The Decibel - Documents reveal fired scientists shared information with China

Episode Date: March 5, 2024

Newly released documents reveal two scientists who worked at a high-security infectious disease lab in Winnipeg provided confidential scientific information to China. Both scientists were fired back i...n 2021, but for years the exact reasons why had been a mystery. The CSIS documents now reveal that one of the scientists was “a realistic and credible threat to Canada’s economic security.”Senior parliamentary reporter, Steven Chase explains who these scientists are and the information they were sharing, foreign interference and why the government took so long to release the documents.Questions? Comments? Ideas? E-mail us at thedecibel@globeandmail.com

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Starting point is 00:00:00 For years, there's been a big mystery around why two scientists were fired from Winnipeg's high-security infectious disease lab. In 2019, Xiang Go-Chu and her husband, Kedeng Cheng, were escorted out of the facility. And then in 2021, they were fired. The incident gained a lot of attention, both publicly and politically. But that's pretty much all we knew. Until last week. That's when previously censored documents came out,
Starting point is 00:00:36 with more information about what these two scientists were doing, and about the information they were sharing with China. The Globe's Steve Chase, along with Bob Fyfe and Marika Walsh, have been reporting on what's in the documents and the reaction to them. Today, Steve's here to tell us what we've learned. I'm Mainika Raman-Wilms, and this is The Decibel from The Globe and Mail. Steve, thank you for being here. Oh, glad to be here. This story is really a years-long saga, but let's start with talking about the two scientists at
Starting point is 00:01:16 the center of all of this, Steve. So what do we know about Xiangou Qiu and Keding Chang. We know a lot more about Dr. Qiu. She is sort of the more important of the two in this whole saga. She got a PhD in medicine in China and a master studies and ended up working at the Canadian National Microbiology Laboratory in Winnipeg in 2003. Now, she was famous because she worked on an experimental biopharmaceutical drug to treat Ebola. And she worked with another scientist at the Winnipeg lab. And the development of this drug won her and the fellow scientist the 2018 Canadian Governor General's Innovation Award. We got funding from the Department of Defense of Canada for developing vaccines and the treatment.
Starting point is 00:02:21 So that's how the work started. And what about her husband? What about Cheng? Not as much is known about him. He also, though, was a researcher at the same Winnipeg lab as her. Let's talk about this lab that they worked at, Steve. What kind of lab is this in Winnipeg? This is a level four facility. So it's equipped to deal with the most serious and deadly human and animal diseases. And that means this lab in Winnipeg is one of only a handful in North America capable of handling pathogens like Ebola require, you know, highest level of containment. and they are supposed to be developing treatments and vaccines for level four diseases, the most serious ones like Lassa fever, Marburg virus disease, et cetera. Okay. So there's lots of information at this lab, access to lots of different things. I imagine
Starting point is 00:03:16 there's pretty strict protocols for actually getting into this lab then. Yeah. Being a high security infectious disease lab, you have to have a clearance of some sort. And that enables you to gain access. So not just anyone's supposed to walk through the doors. Okay. And so this part of the story really starts in July 2019. So what happened then? Well, back in July 2019, we learned because it was reported that Dr. Chu and her husband, Mr. Cheng, and an unknown number of her students from China were removed from the Level 4 lab in Winnipeg.
