The Derivative - The 6-Year Test 10,000 Tickers Failed: with Eric Crittenden of Standpoint Funds

Episode Date: July 30, 2026

In this episode of The Derivative, host Jeff Malec welcomes back Standpoint Asset Management founder and CIO Eric Crittenden for his third appearance, diving into what’s happened since Standpoint launched in 2019 and why their approach has remained unchanged. Eric explains why he resists the industry’s obsession with “constant innovation,” favoring disciplined stability in his trend-following and multi-asset process, and how the past six years, from COVID to fast crashes and energy shocks, have stress-tested both his risk management and investor behavior.Jeff and Eric dig into the “abandonment problem” in advisor portfolios: why investors love managed futures when they’re hot but struggle to stick with them, and how combining global equity beta with trend-following in one vehicle can make diversification more holdable. Eric outlines three simple metrics advisors say they want, beat a 60/40, lower volatility, and low equity beta, and reveals how few of the 11,000+ funds available at launch delivered on that promise.The conversation also covers replication, capacity and market selection, correlation myths, and why Eric prefers trend plus cap-weighted equities over bonds for long-term compounding. They close with thoughts on AI, product structures, and how categorization and reporting frameworks can work against good investor outcomes.Chapters:00:00-01:12=Intro01:13-11:41=Stable Strategy in a Chaotic Market: Standpoint’s Six-Year Stress Test11:42–17:33 = Replicators vs Originals: The Trade‑Offs of Cloning Managed Futures17:34–31:13 = When Trend and Stocks Both Hurt: Correlation, Drawdowns, and Knowing When It’s Broken31:13–49:46 = Beating 60/40 and the Bucket Problem: Why True Diversifiers Are So Rare49:47–57:34 = Buckets, Burritos, and the Sausage Problem: Making Diversification Holdable57:35–01:06:41 = Where Standpoint Fits: Liquid Alts, Multi-Asset Overlay, and Rethinking BondsFrom the episode:Liquid Alternatives - RCM AlternativesPrevious episodes with StandpointBLNDX[ing] Trend Following and Global Equity with Standpoint’s Eric Crittenden on The DerivativeTrends, Inflation Protection, & Getting Investors to the Finish Line with Eric Crittenden of StandpointDon't forget to subscribe to⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠The Derivative⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠, follow us on Twitter at⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠@rcmAlts⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ and⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠sign-up for our blog digest⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠.Disclaimer: This podcast is provided for informational purposes only and should not be relied upon as legal, business, or tax advice. All opinions expressed by podcast participants are solely their own opinions and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of RCM Alternatives, their affiliates, or companies featured. Due to industry regulations, participants on this podcast are instructed not to make specific trade recommendations, nor reference past or potential profits. And listeners are reminded that managed futures, commodity trading, and other alternative investments are complex and carry a risk of substantial losses. As such, they are not suitable for all investors. For more information, visit⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠www.rcmalternatives.com/disclaimer⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠

Welcome to the derivative by RCM Alternatives. Send it. Hello there. Welcome back to the derivative by RCM Alternatives, where we have a new page on the new website, dedicated to Liquid Alts, mutual funds and ETFs, giving you exposure to managed futures and crypto and the like,

showing performance, giving descriptions, using our own categorizations, so you know exactly what's under the hood. So go check it out at rcmaltz.com slash liquid. RCMaltz.com slash liquid. And you'll see StandPoint's BLNDX fund on there. And just so happens, we have Standpoint founder Eric Crittenden

as our guest today. Talking the abandonment problem, the bucket problem, the Chipotle Burrito solution, and how to filter funds for what investors are really after. Participation on the upside, less risk, and low correlation. Send it. All right, everyone, we're here with Eric Crittenden, Eric, how are you?

I'm good, Jeff. How you doing? Good. What happened to your... We've done a few pods before. What happened to your? Nice artwork in your background. Oh, it's still on the wall.

