The Daily - The Family That Profited From the Opioid Crisis

Episode Date: March 15, 2019

The family that built its fortune on the opioid painkiller OxyContin has never been held legally accountable for the epidemic that the drug helped unleash. Here’s why that could change. Guest: Barry Meier, the author of “Pain Killer: An Empire of Deceit and the Origin of America’s Opioid Epidemic,” who has reported on the opioid crisis for The New York Times. For more information on today’s episode, visit nytimes.com/thedaily.

From The New York Times, I'm Michael Barbaro. This is The Daily. Today, the family that built its fortune on OxyContin has never been held legally accountable for the opioid epidemic that the drug helped unleash. Barry Meyer on why that may soon change. It's Friday, March 15th. It's time, Guggenheim! It's time! It's time, Guggenheim!

The Guggenheim is one of this country's, and certainly New York's, premier museums. It's a beautiful museum, a spiral-shaped structure that houses a modern art collection. And in late February, a group of individuals entered the museum. It was the particular night where entrance was free. And they walked up the spiral structure and they took positions there. Because of 400,000... And at a predetermined point, they released thousands of small sheets of paper that looked like the type of prescriptions that a doctor would give you.

that looked like the types of prescriptions that a doctor would give you. They were prescriptions for the drug OxyContin. OxyContin is one of the most powerful and potentially addicting painkillers ever produced by the pharmaceutical industry. And when these papers fluttered down through the air, they looked like a snow blizzard that settled on the floor. And then a banner was released that said, Shame on Sackler. Shame on Sackler! Shame on Sackler! Shame on Sackler! Shame on Sackler!

So what exactly is this group protesting? Who is Sackler? Well, the Sackler name is best known as a family that are beneficiaries of the arts. Their name is tied to the Guggenheim, the American Museum of Natural History. The Metropolitan Museum in New York and the Tate in London. And as benefactors of medical schools. Manufacturers of medical schools. The Sackler name is plastered on institutes or schools of medicine at Cornell, Columbia, Tufts, George Washington, McGill, and Tel Aviv universities. They're also one of this country's most secretive families. And part of their secretiveness comes from the fact

that their fortune has been made from the sale of OxyContin. The Sackler family owns Purdue Pharma and their main drug, OxyContin, has made them tens of billions of dollars since it was introduced in the 1990s. OxyContin is at the center of a national opioid epidemic that's killed an estimated 300,000 people since the late 90s. Now protesters, along with some state officials and plaintiff's lawyers, believe that the Sackler family should start paying the price for some of the havoc that the aggressive and over-marketing of this drug produced. And why are these protesters going after the Sackler family right now, in particular? There has been an almost two-decade history of lawsuits against

Purdue Pharma, as well as other drug companies. But it's only just now that lawsuits are being filed against members of the Sackler family. In particular, one was filed recently by the state of Massachusetts. A Massachusetts lawsuit is the first to name some of Purdue Pharma's owners, eight members of the Sackler family and other executives, claiming they participated in a deadly and illegal scheme. As a result of this lawsuit and the sort of pre-trial discovery that's going on, there are new documents that are starting to come to public light, which really are showing for the first time the apparent depth of involvement of Sackler family members in the operations of Purdue Pharma.

And what exactly do these documents say that the Sacklers knew or did when it came to OxyContin and opioids? Really up until this time, the company and the Sacklers have been very successful in creating what really is apparently a mirage. That this family, while owning the company, were sort of hands-off. They were not involved in the day-to-day operations. They did not make significant decisions with respect to how the drug was marketed or sold. And they were shielded from all the nasty business related to the addiction and abuse that was occurring around the drug.