Starting point is 00:03:55 Staff in the laboratory had been told they were on leave for an unknown period of time, and they were told not to talk to Dr. Chu or Mr. Cheng. So that was in July 2019. But then in 2021, though, they were told not to talk to Dr. Chu or Mr. Chang. So that was in July 2019. But then in 2021, though, they were actually fired? Yeah, in January 2021, both of these scientists are fired from the laboratory. What we learned last week, though, is we learned a lot more about what transpired in the meantime. In August 2020, that's a month after they were removed from the lab, they were notified that their security clearances or their security statuses are suspended immediately, as is their pay pending a review of the matter. And then in January 2019, we learned last week
Starting point is 00:04:40 that they are informed that their reliability status and their security and their secret security clearances are revoked. And then, of course, on January 20th, they're officially terminated. That's January 20th, 2021. Okay. So as you referenced, Steve, that we saw these documents last week that really kind of showed us a lot more of what we had no idea was going on behind the scenes during all of this time. We learned really why these scientists were fired. So let's start getting into this a little bit. I guess,
Starting point is 00:05:08 what did we learn, but also how did we learn it? Well, as you said at the outset, this is a bit of a saga. The attempt to get to the bottom of this started years ago and really began in earnest in January 2021. And when I say attempt, I mean attempt by journalists and attempt by opposition parties. And all three opposition parties, despite their differences, worked together to try to force the government to come clean. Because what we were being told in 2021, after we learned back then that the scientists were fired, is that this was an administrative matter and therefore it's confidential because it involves personnel. And as the months wore on in January 2021, February 2021, March 2021,
Starting point is 00:05:51 the government's tune suddenly switched, and they began to say it's about national security. So there was essentially a struggle between opposition parties and the Liberal government to get the Liberal government to release all documents related to the firing of these two scientists. And then it took subsequently, it took, you know, a couple of years for the government and opposition parties to agree on how these would be released. And that's what brought us to essentially a massive document dump last week. OK, so basically, bottom line is the government did not really want to release these documents. Last week, we got these documents. What exactly was in these documents? These documents explained why the government dismissed these two scientists.
Starting point is 00:06:35 It explained to us that they were fired after a probe concluded that Dr. Chu posed a, quote, realistic and credible threat to Canada's security. And after it was discovered that she and Mr. Cheng had essentially lied, covered up, and refused to reveal the full scale of their cooperation with China until evidence was presented to them. Wow. Okay, so there's lots of breakdown here. But I guess let's start by talking about their connection to China, Steve, what do we know? Part of the documents that were released were the CSIS investigation, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, kind of the spy agency, which was called in to do a lot of the heavy lifting here. And it revealed, you know, the documents revealed rather what it called a close and clandestine relationship with a variety of entities in the People's Republic of China. One thing they found out, for instance, is that Dr. Chu had a whole different resume,
Starting point is 00:07:33 a whole different CV in China compared to the one she used in Canada. In her curriculum vitae for China, it included cross postings or essentially appointments at three universities or research facilities that were not included in her Canadian CV, a visiting professor at the Wuhan Virology Institute, visiting professor at Hebei Medical University, visiting research fellow at China's National Institute for Food Drug Control, and visiting professor at Beijing Institute for Biotechnology. And then they discovered that she had been getting involved in the Chinese government's talent programs. These talent programs, sometimes referred to as the thousand talent programs, are efforts by China to recruit scientists, experts, normally of Chinese origin, who have traveled abroad and studied and worked to recruit them to bring this knowledge back to China. They found applications and correspondence with a number
Starting point is 00:08:30 of these talent programs that aim to sort of boost China's national technological capabilities, but also which CISA said may pose a serious threat to research institutions, including government research facilities by incentivizing economic espionage and theft of intellectual property. They discovered she had a bank account in China that she hadn't revealed, and she'd conducted research connected to the People's Liberation Army. In fact, her research, some of it had been conducted with Chinese research at Chinese defense universities or defense complexes. And Major General Chen Wei, who was a high-ranking official in the People's Liberation Army, wasn't one of her collaborators.
Starting point is 00:09:10 Of course, collaboration happens between countries, especially with universities. But can you just really spell it out for us? Why are these things cause for concern for Canada? Well, CISA said she was reckless in her dealings with institutions whose goals are potentially lethal military applications that are manifestly not in the interest of Canada or its citizens. For instance, the Chinese military's interest in infectious diseases is not humanitarian. In fact, the CSIS investigation found she was approved to participate in a project at Wuhan Virology Institute that would look at cross-species infection and pathogenic risks of bat filoviruses. Work that the service said suggests gain-of-function studies were possibly to take place. And of course, gain-of-function studies include research to improve the ability of a pathogen to cause disease in order to help define the fundamental nature of human-pathogen interactions. We'll be back in a moment.
