The Decibel - Former ambassador on why Canada needs a foreign agent registry
Episode Date: March 20, 2023As revelations about China’s interference continue, so do calls for a foreign agent registry. The U.S. and Australia have registries like this, where anyone acting on behalf of a foreign entity has ...to disclose it. But the idea has its detractors.David Mulroney, a former Canadian ambassador to China, has been advocating for a foreign agent registry for years. He explains how it might work in Canada, why it’s controversial and how the registry could slow China’s interference campaign in Canada.Questions? Comments? Ideas? E-mail us at thedecibel@globeandmail.com
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China's interference in Canada, who's involved and how they've done it,
is a big concern for Canada's national security.
And some Canadian politicians and diplomats are calling for a foreign agent registry,
so the public would know who's being paid by or acting on behalf of a foreign entity.
But the idea is controversial.
David Mulroney has been pushing for a foreign agent registry for years,
something similar to the one Australia brought in.
He was Canada's ambassador to China from 2009 to 2012.
He's a frequent contributor to The Globe, and he recently wrote about this.
Today, David joins me to explain how a foreign agent registry might work here, why it's so contentious, and what difference he thinks it could make.
I'm Mainika Raman-Wilms, and this is The Decibel from The Globe and Mail.
David, thank you so much for joining me today.
Great to be with you, Maynika.
So I want to get into how a foreign agent registry might work in Canada.
But first, let's just establish, what would the goal be of having a registry like this?
Well, foreign influence, and we should talk about there's foreign influence and there's foreign interference.
Foreign influence has been with us forever. I'm a past retired and unapologetic foreign influencer as a Canadian diplomat,
as the ambassador to China. I told a story about Canada to people, to various audiences in China,
and wanted them to understand Canada as a remarkable destination for tourism and education,
as a source of really cutting edge technologies, and as a key player in the region and the world.
But I did that overtly.
I did that as the Canadian ambassador under the Maple Leaf.
There was no doubt as to who I was and why I was saying this,
just like all the other ambassadors and other diplomats.
Where it's problematic is when you try to influence behind the scenes.
And then influence, covert influence,
gets closer to the really serious problem,
which is interference,
which is trying to disrupt and undermine
legitimate institutions.
So what we're concerned about is identifying influencers,
requiring transparency of them.
So we're not saying you can't speak or act
or even disperse money on behalf of a foreign state, but you have to do it transparently.
So if someone is working non-transparently, covertly for a foreign state and shows up on a show like this or on any kind of news show or in a public forum,
Canadians can be deceived if they don't understand what might be motivating the speaker's remarks.
Does it also, I guess, make people think twice,
potentially, about working with a foreign entity?
Like, is that part of the motivation here at all?
I think it should get your attention, particularly if you're a former official.
Anything that requires your disclosure that says,
stop, wait, you have to tell Canadians about this,
should at least get your attention.
And you should be aware that you're doing something that is worthy or that requires transparency. It should make you think. When
Australia introduced its registry, just days before it came into effect, a number of very
prominent former public figures stepped off the boards of, in this case, Chinese companies and
entities. And they said, no, there's no association with this. It was just time. But it was just interesting to see the timing. They didn't want to be, I believe, spotlighted in that
way. So when we're talking about this foreign agent registry in Canada, we're not just talking
about China then? Which countries would we be talking about? Well, strictly speaking, it could
be all countries. Someone might be acting for in a non-transparent way. Most countries that we're allied with, think of
Australia or the United States or France, do their influencing publicly.
Okay. So, David, with a registry like this, who would be considered a foreign agent?
So, there are two categories to consider. First, there are foreign principles. So,
how are foreign states
present in Canada? And they're present through their diplomatic representation,
but a registry would also establish that maybe a community group or a company or some kind of an
association was actually funded by a foreign state. So it identifies foreign principles.
And then once you're identified as a foreign principle, people who are working for you need to register so that Canadians can know that you're working.
Even though this is called the so-and-so cultural foundation, it's actually funded by a foreign state.
So if you're an employee of that or a spokesperson for that, you need to register as a foreign agent.
And so is that the key, the funding is coming from a foreign state, that the money is really what we're looking at here?
It's money, but it's also, it could be political loyalty, it could be family connections and
perhaps even coercion. So there are money, it's always about money, but it could be about other
things. If you're acting for the state, delivering its talking points, lobbying for it, or cutting checks or delivering payoffs for it, you have to be transparent.
Just to be clear here, though, there are Canadians who would support the Chinese government
potentially, but aren't being paid by them. So just to be clear, someone's political views
wouldn't put them on this list, right? Absolutely not. Okay. If you were doing it, if you were a Communist Party member and had lived in Canada for some time and wanted to further the aims of China's Communist Party and were actually working at the direction of the embassy, for example, you'd be a foreign agent.
If you stand up and say, I was a communist in China and I'm a communist in
Canada, that's not against the law, that's free. But if you're doing it and you're activated or
working at the direction of a foreign principal, so it requires both a principal and your own
agency, someone who's directing you and your willingness to be directed, whatever the
motivation. I think we think a lot about former politicians, people who did hold power.
