The Compound and Friends - How to Find 100 Bagger Stocks

Episode Date: May 1, 2026

On episode 240 of The Compound and Friends, ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠Michael Batnick⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ and ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠Downtown Josh Brown⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ are joined by Neeraj Khemlani and Matt Ankrum to discuss: what 100 bagger stocks look like, the search for high quality companies, the impact of compounding and exponential growth over decades, and much more! This episode is sponsored by Victory Capital and Janus Henderson Investors To learn more about Victory Capital, visit  www.victoryshares.com Find out more about Janus Henderson Investors at https://www.janushenderson.com/securitizedmarkets/ Sign up for The Compound Newsletter and never miss out: ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠thecompoundnews.com/subscribe⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ Instagram: ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠instagram.com/thecompoundnews⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ Twitter: ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠twitter.com/thecompoundnews⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ LinkedIn: ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠linkedin.com/company/the-compound-media/⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ TikTok: ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠tiktok.com/@thecompoundnews⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ Investing involves the risk of loss. This podcast is for informational purposes only and should not be or regarded as personalized investment advice or relied upon for investment decisions. Michael Batnick and Josh Brown are employees of Ritholtz Wealth Management and may maintain positions in the securities discussed in this video. All opinions expressed by them are solely their own opinion and do not reflect the opinion of Ritholtz Wealth Management. The Compound Media, Incorporated, an affiliate of ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠Ritholtz Wealth Management⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠, receives payment from various entities for advertisements in affiliated podcasts, blogs and emails. Inclusion of such advertisements does not constitute or imply endorsement, sponsorship or recommendation thereof, or any affiliation therewith, by the Content Creator or by Ritholtz Wealth Management or any of its employees. For additional advertisement disclaimers see here ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠https://ritholtzwealth.com/advertising-disclaimers⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠. Investments in securities involve the risk of loss. Any mention of a particular security and related performance data is not a recommendation to buy or sell that security. The information provided on this website (including any information that may be accessed through this website) is not directed at any investor or category of investors and is provided solely as general information. Obviously nothing on this channel should be considered as personalized financial advice or a solicitation to buy or sell any securities. See our disclosures here: ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠https://ritholtzwealth.com/podcast-youtube-disclosures/⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ Victory Capital Disclosure: VictoryShares ETFs distributed by Victory Capital Services, Inc. For more information or a link to the prospectus, visit www.vcm.com Janus Henderson Disclosure: Past performance is no guarantee of future results.  Investing involves risk, including the possible loss of principal and fluctuation of value.  Janus Henderson® and any other trademarks used herein are trademarks of Janus Henderson Group plc or one of its subsidiaries. © Janus Henderson Group plc. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

All right, guys, this is going to be great. Super excited to have you here. How long did the process of getting this together? A couple years. Once you committed, like, we're doing it. Then what? I think it was about a year to put it together. And then, you know, the book industry is slow.

Yes. So it takes a year from submission to publication. There's like three drafts back and four. I did four books. Yeah. I think it's enough. I think I'm done. It's, it's, and I'll tell you the Columbia process, there's a peer review committee.

Okay. There's an editorial committee. And there's an academic committee. And they take it seriously? They take it seriously. Like they read everything? Yes. Okay.

So I actually enjoyed the process. Okay. Because I wanted to be challenged in every direction before it came out. Okay. And so many people will write stuff now and there's very little oversight. You know, there's copy editing. But you know what you're talking about. You invented Halo.

That's true. It's very true that I did do that. The thing with the book that threw me was I write about markets. And I write in present tense. And then they're like, okay, we got your manuscript. Be back to you in a few months. And I'm like, all right, great. I'll just rewrite everything I wrote because the whole world will have changed by then.

and my publisher, Craig from Harriman House, he was just like, you're capturing a moment in time. It doesn't have to be the moment the person opens up the book. And I found that helpful because keep in mind, I'm not a book writer. I'm a blogger. Like that's, and blogging is what was immediate. Like this is happening now. And that's not what this is.

Yeah. This is like write things down that people will get something out of years from them. It's got to stand the test of time. Yeah. The electronic addition makes it a little bit easier. You can update later on. If you so choose. If you want to have a book that goes on for the rest of your life.

That's right. That's right. Okay. Well, listen, it's a huge achievement. Speaking of updates, I can't wait to talk to you about, obviously, the process. But it's a good thing that we have you on now instead of six, eight months ago before some of the software AI stuff started to happen. Yep. So you can digitally update, although I know.

Yeah. I know you're a long-term investor. Yeah. No, we are literally in the first, you know, year of a 30-year kind of run. So, yeah, I definitely have got some thoughts. And Nieritz and I, you know, when we were writing the book, we actually talked a lot about AI. And so, you know, I think that's one of the things that, you know, a lot of people, you know, are going to be surprised that there are going to be winners and there's going to be losers. Matt, here's a teaser for the audience.

What's that? A teaser for the audience. Yeah. Before we get into the meat of the conversation, is AI wrong about your portfolio or some of the names in your portfolio? Yes. Love it. What I mean is AI? Why would AI be wrong?

AI is not wrong, but the... Investors interpretation. Yeah, the interpretation of what AI is going to do. I believe that they're going to wrong. Well, because there's a lot of names that you've given out that have been taken to the woodshed and you're holding your ground. Yeah. I love it. Yeah.

Okay. Yeah. And, you know, it's going to be transformational. But, you know, at the end of the day, you know, for a lot of these companies, they can use the same technology. And, you know, the incumbents have a lot of power that... Oh, I have a lot of thought. I have a lot of thought. I very much agree with that.

I have a lot of thoughts. I have a lot of thoughts on that. Let's put a pin in that, though. I don't want to do the show before the show. All right. All right. This is the compound and friends. Yes, it is.

Episode 240. Whoa, whoa, whoa. Stop the clock. Here's a word from our sponsor. This podcast is sponsored by Victory Capital. What if your portfolio could read the economy and act on it? West End Advisors, a Victory Capital Investment franchise, has done exactly that since 1996. Their Macroids,

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lower volatility exposure, higher income diversified across various securitized sectors, or perhaps agency MBS exposure as part of their core, Janice Henderson seeks to offer a variety of securitized solutions. Janice Henderson investors investing in a brighter future together. Learn more at Janice Henderson.com slash securitized markets. Past performance is no guarantee of future results. Investing involves risk, including the possible loss of principle and fluctuation of value. Welcome to the compound and friends. All opinions expressed by Josh Brown, Michael Batnick, and their castmates are solely their own opinions and do not reflect the opinion of Riddholt's wealth management.

This podcast is for informational purposes only and should not be relied upon for any investment decisions. Clients of Riddholt's wealth management may maintain positions in the securities discussed in this podcast. Good morning, good afternoon. I don't know when people are going to listen to this,

but man, this is going to be... Welcome to a very special episode of the compound and friends. Is that a fair characterization? Extremely special. This is unlike anything we've ever been before. It's like when Blossom went to the prom. We think it's very...

special episode. We focus on the noise most episodes. Yeah, we're big on noise. We love it. We love it. We're going to put the noise aside and we're going to talk about some of the biggest truths about investing the process, stock selection, gumption, tenacity,

sticking through different market environments. Shibboleth. We're going to do a lot. But let's do our traditional intro while we're all here. What do you say? All right. Bear with me guys. You need a minute? I do.

All right. Ladies and gentlemen, welcome to the compound and friends. I'm in the wrong doc. That seems to be the problem. There we go. All right. Here we go. I'll do some crowd work.

I got some jokes. We're good? Guys, ladies and gentlemen, welcome to the compound and friends. And we have two first-time guests here on the show. Mirage Kamlani is the author of the coffee can investor, a stock picker's journey to build generational wealth, and is the former president and co-head of CBS News and Stations, where he oversaw flagship programs including 60 Minutes, Face the Nation.

They like that one. CBS Evening News, before CBS, he held senior roles at Hearst and Yahoo Finance. Naraj, thank you so much for being here. Welcome to the show. Thank you. It's an honor. And to Neeraj is right. Matt Ancrum is a portfolio manager at Ancrum, which runs a concentrated portfolio for his family office and is an institutional investment advisory. Matt has spent years researching 100 baggers and applies those lessons to his concentrated ultra-long-term portfolio.

His process is the subject of the coffee can investor, earning endorsements from Howard Marks and Dan Rather. Previously, he was an analyst and portfolio manager for Janice and Latif Investment management. Matt also served as head of strategy for a Fortune 500 company, co-founded a fintech SaaS and was CEO of a brain neuro rehabilitation company. Additionally, he is an adjunct professor at UMKC. Matt, welcome to the show. Thank you. It's quite a bio. All right. Keep yourself busy. So we're going to do this show in stages. The first thing we're going to do is get into the basic premise of the book. The coffee can investor.

Michael and I have a lot of questions about that. And then we'll get into the stock selection portion of the conversation. And then we're going to open up to each other. And we're going to get a little bit personal. And we're going to go deep. And we're going to get into it. So here or carbone? We'll do it all here.

I'm on a carbone diet. And we watched the last episode. So it's not tip to tip, right? No, we'll not be going tip to tip today. Excellent. Thank you for watching. All right, Naraj, tell us the basic premise of the coffee can investor. The basic premise is, you know, Matt, he's trying to leave the ultimate lottery ticket to his three daughters.

