The Current - Is this the beginning of the end of the war in Gaza?

Episode Date: October 6, 2025

Hamas and Israel have agreed to some parts of the 20-point US peace plan and talks continue today in Egypt. We talk to Janice Stein, the founding director of the Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, and Zaha Hassan, human rights lawyer and a Senior Fellow in the Middle East program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace about what this peace plan means for the region — and what happens next.

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Join us political nerds on Wednesdays in the House feed wherever you get your podcasts. Party with nerds. Sounds amazing. This is a CBC podcast. Hello, I'm Matt Galloway, and this is the current podcast. This week, that is when U.S. President Donald Trump says the world can expect results on the first phase of his administration's proposed ceasefire deal in the Middle East. Delegations from Hamas, Israel, and the United States are meeting today in Cairo. Hamas and Israel have agreed to some parts of a 20-point U.S. peace plan, which would include a release of all the hostages

held in Gaza. So far, Israeli strikes in Gaza have continued, despite Trump ordering them to stop. Janice Stein is the founding director of the Monk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy. Janice, good morning. Good morning, Matt. Is this the beginning of the end of this war? It's the beginning of the first phase, Matt. I'm reasonably optimistic about that, which involves the exchange of hostages for prisoners. There is a second, much tougher phase coming.

What gives you the reasonable optimism that this, after two years and a number of what appeared to be false starts towards a ceasefire, that this is the moment? There is, I think, something in this for everyone and layered on top of it is intense pressure by Donald Trump and by a coalition of Arab states. They've worked together to put pressure on Hamas and on Nizania who, that's making the difference matter. Let's talk about what is in this. This is a 20-point plan proposed by the president. What to you in that plan stands out? Well, I think it is really important to break it into the ceasefire part of this, which will only come if there is exchange of hostages for what Hamas calls life-serving prisoners,

prisoners who have been in jail for life in Israel because they have been convicted of murder over several years. That's the key. There are some sticky issues on that one. For example, Marwan Barguti, a Palestinian prisoner who's been sentenced to five life sentences commands enormous respect on the street, whether Israel has always refused to let him go, whether he's on the list this time to be released or not, that could be one potential sticking point. But just to put this in context for a moment, Matt, Simar, who began this with the attacks on October the 7th, did it in part because he had promised his brothers in jail that he, when he could, he would secure their release. So we're back almost at the beginning. We haven't heard a response from Hamas on

the demand that it disarms. How likely do you think it would be that Hamas would agree to give up its weapons at this point in this war? So that's part of the second face, which is much more complicated. And you're right, Hamas has not said anything. But it has, there was an official of Hamas just two days ago who distinguished between what he called offensive weapons and defensive weapons. Now, what does that mean? There could. be, you know, artillery rounds, that sort of thing, missile launchers. Those could be given up. I think what he was talking about there were, you know, guns that you holster, defensive weapons. So this is going to be every single bit of this, Matt, is going to be argued over.

As you mentioned, one of the reasons why this is happening now is because of unrelenting, your words, unrelenting pressure by Donald Trump, but by others as well. Let's talk about the pressure. Donald Trump has applied to Benjamin Netanyahu. Netanyahu this weekend took credit for this deal. Donald Trump says that essentially he strong-armed him into it. He did, you believe. Oh, yeah. There's no question about it.

He did in every way. I think most of our listeners probably saw that video where he forced the Prime Minister of Israel to apologize to the Prime Minister of Qatar again and again. And he said, this is the way it is. You have one day to get this done. There is a subservience now, an inability of Netanyahu to stand up to Donald Trump, in part because he put a risk and accumulated the president in Qatar.

Is that why Donald Trump has turned the screws now? There have been calls from people over the course of the last couple of years. for the U.S. administration, which holds enormous sway because it provides many of the weapons for Israel to apply pressure to get the Israelis to back off. And that has not happened, but you believe that it happened now because the United States was humiliated by that attack on Qatar? I think that was the final straw. There was growing pressure, but there's no question that Donald Trump was personally embarrassed. And as we all know, there are extensive business relations. between his son and the Qataris, and it was the straw that broke the camel's back.

Where does it leave Benjamin Netanyahu? He has members of his coalition who have demanded that he continue this war, that he go through with his idea of total victory and have threatened to bring his government down if he backs off of that at all. Where does this leave Netanyahu, do you think? Well, that's been a big source of Netanyahu's refusal to agree to some of these terms. over a year. It's very likely that this coalition will break up, but that assumes that we're going to get to the political, to these harder political decisions in the second phase very quickly. I think that's going to be a slower process, but when they do get to them, this coalition will break up. But other parties, center and central left parties in Israel have already committed to

provide the political backing that Netanyahu needs in order to get this deal done. You said there was also pressure by many of the states in the region. We saw this Egypt supporting this proposed deal, among many other groups. Where does that leave the Palestinians? Well, let's distinguish Matt for just one second between Hamas and the Palestinians. The pressure is unprecedented. You mentioned Egypt. That's not new.

