The Current - World leaders decide how to work with Syrian rebels

Episode Date: December 16, 2024

Terrorist-designated rebel group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) is now in control of Syria, and the world is trying to decide how to engage with them. One of the only Western journalists  to interview HTS’ leader and an international analyst discuss the group’s promise of tolerance, and if sanctions on Syria should be lifted.

In 2017, it felt like drugs were everywhere in the news, so I started a podcast called On Drugs. We covered a lot of ground over two seasons, but there are still so many more stories to tell. I'm Jeff Turner, and I'm back with Season 3 of On Drugs. And this time, it's going to get personal. I don't know who Sober Jeff is. I don't even know if I like that guy.

On Drugs is available now wherever you get your podcasts. This is a CBC Podcast. Hello, I'm Matt Galloway, and this is The Current Podcast. That's the new leader of Syria speaking last week at the Umayyad Mosque in Damascus. He's dressed in green fatigues and proclaiming a victory for the entire Islamic community and a new history for the Syrian people. The question on everyone's mind now is what that new history will look like. Martin Smith was the first Western journalist to interview the new Syrian leader,

Abu Mohammed al-Jilani, in depth. His 2021 documentary for PBS's Frontline called The Jihadist gives a window into this man and what approach he might take in Syria. Martin joins us now. Martin, hello. Thank you, Matt. It's a fascinating film.

When you met Abu Mohammed al-Jilani in 2021, what was your initial impression of him? So I was taken to a building that was somewhat abandoned on the outskirts of Idlib City. I was ushered into a room by armed guards wearing black ski masks. So it was all kind of almost a cliche of when you go to meet a terrorist. I sat down, he walked in, he is tall, fit, and serious. And we proceeded to have several hours of conversation. This was before we set up cameras, this was a preliminary interview. But he was quite open. I told him that I wanted to do an interview that would be spontaneous. I wasn't going to

submit questions. And I didn't want anything to be off limits. He was open to all of that and spoke rather candidly, I thought. And a few days later, we were whisked off to a location outside of Idlib city and proceeded to do a long interview. Why do you think he wanted to talk to you? It was clear. He had spoken, I think, to the international crisis group briefly. He was indicating that he wanted to get a message out that he was not an ISIS or Al-Qaeda figure anymore, that he was somehow rebranding himself. He had broken with those organizations a few years earlier. And so I was able, through intermediaries, to arrange to meet him and do an interview. I knew it would be controversial because except for bin Laden, I don't think any leader of any of these groups has ever spoken to a journalist. addition to, you know, that initial conversation, and we see this in the film, you're taken to see the territory that his group, HTS, controlled. What did you observe? They call this the Salvation

Government. What did you observe about how that government ruled? Yeah, well, first of all, you have to understand that they were under siege. There were Russian drones overhead. We could hear them. They were attacking the Idlib perimeter. And there were also cells of al-Qaeda and ISIS operating, and he was busy subduing them or arresting or killing them were necessary. Um, but so under those conditions, the Salvation Government is what positions himself correctly as a military figure, and the running of things was done by technocrats, bureaucrats that had fled from Assad's Syria to come up and help him run things. What did that tell you, or what does it tell you now about how he might approach running the entire country? Well, you know, he's saying a lot of things that are encouraging, that he's going to be tolerant of minorities. He's going to—he believes in Sharia law, but he's not coercive as ISIS was in Iraq and northern Syria. He's not coercive as ISIS was in Iraq and northern Syria.

He seems to be positioning himself to be a leader of all Syrians, whether those are Christians or Druze or Kurds or Alawites, the clan from which Assad's family comes from. So we don't know. It's one thing to say, but it's family comes from. So we don't know. It's one thing to say, but it's another to act. When you say not coercive, do you mean like not chopping people's hands off if they're thieves? Yeah, exactly. But that doesn't mean that he couldn't be harsh. And we did focus on some of the reliable claims of human rights abuses that were taking place in his prisons. I mean, under Sharia law, there was no court system. It's not a democracy.

cases where people had come up against him as critics and how they suffered, including one man who was executed for criticizing Jelani's government. I mean, this matters in part because, as I said, people are trying to figure out how this government may operate and how the world should engage with them. The new de facto governor of Damascus, Mohammad Yasser Ghazal, gave an interview with Reuters in English. Have a listen to a little bit of what he said about how HTS plans to govern. There's no such a thing as an Islamic governor. We are Muslims and it's a civil institution or ministries.

We don't have any problem with any ethnicity or religion. You used the word rebranding earlier. I've heard that thrown around a couple of times over the course of the last few days, that he has undergone some sort of strategic rebranding. You initially said it was like going to meet a terrorist, but now he's trying to distance himself from that. What do you make of that? What do you make of that? Well, I came away feeling that he was sincere. I'll say that.

