fire, How Israel Became its Own Worst Enemy: https://www.amazon.com/Friendly-Fire-Israel-Became-Future/dp/1586422588

And welcome to a very special edition of Live from the Table, the official podcast for the Comedy Cellar. And we have a very special guest today, Mr. Ami Ayalon, who was previously the head of Shin Bet, which is the... Director. Director. Previously the director of the Shin Bet and commander in chief of the Israeli Navy. And he is the author of Friendly Fire, How Israel Became Its Own Worst Enemy and the Hope for Its Future. Welcome to the show, sir. Thank you very much.

I'm very, very pleased to meet you, Mr. Ayalon. So before we get into the current stuff, you know, I have a friend on Twitter. He's a strong critic of Israel. He's very knowledgeable, very smart. And I told him I was having you on. I said, what should I ask Ami Ayalon? And his answer, it turns out he's like a fanboy of yours. He's a huge admirer of yours. I'm going to read you what he wrote me. I think it's interesting. I was expecting something very critical about, you know, prisons or something. He says, definitely.

His time as commander of Shialet 13, Flotilla 13. They're Israel's maritime commanders, basically seals, and they're bad fucking ass. He took over as commander in 78 or 79 if I remember right. So those were crazy years. The Coastal Road Massacre in 78, the Nahari attack in 79, those were the years when the PLO stepped up the level of brutality to levels previously unheard of. When it went from terrorist acts to the sick Michael Myers serial killer shit we're used to seeing now. I'd be interested in hearing him talk about those times,

especially how it affected Israeli military culture and the culture in general. He was probably also involved with the 73 Lebanon raid, Flotilla 13 and others pulled off as part of the retaliation from Munich. Yeah, okay. First of all, I can speak about it for, I don't know, five hours. I'm not sure how much time do we have. I want to be very honest with you. Every time when I start to speak about it, I have three sons, three daughters-in-law and nine grandchildren, and they are fed up. They said, okay, okay, Pa or Grandpa, we had enough. So I'm not sure that we should spend our time, but in a nutshell, I'm not going to speak about myself, but since the question was, you know, the changes, the culture

during that time uh i think that um what i learned as a commander of the naval commando at that time uh is that um in retrospect uh the war is changing uh you know klausich said it almost more than 200 years ago. But yes, you know, when I joined the Navy as a young warrior and later a young naval officer, everything was very clear. You know, the reality was painted in white and black. We were the good guys. Enemy was the bad guys. And all what we had to do is We were the good guys. Enemy was the bad guys. And all what we had to do is to kill the bad guys,

to defend the good guys. We fought against states and armies, navies. During the time, during the late 70s and 80s, and even today, the war is changing every day. And today we are not fighting against states, against armies. The war on terror is totally different. One of the places in which you see the difference is that there is no military decision in the battlefield. It is very relevant, by the way, to what we see today in Gaza or everywhere. What you saw in Afghanistan, in Iraq, the idea, you know, political leaders are sending us in order to achieve military decision and to defeat the enemy and then, you know, to go back with, you know, a major victory. It's over. And I remember

it because, you know, every month, several times, we penetrated into command centers of Hamas terror organizations in Gaza or sometimes in Syria. And we did what we had to do. We fulfilled our missions. But it was clear that no matter how many terror activists we shall kill, they will not surrender. There is no military decision, terror organization, do not surrender. We saw it with Al-Qaeda and with Daesh, or you call it ISIS. And in a way, this is what I learned at that time. And I'm saying it because I think that it is very relevant

to the way we understand the reality and the way we understand the war that we are fighting in a way during the last 20, 30 years. All right, by the way, his name is Daryl Cooper. He goes by the name of MartyrMate on Twitter. I don't know if you're on Twitter. People believe the most horrible things about Israel. There's even now the accusation of genocide. Tens of thousands are dying. We've read the breaking, the silenced testimonies of former Israeli soldiers.

How sincerely and deeply are moral considerations taken as Israel fights a war? Well, the tension between moral considerations and killing people in the battlefield is a very complicated issue. You know, philosophers are dealing with it um and it is relevant to everyone um we saw it in afghanistan we saw it in iraq we saw it we saw it everywhere and we see it yes we see today in gaza and um i cannot justify all what we do in Gaza. But on the other hand, I find it very, very difficult to blame every soldier or every commander who is crossing every line of what is allowed and what is not. And again, I repeat myself, you know, the enemy of today is not the enemy of yesterday. They are not wearing uniform. You cannot identify them. So who is the enemy? Who is the enemy that we have to kill in order to defend ourselves and to defend our people?

