The Current - Is This War About to Get Bigger?

Episode Date: March 30, 2026

Talk of negotiations is everywhere but so are signs of escalation, in the U.S., Israel and Iran war. Inside Iran, people are trapped between fear of war and fear of what comes after. Outside, military movements suggest this conflict may be heading somewhere much harder to stop.

Jacqueline Furland Smith, a 40-year-old former Canadian military trainer, moves to Costa Rica to follow her dreams, but in the summer of 2021, vanishes without a trace. How can a woman just go missing and us put out all that effort to find her, and she's still missing? I'm David Rigen, and this is Someone Knows Something, Season 10, the Jacqueline Furland-Smith case. Available now on CBC Listen and wherever you get your podcasts.

This is a CBC podcast. Hello, I'm Matt Galloway, and this is the current podcast. After more than a month, war with Iran appears far from a conclusion. This past week saw dueling peace proposals from the United States and Iran, but the fighting goes on. U.S. and Israeli forces continue to pound targets across Iran while quietly positioning paratroopers and ground forces in the region. At the same time, the Iranian regime remains defiant,

launching strikes across the Middle East and denying that any real negotiators, are happening at all. Iran-backed Houthi militants in Yemen have now entered the war. And yesterday, Iran's parliament speaker accused the United States of secretly planning a ground invasion while publicly seeking talks. Arash Azizhi is an historian, author, and contributing writer to the Atlantic. He's been speaking with Iranians living through this war about their fears, about what comes next and what happens when the war comes to an end. Arash, good morning. Good morning, Matt. It's great to be with you. It's great to have you here. The piece that you wrote for the Atlantic is fascinating and talking to Iranians. Who are you speaking with and what kind of window do they give you into what's going on? I try to speak to a very

diverse crowd. I've made it, made it a point from the very beginning of the war. Every day I try to speak, you know, not just sort of friends and family, but Iranians from all walks of life. I have my, you know, methods of doing that. I find, you know, friends and friends of friends, names of different people. So, I mean, I've spoken to government supporters, those who support the regime, to the other extreme, if you will, people who are cheering on the war, especially early on, they were, although that number

doing those as we go, and everybody in between, people who are really worried about what's going on and are very terrified by the conditions that they find themselves in and are also affected every day by the course of the war.

And what do they tell you about the day-to-day physical and emotional reality in living through this war? I think, you know, most Iranians had, I mean, basically Iranians before last year, we had a 12-day war with Israel and the U.S. But before that, Iranians have never experienced war since 1980s. I was born in 1988, you know, and the war with Iraq ended that year. So people my age and younger had never seen a war before, and they're finding out what it is.

They find out, you know, destroyed windows, closed down, you know, shops. Also economically, they're going through a very tough time economically because, you know, a lot of companies lay people off. There's little they can do, and there's not a whole lot you can do when you don't have any money. So, but also broadly, you know, in a broader way, they're feeling sort of politically helpless because the decisions that affect their lives and determine their future are taken by Israel and by United States and by different factions of the regime. and as a result, you know, they feel like there's the very little they can do. What is your sense as to how, and again, there's a range of feelings and emotions that you describe, but what is your sense as to how people's feelings have changed over the course of this war? I think a lot of people who might have, you know, a lot of people might have had, you know, openly or semi-opently or in their hearts,

feelings that, okay, maybe if the Supreme Leader, who many people hated, because, you know, he was a heinous dictator, maybe if he's killed, something better will immediately happen, or maybe the war will help weaken the Islam Republic and pave the path for a better future. And this becomes harder to imagine as time goes on.

People see the ugly face of the war and the very uncertain future. But also worried about that, and this is hard for people to understand sometimes, like, you know, that they're very worried about the war ending also. So as a lot of people are terrified with the war, they might want to stop, you know, one minute, but another minute they're thinking, well, wait a minute,

what if it stops and the regime is more brutal or what is going to happen the day after? So there is this terrible feeling of uncertainty and fear of things getting worse as they consistently have now for years for Iranians that really, you know, it sort of rules people's lives. surprised by that? I'm not particularly surprised.

