The Daily - What Trump Gave Kim

Episode Date: June 13, 2018

In a joint statement, President Trump and the North Korean leader, Kim Jong-un, committed to complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Why is a seemingly significant promise being dismissed by critics as meaningless? Guest: Nicholas Kristof, an Op-Ed columnist for The New York Times who writes about human rights and global affairs, and who has repeatedly traveled to North Korea. For more information on today’s episode, visit nytimes.com/thedaily.

From The New York Times, I'm Michael Barbaro. This is The Daily. Today, in a joint statement signed by President Trump and Kim Jong-un, North Korea committed to complete denuclearization. Why is a promise that big being dismissed as meaningless? It's Wednesday, June 13th. The letter that we're signing is very comprehensive, and I think both sides are going to be very impressed with the result.

A lot of goodwill went into this, a lot of work, a lot of preparation. I want to thank everybody on both sides, Secretary Pompeo and all of his counterparts. They were absolutely fantastic. And I would actually say that it worked out for both of us far better than anybody could have expected. I think far better. I watched the various news reports. I would say far better than anybody even predicted. And this is going to lead to more and more and more. And it's an honor to be with you.

Very great honor. Thank you. Thank you to all of your representatives very much. Mr. Kim, would you like to come to Washington? Thank you. Thank you, everybody. Thank you, everybody. So, Nick, what are you thinking as this deal is being struck between the president of the United States and the leader of North Korea? What's your initial read on it? Well, I think our president got hoodwinked. Nick Kristof is a columnist for The Times. I mean, it's not really a deal. Nick Kristof is a columnist for The Times.

I mean, it's not really a deal. It's a piece of paper that aspires to a deal. But it looks like we gave up a fair amount just to get that piece of paper, and North Korea didn't really supply anything. And why do you say that? What did both sides agree to? What did they really give up? Chairman Kim and I just signed a joint statement in which he reaffirmed his unwavering commitment to complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. North Korea reaffirmed its commitment to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula.

Chairman Kim has told me that North Korea is already destroying a major missile engine testing site. The U.S. provided security guarantees to North Korea. We will be stopping the war games, which will save us a tremendous amount of money. And also to halt what President Trump called war games, essentially military exercises in the area. So under the circumstances that we're negotiating a very comprehensive, complete deal, I think it's inappropriate to be having war games.

So why, in your mind, does that represent the U.S. giving up a lot and not getting much in return. Because to my mind, on the surface, denuclearization seems like the highest possible aim of these negotiations. And something like military exercises, the U.S. and South Korea basically doing war games, seems kind of symbolic and maybe even meaningless. They're essentially kind of theater. So it seems like the U.S. is They're essentially kind of theater. So it seems like the U.S. is giving us something kind of small and getting something seemingly huge.

It's actually kind of the reverse. We're really not getting something huge. And let me explain the background to the word denuclearization. Which is a seemingly huge thing we're getting. Which is the big thing that supposedly they're giving. This goes back to 1992 when we were negotiating nuclear disarmament and North Korea didn't want to disarm. And so we came up with the word denuclearize to create some fudge room. And to— Fudge room for who? Basically for North Korea.

So when North Korea uses the word denuclearization, they don't mean that they hand over nuclear weapons, except maybe in some distant paradise far off. To North Korea, it means that South Korea will not be protected by American nuclear weapons. So in other words, that the U.S. and South Korea are no longer in an alliance. And so it's very easy for North Korea to make these commitments about denuclearization because it's essentially saying, OK, you guys act first. And then down the road at some point, we won't need nuclear weapons and the problem will be solved. But why would the U.S. agree to use this word if, as you say, that word doesn't seem to mean what we all think it means? or doesn't seem to mean what we all think it means, that it really means for the U.S.

to give up a nuclear protection of the South, as well as the North perhaps giving up some nuclear weapons of its own. So historically, the U.S. has agreed to denuclearization because we know that we can't get a deal and disarmament, North Korea will never agree to it. And so we accept this ambiguity because at least it's the basis for an agreement, even if it way really means they will get rid of their nuclear weapons right away, but maybe someday they'll do it.