It's just the wall in front of me. I had to flip the office. A little bit of construction, some electrical work, other things. It's temporary, so forgive the bare background. We'll be back to normal in a couple months. Love it. All right. It just makes me worried you're like one of the...

Maybe you are. Like, you're the mad scientist just in a plain office. nothing on the walls. Try to stay sane. Yeah. You start taking plan on life. Right. Take some dry race markers and just start doing formulas on the wall. A beautiful mind style. Yeah, exactly. No, now that era has passed for me. So I'm done. I'm done. It's just an execution mode now. Love it. So third time on the pod, can you remember the first time, the year? You know, I felt like I was a teenager back then, but what was that? Seven years ago? Six and a half years? ago, I think. Yeah, it was July of 20, so nearly six years ago on the dot. Oh, yeah, that's

right. So we, yeah, I remember. Feels like we've been through four or five market cycles since then. It's been kind of a wild time. Exactly. So we've done nearly 300 podcast episodes since then. You had just launched and you're still going since then. So what else? What's changed since then? What stayed the same? Well, I mean, a lot of things in the world have changed. What's that word, chronocentricity, where we always think that whatever's happening right now is more important than anything that's ever happened historically. I think we all fall victim to that from time to time, but definitely the past six years have been consequential. Different. I thought it was recency bias. I like your word better. Yeah, chronocentricity.

Yeah, it's not my word. I stole that from Liz Chappelle, I think. He's in Buck. Yeah, he may have used it as well. Yeah, a lot has changed in the world. Nothing really has changed here at standpoint. We're just continue to do the same thing that we've always done. You know, our research goes back to 1970. I like to invest the same way I would have invested back then. That's important to me. So unless we're forced to change, you're not going to see us changing. You know, there's a fine line between changing and breaking discipline and we don't want to, we don't want to test that. But assets are chain, right? So back a year in, I can't remember what you're at, maybe 50 million or something? Yeah, yeah, about 50. So yeah, we've had nice asset growth. I think we're at

850 now. So yeah, I think I'm thankful for that. You know, you like assets to grow. So, so far, so good. It's been a fairly successful journey. We hope to get a lot bigger in the future, though. Right. And how it's a weird thing, too, like it's just based on the compounded growth, like you don't even need to get new clients, right? Like the compounded growth, the assets will grow on their own. Yeah. I mean, that's the physics of finance. right and if you're compounding at whatever eight 10, 12 a year, you're growing your own asset base. But we're actively looking for inflows. You know, I built this thing to have capacity over 20 billion. I don't know the we ever get to 20 billion, but I'd like to get into the, you know, two, three billion.

That's kind of the sweet spot for a strategy like this. So we're going to attempt to grow assets and generate returns. Market-wise, right? We said politically and economically things have changed a lot. What about market-wise? Have you seen more electronic, less trending markets, anything like that? What's the last six years where it looked like market-wise? You know, I stopped looking at the microstructure of markets a while back because it doesn't really affect what we're due. We're medium to long-term in our approach.

So I haven't really been paying attention. You would know more about, you know, with all your execution desks and algos, you guys are always trying to get me to sign up for. We like to keep the simple, you know, use time-weighted average price orders. So, and we don't fear the microstructure. That's why we don't have short-term trend following. If we had short-term, like very short-term, you know, less than six months, maybe even less than three months, we would spend more time looking at the microstructure of the markets.

But because we don't, it's really outside the scope of what we do and what we need to worry about. So I couldn't tell you. You tell me, well, how much has the microstructure changed on your end? I don't know, either. So we'll skip over that time. I don't think much, right? but how about the trendiness, right? A lot of times, April of last year, the first tariff tantrum,

April of this year when the war, a lot of whipsaw market movements. People are saying, trend is broken. Look how it doesn't catch this new crisis period. What have you seen in those six years since we're last on? Like, has the market changed, has the trendiness changed, or is that just always people putting narrative on what's happening? I think it's more narrative. I mean, the trendiness of the market, the signal to noise ratio is always changing.

