The Comedy Cellar: Live from the Table - Live from The Table: Jon Hoffman - Israel Is a Strategic Liability for the United States.

Episode Date: April 8, 2024

Foreign policy analyst Jon Hoffman discusses his recent article and worldview. "The special relationship does not benefit Washington and is endangering U.S. interests across the globe." https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/03/22/israel-gaza-biden-netanyahu-security-united-states/

This is Live from the Table, the official podcast of the world-famous comedy seller coming at you on Sirius XM 99. Raw comedy, formerly Raw Dog, and available wherever you get your podcasts. Also available on YouTube if you want a visual experience and see our beautiful faces, some more beautiful than others. Dan Natterman here, along with Noam Dorman, owner of the comedy seller and rising star on X, formerly Twitter. I still call it Twitter. Periel Ashenbrand is here. And with us, via the miracle of teleconferencing, John Hoffman, Policy Analyst in Defense and Foreign Policy at the Cato Institute. His research interests include U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East, Middle East geopolitics

and political Islam. Here he is. Welcome to our show. So you wrote a comment in Foreign Policy magazine called, Israel is a strategic liability for the United States. The special relationship does not benefit Washington and is endangering U.S. interests across the globe. Now, of course, as a rabid pro-Israel person, this kind of thing, you know, hits me in the crawl, but I do recognize, and I've always recognized that,

um, this kind of an, and you can disagree with me as I regard as kind of Buchananite, uh, worldview is something that, um, in certain contexts I found to be, uh,

if not persuasive, uh, really worth grappling with. And number two, we can't deny that in retrospect, some of the people who were espousing these views turned out to look pretty good years later as these wars and the various things that they warned didn't turn out like the neocons and the liberals said they would.

Do you think America was correct for getting involved in the Second World War? So regarding the Second World War, you know, my analysis would say, yeah, you know, the United States was correct in getting involved in the Second World War. You had an actor, you know, Nazi Germany, that actually was making a bid for regional hegemony and doing awful, god-awful things in the process. So, yeah, you know, the way that I approach international affairs and U.S. foreign policy more generally is this idea of offshore balancing, this idea that if anybody in any region around the world, you know, makes this bid for regional hegemony, makes this bid for dominance, then, yeah, the United States should work with, you know, local actors to prevent such a bid toward regional hegemony. And that's, you know, precisely what we saw with World War II. So, yeah.

So how – but in World War II, the big problem was that we recognized the regional hegemony or the attempt of regional hegemony late in the game. That if we had acted sooner, before it was as blatantly obvious as it was, we would have saved millions and millions of lives. And that's where the people I associate with your view, that's the risk that they won't acknowledge something until it's so clear that it's really too late to react to it in a prophylactic way. So what do you say about that? How do you square that? Well, I mean, of course, hindsight is 2020. But, you know, leading up to World War Two, you know, the United States as a country itself, when it was founded, the founders wanted to separate the United States of America from the balance of power within Europe. They wanted to create this novus ordos et chlorum, this, you know, this new order for the ages that separates what's going on over here from balance of power politics taking place in Europe. So, you know, for the first, you know, majority of our existence as a nation, you know, we tried to stay out of those, you know, balance of power conflicts in Europe. You know, World War I and World War II, you know, were, you know, examples of us getting, you know, pulled into those conflicts. And, you know,

World War II, you know, you know, I've never actually sat down and said, you know, oh, well, I agree or disagree. But, you know, the case for getting involved in World War II is, was, in my opinion, pretty blatantant we were also attacked by japan um so you know oh go on right but i'm asking about the fact that when churchill was identifying the threat and uh you know uh um czechoslovakia and all that that uh at that time the country our country was quite uh isolationist roosevelt was trying to angle us to to get in earlier. And if Japan had not done us. The favor of bombing us.

Who knows if when we would have been able to get into that war? I'm just trying to to to to you understand what I'm getting at here. Is that because it's going to apply to Israel is that what would happen to Israel if we were to pull out of the picture? And when would we then know, oh, it's too late. Now we need to get in there. So so and I think the World War Two question is would I would think that would be the natural thing to study. As a counterfactual, then to try to transpose it into other scenarios and to say to yourself, well, I mean, there's a lot of them like we were too slow to take care of bin Laden in retrospect, when many people were saying that we should. I think, you know, comparing, you know, Hitler's march across Europe to, you know, the threats facing contemporary Israel are, you know, pretty disconnected from one another. You know, I think we're talking about,

you know, in the case of Nazi Germany, we're talking about a state actor with, you know, massive resources at its disposal with an intent on marching across Europe. And, you know, when we look at the threats that, you know, we can get into this, when we look at the threats that Israel faces today, you know, no country in the Middle East has the military or technological prowess that Israel does. And the threats that Israel does face, primarily from armed resistance groups like Hamas, Hezbollah, so on and so forth, you know, these aren't, I would argue, existential in the way that, you know, Nazi Germany was existential for so many within europe okay so let's get to that so first question is just as a as a threshold question if israel were to be overcome by its enemies is that in the american interest to prevent american national interest to prevent in your opinion and by And by the way, if you say no, I won't hate you. I just want to know. No, no, no, no. So so I approach it from this. And I said this on

MSNBC last week. If if we were talking about Israel about to be pushed into the sea, this would be a very different conversation. But the fact of the matter is is that israel is not at any no no step by step but but so so you you so you would say that it's in america's strategic interest prevent israel from being uh wiped off the map i don't think that's at stake here or if it were if it were well you know we can play with hypotheticals all we want but so what i'm trying to say every every uh um president that is making strategic doctrine has to play with hypotheticals you have you have to plan in advance you can't just think about it for the first time when it happens sure so when it comes to israel or when it comes to any state i don't think the

united states wants to see any state wiped off the face of the map so when it comes to Israel or when it comes to any state, I don't think the United States wants to see any state wiped off the face of the map. So when it comes to Israel specifically, when we take a step back and when we look at the position that Israel finds itself in the Middle East, we see it's vastly militarily and technologically superior to its neighbors. It has 90 nuclear warheads. It's an advanced economy. So this isn't a matter of Israel about to be wiped off the face of the map. This is a matter of – and the fact that Israel is aligned with the vast majority of the governments in the region strategically. So this isn't a matter of Israel about to be wiped off the face of the map. I understand that. OK, I mean, I think he answered. He said that we don't have we we would be against any state being wiped. No, no, no. Like any state, any state being annihilated, you know, that would be horrible.