It's Pakistan. It's Indonesia, it's Turkey, it's everybody across the region. Those who are not, members of the region who are not Arab have joined. And this begins actually with the discussions that, for instance, Saudi Arabia shared, in which they said to Hamas, you must disarm, you must leave Gaza, and you cannot be part of the future governance. of Palestine. So the toughest position thus far, with respect to Hamas, has come from Arab governments and beyond in the Middle East. And you're very right to distinguish between

Hamas and Palestinians. But for those in Gaza who have been through this ringer for the last two years, where does this proposed deal such as it is leave them? Well, if we look at whatever opinion polling there is, and there is some from what's called the Arab Barometer, Helsinki's inside Gaza have one overwhelming demand right now, Matt, stop the war, stop the fighting. They are overwhelmingly demanding a ceasefire. Secondly, their attitudes toward Hamas. Oh, you know, the numbers don't mean anything here because the conditions are so terrible. But there is a lot of anger at Hamas.

There is overwhelming anger at Israel, but there is a lot of anger at Hamas for what Hamas has exposed Palestinians in Gaza to, and for how long Hamas has been dug in. Canada, alongside many other countries, now recognize Palestinian statehood. This 20-point peace plan does not include that. Do you believe coming out of this, and again, there are many phases to this proposal, but is Palestinian statehood something that is likely to come out of this process, do you think? Matt, it depends on the time frame. It's clear that it is not going to happen in the next several months. There is going to be a process. And here's where I hope that the countries that recognize the Palestinian states

will commit the resources, the state-building activities are going to have to take place. You know, the reconstruction demands and gas and the needs are enormous. but there's going to be, I think, a longer period. The plan you're right provides that very best some gesturing toward a Palestinian state, a political pathway, but it is down the road. And I think there's no question. That's a disappointment to many Palestinians. Tomorrow is the 7th of October.

I don't know that in the last couple of years, people have used that word optimism or even cautious optimism very often. But you do with intention, but also in a very measured way. Yes, I'm optimistic that there is a greater chance of a longer lasting, a long-lasting ceasefire now than there has been for the last two years. The pessimism is really public is pessimistic. The Palestinian public is pessimistic. They've been through too much. They've seen too much.

but I think the ones have had the veto over this up till now, which has been Hamas and Nizanahu, their backs are to the wall now, Matt, and that's why I am cautiously optimistic. Janice, it's good to speak with you as always. Thank you very much. You're so welcome. Janice Stein is the founding director of the Monk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy.

She was in Toronto. What kind of person takes on the law? Can they ever really know what they're getting into? A really tough-looking guy. came up to us and said, are you part of this gay case? My family started getting death threats. I wasn't able to go outside alone anymore. I'm Phelan Johnson, host of See You in Court,

a new podcast about the cases that changed Canada and the ordinary people who made history. This is David and Goliath we have here. Find and follow C.U. in court wherever you get your podcasts. Zaha Hassan is a human rights lawyer, senior fellow in the Middle East program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Zaha Hassan, good morning to you. Good morning.

Let me ask you the same question that I asked Janice Stein. Is this the beginning of the end of this war, do you think? I agree with Janice that there is reason to be optimistic in this moment, that there could, in fact, be a ceasefire. Whether it turns out to be a permanent ceasefire or a long-term ceasefire, I think, remains to be seen. You know, this moment is different than the other moments. I think, you know, in building up to this point, we saw, you know, an international community that was jelling around the notion of a Palestinian state inside the occupied Palestinian territories. That was the international conference in New York that took place that France and Saudi Arabia led and that saw now around

159 countries extend bilateral recognition to Palestine over the course of the last decades. But in particular, you know, the countries that are allied with the United States in the West and elsewhere. And then we had this international court of justice advisory opinion, which basically said that Israel's presence in the occupied territories is illegal, its regime over Palestinians apartheid and that the settlements need to be removed immediately. So we had we had that context now that we're dealing with as well as a region that is completely fed up with the constant instability. They're fed up with being targeted as states, whether we're talking about Qatar, talking about Lebanon, Syria, or Yemen. So there's a sense in the region that we have to deal

with this and we have to deal with it soon and rather than later because of the national security implications in the region itself. There are questions in that. I mean, and that's part of what these negotiations in Cairo today are trying to get at is whether Hamas will agree to to disarm, but also to step aside from controlling Gaza in particular. What option do you think Hamas has realistically? You know, they don't have a lot of options, quite frankly, but, you know, their response to the Trump plan, I thought was interesting because they broke it down for themselves and in explaining it to Palestinians first and foremost is that, you know, they basically see this as a three-part plan. You know, the first one is, you know, a prisoner exchange