And who is a civilian who we shouldn't kill. And we are not allowed to kill because he is innocent. When you fight terror, it's almost impossible. Now I want to say something. I think that it is not said enough. And people, you know, who see us from a different planet, from America, Europe or any other place do not understand it. You know, it's the the world that we are fighting today is in many, many aspects is the most complicated battlefield ever fought in human history. it is densely populated more than any other battlefield. Um, and second,

we are fighting against an enemy that in his former strategy, he is using his people as human shield. And the best example is, you know, Hamas during the last 10, 15 years, they did and they built the largest shelter in the world, the underground Gaza. There is no entry to any civilian. They could defend hundreds of thousands of people, of the innocent people who are living in Gaza.

But the innocent people who are living in Gaza, they cannot enter to these tunnels. Only Hamas commanders and Hamas terror activists. So it's unbelievable how can you fight, how can you defeat an enemy that he's saying, by the way, you just have to go to read

his Azatina Kassam website. By the way, they translate their ideology or strategy to English. So everybody can do it. And they say the whole idea is to bring the IDF, Israeli soldiers, into the centers of the cities. And then we, Israelis, we shall kill as many civilians as possible, and then the world, the Islam, and the Palestinians will understand that we are on the right side. We Hamas. So it is very, very difficult, almost impossible.

And yes, in addition, you know, they built their military centers and their military infrastructures in hospitals, in schools. So, and this is why it is so complicated. So, again, we are doing many mistakes. If you want me to justify every event, I cannot. But I know how a warrior or soldier feel when he has to, when he goes to war, and he cannot, he do not, he see enemy in everybody.

Sometimes, you know, it is a civilian, you are sure that he is a civilian, and the day later, he is shooting your friend. Or, you know, in a nutshell, what I say, the responsibility is on the shoulders of our political leaders. And I want to say something about it,

because I know that I'm not speaking to Israelis, I'm speaking to people who see it from another planet, on, I think, the four or five days after the massacre of Hamas on the 7th of October last year. And I think that people tend to forget what we had been experiencing at that time. But our cabinet had a first meeting. to forget what we had been experiencing at that time. But our cabinet had a first meeting. And the decision, of course, was to go to war. But they accepted a decision which is, until today, I cannot understand.

I cannot justify. They decided not to discuss the day after. Now, let me tell you something. When you send your soldiers, your people, your youngsters to war without a clear definition of a political goal, it means that you send them to war without a definition of victory. Victory is not measured in military terms. Victory is measured in a very simple language describing the day after for which we are fighting.

We are killing or many of us are dying. So once you decide to send your people to war without a definition of victory, without a definition of political goal, immediately the war becomes the end and not the mean. And the result is that you send your people to war without end. And this is what we see today. Our political leaders sent our people to war without an end. So if I have to tell you who is responsible, if I have to tell you who should be blamed,

I blame our political leaders and especially our prime minister. Now, this is, I'm going to ask you to speculate here. If you were to have, I mean, you know these people, if you were to have a private conversation with the members of the war cabinet and you said to them just what you said to me now, what reason would they give you for not putting a day after plan on the table? In a way, if I understand the question, is you are asking me what would they tell me? Yes. Or what would they tell you and what's the sincere reason? When you speak to politicians, and it is the same in America, Europe or in Israel, don't listen to what they say. Try to think what they really mean. I know everybody in Israel know why they did

not discuss the day after. Because of political reasons. Because they do not agree on the day after. Until today, you know, many people tend to forget that we do not have a border on our eastern side. You know, when we speak about 67 borders, there are no borders. It's a ceasefire lines. Until today, it was not agreed. Where is our eastern border? And this is, you know, what creates the rifts between the, you know, several tribes of the Israeli people is exactly this. What do we mean when we say West Bank or occupied territories or Judea and Samaria, by the way, it is the same territory. But every term presents a totally different ideology.

And since they could not agree, so they decided not to discuss it. That's it. Well, then let me ask you in a different way. If you could read minds, and you could go individually to the key decision makers, Netanyahu, Gallant, Eisenkot, whoever they are, what do you think privately is their vision of what the day after will look like, or should look like? Well, I find it very, very difficult. Psychology department in our family belongs to my wife. And we do not agree on everything, at least during the last 53 years. We have a debate at least once a day.