And the understanding is that it's better for us to be talking about a word that's ambiguous and negotiating than having North Korea threatening us with nuclear war. Yeah, that's right. And frankly, I mean, I think that the bigger point is that denuclearization is something they've sold us many times in the past, often with much greater specificity about how it would be done than this time.

So an already ambiguous kind of fuzzy word was used in an especially ambiguous and fuzzy form in this summit. That's right. I think we got bamboozled and that it's a nice public relations gesture to hail the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. But this has been hailed all the way back since 1992, hasn't ever meant anything. And there's no reason to think that it will be any more meaningful in 2018 than it was in 1992.

So, Nick, why is what the United States gave up in these negotiations such a big deal? So these military exercises, we hold a series of them around the year, both big ones and small ones. The big ones can involve hundreds of thousands of troops. Stand by. Contact. They involve simulated battles, practicing to be ready for any kind of North Korean attack. Now think of them as a big fire drill. And if you don't have fire drills periodically, you're not going to be ready if there is a fire. And so they've always been regarded as essential to military readiness and also as a crucial part of our relationship with South Korea and with Japan.

And not only did we halt military exercises, but we didn't consult our allies in doing so. So the United States did not talk to South Korea about this decision by President Trump in the middle of negotiations with Kim Jong-un to say we're not going to be doing these exercises anymore. Normally, summits are highly planned, and so you would consult with your allies ahead of time.

South Korea seems to have been completely taken by surprise by the cancellation of exercises. The Pentagon seems also to have been taken by surprise. So this was not anticipated by either our biggest ally in these negotiations, South Korea, or our own military. At the moment, that's what seems to be the case. So in your mind, what to many of us looks like a small deal, ending these military exercises in South Korea is perhaps a very big

deal. And what seems on the surface like a big deal, North Korea saying that it's going to denuclearize is actually a pretty small deal. Yeah, I think that North Korea denuclearizing is indeed a small deal. I mean, they've, you know, there's nothing new there. The military exercises, you know, look, I'd be willing to give them up as part of a process in which we gain something. But I don't think we should just give them up for nothing. thing. Given what you've just explained, why do we think that President Trump negotiated the way he did, gave up what he gave for what he got in return? I think that he approached this summit in a vacuum, in a vacuum of history, in a vacuum of high-level advice. He wanted to leave

the baggage of history and the baggage of human rights behind and just work out a deal based on his feelings with Kim Jong-un. So to operate in that kind of a vacuum, what parts of history and what kinds of issues does the president have to set aside and ignore in these negotiations? You're the only one I've done an outdoor interview and it's about 130 degrees, but that's okay. I think it's about 150, but anyway. He gave an interview to Greta Van Susteren, a voice of America, and really kind of came across as a spokesman for one of the world's leading dictators. What surprised you today about Kim Jong-un?

Really, he's got a great personality. He's a, you know, funny guy. He's a very smart guy. He's a great negotiator. He loves his people. Not that I'm surprised by that, but he loves his people. And I think that we have, you know, the start of an amazing deal. He described American military exercises as provocative, which is what North Korea has always said they are.

We'll be saving a tremendous amount of money. Plus, I think it's very provocative. And in talking about human rights, he said, yeah, North Korea has problems with human rights, but then other countries do too. It's rough. It's rough in a lot of places, by the way. What seems to engage President Trump more is not the past, but is possibilities of the future. Seven billion people inhabit planet Earth. Of those alive today, only a small number will leave a lasting impact. And one of the remarkable things about this summit was that he pulled out an iPad and showed a four-minute promo, kind of a four-minute trailer of the possibilities of a future in which North Korea and the U.S. get along and there's economic development. History is always evolving. And there

comes a time when only a few are called upon to make a difference. And he tried to seduce Kim Jong-un with this vision of what might be possible. What if a people that share a common and rich heritage can find a common future, their story is well known. But what will be their sequel? Hmm. Kind of like a trailer of the future. Of a movie yet to be made. To a degree that feels unsettling. I wonder if to even enter negotiations with a dictator as brutal as Kim Jong-un, if you have to cast aside his atrocities and his repugnant behavior, even to start a negotiation with him?