You know, so, of course. But but would it be worth our sending troops or just as a financial support in such a in such an instance in your estimation you know again you know i don't think i have a clear answer for that because you know we're just not anywhere close to you know that situation taking place so let's take let's take the next step because and i really i'm building a brick right here because these are i'm actually disclosing to you my own thought process it's not just to try to interrogate you so the next question next question is and this gets bandied about in a lot of contexts including with trump this phrase existential threat is almost meaningless. Very few countries have actually been wiped off the map in a war. If Israel has to have 150, 200,000 internal refugees,

has to live in and out of bomb shelters on a weekly basis, if terrorism is above some critical mass, or people just out, go out to restaurants and whatever it is. And rockets come in and a certain number of people die every year. I would say that's not it's not wiped off the map the night into the sea. But that's well beyond the line that any country would ever accept. In other words, putting it as that, if it has to be wiped into the sea for us to be concerned about it, that's really meaning we're never going to be concerned about it. The question is, at what point, short of being wiped into the sea, would you say that this is serious enough

that we would want to entertain acting on behalf of Israel? Well, look, I think, again, you know, like you said, I think, you know, Israel's not about to be pushed into the sea. We, you know, there's but there's a big middle ground here, you know, is what I think you're trying to get at, you know, between, oh, you know, completely existential to absolutely doing nothing, you know, there's a middle ground here. So the way that I see it is Israel does face threats in the Middle East, just like any country faces threat. It faces threats from Hamas, from Hezbollah.

Iran spews all day long about how much it hates Israel, so on and so forth. But the most immediate threat that Israel faces is in the form of armed resistance vis-a-vis like Hezbollah and Hamas and groups like that. Whether those problems can be... You never mentioned Iran. I just did. Which seems to me that, you know, the elephant in the room. You have Iran on the verge. I read, I think I read in Foreign Policy,

within weeks of an atom bomb, should they want to constitute one, and, you know, has money coming out of the ground and proxy armies all over the the the region there and could certainly fantasize that it could overwhelm israel so not just armed resistance groups it's it's nations right but to an extent i mean you know iran has uh you know one of the reasons why iran relies so heavily on proxies is because of its own military weakness. You know, proxies typically are the tool of the weak, not really the tool of the strong. If you're strong, you'll just roll in and do it. You'll just roll in and take it. But proxies, you know, are typically used by, you know, those that don't really want to and don't have the ability to really step out and, you know, you know, conquer so on and so forth.

So in each of these. Well, we're like we're sort of using Ukraine as a proxy against Russia now. It's also the tool of somebody of a country that wants that wants it doesn't want to put their ass on the line. You know, we're not going to they're not so easily gonna bomb iran because of the proxy russia is not so easily gonna bomb america because of our flirting as with ukraine as a proxy so i don't i don't know if it's a sign of the weak it's a strategy to avoid full measure right yeah but but you know i would consider that to be a strategy of you know perhaps maybe weak is too strong of a word, but of the more averse, let's say. So Iran in particular is pointed to as the country most likely to attack Israel, wipe Israel off the the map so on and so forth iran is a terrible actor um but so are other states in the middle east like saudi uae egypt all of these countries

so the problem with iran is you know and whether iran poses an existential threat to israel is the fact you know i would argue again no israel has 90 nuclear warheads cocked and ready to go. They could wipe Iran off the face of the map with the click of a button if they wanted to. And Ayatollah Khamenei knows this. You know, there's a reason why there's this clear aversion to direct escalation with with Israel, because it knows that Iran knows it would get absolutely clapped. So does that mean Israel would be right to make sure that Iran never gets an atom bomb? Look, I think you're trying to drive this interview in a particular direction. No, these are the natural questions. If you're saying that Israel doesn't have to worry because it has 100 percent a total nuclear advantage.

The next natural question would be whether it's a difficult question is, well, in that case, what you're saying is what you might be saying is that Israel should never dare to give up that advantage because then everything you're saying forever and irrevocably changes. Right. As soon as Iran has an atom bomb israel's advantage they could rely on mutually assured destruction as we yeah yeah so because so that's what i was about to go into you know so according to the academic literature you have this thing called mutually assured destruction so you know if you have secured second strike capability the academic literature tells us that two nuclear nations will never go to all-out war with one another so then why do we freak out about the cuban missile crisis well because of the okay look i think what you're trying these different things we're trying to bring in here, you know, should we, you want to talk about the article or you want to not talk about the

article? I do. Well, okay. Okay. So let's go through the article. Okay. You say the special relationship does not benefit Washington and is

endangering us interests across the globe. So what, what get go easy on, you know, what, so what interest is, is it endangering? Sure.

So when I say that it's endangering our interest in the Middle East and across the globe, I mean, you know, in terms of endangering our interest in the Middle East, you know, we, you know, this war has really brought the region to the brink of a broader war. You saw the strikes, you know, in Syria, you know, on the Iranian consulate. You see 170 strikes against U.S. troops in Iraq and Syria. You know, you see what the Houthis are doing in Yemen. So what we see is this kind of this arc of regional escalation. So, you know, I argue that our emphatic embrace of Israel, specifically its campaign in Gaza, is undermining our interest in the Middle East in the sense that it's really risking dragging us towards all-out conflict. But then I also argue that it's kind of undermining our interests globally because, you know, people around the world kind of see this hypocrisy,

you know, talking about upholding this rules based order in Ukraine. And then they see, you know, what the United States is supporting, you know, happening in Gaza, so on and so forth. And this kind of undermines the liberal values that we claim to stand for. So the all-out conflict would be a total regional war in the Middle East, right? Yeah, that would be detrimental for everybody. Israel,

the Middle East, us. But this goes back to what we were talking about before. If the American threat of the American the threat. Of the American deterrent. Is removed from the calculation. Of these actors that you're concerned about that would be part of this. Regional conflict.

Would that not bring make the regional conflict much more likely once these states no longer have to worry about the United States of America as part of that equation? No. So I think there's two key things to hone in on here is one, this notion of the American deterrent. Since just October 7th, 170 attacks on U.S. troops in Iraq and Syria,

all the tit-for-tat exchanges with the Houthis, so on and so forth, the skirmishes between Hezbollah and Israel, I wouldn't say that America's presence is necessarily deterring anything. These actions are taking place, but

the other point that I would hammer. of rockets coming into Israel from the Houthis, maybe from Iran, from Hezbollah, would not be any higher than it is now, that America is not part of this calculation when they're trying to figure out how far to go with this stuff? No, you know, in terms of whether America is part of this calculation, you know, sure. I think, you know, America's presence, you know presence to an extent holds some full-scale all-out war, but I don't think actors such as Hezbollah or the Houthis in Yemen are – I think – take Hezbollah, for example. Yeah, they're launching these exchanges back and forth with Israel, but Hezbollah knows that any outright conflict with Israel is going to be suicide for Hezbollah. You know, so there's an element of realism here that these groups, you know, tend to punch above their weight and, you know, are, you know, when we look at groups like Hezbollah, when we look at groups like that are in Iraq and Syria, like Qatayev, Hezbollah and all of them, you know, none of them could or, you know, go toe to toe to Israel.