So I believe that the real reason for Netanyahu not to discuss the day later or the day after is in order to survive politically and in order not to go to jail, because he is on trial now. I'm sorry, sir. I accept that. I'm saying, but he still must know that the day after will come at some point, and he must have some thought as to what he believes it should look like or does he not even think that far ahead no you're speaking about ideology and and most politicians they are selling their ideology in order to survive in power so I can tell you I believe that Netanyahu when he when he was elected first time I believe that Netanyahu, when he was elected first time, I think that he had in mind, he accepted the concept

of two states. And probably he even had a dream that he will be the one who will sign on the peace agreement, making sure that we shall give back as less as possible when we measure Palestinian territory, and to make sure that in spite of the fact that we divide this piece of land between two people, we shall have security. So peace and security was, you know, the idea for Sharon and for Netanyahu at that time. I think that today he came to believe that if he will do it, he will not be elected. And he's doing everything in order to be elected. So he couldn't care less about the future of Israel.

And the other people in the war cabinet cabinet do they not have any idea what it should be no no the world cabinet is is not you know the world cabinet is um there are several uh members uh they were not part of the world cabinet but you have to understand that we did the the political system in israel uh the people who really influence, by the way, they're not sitting in the war cabinet, but they decide whether the coalition will come to an end or not. So they are a religious messianic group who believe that this is a holy land, and we are not allowed to give any square meter to any Gentile, and they are ready to do everything in order to achieve it. And I don't want to use their language

because audience might think that most Israelis believe in it, although they are a small minority that are using our political system in order to lead us to the wrong direction. I believe that the people who sat in this cabinet, that they decided the decision not to discuss it, Benny Gantz and Gadi Eisenkot,

that they believe in the reality of two states, but they don't have the political power. And in order to save Israel, because you have to understand, I think I know them well, and I really believe that they, at that time, believe that they are, you know, doing everything because it was clear that it would be a very, very tough war. So they did it in order to defend the Israeli people,

the Israeli society. Took them, I don't know, too long to understand that they entered into a trap and they left it. They left the cabinet. Let's talk about two states. I support two states, just so you know where I'm coming from as an American. I saw one of your interviews where you said that Israelis wanted security and what they got was terror. The Palestinians wanted the end of the occupation and got more settlements and more IDF. We know about the failure of the Barak Arafat talks, the Olmert Abbas talks. I more recently learned about a 2014 episode where Abbas refused to respond to Obama's

proposal. Why have all these attempts to make peace ended without so much as a concrete counterproposal from the Palestinians? Or is that just Israeli and American propaganda that there hasn't been any counterproposal? Why have the peace talks failed so badly? First of all, you mentioned my book, and in my book, I'm trying to give all the answers. Again, the way I saw it, I believe that many people will present a different aspect of the past. My advantage is that at least today I have no political aspirations.

And second, that I saw it in a way better than any other Israeli for at least four and a half years that I was the director of the isolation bed and later when I was a minister or even when I was a a member of our class which is our Parliament and and the answer is very simple the answer is exactly what you quoted from my book there are two conflicting narratives and finally you know when you are in a political position and you have to take a decision each of us by the way we decide you know um our decision is a result of the way we understand the reality the way we understand, you know, us, ourselves, and the way we understand the enemy. So if I tell you that we Israelis, all what we wanted was security. By the way, we learned it only after the first Intifada. Until the first Intifada, and I include myself

when I say Israelis, I was sure that we are liberators. We liberated these places because these places were given to us. And you cannot reach any other idea because, you know, when you are a child, you learn the stories of the Bible and you understand, you know, this is ours. It took me 20 years since the Six-Day War until the first intifada, which was December 87. I understood it in 88.

Because we faced a wave of civil violence. And we saw the eyes and the faces of youngsters. And I can tell you, I saw the eyes of a youngster who tried to kill me with stones. He didn't have any plastic or whatever. And I understood that, yes, I'm a liberator, but he does not see me as a liberator. He sees me as a cruel occupier.

And he will do everything in order to explain it to me. And only then, you know, it took me several years to understand that, yes, this land is ours, but it is not only ours. So after the first defilement, all what we were looking for was security. We went torid in order to achieve it and then to oslo and all what we got we were ready to give back some of the some of the lands that many israelis think that we do not have the right our prime minister was assassin because he took this approach. And, you know, if you're an Israeli,

we should tell you all we wanted was security and then we got terror and intifada. This is Israeli narrative. But on the other hand, yes, you quoted the Palestinian narrative. The Palestinian narrative is totally different. They will tell you all what we wanted was to have a state alongside Israel. We gave up on the Palestinian great Palestinian dream. We gave up on the idea of greater Palestine from the

river to the sea. All what we wanted was 25, 27% of our land, a state alongside Israel. We are a people, and we have the right of self-determination. And all what we got, we expected to see less and less settlers, less and less military units, and instead, what we saw was more and more settlements, more and more settlers, more and more military units, etc. A person from the outside should not tell you what the American political leaders are telling you or what the Arab political leaders are telling you.