He was showing me what he wanted me to see, and he was telling me what he wanted me to hear. I mean, I was there for about eight days in Idlib. I did ask him to take me around, and we went to places, and I said, can we go into that marketplace, and can you get out of the car, and can we go in and talk to people? He was willing to do that, although wherever we went, he was very nervous. He was worried about an assassin from Hezbollah or, you know, a drone attack or a disgruntled citizen. I mean, we would never stay in any one place very long. I guess to some people it's just difficult to square that rebranding with, as you said, the history of the organization and its leader, the fact that he was a commander in the Islamic State, that this group is an al-Qaeda affiliate.

How should we interpret that? Should we believe that somebody can change, the lion can change their spots? Yeah, I think the lion can change its spots in this case. I mean, if you look at his history, it's a very interesting, you follow a very interesting trail. you follow a very interesting trail. As a young man, he went to Iraq in order to fight the Americans after the invasion. A lot of young men in the region did that. And as he said to me on camera after 9-11, most, he said it, most young men were pleased that that had happened to the United States. So he took up arms and he then ended up in an American prison camp.

It was something, as it turned out to be, a jihadi university because they were all sitting there and talking and planning. page paper that outlined how he saw his native Syria and how important it was to him, perhaps, to fight Assad, not the Americans. And after he got out, he went to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the head of ISIS, and showed him his paper and asked for money to go into Syria and form a asked for money to go into Syria and form a branch of al-Qaeda called the Nusra Front. And that's what he did. He got about $60,000 and more and went down there and started an army. He came across the border from Iraq with only six men, but soon he was building an army. with only six men, but soon he was building an army. But I think that that history indicates that he was serious early on about fighting Assad and not about fighting the Americans, and that he didn't see his role as al-Qaeda did in fighting a global jihad. So what he's going through or what he's appearing as now is consistent with that

trail, that history. Just before I let you go, I mean, you mentioned the Americans. Antony Blinken confirmed that the United States has made direct contact with HTS. How open do you think Western powers are to changing their relationship with Jelani and perhaps lifting sanctions, as well as the terrorist designation? Well, I think it might happen. Back in 2021, the Americans reached out to him. I'm sorry, he reached out to the Americans to have a conversation. The Americans gave him no response. So at that time, they were wary of him. But now, him sitting in Damascus, they've changed. But there was a sense from top diplomats that Jalani was perhaps the least bad option and that the terrorist designation was never acted upon. Americans killed Baghdadi. They killed bin Laden. They didn't make a big effort, even though there was a $10 million price tag on his head,

to go after him then. So I think there's a possibility that you may see something, and we know, as Blinken says, that they've reached out. Martin, really good to talk to you about this. Thank you very much. Thank you, Matt. Martin Smith's documentary for Frontline in 2021 about Abu Muhammad al-Jilani is called The Jihadist. You can find it on the PBS website. about Abu Muhammad al-Jilani is called The Jihadist. You can find it on the PBS website.

In 2017, it felt like drugs were everywhere in the news. So I started a podcast called On Drugs. We covered a lot of ground over two seasons, but there are still so many more stories to tell. I'm Jeff Turner, and I'm back with season three of On Drugs. And this time, it's going to get personal. I don't know who Sober Jeff is. I don't even know if I like that guy. On Drugs is available now wherever you get your podcasts.

So the big question is, should the international community consider lifting some of the sanctions that have crippled Syria's economy? And what about that designation of HTS as a terrorist organization? Is it time to reconsider that as well? Delaney Simon is a senior analyst with the International Crisis Group. Good morning to you. Good morning. You've said that leaving severe sanctions on Syria would be like pulling the rug out from Syria just as it tries to stand? What is the case for removing sanctions on this nation? I can't emphasize enough what the effects will be of continued sanctions on Syria. Sanctions on Syria are some of the most extreme and complex in the world. And you were speaking before with Martin about sanctions that are on HTS. HTS is under terrorism sanctions, and that's one layer. And the terrorism sanctions that HTS is

under, particularly from the United States, make it very difficult for businesses, for NGOs, and for others to engage in areas under HTS's control. That's complicated now because HTS ostensibly controls most of Syria. But beyond the terrorism sanctions, Syria is under this enormous web of overlapping sanctions. You have EU sanctions, Canadian sanctions, U.S. sanctions. You have a state sponsor of terrorism sanction that's been in place since 1979. You have sanctions on Syria's energy sector, on its central bank, on its telecoms. You have controls on exports. So it's almost impossible to import into Syria any major infrastructure equipment or anything else like that. And collectively, this web of sanctions