But what the documents that are emerging now are starting to show is that the Sacklers micromanaged this company. They obsessed over issues like how many sales representatives should be out there promoting OxyContin to doctors, how many times those sales representatives should go to there promoting OxyContin to doctors, how many times those sales representatives should go to a particular doctor? Because they were doing studies that showed the

more you send a rep to a doctor, the more they prescribe. They were determining, apparently, the criteria for how salespeople would be compensated, putting a premium on getting sales representatives to sell the highest dosages of this drug. And as we know, the highest dosages of any opioid poses the greatest risk of potential addiction to a patient and other really serious side effects. I mean, there was even an email written that's come to light by Dr. Richard Sackler, who is the son of one of the founders of Purdue Pharma and the company's one-time president,

that suggests that he told the company in 2008 that we are going to measure our performance by prescriptions, by strength, giving higher measures to higher strengths. So what you're laying out here is not just a family that is involved, but a family that is intimately involved with the minute details of how opioids could be systematically prescribed and, in a sense, overprescribed. that was being sold, but making sure that every pill that was sold was the highest strength of that pill because it would bring in the highest amount of dollars. And what we know is that the Sackler family was apparently made aware of the abuse of OxyContin not long after the drug first came onto the market. Which was when? Which was in 1996, well before the company publicly acknowledged that abuse in 2000.

And there was a view within Purdue Pharma that all the problems associated with this drug were due to the bad people who were abusing it. And what we know from these documents is that in 2001, very early in the opioid epidemic, Richard Sackler wrote in an email that is cited in this Massachusetts lawsuit, he said, quote, we have to hammer on abusers in every possible way. They are the culprits and the problem. They are reckless criminals. They are reckless criminals. So what this member of the Sackler family is saying is there should be a strategy, a public relations strategy, of attacking people who become addicted to OxyContin. That's right.

And in that same year, 2001, there began to be a number of public reports about overdose deaths involving OxyContin. And in one specific report, there was a citation that there were 59 overdose deaths involving OxyContin in one particular state. And again, Richard Sackler, when he saw that report, had a very curious response. Which was what? He wrote, this is not too bad. It could have been far worse.

More deaths, more problems for... Correct. For the company. Correct. So, Barry, when you get your hands on these documents and you read them over and you process them, what is going through your head about the Sacklers? It's a funny thing, Michael. I have covered the story for almost two decades. And there have been many times over these two decades where I thought I knew the story. And when documents like this appear, it jolts me. And in many ways, it reminds me

very much of an industry I covered in the late 1990s for The Times. This was another industry that thought that it would never be held to account. And I got to cover that accounting. We'll be right back. Barry, tell us what was going on in the 1990s that reminded you of the Sacklers. There's one particular episode that was striking. There's a professor at the University of California in San Francisco, Dr. Stan Glanz. And one day, there is a cardboard box that suddenly arrives in his office. board box that suddenly arrives in his office.

And the return address on the box has the name Mr. Butts, which was the, you know, famous Gary Trudeau cartoon character of a cigarette, you know, representing the cigarette industry. My first subpoena. I'm psyched. Mr. Butts, that's a tobacco industry target, kids. Oh, kids, you gotta love them. I know I do, even though I'm constantly on the go. And when Dr. Glanz opened the box, what he finds inside of it

is a trove of what are essentially stolen documents. Documents that have been taken out of a law firm that represents one of the world's biggest cigarette manufacturers, Brown & Williamson. And within this box are dozens of internal memorandum and records showing that this company and other cigarette makers knew that their products were killing their customers. I'd like you to rise, and those who will be testifying as well.

Not long before these documents appeared, the executives of all the major cigarette companies had been called to Congress. And there's this very iconic photograph that exists where all of them stand up at the witness table and are sworn in, and they hold up their right hand. Do you swear that the testimony you're about to give is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth? I do. Please consider yourself to be under oath. And one by one, they were all asked a question to the effect of,

to your knowledge, are cigarettes addictive? Yes or no. Do you believe nicotine is not addictive? I believe nicotine is not addictive, yes. Mr. Johnston. Congressman, cigarettes and nicotine clearly do not meet the classic definitions of addiction. There is no intoxication. We'll take that as a no. And one by one, each of them said no.