So what about former politicians taking on a job once they're done their government role?
So I've thought a lot about that because I come from a world, I wasn't a politician,
I was a public servant, but sometimes the responsibilities are the same.
And there are cooling off periods, in some cases, in the case
of public servants, it's a year within which you can't take a job in the private sector.
And one of the things that's designed to do is to avoid the case where you're influenced in your
last years by your next potential employer. And that's a real problem. Australia has taken that
further. And this is part of the,
and I know we'll talk about this, and what they're saying is that transparency is required of public
servants for a much longer time. For senior public servants, deputy ministers, and ambassadors,
and senior political staffers, it's 15 years. And for ministers and prime ministers, it's a lifetime.
I just want to clarify one thing, just so I'm sure I understand this. So if you're a former
prime minister, for example, you have to be transparent for the rest of your life if you're
working for a foreign entity. How is that different from a regular person?
The key is everybody is required for life to disclose anything they're doing that sees them speaking for,
lobbying for, or dispersing money for a foreign principal.
Where this applies to a former public servant or former elected official is that they need
to disclose any work they're doing for a foreign principal at any time, not just the speaking or lobbying or dispersing money.
If they do anything for a foreign principal, including providing general advice, working for them in any way, they have a lifetime obligation for transparency for any association with a foreign principle.
That's not the case for people who haven't come from those backgrounds or don't have
that position of influence in society.
Okay.
So let's say a former politician, a former Canadian politician decides to work at a
university in the UK, let's say.
Would they have to register?
Would they be considered a foreign agent in that situation?
No, they wouldn't.
And that would not be a case where a former politician needs to register.
But if that former politician goes on the board of a bank that is controlled by a foreign
state, that is something that would have to be
disclosed because it could be, he's acting directly for the foreign state.
Okay. I want to ask you about a Chinese example because it's a little bit of an interesting
situation here because right now there's very close ties between the companies and the government
in China. Companies there can be forced to hand over information and intelligence to the Chinese
government. And that's part of the reason, of course, why we're seeing all these concerns
around TikTok these days. So would any Canadian working for any Chinese company have to register
as a foreign agent? I think we're pretty much at that state. We were heading in that direction
when Xi Jinping took power, the leader of China. We see Xi even
to this day squeezing senior corporate leaders. They disappear for a time if they've crossed Xi.
They have a responsibility if asked by the state to conduct themselves, to share foreign
intelligence. So I think we have to question the reliability of all major Chinese companies. It's clear that the party is now much more in control of the private sector, what passed for the private sector in China, than it has ever been.
Okay.
Okay, practically, how would this list happen?
Like, would people volunteer this information? If you're working for an entity that is classified as a foreign principal, i.e.
acting under the direction of a foreign state, in this case in Canada, you would have to register.
So what if someone doesn't though? Are there penalties?
There are. It's a criminal offense.
Okay. So jail time we're talking?
Fine or jail time, yes. Okay.
And so what happens once someone is declared a foreign agent?
What is this information that we're compiling here?
It just allows other Canadians to make a judgment about what they're saying and doing,
and it also makes clear the connections that that person has with a foreign state.
And I would hope that journalists, for example, before someone is asked to speak on a panel show or whatever, would look up and be able to say so-and-so is also registered as someone who's working on behalf of China or Yemen or Saudi Arabia or what have you.
And it allows Canadians to be more informed about that.
So this would exist like as a list online on a website that people could go to?
Yeah, you can look at the Australian list and you can see who's on it.
You can see what entities are on it as foreign principals and you can see who's on it as
having disclosed a working relationship with a foreign principal.
We'd have to acknowledge that this is a difficult thing to get right.
The Australians are struggling with theirs, and they're struggling with it.
If you look on the Australian registry, for example,
you'll see a whole bunch of postings from a former prime minister
who I think has decided that the way it's worded is so loose
that he, in this case it's he, needs to disclose everything.
And I think he may also be making a point.
He's got any work he's done for the BBC or Radio New Zealand or things like that.
And that is a problem.
The Australians haven't got it focused enough on the particular areas they're most interested in. So it's not uncontroversial,
but it allows Australia to act against foreign influence.
We'll be right back.
So there is a bill in the Senate right now
looking to start up a foreign agent registry.
The government has started consultations on setting up something like this here in Canada.
Do we know, has the government looked at what's gone on in Australia to try and learn from what happened there with this registry?
I would hope so, although I think some of the official thinking in Canada, both at the level of the House of Commons and the Senate,
has been more focused on the House of Commons and the Senate itself and influence on those bodies.
Absolutely important.
But I think the Australian measure goes further because it talks about influence in society itself and attempts to corrupt institutions. I mean, it would allow you to get at things like community organizations, student groups that are being undermined and victimized by the Chinese state.
So I would hope that they'd also take a look at what Australia has done.
So, David, as we said, this is not a measure that's without controversy.
Some people really don't like this idea.