And it's a coffee can full of stocks that he hopes someday will be worth half a billion dollars. Metaphorically. Metaphorically. Right. We're not printing out stock certs and putting them into coffee cans. It's a way of thinking about, like, people put, like, think, think, about coffee can money. Yeah.

We'll keep some change in the coffee can. This is obviously a much higher concept version. Yeah. I mean, the old Western pioneers used to put their valuables in coffee cans and, you know, bury them under the ground somewhere

and then come back to them a long time ago. And so that's where the idea comes from. The story and the hook for me, as a reporter, was Matt's, Matt telling me a story a couple of years ago. And I've known Matt for about a quarter over century as a sort of deep background source.

You know, 60 Minutes, we used to call them Marvin the Explaners. And so I would always call up Matt and say, what's going on in Wall Street? What's going on in corporate America? And a couple of years ago, he tells me this goddamn story about a guy named Robert Kirby. And Robert Kirby was at the Capital Group in Los Angeles. And, you know, very distinguished Harvard Stanford grad who worked for Ronald Reagan. He was on the Brady Commission after the 86 stock market crash. Very conservative.

Anyway, Kirby approaches one day an L.A. heiress. It says, can I manage your money for you? And she says, sure, I like you. I like what you're about. But I don't really know a lot about this. Can you deal with my husband on day-to-day matters? He's a lawyer. Sir Kirby says, sure.

And over the years, Kirby would call the husband and say, buy this stock for your wife. And so the husband would dutifully buy the stock for his wife. Okay. But without telling anybody, he bought the same stock for himself, and he would put the stock certificate in a coffee can. Literally. Literally.

And over the years, Kirby would call the husband and say, sell this stock for your wife, and he would dutifully sell the stock for his wife. But he was like, screw it. I'm keeping the stocks I'm buying with my own money in my coffee can. I'm never selling. Right. churn the wife, but then keep the, keep the position on.

You said that, not made. I love it. I thought you were saying he's short of the stocks for himself. No, no. He just kept them. He just kept them. And he put $5,000 in each one of the positions. What era is this?

80s? In the 80s. And so over the years, so husband, unfortunately, passes away. They find the coffee can, gives it to the wife. Wife's like, I don't know what this is, gives it to Kirby. and in a hot minute, Kirby realizes what's going on, that the husband's been pickybacking on all the buy recommendations, but never selling.

Some of the $5,000 positions trended down to $3,000. A half dozen of them went from $5,000 to $100,000, and one went to $800,000. Probably Apple. It was at that time, it was Xerox. Okay, close enough. And so he decides to write a paper on this for the, you know, journal of portfolio management that five people including Matt Reed.

Sure, JPM. And, you know, they do the Quant of the Year award specials. It's like obscure sports quarterly. Exactly, exactly. I actually, I read it. You read it, okay. And so. No, he doesn't.

Yes, he does. I trust Michael on this one. And so he writes his paper and he describes his whole experience. And at the very end of it, he says, I hope someday, someone, somewhere, will repeat this experiment. And Matt tells me this story. And he's preoccupied not with, you know, Kirby's short and midterm stocks that he was putting into the can, but the ones that multiplied a hundred times.

And he started to study 100 baggers. So I was completely hooked at that point. Right. Now, the concept of a hundred bagger, just for people that they're investors, they're traders, but they haven't come across it. How do you define, I mean, obviously mathematically, a stock that goes up 100x, but how do you define what these stocks are that you're looking for? So I guess the first thing to do is actually define kind of my definition of 100 beggar. I don't know if we can pull up the slide.

We can't. Yeah, slide number two. Use the AI, John. There we go. So for those of you on the audience who just on audio, what this is is a graph of there's a red line. And what that's doing is going up, that's the S&P 500. And it's using the long-term average of 10.8% and showing that over 30 years, kind of where it goes. The blue line is actually what a 100-bagger would be over a 30-year timeframe.

Okay. And the reason why I chose 30 years is because that's about double of what the S&P was doing. And so if you look at that, that's going up about 16.6% a year, essentially doubling about every five years. A couple of takeaways from that graph, though, is you notice, as you get out towards the end years, you actually have a massive difference kind of between the two. It's actually about an 80-fold difference. But the shorter one is probably the more interesting one, is that in the first kind of 10 years, there's not a whole lot of difference between that.

That's where people don't really see it. And this is the kind of the concept that people struggle with is when we talk numbers, we think of things linearly. So when I say things are going up, you know, 15% a year sounds great, right? And you kind of think every year is kind of going on. But if you go through time, that actually goes to that exponential curve. If you can compound 16% a year, you can be a hundred bagger stock after 30 years of that. That's correct.

And so much of the dollar amount, the wow factor will happen in the last five years. Exactly. And to put this. This is like Buffett, like, Buffett's wealth, when after he took. past 65 or 50, that's when it really exploded. Well, it's even later than that. After the age of 65, he created 98 to 98, 9% of his total wealth. Right.

Which gives hope for all of us, right? 98% of his total wealth was created after 65. Yes. Wait, so he was in the bottom 2% before he says he was. I'm not a math guy. Yeah, that's how it works. No, but people, so I think people know what compounding is, even if it's hard for them to imagine it,

Everybody knows the story of the chessboard where the guy challenges the emperor or something. He says, I want you to put a grain of rice on every square, but double it each time. And it goes one, two, four, eight, 16, 32. And then by the time you get to the end of the chess board, it's every grain of rice that has ever been grown in human history. Yeah, we actually assigned a dollar value to a grain of rice. Okay. In that example. Okay.

Right. And it takes like nine or ten days just to get to a dollar. Right. And then it keeps compounding and you start to blow past the net worth of Elon Musk and Warren Buffett combined. And by the time you're done at 64, you're more than the entire US GDP. Somebody told me, I forget the number. So maybe it's not interesting. But you start with a regular standard domino.

And each domino it knocks into is twice the size. I think after the 13th domino you're knocking down the Empire State Building or something like that. It's a good example. So it might not be 13th, but the point remains. People understand the concept of compounding.

But what people don't know is what you just said, which is like just how much of the astounding return happens at the very end. Which, of course, it's hard to get that far. And it's boring. Who wants to be rich at the end? Right. I want to be rich right now. This is a get rich slow kind of.

concept, right? And that's why a lot of people, you know, kind of look at it and they make their 100 percent and then they're, you know, on to the next. Before we go into your slides, I want to, I want to make sure that for the audience, they understand where you're coming from. So, you and Naraj meet. This story is something that kind of like binds the two of you. Okay. And you have this obsession that you want to learn more about what it means to find these stocks and how to do it. And okay, I love it. But your background, super unique, you were at Janice. And you sort of tell this apocryphal story of you find out as an analyst that a company called Fastenol is going to miss earnings.

Yep. And you go running into, I guess, the boss. Yeah, my portfolio manager. So tell us the story. So I was a young analyst. And, yeah, we followed this company, Fastenol. It was one of the first companies that I had followed. I got to know the team really well.

Do the CEO, Bob Kirna, very well. This was in the day and age before Reg. FD. So what that meant was, I got full access. You were allowed to know more than other people by virtue of your closeness. Exactly. It was, you know, kind of the work that we did, we benefit from that. So I got to go on tours, if you will, with the branch managers, going on customer visits and doing that. Well, I got to meet a lot of the regional vice presidents.

What I was able to do is, you know, kind of going through that process, I was able to figure out that they were going to miss that number. Now, at the time, it was actually about 8% of our portfolio at that time. But what we didn't know, you know, at the time was how great a company this was. I mean, we obviously were, you know, fascinated by who they were and kind of what they had, and that's why it was our largest position. And I'll just say that it's a company that sells nuts and bolts. It's literally nuts and bolts.

Luts and bolts on construction sites in vending machines. So, you know, they really penetrated. So those site visits were important. Oh, yeah. Yeah. So construction company doesn't have to run back and forth to the supply house. Yeah. They will literally set up.

Here are all the screws and nails and fasteners you might need. Yeah. And you just pay as you go. It's like mobile home depot. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Well, the greatest thing that a lot of people didn't understand,

but we actually had figured out was that the cost of what they were selling, and all the nuts and bolts was less than 3% of the total project cost that the customers had. And so why that was important is that what really mattered is the service that Fassanol could provide. So think about it. They didn't have that nut there or they didn't have certain things. You would have an entire labor crew that didn't have... Waiting for a part. Yeah, couldn't do it.

And you know, and you'd have the machines that they had to have. So this was a really big part of that story. And what they realized where Fassanil really created was we're going to be your supplier of choice. We will make sure you will have the right part at the right time and do that. And if you don't have the right part, we can actually machine, you know, tool them so that you actually have that. That's what made them so special. And you're running around worrying about they're going to miss the earnings this quarter. So what had happened was, you know, given it was a large position in the portfolio, I had figured out that they were going to miss.

And so we went out, went to my boss, and we sold the stock. Well, from there, the stock actually went down 55%. Now, the market at that time had gone down about 15%. So I looked like a genius over that time frame. Yeah. You saved the day. 8% position. Yeah.

And a split adjusted basis, it was about $1.45, went down about 70 cents, right? Somebody thereabouts, 65 cents. But if we had actually held our position, that it then went up from there by 19-fold. 19-fold. 19-fold from where we sold it. Did Berkshire end up buying it? No, Berkshire hasn't bought that. Oh, who bought Fassanol?