They should tell you that what they saw from a different planet was two minorities, less than 15% Hamas terrorist on the Palestinian side, and our radical messianic people. Or the Israeli side, who led the Middle East during the last 30 years. Aidan McCullen, Okay, but I'm, you know, listen, I'm an American Jew. I don't want to assume by an accident of birth that my side is correct there's a narrative out there it's not just from israelis from bill

clinton from dennis ross and the narrative is that israel put on the table everything or close to everything that the palestinians should have wanted or could have wanted if they sincerely wanted to end the conflict and the narrative says that in the end when push when it came down to the the zero hour the moment of truth that they walked away from the table without offering even to tell what it is that they would agree to is that a false narrative or is that a true narrative there is no false narrative i you know um i don't i don't i know dennis ross uh he wrote you know the um missing piece i think yeah right uh no no he um Missing piece, I think. Right. No, no. He wrote the introduction to my book. Ah, sorry. And I met him every time.

I was the director of the Elishan Beth. And by the way, in his book, he writes that every time when he came to Israel, he went to my office to hear the view of the Elishan Beth. And we, not me, we presented our views. And he came, you know, in a way with the notion that we are coming closer and soon we shall sign a peace agreement. And he came to us during 12 months. And we told him, forget about it. No one will sign any peace agreement. And he said, why? I met Arafat. I met Ehud Barak. And we said, Arafat, do not represent the Palestinians anymore. Ehud Barak, do not represent the Israelis anymore. Ever Barak do not represent the Israelis anymore. By the way, I'm sure that you remember when ever Barack came to us to sorry to Camp David. You know that he was a prime minister and he was minister of seven offices because all his ministers left his coalition. He did not represent the Israeli people who lost confidence in all the process because of the terror. You know, we faced,

you know, we lost confidence because our people were dying in the streets and Arafat did not represent Palestinians because his people were dying in the streets. So all what they discussed in Camp David is irrelevant. Okay. Yes, I do believe, I do believe that, you know, they were very honest, they thought, look, to ask Arafat to discuss the holy places in Jerusalem, you have to, I don't know, to be disconnected from the reality. You don't understand the Palestinian narrative. You don't understand Islam. You don't understand that he does not have the right

to discuss the holy places in Jerusalem. Only the king of Saudi Arabia, the king of Morocco, and the king of Jordan are responsible to discuss it. So to ask him to sign on this paper, he said, look, who am I? I cannot. I cannot do it. So I really believe that they had a very good will. But let me tell you, you know, I don't think that they understand the narratives, the conflicting narratives. And frankly speaking, you know, there were no Muslims in the room, only Jews and some Christians. Do you understand the importance? Anybody, everybody who comes to the Middle East, he has to understand,

we are not living in America. We are living in a place, our written history, started more than 4,000 years ago. I have a friend, very good friend. He's a Palestinian Muslim, professor, Sainu Seba. He was the president of Al-Quds University. He finished his PhD in Harvard University. When we met, and we had an initiative, you know, trying to present an achievable framework

to peace between Israelis and Palestinians. When we met, the first question that he asked me was, Amit, tell me something about your history, your past. I said, okay, my parents came from, et cetera. My father came illegal immigrant. My mother came as a child to study in Jerusalem. He said, no, no, no, your family tree. I said, what do you mean family tree?

I don't have, we, any of our generation you know all our parents were were killed during the holocaust i never saw an old person as a child and i asked him okay tell me something about your narrative your history and he said my family tree goes back to the 7th century, the time of Muhammad. My family is the keepers of the key of the Christian holy church. Because Christians are fighting each other. There is a Muslim family, Nusayba family. So can I come to him telling him this is mine and not yours? People do not understand the history. They do not understand the religious

history and the religious importance of this conflict. And they think that if they, you know, if they will measure all the factors, they will come to an agreement it is much more complicated um i'm only going to ask a little bit more because i i find myself with this opportunity to speak to a man of history here uh i read up um all there's i'm a man of future i i i read all mert's uh memoir and he discussed presenting abbas with the the map and he talked about the day that he uh was ready to negotiate uh sovereignty for certain sites in jerusalem is the hardest day in his life i read a um it was a little account in the um new york times in a march meeting with mr abbas in the Office, Mr. Obama tried to sell him, Abbas, on Mr. Kerry's framework. The Palestinian leader, the official said, did not respond, preferring to reiterate his rejection of the Israeli demand that the Palestinians recognize Israel as a Jewish state.