I don't believe that nicotine for our products are addictive. No. I believe nicotine is not addictive. No. I believe that nicotine is not addictive. No. So these executives testified to Congress that they did not believe cigarettes were addictive shortly before the professor received a box of documents showing that the executives, in fact, did know they were harmful to people. That is right. What do we know about who sent these documents? It was a paralegal at the law firm that represented Brown and Williamson. And the reason is often the reason why documents like this come to light. Someone decides that they want the public to know the truth. And it wasn't just Dr. Glanz that got these documents.

A reporter at the Times named Phil Hiltz got them as well, and the Times broke the story. What was the reaction from the public to the revelation of these documents? It was a shock. Probably 25 to 30 documents will be the most incriminating documents ever in the history of tobacco litigation. These are documents you see that we were never supposed to find out about. It showed that the industry had been consciously lying to the public for decades and decades. Internal documents from one company, Brown and Williamson, show the tobacco industry knew the addictive and cancer-causing impact of cigarette smoking for 30 years.

This was a defining moment for the tobacco industry. They're not driven out of business, but there is a tsunami of lawsuits. Good evening. Remember the date, the 20th of June, 1997. It was on this day that the attorneys general of more than 40 states said in Washington that they had finally beaten the tobacco industry into submission. As the first state to sue Big Tobacco, it was only fitting today that Mississippi become the first to get paid. Texas Attorney General Dan Morales presented his settlement with tobacco giants with triumph. Minnesota becomes the fourth state to settle with the tobacco industry over the costs of smoking-related illnesses.

forced the industry not only to pay out hundreds of millions of dollars, but to publicly acknowledge that they've been lying to the public. And as part of the settlement of all these lawsuits, the cigarette makers agreed to end the public advertising of cigarettes on billboards and in other media, be it newspapers or magazines. I can remember doing a story for The Times about the last cigarette billboard. And I mean, they were ubiquitous in the United States at one time. So you had essentially a total cultural shift in how a product was sold and how a product was perceived.

Barry, it's easy to see the parallels between the Brown and Williamson documents that you're referring to and the Purdue Pharma documents that we're starting to lay our eyes on. Do you think that we're in a similar moment for the Sacklers as we were in the 90s when these tobacco documents came out? It's very interesting, Michael, because in the history and the story of every controversial product, be it asbestos or tobacco or narcotic painkillers, they tend to follow the same arc. they tend to follow the same arc. The manufacturers, the industry,

is successful for years or decades in protecting itself. They hire the best lawyers. They hire lobbyists. They're able to deflect, to defend all the attacks against them. And in the process, they also become arrogant. They think they're invulnerable. They think this reckoning is never going to happen. And ultimately, there's a crack. And through that crack, the truth starts seeping through.

And I think that in the case of the Sackler family, that is beginning to happen now. This is their tobacco moment. This is their moment of reckoning. They claim that the documents that have emerged paint an unfair picture, that they've been cherry-picked to vilify them. But Purdue Pharma is free to release all the documents it wants.

If it wants the full story to be out there, that is in the power of the Sackler family, and the Sackler family has chosen not to do so. Barry, the documents that you have been referring to throughout our conversation, I'm realizing that they are, in some cases, 17, 18 years old, 2000, 2001. Why are they just coming out? Well, one of the most troubling aspects to this story, Michael, is the fact that public officials bear responsibility for the opioid epidemic.

I mean, the first investigations of Purdue date back to 2000. But time after time, to settle these lawsuits against Purdue Pharma, Purdue paid public officials money, settlement funds. And in exchange, these officials who represent us agreed to consign these emails, to consign these documents to secrecy as the price of settlement. So these public officials allowed the Sacklers, as owners of Purdue, to buy a kind of collective silence around their culpability. They joined in that collective silence. They didn't just allow the Sacklers to buy it.

They became parties to it. And it's my belief that had these documents come to light, if these public officials had truly acted in the public's interest, that the trajectory of this epidemic would have changed drastically and it would not have evolved into the public catastrophe that it has become. And it's only when these documents are seen by the public and that there's an outcry over them, like there was at the Guggenheim with this blizzard of fake prescriptions, that these public officials are motivated to really do something to stop what's happening. That's right. And ultimately, it's my hope that all these documents will become public and that we will know the history of the opioid epidemic,

much in the same way that we know the history of the tobacco problem now. With these documents, Barry, we're talking about one family, the Sacklers, and one company, Purdue Pharma. If the Sackler family's time running this company and the power that they have begins to fall apart. Where does that leave the rest of the opioid industry? Isn't it very possible that another pharmaceutical company will come along and will take its place, will sell another version of OxyContin? There's a huge market for it and potentially lots of money to be made.