Or is it still public? It's still public a trade. Yeah. Yeah. And it's still exceptionally well run. CEO now is Dan Forerness. He used to be the CFO. I mean, this is one of those companies that just, you know, is so well run.

What's a 19-fold return over? Like, what's the average annual return of that stock? So put it in terms versus the S&P. Yeah. The S&P went up over that time frame four times. Okay. So you can tell. If we would have just held a honda that position,

even though you had that down to, you know, we would have done. You should have done what I did. I sold at the same time you did. And then when it fell 55%, that's when I bought it back. You're brilliant. Just saying, why don't you do that? You know what? I'm saying that's an approach.

Yeah, no, it's absolutely. Okay, so, but that's a very, it's a moment where you say to yourself, I just learned something really important. Absolutely. Okay. And this is what you're actually getting into is the real important thing that we talk Epiphany, I was trying to say. It's an epiphany.

It is. It was an epiphany. It's a human psychology that plays such a role in how we do as investors. And, you know, that was a great one right there because to your point, if I had known, I knew that to sell it, guess what, when it was down 55%, it's really hard to go back and buy it again, right? Because at that time, too, one of the things that was playing out was Amazon. You know, Amazon's going to enter the market. They're going to destroy fast and all. They're going to do that.

Right. never turned out that way. And in fact, now Amazon is one of that. Fasional's the largest customers. So here's the problem, though, and this is what I think our audience, you probably tell everyone, is what we struggle with. When it's down 55%, you now know it's a great company because you've been on the road with management, you've met the customers, and you understand whatever's going on this

quarter is not existential. You know this. But most people, they're not that close to the situation. they have a stock that just dropped cut in half on earnings, they don't know it's going to go up 19-fold after. They think it's going to zero. Right. Or best-case scenario, they get stuck in a down-stock.

So that, to me, it's not just the length of time to hold the stock. It's the willingness to endure 50% drawdowns. Not everybody has that. No, they don't. And that's what makes the long-term investing special, right? You have to be willing to go through that. I'll just add, Matt, and Matt's study about what these companies have in common, nearly every single one of them experience an existential event. Yeah.

Okay. That they survive and come back. Exactly. Yeah. And over that time frame, from the max drawdown, 70%. So it's almost like the hero's journey. It's like the Campbell books. That's right.

Like you have to come back from the dead to act three. Right. To have your act three. So Matt, you just said this. about the 40% number, or the 70% number. I read this in 2014, I believe, and this really stuck with me. There was a research report from JPMorgan called The Agony and the Ecstasy of Stock Picking. Yep, right.

And they said 40% of all stocks in the Russell 3000 experience a catastrophic decline, meaning a 70% decline from which they never come back. Right. So four out of 10, never come back. So I think what Josh said is, so right that you have unique information that the average investor does not. And I think the reason why it's so hard, I mean, for a million reasons to stick with the winner is because, A, you know that at some point you will get cut in half. It's just part of the deal. None of these stocks go up

100 X in a straight line. Right. And you don't know which of those are going to come back. And so if you double your money, that's a great investment. It's a great trade, whatever you want to call it. I better not be part of that 40%. Let me just take my money and just leave. So for every fast and all, there's thousands of companies that do go to zero. Right. So it's actually one of the basis of my entire study. So think about what you have is what were those stocks that went down by that and never came back. Because those are the ones you have to avoid.

Exactly. On the road to a hundred bagger, you can't have. You might have a few zeros, but you can't have a lot. Right. Right. And the biggest difference, what I found after going through the 100 beggar is that all of the companies that kind of turn out to be 100 beggars, were high quality. A lot of the stocks that Morgan Stanley talks about are the ones that actually lower quality. But do they start out as high quality? Or do they become that in time? They actually

all did. They started as high quality. Yes. From the study. So what I started out with is from the IPO. What happened was that these are really high quality companies. What's your definition of high quality? They had high returns on tangible assets, which before you guys roll your eyes, We don't care about that anymore. Yeah. It's just a definition of efficiency of how, you know, kind of how much operating profit they do relative to their assets. But what about in the modern economy? Because not a lot of companies have tangible assets like they used to.

Right, right. Well, but that's actually a great definition, right? Because if they can generate those profits and obviously turn that into cash flow, that is a great thing. That means the faster that they grow, the more cash flow that they generate. And that's one of the reasons why, you know, when people will, I'd like to look at, you know, multiples today versus multiples, you know, 40 years ago. I don't know if that's always apples-apples. It's not.

But what about the consistency of the returns of tangible assets or whatever you use? Because any company can have a good couple of quarters or whatever, but what do you look for consistent-wise? Yeah. No, it has to stay there, right? This is, so think about you take an energy company, right? In any kind of given time frame, they could actually have very high returns on capital, you know, because oil prices are really high.

The margins are running really high. They're running utilization on the refiner is really high. So you can look at it in that. What I do is I look at it over a 10 plus year timeframe and look and say, are these returns, you know, consistent all the way through that. It's stable and up to the right slowly. Well, it doesn't actually have to go up always. But to give you an idea, it's Warren Buffett's, you know, kind of a favorite way of looking at the quality of a business. So he and I, I guess I can't speak for him.

But for me, what I would say is that 15% or more is actually a decent business. 20% or more is a good business. 25% is a great business. And then 30% more is an exceptional business. Don't high quality companies, though, become low quality companies. And if they're shoved into the coffee can, what can you really do? You have to bet that it'll become high quality once again. Absolutely.

You're hitting on the most important point from what I learned from the study. These are companies that don't regress toward the main. They don't. They do not. And what happens is that they have such a strong enduring competitive advantage that that's what keeps the returns high over that time frame. It's like anti-disruptors? Yeah.

Yeah. So think about when they actually have something that people can't just, you know, through a bunch of money and, you know, like that they can't go in and kind of turn this over. All right. So let's say, all right. So let's do like real world examples. Let's take a company, Sheenier Energy. I'm not saying it's.

a hundred bagger. I'm not even saying it might fit your conventional definition of high quality. What I will say is nobody in the next 10 years is going to stand up a liquid, a liquid natural gas export terminal on the Gulf. Nobody. Like literally nobody. We know this. So now it's only a question of can they run the business in a high quality enough way, I guess, to generate the profitability. But we know the mode is there. What do you do with a story? Like, what do you do with a story like that? So I think it's actually a great example of one that I would not invest in. Okay. And the reason being, I don't know Schneer very well, but the reason being is that my

gas is that Sheenere's margins are function of what the price of the natural gas is. To some extent, they have to be. Yeah. So what I always kind of look for and I, this is kind of part of the kind of the replacing, making sure that you don't buy the lower quality one. I look for ones that the management has the most control. Pricing power. It's not only pricing power, but actually control over kind of the inputs within that so that they can actually be the ones that can control that. So a lot of commodity stuff gets screened out by that one factor alone.

Yeah. Okay. So one of the things that, you know, and maybe this is a good time to bring it up, it is the slide that I've sent you, so I don't know. Guys, we are looking at chart, a small percent of Outlaw companies. Yeah. One of the first ones. Yeah, 16, I think it is. Yeah, there you go.

What's going on here? So these, I think, are Michael's kind of favorite things. Naraj, this is from the book. This is new. Yeah, oh, this is new. This is new. This is new. So the reason why I actually put this together was that Michael's quoted this a lot.

And I think this is a really important one for your listeners to understand. And for those of you who are listening, can't see the screen, the first part is at two-thirds. And what it is is two-thirds of companies actually underperform the kind of rolling 10-year index numbers that they have. That's a large number. That is a very large number. Let me just the fine point. Over rolling 10-year period, 71% of individual stocks fail to match the market return. 71.

Yes. So like by 10 stocks, the probability is that not for me, but for most people, seven of them will underperform the index. That's a damning. Very much so. This is from Besson Bender's famous study. And I think, I forgot what the exact number was, but he looks at the number of stocks that failed to beat inflation. Right. That's the third column.

Okay. So I'm getting to that. So the second one is, you know, one out of five of the stocks survive and outperform over 20 years. So one out of five. One out of five. Yeah. So let me go to the one. And this is a seminal paper done by Bessambehn, from ASU.

And what he found is, to your point, Michael, when you look at the, you look at the one, at relative to the T-Bills, right, that only 4% of the companies, and this is from 1926 to 2018, and then he redid it in 2022. He found that only 4% of those actually had actually created net wealth, is what he calls. Think about it. We all know the Pareto principle of 80-20. This is 100-80% of the gains will come from 20% of the, right? This one is 100 to 4.

So much worse. Yeah. So much worse. So what I haven't seen a lot of people do is actually go to the last one. And so what I did is I took Bess and Binders numbers. And he had that the top 50 companies from the study that created 50% of the net wealth, I then said, well, how many of those are high quality companies? What I found out is 84% of those were high quality.

Wow. And here's the other side of that is Morgan Stanley and Atlanta Capital then actually did a study that showed that over a 35-year period, high-quality companies outperformed low-quality companies three to one. Now, you guys had Jeremy Gratham on the show the other day. I love the guy. Fantastic. Their firm has actually done a lot of research on high-quality companies. And what they found, did they call it the weirdest efficiency in the market? It shouldn't exist.

Yeah, it shouldn't exist. Right. And so, you know. Say what it is. Say what it is. Yeah. So what it is is that you can actually have higher returns with lower volatility. Makes no sense.