The president was skeptical about a deal after that meeting. What I'm trying to get at here, and maybe I just add, is there a critical mass on that side of the table that can not only agree to peace, but can survive agreeing to peace such that they're ready to go forward with it? Or if Abbas were to make peace, would he find himself the victim of a coup? Benny Morris has written recently that until they take out the regime in Iran, there can't be a two-state solution. Is any of that true? Could a different Israeli Prime Minister have achieved a two-state solution? Could you have achieved a two-state solution if you had been in charge? Well, first of all, let me add some details to your question. The one who assassinated our Prime Minister was a Jewish terrorist.

And just to remind ourselves, I'm not sure about, you know, a potential terrorist who might kill Arafat or Abu Mazen. There are violent branches and terrorists on both sides. We have to choose the right way. What is the right way? This is a question. We do not ask ourselves, what is the alternative? The alternative, if we try to understand the reality today if we shall not choose a road that will bring us probably in 10 20 or 30 years but it should be very very clear

that this road bring us to a reality of two states. We shall face a regional war. The peace with Egypt will not survive. The peace with Jordan will not survive. We shall not have normalization with Saudi Arabia. Iran will increase its influence, and we shall have to go to war that we shall not be able to win because the world will not support us the way we behave today and um and we shall not be able to keep keep our identity. Um, if we, if we should try to annex something that we are trying to do now to annex the West Bank, even if we shall maintain our military superiority from the

Jordan to the sea, we will not be majority. we are 7.2 and they are 7.4 Muslims in this region and if we are not majority we do not have the right and we do not have the power to dictate the culture the language, the calendar as a way we celebrate

our holidays it will not be a democracy and we shall lose our Jewish identity as a way we celebrate our holidays, it will not be a democracy and we shall lose our Jewish identity as a state. It will be a chaos. We see what is happening now in Lebanon and we see what happened, I don't know, several years ago in Egypt. This will be the Middle East.

So the other option will be very very difficult yes we shall have you know terrorists and we shall have you know opposition and we shall have enemies on both sides but if we believe if we shall believe that it is achievable 75 80 percent of the jews in Israel. I'm saying it because, of course, our Muslim population, our Palestinians, will support it by 100%. So 75% or 80% of the Israelis will support it. 75% or 80% of the Palestinians will support it. We saw it during the 90s. And our mistake was that we were not able to fight to face our terrorists.

We were not able to stop our settlements and they were not able to stop and to fight terrorists. Both sides, both majorities, 75, 80 percent surrender to the both minorities who led the Middle East. By the way, they are still doing it. Boy, you're describing a very, very upsetting picture because, to my mind, because you're, you know, hopeful that there's some way that Israel, through more humane policies, can reach these people. More pragmatic, not more humane, more pragmatic policy. Okay, pragmatic, can win them over in some way. But from the other side of the table, if I were Hamas or somebody who never wanted peace with Israel, and there's a lot of those people, I would say, listen to him.

He's giving us the roadmap of how we win. All we need to do is dig in. And I alone have said, in 30 years, we win. No. By the way, if you ask them, they will tell you that their victory will be achieved in 2027. And you have to understand Hamas. Hamas won this battle in his eyes.

In his eyes, he won this battle. Because what he wants is to achieve the support within the Palestinian society. Now, when he started this war, the support for Hamas was around 30% of the people. Today, 80%, 75%, 80% of the Palestinians and Arab states and Muslim world support Hamas. So their achievement is double. First of all, they got the support of their people. Second, it is clear to all the world that nothing will be achieved

without putting the Palestinian conflict on the table. By the way, something that was not on the international table during the last 15 years. This was the achievement of our prime minister. He told everybody, Abraham Accord and everybody, we can achieve peace without, you know, without the Palestinians. And everybody was very happy. But I said, look, I'm really very, very happy every time when we sign a peace agreement. But unless we shall solve the Palestinian conflict, we shall not have security and we shall not have democracy. And this is why I'm very sad, but I'm not surprised.