I think it's a mistake to ignore human rights, for example. I don't think that human rights should be a condition of a nuclear deal. But look, this is a country that the United Nations itself said has no parallel in the world today for violations of human rights. It's a country where if somebody has a radio that has a dial so they can pick up South Korean or Chinese stations, then not only will they be sent. And for the U.S. not to raise these issues and make it clear to Kim Jong-un that when you have 100,000 political prisoners in these camps, that you're just not going to be accepted in the world today, you know, I think that's a missed opportunity. in the world today, you know, I think that's a missed opportunity. So in your mind, it's very much possible to tie this history to these negotiations, to bring them up and to make them a part of the discussions. Look, there's always a risk in complicating any negotiation. And there are all kinds of issues

that different groups think are important. But in 2000, for example, Madeleine Albright went to North Korea for a negotiation. I have often spoken about the importance of the World Food Program. And the way she approached human rights was she brought on her delegation the assistant secretary for human rights as part of the small group that was at the table with the North Koreans. But it's so important to see it in person because your work is vital. Because these children and their brothers and sisters around the country should be able to grow up without fear of emergency shortages or famine.

And that was a way of signaling to the North Koreans that, look, this is an issue that the U.S. cares about, and that if you want normalization of relations, then you've got to clean up your act. I wonder, in your mind, Nick, for this first meeting, which the president says is just kind of an opening salvo in these long-term negotiations with Kim Jong-un. What could have been agreed to that would have been meaningful? What would have been the agreement that you felt would be a success for the United States? I think that it would have been key for North Korea to promise no more nuclear tests, no more missile tests, no more production of plutonium, no more enrichment of uranium.

So real specific understandings about what it means to denuclearize. That's right. But look, I mean, I must also say that the problems of today are a lot better than the problems of six months ago. So I think that the Singapore summit was very badly handled, but I'm really happy that he is now engaging North Korea and that they are conducting real talks. And, you know, I hope to be proven wrong and maybe down the road, some of these things will be fleshed out. So despite all the objections that you have to how Trump conducted these negotiations and all the history and human rights that he seemed to disregard, are both countries, Are both countries, United States and North Korea and our allies, now safer because Trump and Kim are engaged in these talks? Does that automatically lower the chances of nuclear conflict and therefore represent a step in the right direction?

Yes, absolutely. I think that maybe the biggest single risk of the next couple of years was indeed the possibility of a nuclear war beginning in the Korean Peninsula. And I think that is not going to happen now. And that is because the psychology has been changed and there's much less risk of a military accident sparking a broader conflagration. There's also much less risk that President Trump will order an attack on a missile launch in North Korea, for example. So what happened in Singapore, it's a little like that word denuclearization, full of ambiguity. What was achieved so far is not very impressive and, in terms of substance, is pretty disappointing. One can hope, though, that this is the start of a conversation, that this is the start of a process. And it's also striking that President Trump and the Republicans have, in effect, embraced

precisely the process of engagement that Democrats have been talking about vis-a-vis North Korea for more than 20 years. And if there actually is bipartisan support now for engaging a rogue regime like North Korea and trying to solve these problems with diplomacy rather than with bombers, we'll all be safer. Nick, thank you very much. Good to be with you. I think he's, I think, honestly, I think he's going to do these things. I may be wrong.

I mean, I may stand before you in six months and say, hey, I was wrong. I don't know that I'll ever admit that, but I'll find some kind of an excuse. Okay, one or two, one more. Come on. Yeah, go ahead. We'll be right back. Here's what else you need to know today. We'll be right back. argument that the merger would lead to fewer choices and higher prices for consumers. The ruling clears the way for the creation of a media giant that would combine the distribution systems of AT&T, a phone and internet provider, with the content of Time Warner, the owner of CNN, HBO, and Warner Brothers Pictures, something both companies said was necessary

to compete with new rivals like Netflix and Amazon, which both make and distribute content. The Times reports that the court's decision will likely lead to similar mergers across the media industry. That's it for The Daily. I'm Michael Barbaro. See you tomorrow.