Sometimes it's getting better. Sometimes it's getting worse. During COVID, you know, things sped up to a very high rate that people were not familiar with. If they hadn't looked at data from, say, like, the 70s where things high, we had a high signal to noise ratio. A lot of whipsawes from time to time. Other times you get beautiful, slow trending markets, it comes and goes. If there was a way to predict that, we'd be trying to do that. But it just turns out that according to my research, there's just no way to predict whether you're going into a trend friendly era or a counter trend friendly era.

So in the last six and a half years, I think we've gotten like multiple market cycles compressed into one relatively short period of time. So like I said, we've had, you know, fast trends during COVID. You had slow trends after that. And then you had the tariff tantrum where it became extremely difficult. You know, I remember one day the S&P, I think was up 11% in like 20 seconds in the morning. So, you know, there's really not a lot you can do about that. It's just you have to account for the fact that it's going to happen to you from time to time and have that budgeted into your risk management process and accept your lumps when they come.

So, but it's been, you know, it's interesting that a lot of people tell me that, you know, you launched, you know, right before COVID, the end of 2019. And it's been an amazing period of time for managed features trend following. And there's some truth to that statement. There's also a lot of trend following managers had their work. drawdowns ever during that period of time. Yeah, I'd say it's been a hard period. Yeah, it's been both productive and profitable,

but also incredibly difficult at other times and incredibly unprofitable. So I think the last six and a half years have been a great stress test for somebody who's running a managed features trend following program to see if they stuck with their strategy and how way they did. You know, my risk management philosophy

certainly got stress tested during that period of time and I'm happy with what it did. But there was some pain along the way, and it wasn't insignificant. Are people asking you that, are they're kind of saying, hey, you're doing great, but that was just this great trend period that we went through is why you're doing great. Right. You know, I hear that quite a bit from the smart people, you know, and then I just point out that while that's true, on the back end of that was probably the toughest period of time I've ever seen.

So, you know, it's kind of a good period of time to evaluate someone. Did you make money when you were supposed to make money? Yes or no? And did you manage risk on the back end when a lot of people were giving all of that back and more? So, and they look at the scoreboard and kind of evaluate how someone did during that iteration. Yeah, point them to me.

I'll tell them. We'll go through the battle scars of April and May, 25. I'm getting the dates. 25 and April of 26th, yeah. April of 26th was weird. Let's talk about that for a second, right? the what everyone's thinking oh now you just made money because there was a war and energy prices went up true or untrue for trent uh true you know and that's our job yeah our job is it all it wasn't

all energy right it's more to my point like yes made money and energy but the greater performance was from some other markets in that period like metals early on in q1 yeah metals some degree but i mean i would say a big chunk of it came from energy a big chunk of And that was our job. You know, when we find supply demand dislocations like that, our job is to be on the right side of the, when the pressure valve gets released, you know, that supply demand imbalance gets resolved over time,

be on the right side of that convexity. So that's our job. And I think we did it pretty well. And then, of course, you give some back when it is finally resolved and reverses. The question is how much. Yeah. And then the last six years, too,

you've seen a lot of, I'll hesitate to call them copycats. I don't know. We'll ask how. what you feel about them, but right, you were one of the first to put beta with the trend, with the alpha. You put the beta in there, the worldwide equity coverage. Now that's been, you know, many, many people have launched similar products putting

beta with their alpha. Yeah. How do you feel about that? Like, are you flattered by the comparisons or are you saying, hey, they're coming from my turf? What's your thoughts? There's plenty to go around? Yeah, a little of both.

I can't complain because I was screaming forever. the product like that should exist, you know, in the mid-2000s, like why the managed features industry has been showing these efficient frontiers for three decades now, showing how much your portfolio would improve if you put 20% in trend, 30%, 40%, and then, you know, the efficient frontier, your max sharp ratio or your optimal sortino is right around 50%, you know, risk from trend and, you know, equal risk contribution from trend and equities are 6040. I always wondered, well, why don't, If you guys keep telling people this, why don't you launch a product that does it and prove it? And then one day it recurred to me.