Nothing else in finance works that way. I think it does make sense. Only it's counterintuitive, of course. These companies are so boring that they're underpriced and they're underpriced for perfection. Serially underpriced. Yeah. And what I'd also tell you, I think a lot of it is time. Because they just, they're so boring that people, you know, kind of, you know, just,

You know, don't watch them. Don't, you know, kind of go with those. Oh, they sell nuts and bolts. Let me put 100 grand. Exactly. Nobody wants that. So for the listeners' benefit, this is so important. What Grantham is saying and now what Matt is saying, like, if you buy a one-year

treasury bill, two-year treasury bill, like, you should have very little volatility. Right. And as a result, you should have very little upside. Right. Because risk is rewarded in the markets. And then if you buy a. junk bond, you're taking more fluctuation, therefore you should have a higher total return. It doesn't always work out.

But like, you're at least putting yourself in line to make more money. What Grantham is saying is this makes no sense. These are the highest quality companies. Therefore, you have the least amount of like terminal risk. Like this is a zero. Why is it that these are the best performers too? Right. You should be getting less return.

Right. Per unit of, based on the lack of risk that you're taking there. Finance academia, it makes no sense. Right. Right. And they actually proved this over not just, you know, high quality kind of big cap stock. They looked at small cap stock. They looked at junk bonds.

Every seemingly every single category showed this high quality marketing efficiency. The reason why I'm bringing this up is let's go back to Besson Binders, you know, finding, right? And one of the things that I love is, you know, Charlie Munger's kind of idea of invert, always invert. Right? So if you look at Bess and binders finding, the easy thing to say is, wait, 4% created 100% of the net wealth. Let's do it. Just by those. Just by the 4%? By the 4%. Obviously. But the bigger thing is, how do you start to eliminate that 96%?

That puts you in a much better position to find that 4%. It doesn't guarantee you you're going to find that 4%. But what a lot of people do is that they're constantly looking for, you know, what's working right here right now. And so what they're not doing in my opinion, is that they're not focusing on trying to kind of winnow the entire kind of the universe to the things that in the companies that really want to own. So let's look at what's in that 96%. These are companies that are in declining industries. Go to next chart. These are companies in declining industries. They're over levered. They don't have free cash flow. They're not growing. They don't have. These are all things that you can go through the process. And once you figure that out,

you screen those out. Now, maybe you take that, you know, 96% and you can cut that in half, probably cut it down by two thirds. You dramatically improve the probability that you can now look to find out. So you're saying if you're looking for a needle in the haystack, pull the hayout. Yes, exactly. And actually, you know, go get a better sieve. You could put that as a blurb on the back if you really like it.

I'm not doing it. Rather, I understand, but. I had a chance to, on the next one. Okay. I had a chance to just watch that go through this process. and forgive me, it was a little bit like Rain Man, because he'd be mumbling to himself, he'd put up the screens. I have quality.

He'd have... Am I allowed to do that? That was good. That was good. That was good. But, you know, he would do that, and he would just, I would hear his pen. You'd just be scratching them off, talking to himself, including things like, no, that's dependent on the price of oil.

I don't even want anything in that space. And he would constantly do this, and he'd narrow it down to just a couple, and then his research would begin. Right. After getting rid of... Exactly. Disqualify first. Right.

Yes. Okay. Do you think a lot of investors work that way? No. You don't? No. Despite how, like, as we say it out loud,

despite how obvious it sounds, right. You don't think that there's a lot of people that are managing money this way. And I think it's actually a couple of reasons. One is, you guys know this. The average holding period... You could take that off.

Yeah. The average holding period is $5. and a half months today. Back in the 1950s, 1960s, it used to be eight years. Well, if we're only holding something for five and a half months. They didn't have Robin Hood back then. Yeah. But one of the problems that you have is not only are you not doing all the research up front, but in a five and a half month timeframe, really good businesses don't, you know, get the benefit of that. So you're not seeing that compound. I mean, going back to that slide, that first 10 years, the differentiation between the market and, you know, these really high quality

companies is not particularly large. Some of the most money I've ever made in individual stocks has come from buying, I wouldn't say low quality. I would say high revenue growth pre-earnings. And then eventually when the earnings kick in, that's when the stocks start to work because a new category of institution is willing to take a look. Whereas previously, you're sort of like paddling in front of a wave. If the growth rate is substantial and the revenue is there and you can see management executing its plan, you sort of know you're going to make money or you know the company will get profitable.

You don't know what that will mean for the stock price. Of course, if you did, you'd mortgage your house and buy. But I have 10 examples at the tip of my tongue where that's worked for me. I think what I'm trying to say is that is very far away from what you're attempting to do. but for the listener, this is not the only way to make money in stocks. No. This is a very specific project that you're embarking on, and it requires you to throw situations like that away

because by definition, if you're not profitable, you're not high quality. Yes, but here's what I will tell you. Once it becomes that, if everything that you said before kind of plays out, and it's a high return and you get the growth, you know, now you got the compounding, and these are the ones, if it has an enduring competitive, advantage, I can own that for the long term debt. Right.

So I'm actually, I might be the buyer, you know, from you and you're going out and finding another one. But you are not opposed to coming into a stock after it's three-xed. No, not at all. Because you would not have bought it earlier prior to it becoming a quality compounder. And now it is one. And now it's in your universe. Right.

Okay. Because you and I are taking a different risk. That's right. And so for me, one of the things that I learned, from the study is that you actually these are lower risk stocks you know because they've already proven out their the business model they've proven out the product you know fit they've proven out you know the economics that they have so you it's just kind of a different game that you know the two are playing but what i'll tell you is it's whatever you know kind of get comfortable with and

what your own investment style is right for me given i'm looking to hold things for a long time the last thing i want to do is actually hold you know buy one that you know didn't even have the likelihood of being viable. Matt, I'd be curious what your, I know it doesn't especially matter if you're holding a stock for 30 years where you buy it at the price, right? You hold something for 30 years, then a lot will be forgiven. But last week we were talking about would you be more likely to buy a stock that doubled or that just got cut in half?

And the four of us said, well, doubled, obviously. That means it's working. Is that, are you more likely to buy a stock that has just doubled or doubled again? Or one that's a new position. Right, new position. Or one that's been cut in half and you think the market is wrong. personally I'm more to the one that's been cutting hat. Okay.

Because what I'm, but I can feel comfortable buying both. And the reason why I can have that is I'm not looking at the near term of kind of playing that game. What I'm actually doing is all the research to say, is this a company that I want to own for the next 30 years? That's very different than like somebody who comes in. And I think a lot of people can make good money on this where their, their view is, you know, is this stock going to go up? my view is, is this a company that I want to own for the next 30 years if there is no market? So how important is the current multiple to you? Because if you say it's trading at 40 times or 60 times 40 earnings, like, I don't care.

It's earning $2 today. I think it's going to earn $50 in 2042. Like, how do you think about the earnings trajectory and the current valuation? So you've heard, you know, Charlie Munger's saying, right, that, you know, the return of the stock held for a long enough time frame is going to be matched the return of the business. So this goes back to what we were talking about before with high quality. These are high quality companies that have a high return. So what happens is if I buy those, even if I might pay a little bit too much in the short term, to your point, it covers a lot of sin on the long term.

And I'll just add in Matt's study on the revenue growth that you were talking about, when you follow those companies over time, they have insane growth profiles. I mean, I'm talking about 20% growth year over year, over year, over a year. And that gets harder to do the bigger you become. So I think 20%, I mean, it was 20% growth, 20 years into there. So it was the 20% Kager 20 years after the IPO. You, by definition, you have to become one of the largest stocks in the market if you can do that. Like, those are all going to become blue chips. Yeah. Okay. And that's a whole gut idea and kind of when you buy it. So before we get into the 100 baggers that are in the study and start talking names, I want to come back

to the philosophy and the origin story itself. You worked at a firm called Latif. This is kind of an old line money manager that had this sort of concentrated long-term, low-turn over portfolio mentality. Like, is that where you first adopted some of these ideas that became core to the type of investor that you are? Absolutely. So when I was at Janus, you know, it was great because it was all about really deep, fundamental research. I was on a team when I started there. And got to beat the market this quarter. Yeah, exactly, exactly.

So, you know, they were always kind of, you know, kind of chasing different things. Yeah. Then when I went to Lateef, you know, we actually held 15 to 17 names. That was kind of the, you know, kind of the street spot. Where are you? Geographically. Oh, it was out in California. So it was in Marin County.

What kind of guys were these like hippies or kind of guys are these? These are actually great guys. What I loved about. That's terrible dead. But what I loved about, Lateef, it was a lot of, it was a guy. almost all separately managed accounts. So this is a very important statement. Exactly.

They are not in the mutual fund derby trying to get morning started at a fourth or a fifth star. They're not worried about their ranking this court. I'm sure they want to perform. But because they're not in the mutual fund derby, they can afford to act differently than everyone else who is. That's exactly the point. And one of the things that I actually loved is that we spent a lot of time with the with the fundholders, right?

Because we'd be talking about how, you know, how they're going to pay for their kids' college. You know, what are they going to do with retirement? It's what we do here. Yeah, exactly. And so one of the things that we spend a lot of time on is we would educate them on the stories, on the companies that we actually owned.

And what that allowed us to do is that then when things were down, we just were able to come back to them and say, remember what we talked about with this company. Here's where they're at. Here's how the, you know, kind of how the business is trying to, stock market may not like it today, but this is a business that we're going to want to own the long term story has taken

on a negative connotation in recent years. But I find that investors don't care about the disdain that professionals have for that negative connotation. Investors like stories. And that works out quite from me because I like to tell them. Big story, yeah.

