The Daily Signal - INTERVIEW | 'Not Sure Taiwan's Going to Survive,' Defense Expert Warns of Xi's Push for 'Reunification'

Episode Date: October 19, 2022

Chinese President Xi Jinping renewed his calls for the "reunification" of China and Taiwan on Sunday during the opening session of the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party.  "We will continue to strive for peaceful reunification with the greatest sincerity and the utmost effort, but we will never promise to renounce the use of force, and we reserve the option of taking all measures necessary," Xi said.  China is "determined to pursue reunification on a much faster timeline," U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said Monday. "So, now it's sort of pretty clear that the Chinese are thinking seriously of making a move. So, why aren't we acting like it?" says Elbridge Colby, a former deputy assistant secretary of defense for strategy and force development in the Defense Department.  "Why aren't we acting on a national mobilization effort precisely to avoid a war? Because once we get into a war, it's definitely going to be far more expensive and costly in terms of lives and resources. And it may be too late if we wait that long," Colby says. Colby joins "The Daily Signal Podcast" to discuss Xi's comments, his recent article in Time magazine about why the U.S. should defend Taiwan, and what message could be sent if the U.S. is not able to successfully deter China from invading Taiwan.  Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

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This is the Daily Signal podcast for Wednesday, October 19th. I'm Samantha Sherris. The 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party is meeting this week, and President Xi Jinping has renewed his cause to reunify China with Taiwan. Joining today's show is Elbridge Colby, the co-founder and principal at the Marathon Initiative and a former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Force Development in the Defense Department.

He's here to discuss Xi's speech, his recent piece about why the U.S. should protect Taiwan, and what's at stake if the U.S. fails to help Taiwan deter China's aggression. We'll get to my conversation with Elbridge right after this. Hi, I'm John Carlo Canaparo. And I'm Zach Smith. And we host SCOTUS 101. It's a podcast where you'll get a breakdown of top cases in the highest court in the land. Hear from some of the greatest legal minds. And of course, get a healthy dose of Supreme Court trivia. Want to listen? Find us wherever you get your podcasts or just head to heritage.org

slash podcasts. Joining the podcast today is Elbridge Colby. He is the co-founder and principal at the Marathon Initiative and a former deputy assistant secretary of defense for strategy and force development in the defense department. Elvich, thank you so much for joining me. Great to be with you, Samantha. Now, the National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party is meeting this week. And during the opening session on Sunday, President Zee-Z. Xi Jinping talked about complete reunification of China and Taiwan. But before we get to his comments, I want to discuss with you a piece that you actually recently wrote for time titled Why Protecting Taiwan Really Matters to the U.S. Can you walk us through some of the reasoning

that you discuss in your piece? Sure. Well, no, thanks for asking. I think this is a very important issue. It seems one that's very removed from most Americans' concerns. And I sympathize and understand that. But what I wanted to try to do in the piece is actually really make the case for why defending Taiwan is so important to Americans in a very concrete and brass tax interest. And let me just say up front that I'm generally against military interventions. I've been against most of them of the last generation. I don't want to see the U.S. military be used. But my view is also that the U.S. military should be used when it's in the concrete kind of core interests of the American people. And that's how I approach it. It's not not out of a special affinity for Taiwan. I admire

Taiwan and it's democracy, it's prosperity, et cetera, society. But that's not enough for Americans to go to war, in my view. And what is the reason for Americans to go to war? Basically, my view, that if we're not prepared to defend Taiwan, certainly our allies in Asia, it's very likely that China and my view will ultimately establish a dominant position over Asia. And again, Asia's just halfway around the world from the United States, but the fact of the matter is today that Asia is going to be upwards of 50% of global GDP going forward. And I think what's pretty clear, and I think the party Congress this week provides further evidence, if any, was needed, that Beijing's ambitions, you know, it's certainly about Xi Jinping, but it's not only Xi Jinping, are about establishing a

dominant position over that enormous area and basically establishing a kind of control, sort of soft control over the global economy from there. Look at it. and this is the argument that I lay out in the timepiece is, you know, we can imagine, you know, what the Chinese are going to be capable of because we can already see them doing that using economic resource, their economic leverage vis-a-vis-vis Australia, you know, on social media, collecting enormous amounts of big data. Heck, they already do that to their own people. So that's the future that we have to look for.