Why don't I just take my own advice? So in the summer of 2019, I sat down to build that product and we launched it. And here we are today. So the fact that other people are now doing it, I can't get upset at that. You know, it may be that they're looking at the risk adjusted returns and saying, well, that's compelling. Our clients might like that. So they're launching it. or they just were convinced by the evidence themselves

and said, you know, that is a good way to prepare for a very uncertain world to get something in the portfolio that has a good shot of being on the right side of convexity when it matters going forward with enough juice to move the needle. I can't blame them for coming along for the ride. And what do you think over these six years, too, there's been a lot of replicators have launched, whether they be in sort of risk-premia shops,

trying to replicate the trend index or the Man's Futures Index or outright ETS and mutual funds. I'll go full stop there. Like, what's your first blush thought on the replicators? And then we'll dive deep. Well, I have kind of a love-hate relationship with the concept of replication. I spent about a year looking at it myself. And there's various different ways to try to replicate some sort of a beta that you want. And it's a good practice to take a look and say, like, well, how much of it can I get?

How durable and reliable would my process be? and everything's a trade-off. You know, you're going to get something and you're going to give something up. So what you get is low fee, done correctly. You'll get scale and capacity. What you give up is the ability to take responsibility for the underlying positions. You're essentially replicating something, you know, and you give up the ability to control those positions.

You're kind of looking at something after the fact. I mean, most of these guys are going to be using some sort of a multivariate regression. Some are using very sophisticated ones, and they'll attempt to fit what they see other managers producing. And I've done that kind of work, and it does work, but it does introduce a delay of some sorts. I think people fear that delay more than is justified, but there is some risk in the delay. So you are giving something up, but what you're getting in return might be a lot more valuable, you know, not paying two and 20, you know, using representative sampling to get the portfolio down to a manageable scope. portfolio scope that would work in just a U.S. context. You know, some of the old school managed

features programs really wouldn't fit too well into an ETF structure, at least historically, that it's starting to become more plausible because they've got overseas contracts that are closed when the U.S. is open and whatnot. Right. The replication process can bring that scope down to just North America where the time zones line up and you don't have markets that are closed while the ETF's trading. That can make a lot of sense. So, you know, it's capitalism. It's a free market. So if the replicators want to give it a shot and they're successful, then they deserve the success. I mean, they're just trying to create product market fit. You know, clients want, if clients want managed futures beta and they can deliver it, then more power to them.

So I took a long, hard look at it and decided that I just wanted to build my own program and not charge 2 and 20 like the big CTAs do. That was a better fit for me, my personality, and, you know, how I wanted to run the business. But I don't have a philosophical problem with replication. But at the end of the day, you thought designing your own program gave better long-term success for your clients. Yeah. Well, it allows me to make the decision. You know, the systems that we build make the decisions about what markets to get into and when on how long to stay. Rather than, because now it's on me, whether it works or not.

If I'm replicating other people, it's like, well, if their stuff works and I replicated effectively, well, then we all win. And that's okay. I have no problem with that. It's just I like to line up the accountability with the responsibility in a certain way. And that fits my personality. And that meant building my own systems that I like better than the systems of the people that I'd be trying. Yeah. But it's like ties my brain and knots, right?

Of one, if every one you were replicating just went down to that, call it a North America 12 market portfolio or something, then would the replication change? like that would the replicator have to go even smaller on markets? So it's a weird thing that those, what they're replicating has to do the full universe of markets in order for the representation to come through to that subset of markets, question mark, yeah. That's a good question. I don't think so.

I think that the reason that they sample down is just to make it convenient to fit into the ETF structure. And the question is, how much do you lose by doing that? And it's less than you think, at least historically. I can't tell you what's going to happen in the future. But it's a time. Yeah, how many markets do you have? Like, 60, 5.