No, but listen, I could recite, here's the earnings, here's the book value, That doesn't mean it. Everybody could recite that. It's right off of a screen. Investors do, when they own individual stocks, they do want to know what they own. You could talk them out of it. You could tell them it's irrelevant.

You could tell them blah, blah, blah, blah, blah. But they still want to know. Okay. So that was a powerful way to keep people in these low turnover portfolios. One of the best ways is by helping them understand what the company does. Especially business owners. Yes. They especially appreciate a portfolio.

manager who's willing to spend a minute and say, here's why we're invested in this. What they really actually appreciated, we actually understood the business so that we could explain it to them. Because ultimately, when things go up and things go down, the most important thing you're going to be able to say is here's why they still are relevant. Here's why they still are important. I think feeling the confidence from the person you're working with and the conviction behind the idea is important.

Absolutely. I had to go up through a big learning curve on this one. And there were times where there are certain stocks that Matt was following. I'm like, but, you know, something happened. And he's like, I still believe. In fact, this is a buying opportunity. You're a story guy. Yeah.

You're a producer. Yes. So you understand the idea of these are the characters. This is how the story starts. And we run into trouble. This is how it resolves. Like you innately understand that. So here you have a source.

who's a Wall Street source. That's right. But he's not in Wall Street. He's in Kansas City, which we'll talk about later. So he's very far from the melee of quarterly, monthly, daily reports on performance. It's Omaha.

And he knows the stories of the companies that he's invested in. He's calm. Yeah. He knows what's going on. He's following the numbers. He's been following it over time. Right. So I think Matt spends more time choosing the stock

than ever thinking about selling it. So one of the 100 beggars is Amazon. And Amazon reported today. And what these companies are able to do is unlike anything we've ever seen at this scale. So Andy Jassy said, we're reporting $181 billion in revenue of 17% you over here.

For the quarter. But you mentioned, Naraj, how hard it is for these big companies to continue to grow. He said, starting with AWS growth, growth continued to accelerate up 20% year over year. The fastest fastest growth rate in 15 quarters. AWS is now a $150 billion annualized revenue run rate business. It's very unusual. This is a quote. It's very unusual for a business to grow this

fast on a base this large. And the last time we saw growth at this clip, AWS was roughly half the size. Unbelievable. Yeah. The classic, is this the classic hundred bagger? founder-led, B-to-B, well, not just B-2B, but. When people say the law of large numbers, they're saying it wrong. It doesn't mean what people think it means. There is this human tendency to think

what goes up must come down, right? We call it the gambler's fallacy. The roulette wheel is red. It's red, it's red, it's red, it's red. It's got to be black next, right? So we have that as part of our DNA. It's the way our minds work. And we're programmed, right?

after winter, there's spring. We just, okay. And then people trot out this trope about the law of large numbers, meaning like, no way it can grow its earnings 20% for much longer.

And then it does, and then it does. They think it means what goes up must come down. Yeah. It is a regression towards a mean. Yeah. Like the base is too big

to sustain a growth rate. And the mode. So the actual definition, I'm so glad you mentioned this, Josh. The law of large numbers states that as the number of independent identically distributed trials increase, their average result approaches the expected value. That's not what we're talking about.

I have no idea what that means, but it's not what we're saying. Well, I'm just talking about if you spin heads or tails, you're not going to get 99 tails in a row. Right. Can we look at slide 25 as I think it hits that right on the head, Matt? So this plays into what we were talking about before. So remember, you know, the one on the left, for those who are just, listening. It is the, you know, the Morgan Stanley Atlantic Capital one, talking about over 35 years how the high quality outperform three to one over the low quality. And on the right, we actually

had the Grantham Mail showing on that. But what you're getting at, Josh, was the key thing that came out of that study is that, so I'm a University of Chicago grad, right? And we were taught, everything regresses towards a mean. You got, you know, efficient market. Pharma. Yeah, Fama. So come from Fama land. Yeah. So that was Fama. On the other side, I actually had Richard Thaler from University of Chicago, too, who behavioral finance. Thaler 1. Yeah.

That chart, the high and low quality stock, the fact that low quality stocks have lower performance and higher annualized volatility, Thaler 1. That should not be a thing. There. I'm in agreement with you. So, but what a lot of it came down to is these were good, remember we've talked about before, these are good companies that came great and they stay great. Yeah. That's why I actually own Google, I own Amazon, you know, and I've owned these for years. because they have, you know, they had these characteristics that you feel very comfortable. When did you buy Amazon? It was probably about seven, eight years ago. Okay.

Amazon was so crazy because it was B to C, founder led to, and then it went B to B. And that was like where the explosive growth came from. Wait a minute. So the stock worked. They lost money every year. The street wanted them to lose money. The street looked at them losing money as validation of Jeff Bezos's overarching worldview, which is a lot of companies have profit margins that we don't think they need to have.

We're going to take the customer. So every time they lost more money, the street said, this guy is amazing. And then the switch flipped with the advent of cloud computing. They just, it was too profitable. They couldn't help but start to report profits. Okay. At that point, you get in. That's nowhere near the end of the run.

That's where the run begins. That's so important for our listeners. who think, how could I buy Nvidia? Right. How could I, right. How could I buy Eli Lilly? This is how you can. Right.

Because companies reinvent themselves. And they keep growing up. So one of the things I think a lot of people missed about Amazon is how much of their revenue they're investing in R&D. You guys remember that. I mean, it was, they were, you know, quote unquote, unprofitable and a lot. But if you looked at it and you took out the, you know, the R&D, which, why would a retail company actually invest in R&D?

What they were doing is they were rebuilding the future revenue. And so, you know, a lot of people... People don't even know. They built their own UPS. That's right. People don't even understand that. Yeah, yeah. I mean, they do now, but at that time.

Right. Right. But that's one of the things I look for in the companies I buy now is these are companies that are putting a lot of money back to work. And, you know, Jeff Bezos talked about it. It's like the numbers who were putting up this quarter were from things we spent three years ago. Yeah.

Five years ago. These were things that we're putting in place. That's a great management team that don't try to go back and, you know, hit a quarter just because, you know, you know, they, and pull back on the R&D for that. They, they are looking at and say five years from now, 10 years from now. They're sitting in the shade of trees that they planted 10 years ago. And you, you had to have believed.

Right. Okay. Can we get into some of the names in your study? Can we do that slide now? Absolutely. Okay. John, put up the 100 baggers included in the, Oh, here we go.

Okay. So for the listener who's not looking at this, looking at this tableau of tickers, Sintas, Adobe, Microsoft, Fastenol, Haiko, Kognix, Nike, Intuit, Cisco, Tractor Supply, Monster. I think Monster's the best stock of all time. I'm pretty sure.

United Healthcare, Oracle, Invidia, expeditors, Landstar, Copart. First observation, with maybe one or two exceptions, this is every sector in the S&P. Okay, I don't see, I don't see real estate.

I don't see oil. It don't see chemicals. Or utilities. But you told me why on the chemicals and the energy. Yep. I don't see, good point. I don't see.

He actually sorts this by sector. Yeah. So if you go, two slides down. These are not stocks to buy today. These are the stocks that are in your study of the best stocks ever, the 100-baggers. And I'm not saying they're not kind of worth buying today. Some of them may be, but, yeah, yeah.

I mean, Warren Buffett actually just went out and bought last year a pool card. So he put it, you know. Bad timing. Yeah, it looks like death. And we don't know if that was Todd Colmes or Warren Buffett. Right. So here is what you're getting at, Josh, right here. So for those listeners who can't see the screen, what it is,

is we broke all the 50 names in the study. We broke it out by the industry. And this might surprise a lot, but technology, which I put is both software and the technology sector, only made up about a third of the total. You actually had a lot in retail. That's interesting.

Yes. And so, you know, you look at like a tractor supply company, which you guys probably know sells directly to farmers in rural markets or, you know, AutoZone, Home Depot, you're like. But then you get into the, manufacturer. You've got, you know, anphenol, HICO, AI. I don't know what half these companies do.

Yeah, exactly. Maybe more than half. Yeah. And most people don't. Yeah. That's one of the big takeaways to what, you know, we're going to talk about here in just a second. We use the term unsexy a lot in the book. Yeah. And it's funny because Matt considers himself personally to be unsexy. Oh, that's not true. He likes to do the research. He does a lot of reading on each of these companies and really gets into them. Do you think we'll get another retail 100 beggar? It seems unlikely given the current makeup of the market that these names don't come public.

And if they do like a retail name, like how would that even happen? These are such like iconic names. I know they had to come from somewhere, but here's what I'll say. I can't predict the future. And so I don't know. And I think about, you know, if there's a new category. There is. And we have them.

They're not in the United States. Zara, what's the parent company, the Spanish, uh, fast fashion, into techs or something? What is it called? Yeah. It's like the biggest fast fat. That's what it's called. It's a Spanish business.

Guys now one of the ten richest people in the world. Yeah. He's selling schmattas. Yeah. It's like literally selling like $10 sweaters. But like the business is completely on. So we're still getting new retail. Like we're still getting new consumer brands.

Yep. It does happen. They keep coming up. So I think the next side looks at them by five year increments. So if you think, I think they all happened? Oh, this is great. Yeah, go to the slide.