So, you know, I think that calculus, like on behalf of Nasrallah, you know, knowing that this would be suicide for them, you know, plays far more of a role than does, you know, the aircraft carrier sitting in the Mediterranean. Why didn't the knowledge of suicide, why wasn't that enough to deter Hamas? So, you know, and, you know, Hamas likely knew this was suicide. You know, they likely knew that. So why wouldn't Hezbollah do the same thing? Well, because Hezbollah is different from Hamas. Hezbollah is operating in Lebanon. Hezbollah is part of the government in Lebanon. So, you know, Hamas is, you know,

as an organization, you know, in Gaza specifically, it faces its own incentive structure that is very different than Hezbollah in Lebanon. So, you know, also, you know, I think, you know think it's pretty clear that Hamas launching this attack, they knew that some retaliation would come from this. They were pretty aware. They planned this for two years. So for Hamas, this is a different calculation than it is for Hezbollah. Are you – now you may know stuff I don't know. Are you so confident of that that if you had to make a decision as a head of state vis-a-vis the safety of your state, the safety of your family, that you would say, well, I know Hamas, we weren't able to deter Hamas. I know that Hamas was ready to face suicide, as you put it. But I'm so sure that Hezbollah is completely different in terms of their brand of radical Islam

that we don't have to worry about that. They would never do what Hamas did. Is that you, you, to what, what degree of confidence I put a number from one to a hundred, what do you have confidence? Do you have in that difference of the two,

the two organizations in terms of the difference between Hamas and Hezbollah? Yeah. So I, you know, I don't think there is, you know, a number, number that you can quantify this, this difference between the two. But, you know, what I mean is, is that these two

organizations, when it comes to the incentive structures that they face, you know, in Lebanon versus in Gaza. No, I, you know, if I'm Benjamin Netanyahu or anybody sitting in Israel right now, I don't, you know, if I'm an advisor to them, I'm not. I'm an advisor, you know, where I, you know, advise U.S. foreign policy. then I would say no. I think Hezbollah has a clear aversion to getting involved in all-out conflict with Israel because they know it would be absolute scorched earth, the end of Hezbollah. Then why do they have 150,000 missiles? Most of them are something precision-guided, why did they not retreat behind the Latani River as, you know, per the ceasefire arrangements and the UN resolution that they made with Israel? What are they up to here? So this is-

What you're saying is that they're just, like, cosplaying here? Like, there's no, they actually have no objective? They just want- No, no, no, no. So part and of of hezbollah's image is this you know resistance to israel this strong powerful you know uh part of this you know quote unquote resistance access to israel so you know of course you know they have weapons and you know hezbollah has been very active in the you know the syrian civil war and they've built up tremendously from that so you know hezbollah is you know if you look at it on a piece of paper its capabilities far outmatched that of hamas but but but but but as we know every so often israel kills one of the

hezbollah leaders right so and the leaders are the leaders are aware that israel looks to kill them so the least as far as the leaders go the the suicide thing is not persuasive to them. They are ready for the suicide just to be leaders of Hezbollah. So the question is, would they then risk? I don't know. Listen, I'm just not getting it. Again, you may be more informed about this, but as a psychological matter, it seems to me. There's nothing other than hope here.

Especially now that we've seen. What I thought was a similarly motivated group of Hamas show that the deterrence is meaningless to them. They're ready to risk it all and they're ready to go through it all. I mean, just to go further with the Hamas thing. They want the suicide, right? Like they it's not like they open any of the tunnels and say, come in here, use it as a bomb shelter. They actually want the suicide. And Hezbollah.

They they they're doing everything they can to threaten Israel. They're spending a lot of money. Iran is spending a lot of money. They have the most sophisticated missiles. They're training. They're building tunnels. But you think it's all with never any hope of using them. And, you know, and I hope you're right, but I don't see how a government can make policy on that thin reed of hope. Most times when another nation behaves 100% like they would if they mean to have a knockout, drag out fight with you, you assume they mean it. And especially now that the formula of deterrence has so conspicuously failed, I'm afraid Israel is going to decide they can't live with Hezbollah anymore.

They have to take Hezbollah out. The question is, where are they wrong? Would you feel that that would be a solution to the conflict between Hezbollah and Israel? Do you think Israel should roll into Lebanon? I'm afraid, yes. I don't know. I don't fancy myself an expert, although sometimes these huge questions, like looking back at World War II, do come down to a little kind of common sense about the threat of the provocative nature of being weak as opposed to showing strength um i think that if i were israel given what hamas has done i would decide it's no longer acceptable for hezbollah to be allowed to flaunt the deal that they made and i would make moves to push them back to the latani river where they promised they would be

i think i would have to do that um sometimes there are no good answers i i don't know that's why i'm asking you know like i just don't know well if i if i approach this from the perspective of israel i would be very wary of doing that because on the one hand you know we're say you know we're talking from israel's perspective here we're talking from Israel's perspective here. We're deeply involved in Gaza. The West Bank is very unsettled right now. Last year was the deadliest year in the West Bank. Opening up a new front in the north with Hezbollah would be a huge drain on resources. This war is already hitting Israel's economy pretty bad. Then once you open up the second front in the north with Hezbollah, then you could theoretically run into other issues as well, whether groups in Syria and Iraq then at that point decide to get involved.

And what you could have then is Israel finds itself rapidly overextended. So let me tell you why I think you're wrong. Sure. In, was it 96 or 2006? One of those ends of one of the wars in Lebanon, whenever it was that Hezbollah was supposed to pull back the Latani River. That was before the Iron Dome. And the arguments that you're making now prove persuasive, and Israel let it go. And here we are, you wake up 10 or 20 years later, 18 years later, and everything is much, much worse.

Now there are 150,000 missiles. They're precision guided. Yes, you have the Iron Dome, but the numbers could overwhelm the Iron Dome in no time. And you say to yourself, shit, we really screwed up back then. We should have taken them out. Resources or no resources back then, because look at what we're facing now. And then you have to say, okay, what are we going to be facing 10 or 20 years from now? And you say, well, who even knows if the Iron Dome will give us an advantage 10 or 20 years from now? Who knows if Iran won't have an atom bomb? As a matter of fact, they very likely will have an atom bomb by then. And it's like that thing of when's the best time to plant the tree?

20 years ago. Second best time is now um israel's got to take care of it now because it has it would be reckless for them to assume that the future is on their side at any point in time the future at least in the last 30 years the future has not been on israel's side and technology is marching forward and um you know, that's that would be my argument of that. So let me just go to something else. In your article, you say. Well, let me let me.