means that there's more or less a full embargo on Syria. And so what I'm saying is, if this transition is going to lead Syria to a peaceful and prosperous future, which we hope that it will, sanctions cannot remain as they are today. In the face of those sanctions, I mean, we've seen these images of these enormous stockpiles of this narcotic captagon in Syria. How much of the Assad regime's ability to function relied on that illegal drug money? It seems like from reporting quite a bit, it seems like the economy in Syria under Assad became more or less a house of cards like the regime appeared over the last few weeks. When Syria rebuilds and rebuilds its economy, it's going to have to move beyond this fundamentally illicit economy. It's going to have to reinvigorate industry. It's going to have to reinvigorate its

banking sector. And this will be really difficult with sanctions in place because sanctions essentially criminalize legal trade with the country. And for trade and the economy of Syria to become legal, the sanctions really do need to be removed. What about that listing of HTS as a terrorist organization? The reason that that listing is there is because, and Martin hinted at this, this is a group that's kidnapped people. It's assassinated people. It's set off IEDs.

It's let off suicide bombs. Human Rights Watch talked about how they arbitrarily detained people. They tortured people who were in custody. If you lift that designation, do you not reward that group and past actions, but also allow a bunch of money into Syria that could legitimize another terrorist regime? That's a great point. And, you know, Matt, it's not just because of those actions. HTS was linked with al-Qaeda and ISIS at some stage, even though they've renounced those links. And so I don't want to suggest that this is a decision that policymakers should come to lightly. It isn't.

It's something that's going to have to take an enormous amount of thought from policymakers. But sanctions are meant to be used for leverage. And Western policymakers have an enormous opportunity, and I would argue an opportunity that is going to be short-lived, to use the sanctions as leverage. So Western policymakers could say, look, HTS, we will delist you if you do X, Y, and Z. Now, they have to be careful when they do that because they can't suggest all of these demands, many demands that are unrealistic or impossible for HTS to fulfill. But if they start thinking seriously about what steps HTS could take to get off the list and communicate with HTS

about those steps, I think that they do have a good chance. And I understand that HTS would be amenable to making real changes in terms of how they're governing Syria and in terms of how they're acting vis-a-vis the population there. Is there an urgency to that? Oh, absolutely. and those of us who've been observing Syria for a long time, and also those in the humanitarian community, real challenges bringing aid into Idlib because HTS was controlling the territory. There were enormous delays bringing in humanitarian aid. It was very difficult to stimulate business. I'm really fearful that something similar will happen in all of Syria. You know, we're talking about a country where 70% of the population needs some kind of life-saving

support from the humanitarian community. Already, the broader sanctions on Syria make that very difficult. But the terrorism listing is really, I can't emphasize this enough, it's such a major hurdle because the terrorism listing by the Americans is much easier to violate than other sanctions. Violations can be made if you provide training advice or assistance to a foreign terrorist group. So that's beyond financial support. And also the penalties for violation are very high. We're talking criminal penalties and very serious fines. And so I'm worried that the chilling effect of this particular sanction will be too much for the country to bear. What is the parallel situation, if there is one, and I'm glad that you brought it up. After the Taliban took over the country in 2021, we saw a spiraling economic crisis that was

grounded very much in the fact that Afghanistan's new leaders were under sanctions. But the sanctions that HTS is under are even more stringent than the sanctions that the Taliban was under. I just wonder whether, I mean, you mentioned the Taliban, whether the world has learned anything from that. In saying, there's a Taliban, so we're not going to work with them, but they are in control of the country, whether that makes the situation worse, and whether that is a lesson that the world has taken. I think that the world is still not set up well, unfortunately, to take that lesson. And it's not just Afghanistan. There are many other cases of instances where sanctions have, where policymakers have taken a long time to lift sanctions. So I did some work in Colombia with the FARC who were under the Foreign Terrorist Organization sanction for many years.

And the FARC signed a peace deal with the Colombian government. The peace deal was blessed by the United States. deal with the Colombian government. The peace deal was blessed by the United States, but the United States still didn't delist the FARC for five years after they signed the peace deal with the Colombian government. And so these things can take a really long time to lift. They're very complicated to lift. I hope that policymakers are thinking seriously about expediting lifting in the Syrian case. But we don't have a good basis for that, unfortunately, in history. Because your point is, just very briefly, that while the clock runs in those five years, people suffer.

Yeah, at this early stage of a transition, every step counts. Every step can change the course of history. And so what I suggest to policymakers in Canada, in Washington, in Brussels, I suggest that they take three steps now. The first is to issue a broad general license that says business and commercial activity is allowed in Syria. The second is to consider how HTS can get off the list and to use leverage to convince HTS to take steps that they want to see so that HTS can get off the list on the terms that Western policymakers have set. And then finally, I think it's very important for policymakers to start now defining a roadmap for sanctions relief for all of Syria. Delaney, it's really good to talk to you about this. Thank you very much.

Thank you so much. Delaney Smith is a senior analyst with the International Crisis Group.