Explain this. He's something else. But they didn't all just come out in 1985. Right, right. So if you could go back to slide five. There we go. So here's how I went through and I broke it out. Because the same question you guys are having.

It was all, you know, first off, we looked at it, you know, they're all in the same industry where we're at. Then I actually looked at and said, by five-year increment. So to make sure your viewers understand, so I looked at all companies that went public from 1980 to 2000. The reason why I had to go there is before 1980, there just wasn't very good financial information and not easily being able to take it. Why just stop there at 2000? Because when looking at a 30 year, I wanted to give the companies plenty of time. You need more hindsight.

Yes, exactly. And so we looked at that and said, all right, we had this first. So I broke it down by five years from 1980, 1984. By the way, look at the class of 1980 to 84. Home Depot, Apple, Nike, United Health, Amgen, all in one graduating class. That's pretty epic. It's a great cohort. But then look at the others.

So I go the end of the 80s, right? Now you have companies like Oracle, Microsoft and Adobe. These are ones people have heard of, but look at it like a Jack Henry. You know, that's just the back office software for banks or auto desk, that is the architectural engineering. Electronic arts. Yeah. Then you get into the early 90s, 1994, and you have names like Starbucks, AutoZone, Old Dominion Freight Lines, which is the, you know, trucking company that's at last mile. You then into late 90s and you're looking at, you know, Pool Corp, Amazon, Cognizant, Nvidia.

And one of my favorites, unfortunately, in the book we talk about this, Metler Toledo, right? They make precision scales, you know, like in the laboratory. These are the ones that can get to the, you know, finest of, you know, precision. But they also make the same scales that when a truck pulls off on the highway, they have to weigh them. They do that. It's a hundred beggar. I had met with them on their IPO. Love the company.

Love the management team. You know, stock went up about 30% in the first, like, four months. We sold it. Never got back in. The other interesting thing here is when I was interviewing him about all of these and he's trying to identify future hunter beggars, I said, well, what about some of these companies? They're still growing.

He's like, yeah, you know, I won't say which company, but he said, that's only another 30 or 40 bagger. That's it. I'll take that one. You know, I notice a lot of these companies start with a letter B. Is it that easy? Is it just that simple? Good question.

I'll have to do a little more research. Matt, do you think if the average person, like, listen, I like this guy's style, this all makes sense to me, analyze the business, invest in things that you think probably aren't going to radically change like nuts and bolts. I'm going to try this. Do you say to them, whoa, whoa, whoa, stop the clock? Or do you say, yeah, you could do it too? So let me answer into kind of two parts, right?

I think the first part is can they do it? And I think it's people like you guys helping educate, helping them learn about. companies helping them do that. I think people can do the research. They can do it. It takes a lot of work. The second part of the question is the bigger one. Should they do this? And the reason why I say should is what we were talking about before. It's the upfront of the psychology of that. Can they withstand the volatility? Can they actually have the intestinal fortitude to say, this is that great company? I know this. Let's double click on that. Let's double click on that. then. This would be a good time. A lot of the stocks that you talk about are as we speak,

being thought of on Wall Street as literally marked for death by Anthropic and Gemini and Chachypt. We're talking about both horizontal SaaS, you know, like enterprise software companies that serve companies in every industry. And what they do is a very critical layer to help manage these companies and people think, well, these new tools are coming along that are going to enable anybody to build their own. Okay, that might be true, it might not. Maybe in some cases, okay. Then the vertical software companies is a company called Constellation that owns, I don't know, a thousand tiny software companies that are specific to all these little niches like travel agency software.

And, you know, I make the software that goes into the drive-through window for fast food companies and anything you could think of. That's under siege. Then you've got Microsoft having the answer for itself. And Adobe, Fortune 100 software companies, Salesforce, which is in the Dow. So we're in that moment. And up until the last six months, these SaaS software companies look. as though they were the highest quality, highest profit margin, best growth stories anywhere on

the planet. Customers were sticky. They made a ton of money. It was very clear that they were a system of record for these businesses and they almost were impervious to competition once they got in, right? And all of a sudden, that story that we were all great with for 15, 20 years just was turned on its head. So what do you do as the coffee can investor

if you've got these types of names in your coffee can? Do you pull them out? And you do? Or how do you know? And you do? So tell us. So the first thing I think is always fair is that when the market does a radical kind of down move. A re-rate

lower for a whole sector. Yeah. The first thing you have to do is be honest with yourself, intellectually honest, and look at it and say, is this real? Check your priors, they call it. You never want to put yourself in a position that you're not open-minded and understanding where things are. The second thing that you have to do is then go back to the numbers, go back to the thesis, and really kind of double-click on that and understand that a lot better. So let's talk about the SaaS companies, right?

What's fascinating to me when we look at this, and maybe it's because, you know, market right now holds things for five and a half months. but they hear a narrative. And the first thing they do is if it sounds plausible, must be. So what am I going to do? I'm going to just kind of throw in the towel. Sell first, ask questions later. Yeah, they're shooting right now and they're certainly not asking many questions. One question I don't hear them asking a lot yet, what did the customers think?

Right? I mean, we talk a lot about, oh, you can kind of build this and it's 10% of the cost to actually develop software. Well, let's actually put this into what I like to term kind of low consequence versus high consequence. So the low consequence is we go out and we use the software. If it is close enough, you know, we're okay with that. Think about like marketing technology or me building a, you know, website. And I'm not making comments on any specific company. But that, you know, if I'm off a little bit, you know, I can go back.

I can fix it. No harm, no foul, right? Well, those, you know, there's, there's a reason. chance that, you know, somebody could come in and, you know, offer a much lower price, and they had that. Right. But let's talk about high consequence, right? Cybersecurity.

Yeah, cybersecurity is definitely what. I don't know that. Yeah. Right. Yeah. Can't get little things wrong in certain arenas. Right. So if you guys indulge me for just a minute here.

Yeah. So take a company, you know, one of the companies in the book that we own, technology one, right? Here they are, you take, assume that, or imagine that you're the CEO of the Brisbane, you know, local council, the largest local government in Australia. You have 470,000 property owners there. You have to actually get, by August 15th, you actually have to get each one of them your tax assessment. There's 186 different categorizations of those taxes. It's things like owner occupied. It is, you know, short-term rental, it is industrial, it's, you know, on and on, right? And then you get into levies on, you know, kind of, they have a Queensland Reserve

levy that they have to kind of put on that. These things change every single year. In addition to that, their subdivisions are going up, so you get another 1,500 more every single month coming on. You have to actually get these accurate and correct at that time. Otherwise, say you're off by 1%. that's $14 million of miscollected funds that you've already spent the money on. Not to mention the phone's lighting up. Exactly. God forbid you make an error against the homeowners. Oh, and this is the big one, right?

They actually can take you to the tribunal, right? They can take you to court. But here's the one that nobody probably understands. You as a CEO, you're actually personally accountable. That's high consequence. us. Yeah. That's what in their business, they are actually highly regulated, highly compliant. I mean, they're not worried about saving 20 percent, 30 percent. This is a software provider to a municipality that you're describing. That's the versus. Yeah. And so think about from what they have. So they're in there

and they're actually, you know, kind of developing this, making sure you don't go to court. You aren't personally. That's why I said nobody's talking to them, you know, kind of the user. They're not hearing that side of the story. They're also with universities. Same thing, right? So they are very niche player. They're in local councils. They're in universities and like.

But here's the next one. So we got, is on the cost side. One of the councils that they have, they're paying less for the technology one than what they pay for Microsoft office suite for their, kind of for their council. Yet technology one is what they run their entire business on. You have to pay, you know, you have your residents actually have to pay taxes or they have to go get a dog permit. It goes through Technology One. But here's the reason why I really, you know, kind of love technology one because this is the other side of the story.

Everybody's concerned about what, you know, the downside is. Let's look at the opportunity. One of the things that they've done, they've been doing AI now for six to seven years. They just actually went out and launched about six months ago. it's called Plus. It's their AI. Well, what they've done is they've actually gone through because of the system of record,

they actually own, you know, kind of the workflows that they have. They have access to all the data. They just, you know, here they have all these local councils, universities. They actually created the AI for the orchestration layer. What they're able to do there is now for these, take the university.

Let's say that you're the CFO and you're trying to figure out, you know, that I need to actually go in and figure out the profitability by degree program, by, you know, student or whatever it might be. Well, today, you know, or before, what they would have to do is they'd have to go get a junior analyst, pull all the stuff together and, you know, put it together. It was all coming through technology once. Now technology one's doing that for them. Okay. So the, so the university, they actually have an opportunity to not actually have as much labor. So this is a software company made itself even more sticky. Right. Software is labor. But let me take it one.

one step further. What they've actually also come out with is they've actually gone B to B, now they're going B to B to C. So think about who their, you know, customers, customers are. They're the residents. They are the, you know, kind of these students. They've gone out there and said, all right, say you're a student, and it is 4 o'clock on a, you know, Thursday night, and you're sitting there, you have a paper due tomorrow. What they've actually done has gone in through an app. They can actually just sit and talk and do and say, hey, I've got a paper due tomorrow. I can't get it done. What do I do? They've set it up so that they go through and look at all the curriculum, look at all this stuff, and they actually find out, oh, the paper that you're talking about

is just the volcanoes that are due tomorrow? Well, we found out that you actually get one late, you know, assignment per semester. When do you think you're going to be able to get your paper done? It'll be, I can get it done in five days. Fantastic. Let me actually, send an email off to your, you know, professor, let them know that you're going to be, you know, you get it in by next Friday. Right. Okay, can I add one thing on this? Yes.