It is kind of the opposite of surprised, actually. You could see it coming. Some people, frankly, some people I thought they're very naive about how they thought this world would turn out. And then you see it and you're like, well, especially the younger people I have to say. A lot of younger people had these illusions as to, well, maybe, you know, only the regime would be hit. But now they see, no, it's our cafes, our universities, our infrastructure.

Also, the other thing that is important is that Iran's infrastructure, critical civic infrastructure, has been targeted in the war, and that has had a tremendous psychological impact on Iranians. What do you make of the Iranian government's response to these ceasefire proposals, such as they are from the United States? It feels as though there are negotiations, perhaps about negotiations in some ways. Well, the Iranian regime has done better than expected so far in a way in the war. And it is also worried about the day after the war ends, actually. So in a way, it's in no hurry to end it and wants to make sure that it has good and favorable terms, you know, when it does. So that's the spirit with which it's conducting itself here.

it's not so much just negotiations about negotiations, but sort of putting terms on the table. Trump put the 15 points on the table. Iran put its terms on the table. But I do believe it's likely that we will see some sort of a Pakistan-mediated talks between Iran and the United States be there indirect in the near future. And so end with a little bit more on what you said earlier, which is if the war were to end today, where would that leave the people of Iran? Well, you know, they will be both people and the regime, you know, would be left in a very concerning situation, by which I mean the regime will have problem providing for their basic economic needs and providing basic security to people. It would find itself very much in a situation of crisis. And the people of Iran, let us not forget, before this war, the immediate event preceding this war was, was protests in January, which led to massacre of the Iranian people by the regime, between 7 to 20,000 people were killed by the regime.

These are unprecedented numbers in Iranian history. So you're talking about a very traumatized society who would have to think, first, how to live and live under these conditions, and second, how to continue where it left off the struggles that it had against the Islamic Republic leading to the January protest and thinking, okay, under these new conditions, how do we fight for democracy? But also, how do we just continue our day-to-day life? So it is quite clear that we are in a new chapter in Iranian history, a turning point.

And both Iranian and the regime, both Iranian people and the regime will have to recalibrate themselves when the war comes to a pause. The insight that you give in your piece to what's actually happening on the ground and how people are feeling about this war is fascinating. Arash, thank you very much for talking to us. Thank you so much. Thank you. Arash is easy. a continuing writer at The Atlantic Magazine. Robert Pape is a professor of political science at the University of Chicago. He writes the substack, the escalation trap, where he tracks how this conflict is unfolding.

Robert, good morning to you. Good morning. What do you make of the peace prospects such as they are and these proposals that seem to be going back and forth and back and forth? I think that we are not really on a path to peace. We are in the escalation trap. Now, as we are progressing deeper into military operations in Iran, it's no surprise that both sides are issuing statements mostly for domestic consumption, their own domestic publics, some for international audiences, almost not at all for each other. And you can see that by the fact that there is absolutely no sign whatsoever that the military operations on either side are stopping. So unless you see the Marines reversing and going back to Japan, going back to California, the 82nd airborne of the pieces that are in theater pick up, go back to the continental United States, we really.

just need to set aside the talk. Excuse me. We need to set aside the talk. It's interesting, but it really doesn't matter. You have said that words are reversible, deployments or not. Just briefly explain what the escalation trap is and how a comment like that fits into what we're seeing right now. So before the war, the first bomb fell, I published the stages we would go through in this campaign because I have modeled it for 20 years. I have taught for the U.S. Air Force, studied every air campaign in history for 30 years. And so it was important to tell the world what the stages would be. Stage one would be tactical success, leadership decapitation strikes.