Right. So somewhere in there, your math has said, it's, I know, I want these extra 10 over here and 5 over here and 3 over here. Yeah, it helps with signals, right? Like, if you're just trading like the 10-year U.S. Treasury, you know, but if you're trading, you know, 12 different, you know, bonds around the globe, you get a more granular signal process. You know, you may get into some of them long before you get into the U.S. tenure. You may get out earlier or whatnot. It increases capacity. It increases diversification.

But the benefit is not as great as a lot of people make it out to be. And then last bit on replication, is it weird to you mathematically or as a operator in the space if the replicator beats its index? To me, that's a failure of the replicator, right? It's not trying to beat it. It's trying to replicate it. It depends on why. It really does depend on why. If they're beating it because they're not charging two and 20, that makes a lot of sense.

Yeah, yeah, but more if it's a factor, a different factor, yeah. Right. So you would look at the replication engine, and then you'd look at the underlying what's being replicated, and if they're moving the same, but the replicator's pulling away and you can map that alpha or that outperformance back to lower fees, then that's a win. If it's not that, if it's because the replicator's only trading, you know, 12 markets, And those 12 markets have trended better and been more profitable than, say, the 70 markets that other CTAs are trading. Well, then you have to say, well, there's some tracking error there that's going in my favor right now. And maybe it goes against me in other market environments.

So you'd have to answer that question. So these seven years since you launched, I guess I'll ask how much has changed in the model itself? First, I'll ask that first. Yeah, we haven't had to make any material fundamental changes. every now and then there's some compliance things around exposures. You know, it's just when you're in a 40-act fund, you have to do this really complicated value at risk analysis and whatnot. It hasn't really affected us because our risk appetite is relatively modest compared to other people, but I've seen where other people have had to, like, you know, de-leverage or change the portfolio.

The only change that I've made is really short-term fixed-income contracts, which are basically just leveraged versions of cash. totally redundant with all the other dozens of fixed income, global fixed income markets. I just made the call that it's just too crowded in the fixed income space to have all the short-term interest rate contracts in there. I did that very early on. And you know, you're putting very large, notional positions on for what's essentially a leveraged cash position. And then it shows up, it looks like leverage. And so we didn't want to be a particularly leveraged fund. Those are like sulfur futures and Eurodollar and things like that. You know, the old Eurodollar,

which don't exist anymore, but, you know, Euro-Swiss, stuff like that. They don't add a lot of, they're not helpful to the fixed-income portfolio very much, but they do eat up a lot of cash. So we don't trade those, we don't invest in those. That's pretty much the only thing that's changed. Well, nickel, too. You know, like we made a lot of profits being long nickel back during the chaos when it went way up. And then we took a long hard look at that market, and, you know,

it was controlled by a few oligarchs over in Ukraine or Russia or whatever. Yeah. And exchange. Those profits, that was part of the problem, right? Yeah, well, yeah, we did get most of them, but, you know, the exchange was acting weird. They were saying weird stuff and it's a small market. It busted a bunch of those trades. Yeah, it wasn't consequential to us one way or the other, having that tiny metal market in the portfolio.

So to avoid having to do all this constant compliance due diligence stuff, you just kick problem markets out like that. And so it's a tiny market. This is one of 68 markets we were trading at the time. So we just made the decision to not participate in a market that's not trading freely. But model-wise, 100% the same. Yeah, besides the market. So that in itself is amazing to me, right? A lot of people are promoting and saying, like, you've got to be one step ahead and innovating

and always changing in order to survive in the market. Like, how have you run counter to that and saying, like, no, I want to stay stable. I want to have this solid base that I'm going to keep going with. Like, how do you have to think or? Yeah, there's two things happening there. It's what they say and what they do. So I'm in my 30th year in the industry now, and I've made friends with a lot of the old guard people that I've been doing it for decades.