and entry of humanitarian relief and a at least partial withdrawal of its. is really true. That's part one. That's the part that we have some hope that could be actually implemented. Then the second part of it involves the governance question and the transitional period for Gaza's reconstruction and rehabilitation. That part, you know, Hamas was not completely on board for, let's say, because they indicated that while they are willing to step aside from governance in Gaza. And they've said this actually back in 2024 in February when they signed an agreement with all the Palestinian political factions and they said that they would step aside from governance. They said it again. But what they also said was that they support a Palestinian

technocratic government that is based on Palestinian national consensus. So they're not, they're not accepting the notion that, you know, the governance in Gaza will be dealt with by a Tony Blair or President Trump, it should be Palestinian governance based on Palestinian consensus. And then the third part of this agreement involves, you know, the future of Palestinian national aspirations. And that's where Netanyahu inserted a really fuzzy language that, you know, recognize Palestinian national aspirations, but not a Palestinian state anywhere in the occupied Palestinian territories. And that's the part, I think, that's going to be the most difficult for any future discussions between Israel and the Palestinians.

What sort of pressure do you think Hamas is under from those in Gaza? I mean, there aren't outside reporters who are in Gaza, but there is reporting from New York Times and the Wall Street Journal. We've spoken with people on this program who at great risk to themselves have protested Hamas and said enough is enough that they want this war to end. What sort of pressure do you think that puts on Hamas at the very least to agree to that first phase that you've been talking about? I mean, certainly there's, there is widespread discontent with Hamas rule, but there was widespread

discontent with Hamas rule before October 7th and before what followed. And we do have, we do have a number of different, you know, polls that point in that direction as well, not just from the Arab barometer, but also from Palestinian think banks based in Ramallah that have done reporting on the ground. You know, Hamas enjoys less than 30% of support from Palestinian. writ large in the occupied territories. But the real pressure from Hamas is not necessarily just from Palestinians. It's also from the reality that they're under right now. I mean, there is now confirmed by the United Nations, a panel of experts, that a genocide

is taking place in Gaza. And so Hamas wants to stop. And they've said this after the Trump 20-point plan came out and they had a press conference that they want to see an end to the genocide. aside in Gaza. They want to see an end to the starvation of the people of Gaza. And also an end to the forced displacement of Palestinians from the West Bank. And so they are looking for support from Palestinians and Palestinian political factions for what comes next. But their reference point, they've said, is the national consensus. So they're putting the pressure back on the Palestinian

political landscape to support whatever comes out of these negotiations, while also pulling from the Islamic world and the Arab world to say, we're going to need your help regardless of what comes out of these talks. We just have a couple of minutes left. Let me end with where I ended with Janus. And that's the words, again, that you have used, which is a sense of cautious optimism. There has not been a lot of that. For a lot of people, not just in the region, but beyond, this conflict feels intractable

in some ways. Does this feel like the opportunity for a turning point to you? I hope so, but I am very realistic. I won't say I'm optimistic or pessimistic, I'm realistic

because we're dealing with an Israeli government and a coalition government that is hell bent on seeing a greater Israel and seeing settlement expand into Gaza, not just the West Bank and annexation of the territory. And they're pushing really hard for it while President Trump's in office because this coalition believes that they have an opportunity now.

They've said it quite explicitly. But we should also note that, you know, that the prime minister, Netanyahu, has built his entire career on the notion that he is the one that's prevented a Palestinian state during the course of the Oslo negotiations. And that is his legacy. That's the legacy he wants to hold on to. And he's proven extremely nimble in the way he's dealt with President Trump. And so everything will depend on whether or not President Trump can outmaneuver the Israeli prime minister in this moment. He has definitely a lot of incentives to do so. And he wants the Nobel Peace Prize.

This is one of his things. He thinks that this is his path to that. I mean, as people may dismiss that, but that can lead to some. motivation, too. Oh, absolutely. I mean, he's definitely mentioned it more than on one occasion that he believes that he's the one that deserves it and he's the one that can bring peace. And, you know, the truth of the matter is, is he's in a very unique position as president, different than any other president. He actually has the support of a large segment of his MAGA base to get out of, you know, this blind support for Israel in their view and the constant, you know, underwriting

of Israeli aggression in the Middle East. So there's support within his base. Republican public opinion is also changing, especially among the young Republicans. And so he has an opportunity where others may not have had in the past. Zaha Hassan, it's really good to speak with you about this. Thank you very much. Thanks, Matt. Zahahasan is a human rights lawyer and fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. You've been listening to the current podcast. My name is Matt Galloway. Thanks for listening. I'll talk to you soon. For more CBC podcasts, go to cBC.ca.ca slash podcasts.