We would hit target, kill leader, not topple the regime, strengthen the regime, make it more dangerous. That happened. Stage two, Iran then would do horizontal escalation, seize the strait of four moves. they now control 20% of the world's oil, more powerful than ever. And now we're heading to what I call stage three. And it's critical because stage three, when the ground operations start, that's the true red line in this crisis. After that, it's irreversible because then once there are military casualties of a serious number, that 36% supporting the war in the United States will surely

hardened, at least for a while, months. It may loosen over time, but this is what I study, how military action impacts politics, not just how to put a bomb on a target, and that politics is sending us into an escalation trap. You said that you mentioned the Marines and thousands of Marines have been sent to the region. And one of the things you wrote is that Marines aren't sent for messaging. They are sent for options. That's exactly right. Right. Notice that as we have sent the Marines, we're actually distracting from their movement. The deployment that's happening is not classified at all. It's just happening quietly. So in other words, what we're doing is we are day by day getting closer and closer to stage three because that's expensive.

Moving all those Marines and their equipment, they're not just 5,000 people. getting on an airplane. They're bringing all of that equipment with them and they will have to bring there will be even more logistic coming behind as I'm explaining in the pieces on the escalation trap. This is going to be a widening footprint over time. The idea that we're just going to put 2,200 Marines in a dangerous situation if they all die. So what? I don't think so. This is a much more a serious red line than I believe many understand. Does that suggest that a ground invasion is inevitable? I would say 70% likely. So again, I do risk assessment. I'm not just throwing darts at a board. I've been doing this for 30 years. I've advised every White House from 2001 to 2024.

That doesn't mean throwing darts at a board. It's risk assessment. I would say we're 70, 75% likely. And the reason is because of the enriched uranium inside of Iran, they still have the capability to produce 10 to 16 nuclear weapons, and they now control 20% of the world's oil, more oil than anybody else, including the United States. That will give them somewhere around $75 billion a year that they did not have before. And yet, if you go back to the words, The latest from the president says that the United States is in, in his words, serious discussions with a new, more reasonable regime and that great progress has been made. But he also says that if a deal isn't shortly reached, then the United States will conclude its stay in Iran by, in his words, blowing and completely obliterating their electrical generating plants, oil wells, Carg Island, perhaps desalination plants. What does that tell you?

It tells us it's completely possible for the president to talk out of one side of it. mouth while his other side or his hands are doing something else. And this is normal in war. It's not really unique to President Trump. In Vietnam, there were Paris peace negotiations from 1968 to 1973. That's the height of the Vietnam War when the Vietnamese were killing tens of thousands of our troops. This was going on. That was five years of negotiations. I'm sorry to say, you have to track the indicators that matter and rhetoric out of the political leaders. This is done for other purposes than to tell you what's really happening on the battlefield. Where just finally is the off-ramp?

You have in the United States and around the world gas prices going up. The president is going to feel a pinch because in part he was elected to keep the United States out of what he called Forever Wars, but also to make life more affordable. And that's not happening right now. So where is his off-ramp? Well, President Trump along. can't end the war because Israel won't end the war if President Trump just leaves. So what that means is there would have to be an enforceable military containment on Israel.

So, for example, the president and the Congress would have to pass a law that said if Israel bombs Iran, all aid, economic, and military will be cut off to Israel. Otherwise, how is Iran going to think anything's changed? So now notice that is highly unlikely. I'm not saying that off ramp as possible, but there's no other off ramp. So unless if you're really going to end the war, you have to end the war. That means ending Israel in the war. And if you don't do that, you haven't really done anything.

So I think that this is why they're heading. It's 70% likely we're heading to the ground war. Not because anybody wants it, at least of all President Trump, but because the alternative of an enforceable military containment of Israel is not politically acceptable. Robert Pape, good to speak with you. Thank you very much. Glad to be here. Robert Pape is a professor of political science at the University of Chicago

and the author of The Substack, The Escalation Trap. Hi, I'm Jamie Poisson, host of the Daily News podcast, Frontburner. I got this really cool note from a listener the other day. They wrote, I find myself torn between the desire to understand the world around me and the anxiety associated with the easily access barrage of terrible news. And yet, amidst the torrent, there lies a sweet spot called Front Burner. This is exactly why we make the show. So you don't get swept away in a tide of overwhelming news.