And one of the arguments against it is that,
well, you know, Canada already has laws on the books around lobbying and conflict of interest.
So wouldn't a lot of these situations already be covered by those things? Like,
do we really need a registry like this that's separate?
Some of the things that the registry, the Australian registry covers that we don't cover
are just the communicating instances where at community associations, people of some authority in the
community get up and parrot talking points that have been written elsewhere. And what it also
doesn't cover is dispersing funds. And that gets at the proxy question that I think is really at
the heart of a lot of interference if we look at how China delivers its interference.
So it's just, I like the broader sweep.
Does this require careful and respectful consultation?
Absolutely.
So getting that right so that you're protecting the institution, you're protecting society,
but also protecting liberty and free speech, not easy. But I think where we are in the world and in world affairs means that we have to start
thinking along these lines.
And not thinking about it is allowing a degree of interference to happen that is beginning
to erode and undermine some of our institutions and also leaving people like diaspora communities
more vulnerable to interference and harassment by China. We need to get focused on
this because China is targeting its diaspora. China uses its diaspora and victimizes its
diaspora as a means of gaining influence. So that means we have to tread very, very carefully,
but we can't stay on the sidelines. I worry sometimes that we cede authority to China
because we're afraid to claim that authority.
Another criticism of this is essentially that this could stoke racism.
This is something that Public Safety Minister Marco Mendicino
and International Trade Minister Mary Ng have both raised concerns about,
that a registry like this could end up targeting Chinese Canadians unfairly and stoking anti-Asian racism. So what do you make of these concerns?
I wrote an op-ed recently in which I said that a register, creating a register isn't racist,
but assuming that all the names on the register would be Chinese is racist. This has nothing to
do with ethnicity. It's not targeting anyone
other than people who are working covertly for a foreign state. And a large focus of my interest
is on the Ottawa community, retired public servants and retired elected officials. That's a
community of many ethnicities. But we know how easy and how quickly these sentiments can unfortunately be stoked.
And we saw that a lot with COVID, right?
How quickly we saw that anti-Asian racism kick in.
How do we actually make sure that this registry doesn't turn into something xenophobic? Because the other thing that we need to focus on is the issue of the day is Chinese interference, interference by Beijing and Canadian politics.
But it's also something that we've seen in association with Russia.
It's a global phenomenon.
We are more exposed to the Beijing variant of it, but it is something that comes from many sources.
David, you were ambassador to China about a decade ago now, and the relationship between our two countries has definitely deteriorated since then. How do you think China would respond
to Canada creating this foreign agent registry?
Well, and in fairness, I think China's relationship with a lot of countries has
deteriorated in the last 10 years.
It's the rise of Xi Jinping and a much more aggressive and assertive China.
China would complain loudly if we were to do this and also stoke fears of racism.
But I think at the moment, China is looking at Canada as perhaps the least well-defended five-eye state, which is the
intelligence-sharing agreement that involves the United States, United Kingdom, Australia,
New Zealand, and Canada.
They would complain loudly, but they would also bemoan, privately bemoan the fact that
a door that has been left open is getting closed on them.
The danger we face is because we are perhaps the least vigilant, or along with
New Zealand possibly, we are likely to be more victimized. We're in easier access. And that's
particularly, that's exacerbated by the fact that we are a neighbor of the United States. So we're
a soft window on their prime target. So the tougher we get, the smarter we get, the less likely we are to be victimized by
this kind of interference. Of course, the Canadian government, though, would always want to think
about these international relationships. So how would Canada maintain good, reasonable relationships
with China while also bringing in a registry like this? At the end of the day, there's only so much
we can do, and it's up to China. And if China doesn't act in ways that allow for a good relationship,
if China creates a situation where we have to think of the relationship more narrowly,
and by the way, given where we've been in the last seven or eight years,
I think that's not a bad thing.
We do need to rein things in and think much more closely about what our interests are
and what our vulnerabilities are. The problem is we haven't been doing that thinking.
Just lastly here, we've been talking a lot about how China is influencing Canadian politics more
broadly. The Globe has done a lot of reporting on this in the last month. If a registry like this
was brought in, how much of a difference do you think it would actually make in that broader issue of influence?
Would it solve all of our problems?
Not at all.
Would it get people thinking about the problem and thinking in ways that are creative and
contribute to transparency?
Yes.
I think the most positive effect would probably be on the Ottawa community, where people would
think twice about whether they want to be in a registry or not, would think twice about whether their lack of transparency might somehow be exposed. That's what's happened in Australia. That's not a bad thing. It wouldn't solve all our problems, but it would send us in the right direction. And it would send a powerful message to China that we're beginning to think about these things long after we should have, but we're beginning.
David, thank you so much for taking the time to talk to me today.
A pleasure. Thank you.
That's it for today.
I'm Mainika Raman-Wellens.
Our producers are Madeline White, Cheryl Sutherland, and Rachel Levy-McLaughlin.
David Crosby edits the show.
Adrian Chung is our senior producer, and Angela Pachenza is our executive editor.
Thanks so much for listening, and I'll talk to you tomorrow.