Please. I didn't mean to go ahead. No, you're fine. So all that big list, you know, of, you know, this is not the Hezbollah of 2006. I completely agree. This is a much stronger Hezbollah, which is why I think Israel should, you know, recognize this. And for the sake of Israel, also recognize that a direct confrontation with Hezbollah could mean a lot of Israeli fatalities at the same time. And I understand this thought process of, well, 10,

20, 30, 40, 50 years from now, it could be worse. You know, that's kind of like the same reasoning that we hear now, you know, in the United states regarding china and stuff like that so they're only going to get stronger they're only going to get stronger they're only going to get stronger yeah but china's china's china's not preaching our destruction but go ahead sorry yes but groups like hamas hezbollah all of these actors at the very heart of this resistance of these acts of terror and so on and so forth, is the Israel-Palestine issue, which is an inherently political issue. So this is a rallying call for groups that – like look at before October 7th, Hamas, its approval rating was horrible.

The vast majority of Palestinians hate Hamas. But then post-October 7th and then in the ensuing war, you see its numbers actually so on and so forth, that the United States, you know, really has hopefully now recognized after 20 years of the war on terror. You know, this isn't something you can bomb your way out of. You know, these are these are inherently political. So let me ask you two questions. And the first question is, given everything you're saying, if you I'm presuming that in 2006, you would have given Israel the advice not to take Hezbollah out.

My question is, in 2024, would that have been looking back on it? Would that have been the right advice to give in 2006? No, I don't. You know, I still think, you know, and this is getting very far into the weeds away from the reason i was invited on this show but i think you know this whether or not i would give israel the advice in 2006 to not just go you know full scorched earth or scorched earth in lebanon you know i you know would still well just to make sure they stayed on their side of the river you know where they promised to not exceed to that well so look all right if it's too far i'll ask you the other question you don't have to i'll ask you the other

question is and i don't and i don't know this i should do more reading about it to what extent are you sure that the israel palestine conflict is at the root of Hezbollah's problem with Israel and Iran's problem with Israel. They're not Palestinians. They're not even Sunnis. Does Iran really, is Iran really going to be placated by the fact that Israel and Palestine, a two-state solution? One of the things you notice about Hamas is that they never even complain about the settlements

on the West Bank. As far as they're concerned, the West Bank, both sides of the green line are the same to them. I mean, even as a PR matter, it's striking that Hamas has never, they know, they ought to know that the West is very, very moved by the outrageous, and I think it is outrageous, behavior that Israel commits in terms of the settlements on the west bank yet hamas has never once mentioned the settlements it's as if they don't they call all of israel's settlement now that's hamas but they are palestinian now you're talking about hezbollah

and iran and the houthis and whoever what do they care about the palestinians but why have they said anything like that no so i think that the pal that the Palestinian issue is still very core to these groups such as Hezbollah, the Houthis now, because for many within the region, the issue of Palestine is a projection of their own struggles against illiberalism and this broader order within the Middle East. So, yes, I do think that, you know, a genuine solution to the Israel-Palestine conflict, whatever that looks like, I don't claim to have the answer to that. You know, but we'll leave that to the Martin and Dix and them of the world. You know, I don't claim to have the answer to that. But, you know, yes, I do think this plays, you know, a very central role in their calculus. And you have to look to these actors are pretty unpopular. The Houthis, Qatayev Hezbollah, Hezbollah proper, so on and so forth.

So, you know, this ability to use Palestine as a rallying call, you know, often gives credence to bad actors and groups that really shouldn't be given credence. Right. All right. I'm just Googling, looking something here in your article. gives credence to bad actors and groups that really shouldn't be given credence right um all right i'm just googling looking something here in your article you i thought you did say something about the two-state solution but maybe i'm uh um i talked about the netanyahu's proposed plan and then biden's proposed plan the pathways yeah i mean you you could you did touch on something i can't find an article this second which which I see Thomas Friedman does this as well. They say, well, if only Israel would then get serious and make moves towards the two-state solution, what Tom Friedman puts, which is the Palestinian dream of a two-state solution. And I feel like there is no evidence of a Palestinian dream of a two-state solution. I'm wondering if you think that a critical mass, by critical mass,

I mean enough Palestinians such that if there were a two-state solution, they could guarantee that it wouldn't turn quickly into another Gaza with rockets coming in. Is there a critical mass of Palestinians who want a two-state solution under any terms? Yes. No, I would argue yes. And, you know, I would argue that, you know, the groups that we're most familiar with, like Hamas and so on and so forth, they get the vast majority of the media attention because

of the horrible things that they do. But no, the average Palestinian, you know, wants a genuine two state solution to this. You know, neither Israelis nor Palestinians will know peace or security, so on and so forth until they both have it. And, you know, that's what I was trying to get across in in the article here is, you know, how we actually get towards a two-state solution or, you know, many talk now about a one-state, you know, reality that we're faced with. You know, these debates are pretty, you know, intense in academic and policy circles. How we get to that endpoint considering, you know, settlements in the West Bank, considering that a lot of the Palestinian community is fragmented in terms of, you terms of what a two-state solution would or else we're just going to keep seeing this cycle that we've seen over and over and over and over.

Yeah, but we've seen – I mean we see Sunnis and Shiites fighting for a thousand years or whatever. I'm not an expert. There seems to be no solution to that. So I have to say I don't like that. I don't like that framing because Sunnis and Shias have not been fighting for thousands of years. I teach a class on political Islam at George Mason University. I myself am a convert to Islam and I'm Sunni and I don't have beef with any Shias. You know, I'm I'm I'm white and I have no beef with black people, but I know that it's racism. I mean, I wouldn't personalize it to you well okay listen i don't know that the history and i you know to be honest so i shouldn't have

said something i don't know but i do know that in my lifetime there's hundreds of thousands of not millions of people dead in tribal tribal violence that has nothing to do with jews throughout the muslim world i hopefully that fever will break will break, but I don't think I'm being, as they say, Islamophobic by pointing out the fact that tribes have a lot of violence. I mean, I've been reading Seven Pillars of Wisdom, you know, the T.E. Lawrence book, and he discusses he couldn't even get different tribes to stay near each other in encampments as they were going to fight the Turks. It was impossible to get them to come together because the clannish type rivalries were so deep.

And it doesn't seem to be different today. I know people think that the one tribe they'll live side by side with is Jews. And I hope that's true. Although I will say as a note of optimism that in Israel, more Arabs and Jews actually do live quite nicely together. They have some friction, but they live quite nicely. And in America, in New York, Muslims and Jews actually get along very nicely. So I'm not without hope, but it's, you know,

the polls seem to show that if there were elections in the West Bank, Hamas would likely have won. And people say that's the reason that Abbas most likely canceled the elections a year or two ago. that a day-to-day Palestinian, I hope that it's true, and I'm ready to believe that they want a nice future for themselves and their children like every human being, and they want to live in a peaceful two-state solution that they think is fairly arrived at. But a critical mass means that Hamas can't take over in a coup or simply have its own, like in Mexico, like some area of the land that the government can't control.