But let me tell you why Hamas won this battle, but created all the circumstances for us to defeat him in the war. Because you just have to read what Sheikh Yassin said in 1997. In 1997, he was interviewed by a person in Palestinian Muslima, and he described how Hamas will achieve the victory in 2027. So the interviewer asked him, okay, so what are you afraid of? He said, I'm afraid of only from a reality in which the Palestinians will believe to the Israelis, that the Israelis will give us a Palestinian state alongside Israel. Because if Palestinians will believe they will not support Hamas, who is not ready to divide this piece of land, and if they will not support Hamas,

Hamas will not be able to play any major role on the political or military arena within the Palestinian society. So Hamas created the reality for them, for us, to defeat him. Because to defeat Hamas, we just have to create the political horizon, the roadmen that will bring us, all of us, because then 80% of the Palestinians will not support Hamas, and 80% of the Israelis will not support radicalism and messianic movements that are not ready to divide this piece of land. So this is exactly the only, by the way, the only way and why I say I believe and I know

that, look, you are using the term peace. In Israel, we do not use this term because we never had it. We do not know exactly what is peace all about. But yes, we shall have more security. You know why? Because we shall face, even if they will decide that we are enemies, they will know that they have nothing to lose. Sorry, that they have something to lose.

They have a state. They have an economy. And today, the worst enemy is an enemy that he feels that he has nothing to lose. This is exactly what we face today. But I want to ask you, this is the thing that pops into my head as I hear you speaking, that there's two chapters I'm aware of was came at a time when israel was openly communicating exactly what it is that you're saying one was the second intifada at a time when the israeli leadership was preaching peace and one was the embrace of hamas in gaza democratically for the

most part at the time that omert was openly talking about pulling out of the West Bank. So why did they react that way at those times? Who, Hamas or us? The Palestinians. Why did the Palestinians, the most violence and the embrace of Hamas come at the time when Israel was preaching precisely, seems to me, what it is that you're saying they should be preaching. No, again, you tend to forget or you don't know. I probably don't know. No, no, okay, what happened during...

They had elections during this time. And what happened as a result of the failure of diplomacy and the political process. Hamas won the elections because they came to believe that diplomacy does not work. And then Ehud Olmert sent to jail all Hamas elected leaders. All Hamas elected parliament leaders were sent to our jail. So this was a time in which Palestinian people came to understand that Abu Mazen,

the way they see him, he's an Israeli collaborator. Because, you know, by the way, it was not, you know, presidential elections, but, you know, okay, he was the president. So then they decided that, you know, Fatah became or stopped being, you know, freedom fighters, and they are just Israeli collaborators, and they will do everything, you know, freedom fighters, and they are just Israeli collaborators, and they will do

everything, you know, to maintain, you know, the corruption, etc., etc., etc. This was the way Palestinians saw it. So, yes, Ehud Olmert, I was a minister in his parliament, in his government. I told him, by the way, that it was a huge mistake because we always see the reality the way we understand, but we do not understand the way they saw the reality. And it was a major, major step to transforming Hamas to the liberator, Palestinian liberator, and Abu Mazen and Fatah to Israeli collaborators. By the way, he really wanted

to achieve agreement. We don't call it past, but I have to explain you, uh, Arafat, uh, sorry, uh, Abu Mazen, um, did not give him any answer because it was obvious when he sent him his proposal that he will be in jail. It was his last weeks as a prime minister. I was sitting in his cabinet, I know it, and CP Livni told her negotiator, Abu Ala, that Abu Mazen should not sign on anything because she will replace Ehud Olmert and she will not agree to any of his promises and they will have to negotiate again. So Abu Mazen took the only possible decision, saying, OK, I will wait for the next, you know, government. Tzipi Livni, you know, she got the majority, but Netanyahu formed the coalition. So this was the end of the whole process.

But wouldn't it put pressure on Israel to publicly say that he's interested in what Abbas offered him? Wouldn't that swing the Israeli elections in a direction that would be better for him, rather than look like a rejectionist? I'm not sure I understand the question. You say that Abbas didn't respond because he knew that Olmert's days were few. But how wouldn't the response have been helpful to him, nevertheless, in terms of communicating to the Israeli public?

Both. By the way, the Israeli public knew nothing about it at the time. And I'm not sure what would be the response, because you have to understand that Ehud Olmert has a very, very tough coalition, even with his in government. We don't know exactly whether Tzipi Livni would do it. His jail has nothing to do with it. He was sure that he will have to negotiate later. But I'm not trying to defend any of them. All while I'm telling you, both of them were politicians and political leaders. They have to be elected. So sometimes they have to sacrifice something in order to be elected. I'm not sure whether he could do it at that time publicly because Palestinians believe that there is no one to talk with, nothing to talk about, exactly as Israelis used to

believe, the same. Nobody to talk with and nothing to talk about. So we're going to run out of time, so I ask you one quick follow-up and then two very short ones, and then I want to honor my time. And what about the second intifada? Why did those peace negotiations, why were they answered with basically a slow-rolling version of October 7th?