Why is Taiwan important for that? Because if we want to basically block China from being able to get to that point, we have to have a coalition of countries in Asia in particular. Those are the ones who are most relevant, who are going to stand up together to China. And unfortunately, many countries do want to stand up to China. That's actually the good news. Countries like Japan, India, Vietnam, Taiwan, Australia, etc. They don't want to live under China's thumb. But they're all deciding, is it prudent for me to be able to be able to be free of living under Beijing's boot? But if my choice is getting crushed by China and failing in the effort, then I'm going to probably cut a deal. And it's in that context

of Taiwan becomes important because everybody is looking at Taiwan in Asia to say how trustworthy are the Americans. And again, it's not all about, you know, we don't have to defend freedom in every corner of the world, far from it. But we need to prove to countries in the region that it's prudent to stick with us because only we are strong enough to stand up to China in Asia. If you're Japan, even, or South Korea, if you're left alone, you're going to cut a deal. And so that's where Taiwan becomes very important. And it's, you know, it's also a very militarily significant island. And oftentimes people often today mention it's important in the semiconductor chain, which is obviously very important in our economic life. But the critical point here, Samantha, is what I'm trying to do is get us to prepare so that we never have to fight a war. Because if we can convince Beijing that it's going to fail to take over Taiwan, it's unlikely to try. Mao Zedong was one of the worst people who ever lived. He lusted after Taiwan. He wanted to get his hands around Chiang Kai Shack's neck. but he never tried because he knew he would fail. And that's the frustrating thing. Tony Blinken, the Secretary of State, you said yesterday that China, in his view, has accelerated the timeline

to seize Taiwan. So now it's sort of pretty clear that the Chinese are thinking of seriously of making a move. So why aren't we acting like it? Why aren't we acting on a national mobilization effort precisely to avoid a war? Because once we get into war, it's definitely to be far more expensive and costly in terms of lives and resources. And it may be too late if we wait that long. And just speaking of that timeline, the Communist Party Congress meets every five years. Do you expect China to have invaded Taiwan by the next time it meets? Honestly, I'm very reluctant to make predictions because I have no idea what's going on in Xi Jinping's mind or the mind of the people, the Central Committee, standing committee of the Politburo and so forth. But here's the way I look at it.

if I'm doing the job that I think of myself is doing here, which is thinking about what's best for America, if I were doing that job in Beijing, I think about what's best for China, I could see a lot of very compelling reasons for moving before 2027 or certainly the end of decade. And look, we know it's publicly stated that Xi Jinping has set the objective that he wants the military of China, the PLA, People's Liberation Army, to be able to solve the Taiwan issue militarily by 2027. Now, that's more of like a bureaucratic aspiration. So we don't know. He could go after or they could go before. But there are a couple of things. You know, why that might be the case. Look, they're not going to get Taiwan to fall into their lap. They're not the Chinese. It's clearly not going to happen. So if they're going to get it, they're going to have to force the Taiwanese. And I think one of the lessons of Ukraine more broadly is if you're going to do that,

don't mess around, go in, smash Taiwan, leave nothing a chance, and then, you know, rebuild afterwards, but first make sure you win. So we're not going to have a lot of warning. And I think the Chinese can see, you know, one thing this administration has been talking a lot about China, but it's not been doing a lot about China militarily. So if you're China, you're saying, hey, well, if we wait around 10 years, maybe these Americans and Japanese and Indians and even as Taiwanese who are not doing enough, maybe they'll get their act together and we'll lose the opportunity. So let's maybe act in this decade. So that's what really worries me is that I could see very good reasons for Beijing to act in the coming years. And as I mentioned at the top of our interview, President Xi Jinping on

Sunday discussed this reunification of China and Taiwan. Specifically, he said, we will continue to strive for peaceful reunification with the greatest sincerity and the utmost effort, but we will never promise to renounce the use of force, and we reserve the option for taking all measures necessary. So with that in mind and what we've been seeing over the last couple of months with China's heightened aggression, military aggression in the region, is it inevitable at this point? And what would U.S. involvement, potential involvement, look like in your view? Well, I fear it's getting more and more likely. And this is something I've been sort of trying to push for the last few years because the sooner that we act, the more likely we are to be able to head it off because China will see that would fail. Look, at the end of the day, China's got to be able to project a lot of military power across 100 miles of water. It's difficult, but it's not impossible. And they've been laser focused. Meantime, we've been distracted in the Middle East, now in Europe, Ukraine, et cetera. We're not focusing as much as we should. We're doing better, but we're not doing as well as we need to be. What would American involvement be like? I mean, I think at this point, the ship has sailed on whether people, you know, are expecting the United States to be involved.