Starting point is 00:10:11 So, Steve, you mentioned she lied or she had different things on, you know, her CV for Canada versus her CV for China. But I mean, why wouldn't we know and why wouldn't CSIS know about the scientists' connection to China earlier? If they're kind of this level of concern, I guess, yeah, why didn't we know this ahead of time? Well, she didn't tell them. This all was kept from management or from security agencies. In fact, this whole episode began in 2018, according to these documents, when the public health agency suddenly learns that she's a listed inventor of a Chinese patent that in fact may contain research she did at the Winnipeg lab. So that's where this all
Starting point is 00:10:52 started. They went to see her and they said, you know, what's going on here? Why are you named on a patent in China? And she said that she, yes, she admitted the work had been done at the Winnipeg lab. And she acknowledged that she hadn't obtained a collaboration authorization, a collaboration agreement. And then she talked about other collaborations she was doing in China for which she also hadn't obtained proper collaboration authorization. So that's where they recommended further investigation. And that's where CSIS was brought in. And when CSIS asked her about this, I imagine they went to her to talk about this. I guess what was her response? Both scientists in August 2020 filed grievances
Starting point is 00:11:38 with the public health agency, in which they alleged that they were victims of discrimination because they were Chinese. And they claimed they were victims of discrimination because they were Chinese, and they claimed they were asked specific and personal questions regarding their connections to China as a result of racial profiling. The documents last week describe her as being dishonest when confronted with her actions, making, quote, blanket denials and, quote, half-truths, and refused to admit any involvement in various PRC programs, even when documents about this work were laid before her. PRC, of course, is People's Republic of China, yeah.
Starting point is 00:12:16 And another thing is CSIS discovered that Chu was nominated for an International Cooperation Award by China's Academy of Military and Medical Sciences for using Canada's Level 4 biosecurity lab as a base to assist China to improve its capability to fight highly pathogenic pathogens and achieve brilliant results. And there's not, according to the nomination there. So this scientist is highly valued by the Chinese military. We can assume that the Chinese military's reasons for wanting to work on infectious disease research are not humanitarian. The concern, as CSIS has it, is that they are nefarious. So is the idea here, Steve, that she was doing work in the Winnipeg lab and then giving those
Starting point is 00:12:56 results of that research to the Chinese military? She was not only helping them from the Winnipeg lab, she was making trips to China to convey her research, to share her research, to help them set up their labs and conduct their research. But she was lying to the Canadian government about this. A public health agency investigation in October 2020 found that Chu lied about the nature of her trips to China from Canada. In April 2018, she said she took a personal trip to Beijing, but after investigators confronted her with evidence found on the computer drives,
Starting point is 00:13:31 she acknowledged she was compensated for all expenses by a Chinese company. And she also said that on October 2018 trip to China that she had told her employers was a personal vacation. She later acknowledged, after being presented with the evidence, October 2018 trip to China that she had told her employers was a personal vacation, she later acknowledged, after being presented with the evidence, that their trip was paid for by the Wuhan Institute for Virology. And so it sounds like there's information being shared here. Do we know what exactly she was sharing with China? Yes, she was sharing the results of her
Starting point is 00:14:01 research into infectious diseases. So not only the findings, but also at some point she was shipping vials of disease to China. Now this was known before and what we'd heard before is she simply had not obtained the correct paperwork. But now we see it in the context of everything else that's been discovered and it seems more concerning. Do we know why Dr. Chu and her husband, why they were working with China? Like, we see it in the context of everything else that's been discovered, and it seems more concerning. Do we know why Dr. Chu and her husband, why they were working with China? Like, was there some form of compensation? It sounds like she was paid for trips, but was there more than that?