So follow Front Burner, wherever you get your podcasts. Dahlia Shandlin is a political analyst, an author of the crooked timber of democracy in Israel. She is in Tel Aviv. Dalia, hello to you. Hi, and thank you for having me again. Thank you for being back on the program. In the early days of this war, the U.S. President Donald Trump seemed to give the impression that this would be a short war.

How prepared is Israel for something much longer than that? Well, the question is whether you think the Israeli public was prepared or how much the army and the government were prepared. And I think that the army and the government were probably a little bit more prepared than the Israeli public. I don't know if the Israeli public had a very clear and thought out idea about this, but we know from survey research that in the first week of the war, most people did think it would be a short war.

And by the second week of the war, survey research, particularly polls by the Institute for National Security Studies, showed that there was a rise in the number of Israelis who realized that it was going to be a longer war. And we see that acknowledgement and realization thinking in over time. I wouldn't say it means there's a major protest against this. But Israelis are generally accustomed to short wars. Remember the fact that Israel has effectively been at war since October 7th,

2023 is an unprecedented situation for Israelis. And so this comes on the heels of a very long phase of war. In some ways, there's really no disconnect because even though there was a ceasefire with Gaza in October 20205, there really there has been ongoing fighting ever since. And people realize it's not entirely over. And now the Iran second Iran war has started. So, you know, Israelis are kind of internalizing what it means to live with a sensation. of being in a permanent war.

What is Benjamin Netanyahu, the Israeli prime minister, saying to the people of Israel, about what his goals are as this war continues? Well, he does tend to repeat the goals from time to time. But the first thing I want to say and answer to that question is that he does not say a great deal to the Israeli public. He does not like giving interviews in Hebrew. He gives more interviews to foreign media. And there's a lot of frustration about that. But he does give statements.

He generally repeats the goals of the war, except that they change a little bit over time. In the very first days, he talked about the importance of toppling the regime, frankly. It was kind of different from June 2025 when he dropped hints about that and how nice it would be. But it became a very explicit aim of Netanyahu's in the lead-up and early days of the war. Since then, that has been rolled back. And he now talks about creating the conditions for the Iranian people to topple the regime, which is a change that everybody has noticed.

And of course, typically, you know, he always repeats. two other main issues, which are destroying Iran's nuclear capabilities, destroying its ballistic missile program, including the capacity to build and fire missiles, because Israel's done a lot of work in trying to bomb launchers, as well as the sites of production and the sites of materials production for those missiles. And then sometimes he talks about destroying the proxy network or Iranian sort of militant allies in the region, but that has not featured quite as prominently. Israel is, of course, continuing its war that began when Hezbollah basically joined the war with Iran in the earliest days. And that was all Israel needed to severely escalate what had also been a kind of partial ceasefire with Hezbollah and Lebanon since late 2024. So maybe he feels he doesn't need to stay it as much. But that's something that has been certainly part of the aims in the past. And now I think we had the additional aim of helping the U.S. to open the Strait of Hormuz, which wasn't even an issue before the war. You also, I mean, and to your point, it's not just Iran. You have a ground invasion in southern Lebanon that is expanding, despite warnings coming from countries like Canada and France, that the sovereignty of Lebanon shouldn't be violated. What is your sense of Israel's intentions when it comes to Lebanon?