I think actually the Chinese probably very clearly expect the United States to be involved. So even if even if you wanted to cut off Taiwan at this point, I think it would actually be hard to do because I would not be surprised if the Chinese expanded their attack well beyond Taiwan itself to U.S. bases in the region because they, you know, they've listened to what Joe Biden has said. They're looking at the overall tenor of the discussion in Washington and across the country. and they're saying, well, we're going to get in a war with the Americans anyway. So if we're going to do that, we're going to get our licks in first, you know. And the thing to remember here, Samantha, is that, you know, people tend to think back to the Pacific War of World War II. When Japan attacked and rampaged all around Asia, it was one-tenth the economic size of the United States. China is about the same size of the United States.

In 1941, the United States had the world's largest industrial base in shipbuilding industry. Now, that's China. So actually, China could make something like that work potentially if we're not ready. So my view is, if it comes to that, we should act with resolve and effectiveness and leave, you know, basically don't mess around because in war, you know, as in, you know, anything really competitive, you've got to act clearly and with resolution to take advantage of opportunities before they flee away. So that's my sense of what we should be doing. We should really seek to focus, as I argue in my book, on denying the Chinese invasion. We're not going to be able to make Taiwan perfectly secure. That's not our job. But if we can defeat the Chinese invasion, that'll be enough for our purposes. And if we aren't able to defeat the Chinese invasion, if we aren't able to deter them from invading Taiwan, what message does that send to our allies you talked about before with different countries in Asia, you know, building that coalition to help Taiwan?

And also on the flip side, to our adversaries, if the U.S. isn't able to successfully help Taiwan in this regard. I mean, it's very, it's very damaging. I mean, look, again, you know, I, these are called credibility arguments. I mean, how countries look at how believable we are. I tend to think that we talk too much about U.S. credibility and in a kind of undisciplined, undifferentiated way. But look, Taiwan is very, very important in the central theater to countries that are wondering

whether it's prudent or not to stand up to China. If you're Japan, like Taiwan, you are an archipelago situated off the Chinese coast, Philippines. I mean, even, you know, South Korea, Australia, at some ways not dissimilar. So you're thinking, this is direct, this tells me very clearly whether the Americans have the ability and the resolve to help me defend myself, right? And by the way, if China wins, especially if China wins relatively easily, then China's going to say, well, I guess we did pretty well on Taiwan. And, you know, maybe we're going to go settle those

scores with Vietnam or the Philippines and ultimately try to isolate Japan and get South Korea to effect, right? Because nothing succeeds like success, right? When you do well, I mean, we've felt this in our own foreign policy and military discussions over the years. When you think you're doing well, your ambitions get higher. I mean, look at the Ukraine war, leaving aside the merits and so forth. What people are expecting from the Ukraine war is much, much higher now than it was even six months ago because the Ukrainians have done so well. Or in Korea in the war, which involved China. You know, at first, the Americans and the South Koreans were pushed almost off the peninsula. and then with the Incheon landing and so forth, pushed the North Koreans back.

Suddenly we're talking about reunification of the two Koreas. Then the Chinese intervened and things turned out very differently. But that's a big point. If China can basically be quite successful, not only our allies, but also the Chinese are likely to say, well, why shouldn't I keep pushing? And I think that's a kind of basic sort of human nature point we should observe. I mean, look at Xi Jinping, look at the way he talks, look at the leading Chinese voices out there. These are not shy and retiring, sort of self-flagellating people.

These are people who, if they think what they're doing is right and they think their nation's interests are valid and deserve to be served. And if they can do so effectively and advantageously, we should expect them to do so, you know? And just you talked a little bit more, sorry, you talked earlier about what the current administration is doing. And I want to also talk about, you know, what. Congress is doing, do you think on both sides of the aisle that Congress is doing enough to help Taiwan, to deter China? And if not, what else would you advise that they be doing?

No, I don't think that Congress is doing enough, or certainly not the administration, but talking about Congress for a second. I mean, I think things like what the Taiwan Policy Act have a lot of really great stuff in them that gives more capability to Taiwan. I think, though, the situation is so urgent, that we need to be putting a lot of pressure on Taiwan. This is not merely a matter of, like, reassuring Taiwan and helping improve its arms sales process and, you know, making it easier to meet with Taiwanese government officials, et cetera. This is like, we're not sure Taiwan's going to survive over the next five to seven to eight years. And five to eight years in defense planning terms is, it's not a blink of an eye, but it's a little bit longer than that. It's like,