And that seems to me right now something that the Palestinians can't deliver. They could Gaza immediately take over by coup, and if there was a west bank i mean i i don't know it's certainly not in a way that israel could could risk it's a it's a horrible situation no it is it is but is there a critical mass of israelis that want a two-state solution absolutely no that's incorrect because if you look at all polls since october 7th all – I have the piece right here. A large majority, 88 percent of Jewish Israelis polled in January believe that not only are the astounding number of Palestinian deaths, which had surpassed 25,000 at the time, are justified, but 63 percent – The poll says astounding in it? No. I'm reading from the article here the poll doesn't say that

you're reading the answer but the question is not what they answered they didn't say how are you with the astounding number of deaths we're for it I would call 25,000 astounding yes but it's not the question you're describing something without telling us what they answered yes to

88% believe that the number of deaths are justified. OK. Sixty three percent. Say that they oppose the proposal for Israel to to agree in principle to the establishment of an independent demilitarized Palestinian state. Right. Right. So so why do you think that is? You think that you think that's a mirror image of the Palestinian resistance to a two state solution?

No, no, I'm not. I'm not saying that it's a mirror image to it. But what I'm saying is, is, you know, if we talk about a critical mass on one side, we need to be able to talk about whether that critical mass exists on the other side. I'll prove it to you. I sort of prove it to you. First of all, when I say critical mass, I think you'd agree. If Israel makes peace with the Palestinians, there is no chance that an independent Jewish militia is going to start sending rockets into the new Palestinian state. In a democracy, 51% is a critical mass to guarantee control of the military so that's what i meant by critical math number one number two i believe i can't prove it but history you know shows it and i mean i know israelis as well as i know anything in my life that if the palestinians wanted peace in a believable way if like we saw this actually happen when Sadat came. The polls showed prior right after the 73 war

that Israel was like 80% against ever giving back the Sinai. And the second that Sadat came to speak to the Knesset, the country shifted by like 40%. I'm making it up off the top of my head, but I don't think those numbers are way off. It was a drastic lurching in the polls because every israeli all they want is not every

israeli and there's fewer now but at that most israelis they don't want to send their kids to the military anymore they don't believe in a two-state solution because they're afraid it's going to become a launching pad for rockets and they hear and they read the charters and they know what people are saying and they go on memory and they understand the genocidal rhetoric that is taught from kindergarten on. But the second that a Palestinian leader, a la Sadat or a la Mandela or Martin Luther King said, no, we want to live in peace with you as, you know, neighbors and brothers, of course, Israel is going to go for it. How many Israelis want to live in peace with you as, you know, neighbors and brothers. Of course, Israel is going to go for it. How many Israelis want to live on the West Bank?

There's 700,000 settlers in the West Bank. Most of those are not religious. Most of those living there because it's tax breaks or whatever. There's a small, large part of them are religious. I mean, come on. No, no, no. You'd be surprised. Look it up after.

I was I found this out recently and I didn't know it. I was shocked. Apparently there's, there's apartments. There's many other reasons, but yeah. And the religious people, I know a seller, this is, uh, this we're getting away with stuff, but I know a settler, somebody I grew up with who became a, he was Jewish, but he came a convert to radical Judaism. And I, and he lives in a settlement somewhere near Jerusalem.

And I asked him, what are you going to do if the country makes peace and they want to pull out all the settlements? And he said, well, I'd be very upset about it, but if that's what my government does, I'll have to obey. And I said, is that the general feeling of the people that you live? He says, absolutely. Now, I'm sure there's other crazy, I don't know what sect of Judaism, I'm no expert, I know there's different ones, and I know they fought tooth and nail in Gaza, and I'm sure some would fight tooth and nail in the West Bank.

But in general, in the overall, and by the way, time is the enemy of this because the religious Jews have many more children than the secular Jews. I could just tell you as someone I feel who was in touch with the Israeli people, if God were to come down and tell them, I promise you, if you make this deal, no Jew will ever die again at the hands of an Arab. 90% of Israel would sign on a dotted line. If God came down and told the Palestinians,

I promise you that no Palestinian will ever die again. They're like, that's not our problem here. We want that land. We're not, this is, our issue is not that we think they're trying to kill us. Our issue is they shouldn't have come here in 48, or, you know, in the turn of the century, they shouldn't be here at all,

and we want them out. And by the way, our religion teaches us they should be out. So, not mirror image image in my opinion. Your response? No, my response is that, one, I didn't try to make it that they're a mirror image. Two, I think this framing of God coming down and telling one side or the other you're going to be safe is a little out there. I'm just trying to make a point. I get what you're going to be safe is is a little out there um you know just try to make a point i'm saying i get what you're saying you had absolute certainty is what i'm saying yeah

that's what i mean you know i think there's just a lot of you know problems here you know palestinians you know want their own safety want their own sovereignty want their own rights you know just as much as as israelis do yes so you know uh but i would also you know there was one point in there too when you said you know uh their religion you know says that they that this land belongs to them or that they have to be out uh i don't know i i read the hamas charter and i you know it talks about don't don't don't don't think that hamas represents islam as much as Saudi or Iran or anybody. No, it represents the Palestinians. I don't think it represents the Palestinians either.

Hamas represents Hamas. Hamas polls higher than any other group now among the West Bank and on Gaza. Listen, I pray that you're right. I don't want Hamas to represent the Palestinians. I know they were elected. I know at the time people said it wasn't about the intention to destroy Israel. It was about practical considerations. My mind was open to that, but after October 7th, it doesn't really seem to have been the case, but I don't know. But I'm only saying that if you read that charter, it talks about three rings of of of this is the nationalism.

I forget what the second ring and then there is there's a nationalism. There's the what was it then? I got the third ring, but one of them is Islam. One of the rings of of justification for wanting to destroy Israel. Israel was an islamic belief so well look yeah whether it be hamas whether it be any group all of them twist and bend religion for their political purposes same thing here in the united states same thing in russia same thing in china we see it everywhere my dissertation is on this you know the state manipulate or the manipulation of religion for political ends so you know i i wouldn't take that at face value when when they're you know claiming to speak on

behalf of islam or that x y and z is because islam mandates it um but no i i understand what you're saying what happened on october 7 was horrible. I just is three circles. The Palestinian circle. It was the Palestinian circle. The question of liberation of Palestine is bound to three circles, the Palestinian circle, the Arab circle and the Islamic circle. Each of these circles has its own role in the struggle against Zionism. Each has its duties and its horrible mistake and a sign of deep ignorance to overlook any of these circles. So that's – I'm only – that's what I'm responding to. I didn't mean to interrupt you, but –

No, no, no. Yeah. No, I mean it's – but specifically on the Islamic matter, whether it be Hamas, whether it be al-Qaeda or Daesh, ISIS, whatever you want to call it, all of them speak in this language. Oh, it's a religious duty. It's incumbent upon you to fight the Zionists, so on and so forth. You know, no, you know, this is this is this is the politicization of the manipulation of religion for, you know, what is inherently a political agenda. So, you know, I would just caution the Islamic part of all of this, because Islam is a religion of one point eight billion people. You ask every Muslim, you know, what is Islam? What does it represent? You're going to get one point eight billion answers. a deep amount of relationships and life experience among Arabic and Muslim people.