Well, this is an evolving question. And the reason is because, again, the government has been telling the Israeli people, Nizdahu as well, that, of course, the main aim is to smash Hezbollah and incapacitate it. But people are skeptical of that. because the government already said that they did that in the previous escalation, the significant escalation between September and late November 2024. And the assassination of Hassan Nasrallah, the head of Hezbollah at the time, Israelis thought was a decapitation that was going to permanently incapacitate Hezbollah. So, you know, the government is now telling Israelis, well, we have to do what we said we already did, which is basically, you know, really incapacitate Hezbollah. But the other thing is that you have government ministers,

who are essentially religious fundamentalists who have made it very clear that they think that Israel should not only have the ground invasion, but really create a security zone, expand Israel's border up to the Litani River, or Lebanon's border should be reduced to the Littani River. So that is something they've been saying. And the reason I put it together with their religious extremism is because we know there's also an ideological, again, very extremist interpretation whereby Israel has some sort of a claim on that land. They won't say that openly. They're putting it in security terms, right? And these statements that have been echoed, including by the defense minister, talking about the need for Israel to have its security zone expanded, expanded towards the litany, with, you know, for as long as it takes to break Chisbala is an interesting way of putting it, considering how difficult it was for Israel to actually break and incapacitate Chisbala the first time. It's almost like saying this is going to be an open-ended occupation. And that's something that Israelis are not very happy about. We have survey research on this, too. showing that only a minority of Israelis would support that, although not a small minority, but certainly the majority are not happy about it. They have memories of the 18-year occupation of southern Lebanon between 1982 and 2000, and those are not good memories. You mentioned earlier that Israelis have been living through a constant war since the 7th of October. You wrote that in some ways many Israelis believe or hope that this war will redefine their reality.

In the newspaper Haratz, you said that it would perhaps let them live a normal life. What do you mean by that? I think this is what Israelis are hoping for. It's not what I think will happen as a result of this, but trying to conjure up or trying to explain why there was such a broad consensus, really a sleeping consensus of support among the Jewish Israeli public, okay, to specify, not the Arab or Palestinian citizens of Israel who opposed this war with Iran, but among the Jewish Israeli public to explain why there was over 90% who supported the war with Iran in the beginning, which has since declined. What I did is just listen to what Israelis are. saying, and they have been told again and again that Iran alone exclusively is really the source

of all of the threats to Israel because of that network of allies that Iran absolutely did cultivate over years, Hamas, Hezbollah and the Houthis, who really only jumped in, the latter only jumped in after October 7th. But I think Israelis have kind of strained in a way, but maybe partly succeeded in believing that all of the genuine threats and clashes and instability and attacks and terror are all because of Iran, as if everything would be fine. And, you know, this is largely Netanyahu is doing, right? He has tried to convince the world and Israelis that Iran is at the source of all of this. Now, Iran is certainly an exacerbating factor. But what I've also tried to argue in other places is that really, of course, the deepest source of hostility to Israel,

right there at home and in the region, and probably around the world, is the Palestinian issue. And the fact that Palestinians have been seeking self-determination, and that has been stymied over the years by Israel, also due to the failure of negotiations, but in recent years, very much by a refusal to even consider Palestinian self-determination and statehood by a very, very extremist government. And that will continue to be the deepest source of instability and violence in the region. This is my opinion speaking, but I think, you know, what I'm seeing in Israel in many ways by omission, because the Iran war has overtaken everything else, is that Israelis are, again, hoping that somehow this will, you know, removing this factor, this extremist Iranian regime,

will make everything better at Israel and will, you know, remove its enemies and then when they can live something like a normal life. I do think that it's sinking in over time that that's probably not going to work as, and that's why we see that support for the war is declining fairly significantly. You know, Israelis are realizing that it's going to be a very long haul and it might not solve all their problems and probably won't. Dali, good to speak with you, as always. Thank you very much. Thank you so much for having me. Dali Shandlin is a political analyst and author of the Crooked Timber of Democracy in Israel.

She was in Tel Aviv. You've been listening to the current podcast. My name is Matt Galloway. Thanks for listening. I'll talk to you soon. For more CBC podcasts, go to cbc.ca.