Not a lot. It takes a long time not only to build weapon systems, but also to train military formations. I mean, look at the Ukrainians. They really, that eight years to work between the Crimea seizure of 2014 and 2022, that's a lot of time. And so I think what we need is a sense of urgency to say, like, this problem needs to be addressed right now. And a big part of the problem, Samantha, is Taiwan's own lack of effort and urgency. And this is a really difficult problem because, you know, here I'm talking to Americans and I'm saying why it's worth the spending Taiwan. But at the same time, when I talk to Taiwanese, I tell them to their faces, I say, you are on the verge of being cut off. Because if you continue in this direction and not do

enough, not spend 10% of your GDP on defense, not really reform your military to be ready to fight the PRC alongside America, they need to understand that they are really gambling with fate. Because the ultimate point, and this is the point I made in the time piece, is our interest in Taiwan is very significant, but it's not existential. If we get to the point where defending Taiwan becomes simply too costly, we're going to have to cut it off. And that's a lot about what Taiwan itself does to help its own defense. But we shouldn't also be deluded that cutting off Taiwan is going to make things hunky dory. I mean, you know, at some point, I mean, the analogy I like to use is, you know, Winston Churchill wanted to deploy more aircraft to help France defend itself as, you know,

the French and Anglo-French defense of France was collapsing in 1940. And what the head of the Royal Air Force said to him was, look, Mr. Prime Minister, if we send those aircraft, we won't have enough to defend the home islands, which was critical later in the Battle of Britain. That's the kind of situation where we can get in. But it wasn't good that France fell. That was really, really bad. But that's sort of the situation that we're heading to if Taiwanese don't get, you know, religion and we don't get much more focused. I just have one final question for you about the Russian invasion of Ukraine. You talked a little bit about it earlier. And some of these lessons that, you know, either the U.S. can learn, maybe what

President Xi Jinping is seeing or learning from, you know, the invasion of Ukraine over the last couple of months, do you think they're applicable to a potential invasion of Taiwan, you know, in terms of what Xi Jinping is seeing? And then also lessons that the U.S. can learn and sort of their involvement and what impact that has had over the last few months. I think we should be more cautious than many people are about, you know, saying what lessons there are for China from the Ukraine fight. I mean, there's some very significant differences. I mean, one is the scale issue. I mean, you know, Russia's about three to four times the size population-wise of Ukraine. China's somewhere in between 50 and 100 times the size of Taiwan. Ukraine is a huge country that's very difficult to get your arms around if you're an invading force. Taiwan is a very small island. You know, Ukraine has very long land borders with NATO countries that I don't know, but I assume that's one of the ways that, you know, weapons resupplies are getting the Ukrainians, which is critical for their success. Taiwan is an island. It's, it's 100 miles from China, but it's also hundreds of miles from

U.S. bases and logistics supplies and so forth. So there's a lot of differences. I also think that Chinese are much more powerful and rich and technically sophisticated on the whole than the Russians are. It doesn't mean they're 10 feet tall, but, you know, hey, even if they're like seven feet tall, that's pretty high. So I think the main, you know, the lesson that the lessons that are relevant for China, I think the biggest lesson China is probably taking away from this is don't mess around. You know, because I think one of the big sources probably of the Russians failure was they got too cocky and too sort of Baroque, if you will, to like complicated early on.

There were something like five separate, you know, lines of advance for a force that by historical standards is not that big. I think Putin expected a lot of people in Ukraine to defect. And that all fell apart. And now he's in a really bad situation, thankfully. I think for China, you say, leave nothing to chance. If you were thinking of sending two missiles, send six. If you were thinking somebody who's going to defect, kill him. You know, if you were going to, like, put 10,000 soldiers on a part of the island, put 20,000 soldiers. And so that's a caution, but it also means that, you know, it's not, and I think this has been pretty clear. The U.S. intelligence community has been open about this.

The Chinese aren't like giving up, and we can see that clearly by what Xi Jinping has been saying. They're not giving up on their ambition. So I think the lesson here also, though, for our point of view, is what's stopping the Russians, it's not sanctions. It's not the UN General Assembly or the G7. It's the fact that the Ukrainians are beating them on the battlefield. That's the key thing. And so the key thing for us is for the Taiwanese and the Americans, to some extent, the Japanese and Australians,

to be ready to defeat a Chinese invasion and to do that now so we never get in the war. because if we, you know, we can, if we can deter war, that's much better. Because once China gets into this fight, given how important it is for Xi Jinping and China and the People's Republic, it's going to be hard to end. Yes, definitely. Elbich, Kobe, thank you so much for joining me. I just wanted to mention that you are the author of the strategy of denial, American defense, and an age of great power conflict.

Thank you so much for joining me. I really appreciate your insight. And I hope you can join us again soon. Thanks so much. Happy too. lot. If you haven't got a chance to already, make sure you subscribe to The Daily Signal wherever you get your podcast and help us reach even more listeners by leaving a five-star rating and review. We read and appreciate all of your feedback. Thanks again for listening.

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