I play the oud. I played Arabic music growing up. I'm definitely no expert in Islam or Muslim people on the other side of the world, but I can tell you with full and sentimental sincerity that Muslim people on the other side of the world. But I can tell you with, with, with full and sentimental sincerity that Muslim people on this side of the world are beautiful people. And like I've said on this show before, if you,

if I didn't, if I had, if, if I only knew the Muslim people that I've met in my life, and then you told me what was going on in the middle East, I'd be like, what are you talking about? That can't possibly be true.

I know, I know. But that should show right there that it's political. It's all political. Yeah. Well, yeah, it's political here,

but, but whatever it is, it is what it is. In other words, I, I, I understand that I've heard, and I just had a conversation with my friend,

who I recognize the sentiment of what you're saying and what was painting in him. He's actually he's Arabic, half Kuwaiti, half Egyptian. That these people don't speak for him. He's Muslim and these people do not speak for him and it bothers him deeply. And I don't challenge

him on that. They speak for themselves, but whatever it is, their interpretation of the religion that animates them, that is the interpretation of the religion that Israel has to deal with. Israel can't say, well, you guys are all interpreting Islam wrong, so this disappears. It's like communism. I mean, is communism what Karl Marx wrote or is communism what the various communist governments say it is? It's it is what they say it is in terms of dealing with it. And that's what that's what Israel's up against, you know. But again, what I would bring this back to is, you know, confusing, you know, these, you know these you know the politicization of religion and you know the and so on and so forth you know for what is at the root cause of all of this which is the the israel-palestine conflict which is inherently political you know both sides manipulate religion for their own advantage in this conflict you know the the israelis do it just as much as as the palestinians

not just as much not just as much a huge number of israel israelis don't even mention religion they're not religious at all there's no it's have you been to israel no i've not been to israel it's it's not it's it's not um not even in the same universe of religious impact on society. By the way, to ask you the question, I want you to double-check your article because I looked it up. Israel does not get any economic aid anymore, only military. Now, of course, money is fungible, so you could say that whatever military aid they get comes out

in money they can spend on the economy. But up until like seven or eight years ago, I mean, it drastically, the curve goes drastically down through the 70s, 80s and 90s. And eventually, I think in the 2000s, it zeroes out. So, well, this is a question for for for anybody. But how is is is the what's the best explanation for the United States' strong connection to Israel? Is it the evangelicals? I mean, of course, there are many people that blame the Jews themselves as manipulators. But leaving that conspiracy theory aside, is it the evangelical constituency?

Or is it just that we feel we have shared values with them or do we feel we have a sympathy for for the jewish cause because of of jewish history what's the best explanation for our uh our uh relationship with israel sure so i think it's a confluence of all those things you mentioned except for the the one about you know the jewish people you know somehow running the world and things like that but all the other things that you mentioned i think it's a combination of all of them the evangelical community the you know this kind of historic you know uh guilt on behalf of the west of what happened in world war ii you know in the holocaust and so on and so forth. I think it's also, you know, what also plays a key role here is, you know, within D.C., pro-Israel organizations

and supporters and so on and so forth, you know, they pump a lot of money into D.C., you know, directly into campaigns, indirectly into think tanks. And bless you um and it it's not just uh israel you know it's it's saudi arabia it's the uae it's egypt can we talk about that for a second so and i noticed that you've you've uh i didn't i didn't i wasn't going to go into it but i noticed that you you cite meersheimer and walton in one of your articles. And I'm wondering how far you go with that. Now, I will grant that anybody who gives money to anything assumes you assume that they think they're getting something for their money. So I'm not going to say that that's not true, but lobbying only gets you so far in the sense that you could not lobby leaders into becoming pro-life or pro-choice. I would definitely push back on that. because you're responding to your constituents.

There's some give and take, I don't think you could get the Muslim population in Michigan to become pro-Israeli by giving a lot of money to Ilhan Omar. I think their their views on the Palestinian conflict are impervious to lobbying. missing the forest for the trees here because the vast majority of uh you know americans whether or uh politicians whether they be on the left or the right you know take a lot of money from you know pro-israel organization arms manufacturers uh you know countries such as saudi arabia and the uae so on and so forth so you know by you know really subsidizing both sides uh the mainstreams of both sides of the political aisle you know what i'm saying is that that for instance i donate to a candidate i don't i donate to a candidate who represents the world view that i that i have already all right right. So Mearsheimer.

I don't think the pro-Israel organizations or the arms manufacturers and all that donate to groups that share their worldview. They're donating to mass amounts to groups in order to shape their worldview and their vote. So Mearsheimer in his book

says that essentially that the Israel lobby was behind our war in Iraq. Now, the question is, and one indication of whether or not it's lobbying money would be what these politicians say and feel once they leave office. For instance, George W. Bush is extremely pro-Israel to this day. Hillary Clinton is extremely pro-Israel to this day. She's not taking money. Dick Cheney, you know, was the big advocate for the Iraq war. Christopher Hitchens was a huge critic of Israel, went to his grave as a huge advocate for the Iraq war. But somehow in the mind of Mearsheimer, the Jews were behind this.

Let me just say a few more things. So looking up the money, by the way, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce gives $94 million in lobbying money. American Hospital Association, $23 million. American Medical Association, $20 million in lobbying money. American Hospital Association, $23 million. American Medical Association, $20 million. AT&T, $15 million. Boeing, $15 million. This is what they spent for lobbying. FedEx, $10 million.

Dan, what do you think APAC spends a year? This is 2018. How much was FedEx? FedEx was $10 million. Well, I guess because you're asking me the question, it's going to be lower than I think. Guess. $5 million? AIPAC, $3,500,000.

This is, and it says all pro-Israel lobbyists combined, $5 million. For $5 million, I could almost do it. For $5 million, I'm going to buy the support of the United States of America. Well, let me add one more thing to the Mearsheimer thing. Can you play the, this is a tweet that he did recently, a video, make sure you can hear it. And this, this irked me no end. It's quite clear that on October 7th, a good number, we don't know what the number is, but a good number of the Israelis who were killed were not killed by Hamas. They were killed by the IDF. And I find that hardly surprising,

given the nature of the fight that was taking place. It is hard to discriminate in those situations. Now, the Hannibal Doctrine is a very different matter. The argument there, or the claim there, is that what the Israelis do is that if it looks like an Israeli soldier, even an Israeli citizen, is going to be captured by Hamas or some other terrorist group, to use the Israelis' language to describe those groups, then the IDF will kill those Israelis so that they don't become hostages. And the logic here is that Israelis have such a high regard for human life that if hostages are captured, it will be almost impossible for Israel not to pay an enormous price to get those hostages back so it's better to surreptitiously kill them better for the IDF to surreptitiously kill them rather than have them become hostages and there is a great deal of

evidence that there is this Hannibal doctrine in practice inside of Israel that's murder I guess you could call it that so So, um, that horrified me. The Hannibal doctrine, you probably know it, right? Is, um, the notion that if somebody is being kidnapped or taken hostage,

and by the way, it's been rescinded, uh, um, uh, um, Eisencourt. I think that,

I think the guy is in the war cabinet now is a guy who rescinded it, but it was rescinded in 2016 or something, was the notion that you do not let anybody get kidnapped. So you shoot whatever it is. It wasn't to surreptitiously kill. That's Mearsheimer's ugly spin

on it. It was the notion that you don't let anybody be taken kidnapped, be taken kidnap, be taken prisoner, perhaps because the consequences to having that person as a hostage are too great.