And then I try hard to put them into two camps, the successful and the unsuccessful. And what's unique or interesting about it is some of the smartest people I've ever met are very unsuccessful in this business. because they're just too smart. They're too smart to let a good thing happen. They're always tinkering, always changing things, trying to make it better. That concept of continuous improvement works in most aspects of life. It's a really good philosophy.

But it's not in this discipline, in my opinion. And I say that because the people that were wildly successful, when you look under the hood, they're generally doing about the same thing they were doing back in the day. I'm not saying there are no lessons to be learned, But once you've got it locked down and you've got a mechanism for collecting these risk premium, don't mess it up. It's like if you know a good poker player, when do they do well when they stick to the tried and true and they know they're being disciplined and they're sticking with a winning strategy? It's the ones that go full tilt and try to mix it up and be unpredictable.

That's when they melt down. So the people that have been successful, generally speaking under the hood are using the same. effectively the same systems they were using in the 80s and 90s. Now, their marketing department might be spinning it a different way because people want to hear about the continuous improvement. And they are doing research. Even we're doing research. But research doesn't mean that we're constantly changing things.

We're constantly questioning and probing and seeing if there's some lessons that need to be learned. But for the most part, kind of like Berkshire Hathaway would tell you, sit on your hands when you have something that works and don't over-engineer it and make it too fragile to work on new unforeseen data. It's kind of like this will come out all wrong, so I apologize, but it's like a broken clock's right twice a day kind of thing, right? So you'd say it's not broken. It's a working clock that's maybe right nine hours out of the day or seven hours

out of the day. So just keep it, right? If it's right, that many hours out of the day, keep it going. If it's doing what you designed it to do, don't mess with it. That's the philosophy that wins in this industry. And that's the flaw that fits my personality to be strategically lazy about things that are working. Don't go in, don't mess up a good thing. And that are there periods probably that April 25 or one of the April's where you see equities down and trend down where you question that?

Where you're like, okay, is this a problem? Could we have a year or two years or three years of, you know, equities down 25% trend down 20% trend down 20? Yeah, you know, every time we have something like that, there's a one or two or five or ten people that call me up. Yeah. And they're ready to, they're ready to call it quits, right? And this time was not an exception to that. I remember back in 2013, there were guys that are like neighbors of yours who are calling me up and they have great long-term track records. But now they're in, you know, 23% drawdowns or whatever.

And they just want to get out of the business and retire to Florida and they're calling it quits. this time around there were people doing that too and I'll tell you the same thing I tell them is that you know you've got assets you know because they're worried about their correlation with the stock market and drawing down at the same time that the stock market draws down you got two random variables that are completely uncorrelated they're both going to be down at times you know together

just due to random chance so if that's what's happening you signed up for that I signed up for that it's going to happen from time to time So your risk management process needs to account for that. That once every four years, six years, whatever, that's just going to happen. You're going to have a bad quarter or a painful quarter. Not necessarily bad. It's just painful. Yeah.

That's all that was, in my opinion. So you just, you get past it and you move on. Now, if you want to address that issue, if you want your alternatives sleeve to not be down in a market environment like that, there are ways to do that, but they're going to cost you long term. you have to use options. You have to use tail risk hedging. So essentially you're a purchaser of insurance at that point. So you're no longer a premium collector, you're a premium payer.

That's not always a bad thing. It could be that paying premiums in order to get negative correlation into your portfolio actually lifts the geometric return to your portfolio overall more than the premium that you're paying. So there are some smart people that attempt to do that. There's a case to be made for that. So I don't begrudge people for doing that. but you just pointed out, stocks and managed features trend being down at the same time in April. Yeah, it was painful, but that's what we're signing up for, you know, every now and then that's the way it's going to be.

It's not a reason to throw on the towel unless you were, you know, your risk allocation was simply too high and you couldn't deal with the amount of drawdown. Ours came in right where we budgeted it, no surprises, so we were okay with it. Two things there. One, I think we've talked about this before, right? It's people confusing, conflating, non-correlation with negative correlation. Like, I thought these things were negatively correlated. No. Or yes, they are non-correlated. They're not.