What I love about it is, you know, as someone who's operated businesses, there were times where we were looking at sales force and all of these big sort of ERP systems. No one ever tells you you have to hire a whole bunch of consultants to put this thing in. Oh, I know. And it takes six months a year to get it done. One of the things that I discovered through math's research on all of this is because you're dealing with universities and because you're dealing with local governments, it's just a, it's just a simple platform. There is no installation. You automatically use it. So one of the key things that is a common theme throughout the book is Matt's looking for companies that have essentiality. And the idea that

these people need to use this in order to operate, I can do it at the cost that he's talking about, Whereas de minimis, those are part of the ingredients that he's looking for for the stocks. So to button this up and to finish out what Michael's getting at, let's say there's 150 of these SaaS companies trading the United States. Some of these went from being the biggest winners of the market to this year being the biggest dogs. Broadly speaking, how wrong would you say the market is? Is the market completely 180 in the wrong direction and they don't get it? or will there be genuine winners and losers where before all of these companies look like winners? What do you think?

The way that I'd describe it, I think AI is transformational. I use AI every day. I think it's going to keep getting better and we're going to go forward. However. However, it is again back to this, you know, it's going to, it has to become more discerning because you're going to see companies that have, you know, tremendous network effects that, you know, no AI, you know, native software company is going to do. I used to run my own software as a service, you know, business.

I know how hard it is to compete against, you know, an incumbent. Yeah. In fact, for the incumbents, I mean, they have their own, you know, kind of way of actually looking at it. So if it's already deeply embedded into the workflows, they already have that trust. And again, going back to the customer, what do you really care about? So you guys are probably going to get a, you know, kick out of there. So remember being at Janus, I was there at the, you know, kind of, we're the epist

of the new economy versus the old economy. Yes. Right? Between 99, 2000 era. You guys were the center of the whole thing. We were the center, right? And at the kind of the biggest baseline was in retail, right? That's what was going to get disrupted by the internet.

Ecom. Yeah. So just for giggles, last week I went and looked and said, what are the largest e-commerce, you know, websites out there today? Bye, bye. Yeah. Walmart.com at Target.com. No, no, so the top 20.

How many would you say is new economy versus old economy? Oh. Probably two or three new economy and the rest. Old line retailers that created their own websites? Close. There's only five. Five new economy, 15 old economy. What are the new economy, Chewy Amazon?

So it's Chewy, Amazon, Etsy, eBay, and Wayfair. And everything else is a chain of stores. that got their shit together eventually. It's Walmart. It's Home Depot. It is Best Buy. I mean, I was blown away by that because, you know, going back that time, that's what we thought.

So I'm not saying that's necessarily going to be the same thing going forward. But I think too often the market is very quick to say, this is cool, this is neat, this is going to take over. And then these forget that there's execution. So I have another category of where I think people are wrong on this. I think there are some verticals where the average, willingness to adopt new technology is so low that once you get the workers in that world to do it once, ain't no way you get them do it twice.

I own two software stocks that I'm underwater, 30, 40 percent, both of them. I can't imagine a scenario where these companies get disrupted. One is called toast. Restaurants. They already vanquished, they already vanquished the bigger competitor, which is block square. And FISA serve, which owns Clover.

Toast won. They have 150,000 restaurant locations in a universe of 600,000. They're going to get them all. And now they're getting hotel chains like Marriott. Every point of sale in a Marriott is toast. I think they won. They're going overseas.

I think they'll win there too. And the reason that's important is that every hospitality worker now knows how to use toast. And the next job they get, thank God there's toast to you. I know how to immediately slot in. The stock is cut in half from a tie.

I know for a fact, once you convince a guy that owns a diner to adopt this, he ain't never taken it out. He's definitely not replacing it with something harder to do. So that's one. The other service titan, which came public a little bit over a year ago. You won't like it. They're losing money. this is basically contractors, construction,

people that will dig a swimming pool, people that will put up a fence, alarm companies, exterminators, home services. They literally show up to your house holding the device and they'll print you out a bill right there or they'll do the invoice right there on the thing that they're holding. Once you have people that are in that world that adopt the technology,

they're not like, oh, how quick can we get rid of this? and do something different. So I don't, so I understand why the stocks are lower because people are saying the LTV calculations are going to be lower, right? Like the value of this customer is not going to be what we thought. And I say bullshit. These would be the same companies that have this market share. They might even have more market share three years from now.

Wall Street doesn't care what I think. And you must have that same feeling. Wall Street doesn't care what you think. No. Could you pull up slide 28? Don't tell me a long toast. I'm not long toast. But I will, I have looked at service site.

And one of the things I actually love about that story is the founders. They're still there. Yeah, they're still there. Two brothers, the sons of an immigrant. Yep. And they know the industry well. They came from the industry. That's exactly right.

Yeah. That's one of the key things that I try to look at. So I think this actually tells a bigger story of what's going on in the software stops. I do think the fear of AI is real. And I think not all AI companies, I'm sorry, software companies are going to survive. But look at what's kind of happened to the multiple. So they were too expensive to begin with. Yes, exactly right.

So this is from the guys at Meritech who put out some phenomenal research. But if you look, what they did is they break it down by 25th percentile, 50th percentile, 75th percentile, and then the 90th. And so what they're showing here is, A lot of the companies, the software companies, came public back in the 20, 21 era where the business was just on fire. And they had, you know, and the market was more than happy. And investors didn't care. They would pay any price for any stop.

Right. For a moment. Because they were high growth. And it was COVID. Yeah. Right. Exactly. And so this, I think, is actually one of the big stories in the market here is that we've not only have this big fear that's going on, but you played right in when the multivists were hot.

So I have two questions for you. as we get to talking about the book and why you're even doing something in the first place. So you're doing something incredible for your three daughters. You're putting $5 million into a metaphorical coffee can. The idea was, I'm going to do $2,000,

$250,000 investments into stocks and we're going to put it away forever. You've done 13, at least as of the writing of the book. Unfortunately, eight of them, at least according to Claude, ironically, but seriously, or software stocks. So my two-parters is... You want to do over.

My two part of us. If you knew that Claude and Anthropic were going to be a thing in 2017 or whenever you sort of started to buy these stocks, would you still only, would you still have decided by these names in part two is how permanent is this portfolio really? Like, because some of the businesses are disrupted. Are you going to say, all right, this is obviously not going to happen. I'm just going to take whatever I have left, whether it's $40,000 of the $250,

or whatever the number is, and we're going to reallocate those resources elsewhere. And of course, I want to hear about the kids. Yeah. So the first, to your question, where I've set it up is that the barrier to entry to get into the coffee can is high, very high. I, you know, go through all the different steps. The barrier for me to sell it is even higher. Wow. And the reason why I do that is the whole thing that we've talked about in the past is that, yeah, because you have that psychological, I'm not going to let the market tell me how to think. I have to, let, to better understand what is going on with the companies. Now, with that said, it does not mean I won't, you know, these are not, I'm not looking at this and literally bearing it in my backyard and not looking at them. What I'm actually doing is saying, I'm going to hold myself to a very, you know, kind of tight, high standard to make sure that I don't, you know.

There are false narratives all the time. Last summer, myself included, many people thought Google was in big trouble because AI would cannibalize search. Google knew they were in trouble, and they responded. And they fixed their own future. Stop getting a new all-time hide today. It's not impossible that some of these almost on the verge of being disrupted SaaS companies do the same thing. So here's a question I always ask.

If we loved the management before, and we thought they were brilliant and they ran the company, why do we think they all of a sudden got stupid? Right. That's a great point. So what a lot of people don't understand is that a lot of these have already been doing AI. One of the companies in their CCC intelligence solutions, they've been using AI for 11, 12 years now. In fact, they were one of the first users of the Nvidia chip. So, you know, it's not like they don't know what AI is.

And it's not like they're not actually building that into their business. So, you know, so that's what I kind of keep coming back to is where you have to be careful is that, one, do you have an industry that, is going to be easily disrupted. You talked about like the horizontal that kind of is all things are all people. The value add doesn't run particularly deep in there. Yeah. But this is, yeah, this is, I can't make a comment.

But this is one of those where, you know, this is competition. They faced this before, right? When we move from, you know, the on-prem to the cloud, there was those transitions that they had to go through. I think you have high-mode companies, low-mode companies. That's right. You have industry-specific dynamic.

Right. Yep. Michael and I, Michael and I looked at the, when they finally got around to selling Crowdstrike in Palo Alto, we looked at each other and started laughing and we said, okay, this is a joke. And Schwab? When Schwab felt 10% on this is, this is literally a joke. So you're going to take a quarter, what are the numbers of the coffee can endeavor? What are we doing? So first and foremost, what I did this for is my three daughters. And so my wife and I, you know, I came together and we said, look, how do we leave a legacy for our girls? How do we, you know, how do we leave something that matters? And so this is where, you know, Nierge and I have talked a lot about is we want our kids to actually have true financial literacy. You know, in my opinion, it's an abominable that we don't teach financial literacy in high school. And so one of the things that we do with our kids all the time is talk to them about. about, you know, how to think about not just getting a career, but actually building out your

portfolio and how to think about investing, going into kind of the, you know, kind of the two forms of income that you can have. So that was where we were doing. And so then as we talked through it, it is like, well, what would be, you know, kind of, you know, how do we say that best? And that's when we're talking about writing a book is explaining my process, explaining how that kind of goes through. Now, as you guys said before, everybody has to have their, kind of have their own. I always like to say, you know, outside of your spouse and your, you know, your kids, there's no more personal relationship people have than what money. So what you need to do is kind of figure out what is the right kind of direction for you and how you can kind of go forward with that. So we, that's why we put this together.