Starting point is 00:14:39 It's not clear because they appear to have fled the country and aren't available to explain this to us and don't return any emails or phone calls to their homes that they own in Winnipeg. But we did find that authorities had discovered grant or funding agreements between various of these talent programs I discussed earlier and Dr. Chu, where she would be provided with research. In one case, it would have worked out to $1.2 million of research funding. Other ones would have paid less than that, you know, $15,000 a month or whatever when she was on site. Let's talk a little bit more about the documents and kind of the fallout from that. So, Steve, it took a long time for us to actually get this information, have it out in the open. What changed last week? Why are the documents finally out there for us to see? There was an agreement reached last year between opposition
Starting point is 00:15:30 parties and the government on a process for getting the documents out there while protecting national security. And that agreement meant that one MP from each major party would sit on a special committee and review all the documents in their uncensored form and then make recommendations of what could be released. And then the agreement was that it would then be scrutinized by a bunch of former judges. And the former judges would weigh national security against the need to inform Canadians. And that process finally finished. It came to an end, I think, in February, they issued their report. And that's why we now have the documents in their mostly unredacted form.
Starting point is 00:16:15 And now that the documents are out in the open, what has the government said about all of this? The government, I think, has tried to play down the revelations. They tried to blame it on the Public Health Agency. They said that there is a sense that the Public Health Agency is an independent agency. And so they said it was their Canada in terms of stuff that was leaving the lab, which is really puzzling because in 2021, they said releasing these documents could harm national security. And they said when pressed that they had stopped sharing dangerous pathogens with China. What about PHAC, the Public Health Agency of Canada? Of course, it's responsible for this lab in Winnipeg. What has PHAC said about all of this? They had sort of a very generic statement about how they've made important enhancements to security measures, training, and a new process to vet and approve collaborations between Canadian scientists and foreign scientists. And the opposition parties, of course, you mentioned before, they've been really vocal
Starting point is 00:17:28 in trying to get these documents released. What's been the response in the last week to this? Well, the Conservative Party, the leader Pierre Polyever said that, put this in the context of the government's, you know, failure to protect Canadian information and Canadian research, and that it was, they had allowed essentially the Chinese military to infiltrate Canada's top infectious disease lab. And Steve, you mentioned we haven't been able to get in touch with the scientists at the center of all this to actually hear their perspective. How is that? How have we not been able to find them? Well, they don't answer our emails. We have an old email for Dr. Chu, and it was used years ago, but she doesn't respond anymore.
Starting point is 00:18:11 It's still operative. They have a house in Winnipeg that we have visited many times. Often we end up speaking with the tenants, and the tenants show us that they're dealing with her on WeChat, which is a Chinese social media application that is normally used by people in China. All indications are she's in China when they're talking to her. Evidence came out, I think it was the Vanity Fair article last fall on this, talked about her having a position or at least an honorary position at Hebei University and her name appearing on more patents in China. So we're guessing she is in China as well as her husband. So Steve, we've talked to you about lots of different forms of foreign interference over the months, but how does all of this fit into
Starting point is 00:19:02 the broader conversation around foreign interference in Canada? It adds to the narrative and adds to what we know about China's efforts to interfere in Canada. And in fact, it was the health minister, Mark Holland, the Liberal health minister himself, who really drew this out last week when he said, explained why Canada has stopped sharing deadly pathogens with China. And the answer he gave was because the Chinese government is making active efforts to infiltrate our scientific community for purposes that are not for collaboration. Steve, thank you so much for taking the time to be here today. Welcome. And a little note before we go.
Starting point is 00:19:44 This week, the Globe and Mail is celebrating its 180th birthday. The Globe has always worked to provide journalism that matters, and we want to thank you for supporting The Decibel and The Globe and Mail. Okay, that's it for today. I'm Maina Karaman-Wilms. Our producers are Madeline White, Cheryl Sutherland, and Rachel Levy-McLaughlin. David Crosby edits the show. Adrian Chung is our senior producer, and Angela Pachenza is our executive editor. Thanks so much for listening, and I'll talk to you tomorrow.

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