No, second intif second, no, no. Ehud Olmet was after the second Intifada. No, I'm saying, I'm going back now to the first chapter. Why did the Palestinians respond to what seems to be... The second Intifada was the result of Camp David. By the way, you can read it in my book. You can read it in many American books, Dennis Ross as well. They came to believe their narrative that peace is not achievable

by diplomacy and we blame Arafat and the Palestinian terror but they blame Ehud Barak said when he was blamed by our

people from the right that he is selling Israel to our enemies, he said, I built more settlements than Netanyahu. What do you want from me? Now he said it, you know, Palestinians were listening. So what do you think they understood? I met their people at that time, Jibril Rajoub and Mohamed Ahlan.

They told me, are you talking, you are promising you the hell of the Shin Bet. You are telling us that if we shall cooperate on the security, we shall have a horizon of a Palestinian state and we hear your

Prime Minister every time. And he's very proud because he's building more settlements and sending more military troops. So we do not understand, you know, that I, you know, let me tell you something. Yeah, I read a very, very important book retrospect that was published by former defense minister, American defense minister McNamara. And he's explaining to the American people the lessons that he learned after the war of Vietnam. You know what is the first lesson

out of 11? By the way, it was later a movie, The Fog of War, that won the Oscar as a documentary. The first lesson, he said, empathy. We did not understand our enemy. We did not understand the Vietnamese. The domino effect, you know, domino theory, we believe that if we shall lose, you know, Soviet Union

will win. We did not understand that they hated the Russians. They hated the Chinese all while they did not see themselves as communists. All what they wanted is freedom after, you know, occupation

of France and later America. We did not understand. You know, this is the major mistake that all of us are doing. We do not understand the enemy. We understand only ourselves. And vice versa, correct? And vice versa.

They probably don't understand the Israelis. Of course. Yeah. Exactly. And this is why it's so important that the mediator will not support one side. Mediator should see it from a different planet. And the mediator should understand all the sensitive, sensitive of, you know, the narratives,

the religious aspect and everything. And you should once ask the people who try to mediate whether they really did understand all these complexities. Well, you know, I've for a long time felt that, as I've heard the story, that I just couldn't understand why at some point Arafat or Abbas didn't say yes or indicate a yes. But after hearing you I'm going to think deeply about it I I really want to understand I feel like if there was a Palestinian Sadat everything would turn 180 degrees overnight but I I I know that you know much more about this than i do okay two quick questions um uh javiv retagor has written

that the policy of containing and stabilizing hamas the so-called propping up hamas began with allmert and has been continued throughout virtually every israeli administration tell us your view of that policy its history and what a better alternative would have been rather than allowing all that qatari money it's totally wrong and and and not correct and i wonder i don't know the what the person who wrote it but it was uh well i i'm not it's it's fake. Okay. Ehud Olmert, you know, first of all, he did believe, I think that it was a mistake, that we can't defeat Hamas by the use of military power. And it is a mistake.

But he did not accept, you know, co-opting Hamas or whatever you call it. Second, he really tried to achieve an agreement. You just have to read his book. And I know it because I was very close to him. This, you know, policy of managing the conflict instead of managing the future agreement was changed when he was sent to jail.

And it was the creation of Netanyahu. And this is exactly the policies that brought us to the 7th of October. I think that it is a totally wrong policy. And the policy that I think we should take is managing the agreement. Look, we shall not have peace with the Palestinians in my daytime. You know, it's okay. My generation will not see it. But it is our duty to decide that this is the right road. It will be difficult.

We shall have, you know, obstacles and people who are fighting against us on both sides. Not only Palestinians against Israelis, but Jews against the Israeli government and Palestinians against the Palestinian government. But they are minorities. And the idea is a policy, so we should start from the end

declaring that in 10, 20, 30, or 40 years, we should create a reality of two states and then to go back one. And to start to think, what are the steps that we lead up there? You know, as sailors, we used to say a captain who doesn't know where he wants to sail, there is no wind on earth that will bring him there. But a captain who does know, he can use every changing wind in order to reach. Sometimes he has to change the direction, but he knows where he's sailing.