Now, what bothers me about Mearsheimer here is that, God forbid, he should ever have to be in a position where he has to make this profoundly difficult moral decision of what to do. He wants to call it murder. Murder, he says. Flight 93, when they thought it was going to go into the White House or whatever it was, the American government was going to give the order to send that plane down. Right. Murder. Anybody think that was murder? Murder. When Israel, as we know, gave up prisoners for Gilad Shalit. One of them was Sinwar, who became the mastermind of October 7th. So were they even better off if they could have done everything they could to prevent Shalit from being taken prisoner, even if it meant killing him?

I don't fucking know. These are impossible questions. These are impossible questions which are thrust on Israel because they're dealing with people who want to kill them. And this smug Mearsheimer, makes me so angry, sits there and it's ensconced in his elite

Ivy League apartment. He said, this is murder. As if there's some evil intention here other than a country trying to figure out in the the unsolvable philosophy hypothetical of what is the thing to do here are we better off taking throwing caution to the wind and even if it means the hostage is getting killed we try to save them prevent them be taken kidnapped or do we lose200 people 10 years later because we didn't want to?

This is so all I'm saying, and I know I'm talking a lot because it's emotional for me, is that this guy Mearsheimer, if the jury was out on where he was coming from on this expose of the Israeli, of the Israel lobby, this to me puts him over the edge. This is an animus. And again, if people just listening to it, didn't see the video, the smile,

the curl of, of his lips, the way he said, the way he was happy to endorse that it's murder and the lack and the, the total shallowness of the way he approaches this subject. Um, I would stay clear of Mearsheimer. If I were you,

I just didn't get quite the same impression that you got i you know the guy said to him well that's murder and he said i guess you could call it that um it didn't sound to me like meersheimer was all in on that characterization necessarily why was he why was he bringing it up misham was one who brought up the whole thing he starts by saying uh uh what was the first part the first part what was the one who brought up the whole thing. He starts by saying, what was the first part? The first part, what was the first part? Well, the first part he was talking about that a lot of the Israelis were killed by IDF.

That's right. First he says it's a large number or a sizable number. Now, I think we know that it's likely that, or maybe even certain, that some people were killed in some crossfire. I've never heard that it was a sizable number, some number. He says it's a significant,

but he's, he says, but I would, I would, wouldn't expect otherwise because there was a firefight. But so he said that that's what's, what's understandable. But this other thing is not acceptable.

And his attitude is that maybe a lot of these Israelis were killed because Israel shot them all. And then the host says, that's murder. And Mearsheimer could say, no, no, that's not murder. They were in an impossible situation. That's what you would say. He says, I guess you could call it that. If you told that story and the guy says to you, so I guess it's murder, would you have said, yeah, I guess you could call it that?

Who would say that? I'm trying to think what I would say. You would say, no, I didn't mean it was murder. I would, I would, I would probably say it's a,

it's a horrific. Yes, of course. A million things you would say, other than, yeah, I guess you could call it that. Anyway,

I, you have a question for our guests regarding that. Sorry to make you have to sit through that, but you tell us about that. Then we'll let you go. Go ahead. Look, if you want to talk about John, I would just have John on the show. He won't come on the show.

Did you ask him? Many times. If you could hook us up, I would like to ask him why he's so eager for Ukraine to cede one third of its territory, but then thinks the Palestinians should stand pat. But go ahead. Look, I can't speak to anything, you know, regarding John or, indirect influence, like funding of think tanks and stuff like that is to show that. Not just Israel, but countries across the Middle East, special interests here in the United States, like arms manufacturers, big oil, so on and so forth, have a vested interest in the United States pursuing status quo policies in the region. So, you know, what I tried to highlight with that part is, you know, there are a lot of structural barriers to trying to tweak and adjust

U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. And that's just one of them. Yeah. Well, I would say this. This is an interesting question. I'm going to give you some I'm going to cede some ground to you here. There are a whole lot of issues which the American public is oblivious to. And this could include weapons issues, military issues, foreign policy issues that you buy off a congressman and he sticks something in a bill that's favorable to your interest, and the American public is not the wiser for it. And we see this all the time, actually. That, to me, is quite plausible, if not almost certainly true.

That's quite different than being able to buy the affection of the American people through lobbying, which is another thing which is implied. Where a politician is, or if the American people feel pro-Israel,

I don't think that's because of lobbying. And as a matter of fact, we see that as people get younger and younger and younger, they're becoming less and less and less pro-Israel, despite the lobbying. And older people lived at a different time, closer to the Holocaust, when fewer ugly things were being taught about Israel, when universities didn't teach settler colonialism.

You know, it could pile on a whole bunch of reasons why older people would be more disposed to Israel, older, more religious, religious people are more disposed to Israel as a million reasons. But I would say that the current anti-Israel intersectional kind of sentiment that we see in people under 25 or under 30, I'm going to predict that will also be impervious to lobbying or jewish money i don't think anything can be done about it well first i have never used the term jewish money and will never use that term second there there's a there's a difference here and what we're talking

about is a you know and what we're seeing is a disconnect between the American public and political elites in Washington. So when I talk about lobbying, when I talk about influence and knowledge production and these types of things, I'm talking about how they're influencing decision makers, you know, not really the, you know, the American, you know, Joe Schmo on the street. So when we see younger generations, for example, of which I'm part of the younger generation, turning more sympathetic towards the Palestinians or turning more critical of Israel, so on and so forth,

will lobbying impact that? No, because these are sentiments that are being changed among the American populace. But where lobbying and, you know, knowledge production and things like that, you know, really hold their influence is in elite circles in D.C. where things are, you know, getting changed. You know, like I think, you know, just the past almost six months regarding the war in Gaza has kind of shown this. The majority of Americans favor a ceasefire. The majority of Americans are critical of Israel's military approach in Gaza.