But it is, you know, 20 stocks, $250,000 per stock. and the goal is over 30 years. So you put it in $5 million into 20 stocks. Right, right. Okay. And so the goal is, you know, it should be right around there. Each kid have their own coffee can or this is the coffee can for everyone. Okay.

I don't know if this is actually a coffee can. If you wanted to put $250,000 in there you could. But you wrote about this in the book, about the story of how you sat your girls down. And that must have been quite emotional for you. Your wife, you and your wife did not come from money. No. So you obviously did incredibly well financially for you and for your family. Yeah.

And the girl. I'm sure you grew up fine, but they weren't driving the nicest cars and wearing the nicest clothes. Like, you grew up them up in a very normal. You live below your means. Right. So this must have been like... He's not from Long Island. No, definitely not.

Okay. So this must have been like a... In fact, the car, he won't buy a new car. Yeah. He won't buy it. Just dip into the coffee can get a new car. Yeah. His daughter's car has dense on both sides, a hole on the passenger seat and a magnetic bandaid on

either side of the car. Morgan, you did that? You could do better. You did that? Yeah. All right. Yeah. They call it Wilbur.

Andy. But that must have been, that must have been an emotional shock to their system to see those kind of numbers. It was. And to be honest, we were terrified, you know, as parents to tell our kids. And it, what were you afraid of that they would start acting different or start asking for things? Exactly. Exactly. I mean, I grew up in an era that, you know, I had no idea how my parents were doing. And they didn't share, you know, with us. It's very different now. Yeah, we never had, you know, kind of, you know, once for deeds. But we, I never had. I never. knew kind of what my dad, you know, kind of where he stood or how we did versus neighbors and all that. So when we told them, our biggest fear was that, oh, you know, now I'm going to act different.

I'm going to do this. And, you know, I've got a poem. Yeah, hey, money bags. I want to go to Taylor Swift this weekend. That's right. That's right. I mean, one of my favorite poems is Max Aramund's Deserterada. And I don't know if you've ever read that. But he has a line in there and say, do not compare yourself to others because you'll either become vain or bitter. And that's- I like a comparison as the thief of joy. Exactly.

Exactly. And so when we told them, we didn't know what to expect, right? And here was the greatest gift, I think, that we got. And we talk about that in the book, is that my girls, from my side, you know, first they're like, how much? You know, kind of, and one was asking how much we're going to put in. The other was asking kind of where it could go if we did that. But the first thing that they started talking about is if this works, how can we help other people. What can we do? And then they ask you how can we help you with your research? How can we

be part of this? Because what you're talking about is an extraordinary proposition. You've done all this research into 100 bagger stocks and you're literally aiming to land on the moon. You're saying, I'm going to take $5 million invested in companies that I've researched. And by the time we're taking the money out of it for you, it could, we don't know. We don't know. We're whole. We're hoping it can approach half a billion dollars. I mean, it's an incredible thing. Right. And to be fair, you know, to make sure all your listeners understand this, I don't know

if it's going to get there. No, of course. Nobody knows. But nobody thinks this way. Right. People, you ask people on the street, go out, we're in Bryant Park, right? Norah, you ask somebody, why are you investing? I don't make more money.

Yeah. Right? Does I have more money? More money for what? Look, I think for both of us, this project was really important because we were doing this for our kids. Yeah. It's kind of like, you know, when I took a golf lesson when I turned 50, it was stupid. I had to unlearn all of these bad habits forever.

We wanted the kids to understand how to invest in companies and not be a traitor. Okay. Right? And, you know, the five and a half month whole time for stock and declining is terrible. Yeah. The average American retirement is between $300,000 and $400,000. Right. Good luck.

And so the idea of being able to start early for your own retirement, and in our case, to do something for our kids, was incredible. And not only did they have a hard time understanding $5 million, half a billion is beyond their comprehension. And not once ever, have they ever thought about the term inheritance. they just want to do things on their own and they want our love along the way. Let's test this. Morgan, can you come around this side? All right. Let's see. I hear you're, I hear you're a smart cookie. What do you think? Okay. She doesn't need the headphones.

She doesn't need the headphones. All right. You don't go anyway. I need you. I need you after. Yeah, just stay right there. Okay. How do you feel you're going to be an heiress someday? What do you think? Do you like it? Don't be, don't be nervous. We won't. We won't. won't keep you here that long. It's definitely a shock. Okay. I mean, it's exciting. I hope I don't become one any time soon. You don't want to be Paris Hilton anytime soon? No, definitely no. Here's I want to ask you. So how, when you heard about this, had you thought about stocks at all before the markets? It's your dad's life's work, but had you given a lot of thought to just what he does all day and what he's working on? Yeah, he's walked us through his process a lot of times before because his big

was we should always have a second income in case anything happens. You get fired, you know, taxes, all this stuff. It's always important to have a second form of income. And so him being so passionate and brilliant on this subject, he wanted to get us started on it young. And so we actually have a few stocks that were invested in. And we started at a very young, like he got us into this at a very young age before we could even fully comprehend.

Are you and your sisters now passionately tracking the ticker symbols of these stocks? Because I know that that's antithetical to the approach of holding for 30 years, but you must be curious how things are going. Yeah, have you tried. That's a lot of fun. That's why I've heard. That's what I've heard. I got to give her some kudos. money over to her. Okay, good idea. No, it's been, it's been great. Just at the very beginning,

he's gotten us involved, and it's wonderful to have such brilliant parents who understand business. Oh, look at that. Look at that. You can't hear, but the crowd is going wild right now. Okay. And he's taught us financial literacy, because truly that is not something that is taught at schools, and you have to learn it on your own. And so I'm so... You're in college? Yes. Okay.

University of Wisconsin? Yes. Okay. How do you like it? I love it then. All right. You're going to go into nursing? Yes.

I'm in the nursing school. Congratulations. Thank you. We're rooting for the portfolio for you and your sisters. All right. You could have a seat. Okay. Morgan, you're off the hot seat.

Awesome. Thank you. It's so great talking to you. Thanks for coming on the show. Well done. Round for Morgan. Yay. All right.

Not easy to do. All right. And you got two more of those? I got two more. All right. Good for you. Congratulations. Very lucky.

But now, but now their potential boyfriends are going to know. Yeah. It's going to attract some unscrupulous suitors. I thought you're going to just keep them from having books. Suiters. What century are we in? All right.

Guys, I want to tell everybody, I want to tell everybody, first of all, the book is for sale as of came out in April. Mm-hmm. Okay. What's the feedback been so far? People are into it? Like, people are excited.

Yeah. Okay. I think a lot of people have really liked the idea. They kind of look at it as a cross between rich dad and poor dad. Yeah. And Jim Collins is good to great. Based on his research and family relationship. Okay. And they love that it's a narrative as opposed to just a how to. You know what? That's a great point. There's enough books about how to invest. There's not enough books that marry that with a great story and a personal connection between the person writing. It was an investing adventure. tracking him through this. I love it. And people will come away from this, not just with your story, but with like, if you were to begin to search for 100 baggers, this is how you would go about it. So there is a how to invest component to it wrapped in that story. It's not a what to think. It's a how to think.

Yeah, I love it. Okay. I love it. And one other thing I'd add on that, too, is that this isn't just for 100 bagers. I mean, this is literally looking for high quality companies. You know, you can do that. The 100 beggars one is where kind of where you might be a starting point. You know, I go kind of smaller companies, but you can use this at any level.

That quality paradigm is important across the entire spectrum. Do you guys have fun on the show today? Loved it. All right. Are you ready for hour two or should we leave it there? All right. Guys, this has been amazing. And we've learned a lot.

And now we're rooting for the portfolio. And we encourage everybody to go ahead and check out this book. I want to let people know in addition to the book Where else will you guys I mean I know there's a media push And you guys are going to be doing a lot of stuff Like what's your what's your ultimate goal Like how big do you want this story to get

Or like could this be an Oprah thing at some point? Look I think there's a lot of different forms That this can take place And different outlets to share the education You're a media guy, you have connections I'm a media guy And in fact, you know, I would say to you What I really am trying to do with this

is to create a series of investing adventures. So I'm actually almost done with another book right now where I've been following a billionaire who's a real estate investor and how they built everything from the S&L crisis to the GFC to today. Okay. And so I don't think we get inside the minds of these investors

as much as we should. And not only to follow the story arc in which they're making a giant bet now, in this case, $5 million. So it takes a lot of conviction and fortitude, and I respect what you guys do. Oh, thank you. Thank you. Thank you.

Thank you. And I think you're some of the best storytellers in the business and use business. Thank you so much. Niraj Kamlani, ladies and gentlemen, Matt Ancrim, guys, thank you so much for being part of the show. Thank you. I really enjoy this. And we will follow your career with great interest. All right.

All right, guys. Thank you. Thanks for all the listeners. Thanks to the viewers. Like and subscribe. We'll see you soon. That was great.