All right, final question. There was a headline in Haaretz that is getting a lot of amplification from Israel critics. IDF ordered Hannibal directive on October 7th to prevent Hamas taking soldiers captives. Can you tell us what this is all about? How significant is it? How often is it used? And what were the consequences on October 7th? Look look i'll say something about it but i decided by the way on the 8th of october uh not to discuss uh military events on the battle ground first of all because i'm not part of the intelligence community and i'm not sure that i

know the details second um i left the you know the navy. Second, I left the Navy and the military 30 years ago, and I left the Shin Bet 25 years ago. So I'm not going to discuss daily events. The Haribal policy or doctrine is very, very sensitive and problematic. On one hand, we know the price that we shall have to pay. or doctrine is very, very sensitive and problematic. On one hand, we know the price that we shall have to pay if we have our prisoners in their hands. And yes, there are people, unfortunately,

I do not support them, that in a case when you see an Israeli soldier, you know, in captivity, you should kill all the terrorists knowing that he will die. I think that it is totally wrong policy. I'm totally against it. I'm saying it again and again. Although there are many Israelis who said that if we do not have the ability to do it, we shall lose the war against Hamas.

And I tell everybody that finally, I believe that in every war, we have to start and we have to end. And we have to think, what are the moral limits of our actions. And if we come to believe that we are killing our people intentionally in order to win the war, so it's totally wrong and we shall not win any war. And even if we shall win in the battlefield, we shall lose our identity as a Jewish democracy. You know, I think that you, I cannot tell you what is Judaism all about,

but I can tell you that the idea that, you know, we share responsibility. The people of Israel are responsible for each other. There is nothing more contradictory to this Jewish concept than the Hannibal concept. Does the directive apply to civilians as well or only to soldiers? Well, it was never discussed against civilians well i think that against civilians it is i don't know it's um i i even i i cannot think about it it was never discussed when it came to civilians because we we did not see the scenario that we saw the 7th of of October. All right, sir. I can tell you, yes, there were cases in which, you know, military commander shot and killed Hamas terrorists, knowing that there are Israeli civilians among them. People take it to mean that the civilians or the soldiers are actually targeted

by the Israeli army. But what you're describing is that they're just not considered. They go after the terrorists, I guess, for the best. Of course. Yes. Periel, we have to say goodbye, Periel. But you want to ask a quick question, Periel? I'm going to ask him if it's okay go ahead perry um i was wondering if you could speak a little bit about the hostages and the idea that from the hostage family forum they have taken like a very clear stance that this should not be um used as a political negotiating chip? Look, the event of the 7th of October is, you know, the magnitude is, I don't know, I cannot describe it, but the concept of hostages, you know,

we unfortunately experienced it during the last, I don't know, 30, 40 years. And it is always becomes political. Because everything, you know, when politicians has to decide, you know, there is always opposition and people who support it, they asked my view, some families immediately after the, because as a director of the Shin Bet, you know, in a way you are responsible for many aspects to get information, et., etc. And I told them, don't give up, and don't listen to any government, and don't listen to any prime minister, and don't listen to every minister. You are the only one who can fight for it,

and you can win. And it is a perfect example to show the vibrant civil society in israel because you know during the first week when uh the prime minister asked about it okay so you said uh the goals the military goals uh when we fight hamas is uh uh to dismantle its military power and to kill its leaders and to occupy, to conquer Gaza. He did not mention the people who are kidnapped, hostages. and who is the closest person is

a national security advisor when he was asked about it he said we cannot negotiate with an enemy that we declared that we are going to kill him so it was obvious that the government

didn't care about the hostages. And if you see now, 73% of the Israelis are ready to stop the war just in order to get back the hostages and then, yes, to be a part of or member in this regional coalition, even if the price is to ignite a process of bringing negotiations between Palestinians and Israelis. I'm saying it because this is a victory of the civil society and this is a victory of the families. They were fighting for it for the first day. And if you will see, you know, the weekends in Israel, this is a major issue. Israelis are taking to the streets just in order to make sure that this government will understand that our victory in this battle, not in the war, in the war, yes, to create a different threat, but in this battle, the essence of victory is to see all of them back home. All right, Ami Ayalon, I want to thank you very much.

I first saw you, just so you know, in the documentary, The Gatekeepers, which I recommend everyone should watch. And your memory was seared into my brain because you discussed there basically the dark things and the morally difficult and murky decisions that you had to make as the head of the shin bet. And rather than justifying everything you did and rationalizing

everything you did, what I came away with was seeing a man who was asking himself, I did all these things, we did all these things, and what do I have to show for it? What do we have to show for it? Was it worth it? Has it helped or has it hurt? You know, very difficult questions that I can't even imagine what it means to ask those questions in matters of life and death. Every human at some point asked themselves questions like that. But when I saw that, I was just so impressed with you. And I've been wanting to meet you ever since.

I think you're a great man. And I really appreciate you taking the time to speak with us. Thank you so much. Thank you. Thank you very much.