One would like to think that doctors have learned their lesson. One might be naive to think that. But I believe that there has been a change in the overall medical view in the value of opioids. I think doctors have come to a realization that these drugs do have serious consequences. What difference will it make if the Sacklers fall by the wayside? That's a good question. What is important, along with the price they pay, the financial price they pay, which to them probably will be minimal given their fortune,

is that the truth about them will come out. So that when you or I walk past a museum like the Guggenheim and see the Sackler name, or a young idealistic medical student walks into a medical school and sees the name Sackler on that building, we will know who these people are. We will know them for the life they live and the values that they

embraced. And the drug that they sold. And the drug that they sold, yes. Barry, thank you very, very much for this. We appreciate it. Michael, it's always a pleasure. Thank you very, very much for this. We appreciate it. Michael, it's always a pleasure. The Times reports that in a newly disclosed deposition, Richard Sackler repeatedly gave testimony about OxyContin that appears to contradict evidence found by the Department of Justice. In one case, Sackler claimed under oath

that he first learned OxyContin was being abused in 2000, despite an email which shows he was warned a year earlier. Purdue Pharma had fought the public release of the 2015 deposition, which it called, quote, regrettable. Meanwhile, the consequences for the Sacklers continues to grow. Meanwhile, the consequences for the Sacklers continues to grow. Last week, a major hedge fund said it would no longer manage the family's money, as it has for years, because it was uncomfortable with the Sacklers' role in the opioid crisis. Here's what else you need to know today. Clearly what has happened here is an extraordinary and unprecedented act of violence.

A gunman who described himself as a fascist has attacked two mosques in New Zealand, killing at least 49 people in what the country's prime minister called one of New Zealand's darkest days. Police say the shooter broadcast much of the attack using what appeared to be a helmet camera and posted a manifesto that expressed admiration for right-wing extremists, including Dylan Roof, who murdered Black churchgoers in South Carolina. Many of those who will have been directly affected by the shooting may be migrants to New Zealand. They may even be refugees here. They have chosen to make New Zealand their home, and it is their home. They are us. And on Thursday, the Senate voted by a wide margin to overturn

President Trump's declaration of a national emergency at the southern border in a rare bipartisan rebuke of his domestic agenda that is expected to trigger the president's first veto. Never before has a president asked for funding, the Congress has not provided it, and then the president has used the National Emergencies Act of 1976 to spend the money anyway. Lawmakers in both parties characterized the emergency declaration as a clear case of executive overreach designed to circumvent Congress to finance his border wall. The problem with this is that after a revolutionary war against a king, our nation's founders gave to Congress, a Congress elected by the people, the power to approve all spending

so that the president would not have too much power. spending so that the president would not have too much power. This check on the executive is a source of our freedom. The Republicans who broke with Trump said they feared that supporting this national emergency, which they called unwarranted, would lay the groundwork for future Democratic presidents to deploy the same tactic to work around Congress in pursuit of their own agenda. The Daily is produced by Theo Balcom, Lindsay Garrison, Rachel Quester, Annie Brown, Andy Mills, Ike Srees-Kamaraja, Claire Tennesketter, Michael Simon-Johnson, Jessica Chung, Alexandra Lee Young, and Jonathan Wolff, and edited by

Lisa Tobin is our executive producer. Samantha Hennig is our editorial director. Our technical manager is Brad Fisher. Our engineer is Chris Wood. And our theme music is by Jim Brunberg and Ben Lansford of Wonderly. Special thanks to Sam Dolnick, Michaela Bouchard, and Stella Tan. That's it for The Daily. I'm Michael Barbaro.

See you on Monday.