But there's always been a disconnect between foreign policy behavior in Washington and, you know, the American people. You know, foreign policy is one of the most undemocratic elements of American politics. If there were no pro-Israeli lobbyists, would we have gone to war in Iraq? So I think the part, going back to the conversation about Iraq, that is really missed here is so much of the invasion of Iraq was also part of this post-Cold War, you know, idea of American liberal hegemony. You know, you had the neocons, you had the liberal internationalists who had this idea of really, you know, going out and using force to remake the world in our own image. So whether or not we would have invaded Iraq without lobbying from pro-Israel organizations in DC, yeah. Israel was part and parcel to the intelligence saying that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction. But so it's always a million countries. But yeah, so but what I'm saying is, is that this notion of, you know, America going in and to the Middle East, into Iraq more specifically, was very connected to this idea of American exceptionalism and American.

But as a matter of but if you read Mearsheimer and Walt, he would they would say they would imply that there's but for causation here. Is there any thing but for the fact that Israel. Has lobbyists. You would you know, you're just going to speculate. This would be different in American policy, in American war. What would be different if there was never a dollar in pro-Israel money spent? What do you think would be different? I don't know. That's impossible to answer.

You don't have any gut? Mearsheimer and Walt would say they don't think we would have gone into Iraq. They think that we'd be – I don't think Mearsheimer and Walt say that, though. What was their book about? Their book was titled The Israel Lobby, and they were talking about how it moved the needle in D.C. and so on and so forth. How? Through money, through indirect influence and things like that.

So what is the manifestation of that moved needle? What do we see differently? What do we see that's different than would have been if not for the Israel money? Look, I think this attempt to link like some sort of causal, you know, A to B from, you know, money associated with those that are pro-Israel and outcomes in the Middle East. Yeah, it influences, of course. So what would be different? What would be different is I think the United States and, you know, should not pursue a U.S.

Middle East policy that is influenced by the interest of any other nation in the Middle East, not Israel, not Saudi, not Egypt, not Turkey, not Iran, not anybody. You know, we my approach is approach the Middle East solely from a perspective of American interest, which I say in the piece is at its very basis. The safety and prosperity of the American people. While I understand that. But George W. Bush administration, Dick Cheney, those guys. Do you think they their policy was.

Would have been different if not for Israel money. Look, George Bush and Dick Cheney. The decision that they made. Look, you invited me on the show to talk about the article. Okay, we can stop. I think it's a fair question because the article one would expect you to be able to say is significant, because if not for that, but now this would be different. So how do you explain a pro-Israel policy? Do you explain it by the evangelical community or I mean, same question I asked our guest. How do you explain our actions vis-a-vis Israel?

Which actions? Our support for Israel, our military aid. Generally, if there is a country that is democratic, I know the bubble over here is the West Bank, but believes in civil liberties and all the things that Israel does, um, democratic, let's leave. I know the bubble over here is the West bank, but you know, believes in, in, in civil liberties and all the things that, um, Israel does,

um, wherever it is in the world, it would be the huge exception rather than what is the rule that we were not their ally and extremely concerned about their wellbeing. Number one, number two, until recently, obviously the middle East was of,

of the utmost strategic importance to us. And maybe that's changed. You mentioned that Trump mentioned that it changed because, although I don't think it actually has changed, but if I, as I'm saying it, that, uh,

we were hugely oil dependent on the middle East. Um, one of his, uh, uh, Mr. Hoppen's arguments is that because we're not dependent on oil anymore, we're just our only interest in the Middle East is to protect Israel. But I don't believe that's true because the price of oil in America is still completely controlled by the price of oil in the Middle East. Well, those are those statements are incorrect one saying that i said that oil is irrelevant and two that oil is dictated solely by uh you know you did no you did say that where well so many words you said in 2020 then president donald

trump cut through some of the fog admitting that we don't have to be in the middle east other than we want to protect israel i went and looked at the speech that he said that he was talking about the fact that we are self-sufficient in energy he's basically he basically says we're self-sufficient in energy now the middle eastern countries don't have us by the he didn't say balls but we don't they don't have us by the balls and then he says we don't even have to be in the Middle East anymore than we want to protect Israel. And then you quoted that. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Those are Trump's words.

Yeah, but you're saying he cut through the fog. I'm not. I did not quote. No, no, no. So I'm not saying – I'm not quoting him and saying, oh, my God, Trump is right. The whole idea of being energy independent, especially when it comes to oil, is kind of a – it's a misplaced debate because oil is a global commodity, regardless of how much oil the United States imports from the Middle East. Well, then maybe you got the Trump remark from somewhere else. You didn't realize that was the context. If you knew that was the context and what you're saying, you wouldn't have written this, in my opinion.

Well, that's a great opinion for you to have because i'm saying i'm saying did you know did you know that he was talking about that we we don't have to worry about the middle east anymore because of oil yeah no i know that he mentioned the part about oil i don't agree with that at all why do you what do you think i didn't paragraph is according to biden if there were no israel we'd have to invent one but in 2020 then then President Donald Trump cut through some of the fog, admitting that we don't need to be in the Middle East other than we want to protect Israel. But Trump was speaking vis-a-vis oil. So, OK, well, let's take it a different way. Then then what was Trump saying that you thought was cutting through the fog? No, about how much of an outsized role U.S. support for Israel plays in U.S. Middle East policy. But do you agree we don't have to be in the Middle East other than we want to protect Israel?

No. So we have strategic interests in the Middle East, such as maintaining the free flow of oil. That is still a strategic interest. Making sure that the Middle East doesn't become a hub of terrorism to strike the United States. And three, preventing the emergence of a regional hegemon, somebody that would come in and dominate the region, so on and so forth. All right. I listen, you've been a great guest and I know we're having it out, but I'm enjoying it because you're very, very smart. And what I said at the beginning, I actually respect your school of thought and I struggle with it. I struggle with it also in the,

you know, in the Russia, Ukraine war. I don't, I don't go the full Mearsheimer, but I don't dismiss the realists as a, what's the word Dan? You know,

off offhandedly as many, what's that? As isolation. I don't dismiss them as cavalierly as many... What's that? As isolationist. Cavalierly. I don't dismiss him as cavalierly as many people do. As a matter of fact, I kind of think that people dodge his arguments sometimes by just dismissing him with an ad hominem of some sort.

And I know Robert Wright is sympathetic to some of these arguments as well. I'm a, I'm a fan of his. So I, you know, I grapple with this stuff. I don't agree with it, but I don't, I think that it's, um, it needs to be, uh, uh, respected and thought through step-by-step. All right, sir. Uh, the office still stands when you come to New York. Um, come to New York and we can, we can talk about women and, and, uh, stuff like that, but no, we don't have to talk about Israel. All right.

Uh, thank you, sir. And, and, uh, good night to you. Thank you.

You too. Podcast at comedy seller.com. Everybody podcast at comedy seller.com. Max, you got to stop the meeting so he can finish uploading to his, uh, because it's, uh,