So to your point, that's what that means. On average, it's going to be doing different things. At any one point, could be doing the same thing. Yeah. And, well, one of the things we run into with people is in a structural bare market, like 2002 or 2008, where markets roll over, they start to go down. You know, trend starts to go short. And then it follows through and goes down a lot more.

And they're saying, oh, that's the negative correlation I'm looking for. I want that all the time. But you only get it in the, you know, innings four through nine. You know, you don't get it innings one, two, or three. Because one, two, and three is when the trend is developing. So April of 2025, you know, it was violent. It was fast. It was scary to people, but it was two innings, you know.

It's just not enough time for medium and long-term trend models to actually flip and go short. So it wasn't a structural bare market. It was a fast, vicious correction. You probably actually only get it. innings four through seven, right? Then it reverses an eight and nine. But we can argue that later. But bringing it back to your concept, like, hey, if it's not broken, don't fix it.

Like, where, that's kind of what I'm after. Like, there's these periods that happen. What's that metric that you know it's not broken, right? If that correlations go to, do you have a map, you have historical correlations, you know it's within the bound? Like, how long would it have to be correlated to stocks for you to think it is broken? Well, it depends on what's causing the correlation. If all the markets, you know, start to move together, there's really nothing you can do about that.

You know, it's just you don't have as much diversification as you thought before. So your risk budget should probably come down and you should temper your expectations about how much diversification you can actually offer, right? If they just become randomly correlated and the correlation goes to 90% for some period of time, you have to sign up for that and realize. that that's going to happen from time to time just due to random chance alone. So distinguishing between those two things would require data and time and just trying to understand. You know, there's paradigm shifts. You know, sometimes soybeans are highly correlated with energy prices, or corn, you know, ethanol prices, whatnot. But below a certain price level, the correlation breaks down and goes back to zero. So stocks and bonds, you know, I mean, during my career,

most people genuinely believe that stocks and bonds are negatively correlated. That's not true. Over long periods of time, they tend to be positively correlated, especially when they're both going down together, like in the 1970s. So it depends on what kind of interest rate, you know, inflation, expectation regime you're in. So I spent a lot of my life chasing correlations and co-integration and using copulas and stuff like that. There's really just not a lot there. It's a little bit there, but there's not a lot. You know, it's very difficult to predict when correlations are going to change and break down. So your best bet is to just put a bunch of markets together that have no reason to be long-term, positively correlated or negatively correlated.

Find that independence and then put it on your side, knowing that from time to time, that independence will appear to disappear, just because due to random chance alone, things that are uncorrelated will become correlated for short periods of time. And it seems to me that it's like the old commodity adage, the cure for high prices is high prices, right? People will switch, they'll do different things. You don't use that if it's too expensive. So it seems the same thing's true in correlation, probably behind the scenes, right?

The cure for high correlation is high correlation. And it's due to those price extremes, and people will move off the extremes. Yeah, I think it's fair. Yeah, it's part of it. But I'm, and not, I'll stop pressing you after this, but if it was like three years of quarter, after quarter, equities and

trend both down. And I guess if they're both up in this highly core, then we don't care. So if it's both down, like there's some point you're going to wave the red flag or say, hey, we got to look at the model, re-look at the model. Well, I think you just, yeah, you definitely take a look.

Yeah. And then just admit that, you know, we're not the greatest diversifier on the planet anymore, just like every other asset class. The nice thing about trend is it's the one asset class that consistently comes back to being uncorrelated. Yeah. You know, if you look at all the other things that are considered alts, you just objectively look at them.

They tend to be highly correlated with equities when equities are going down. So trend's kind of the last, you know, trend and tail risk hedging are the two that tend to not be positively correlated in down market environments. So that's where we go hunting. Yeah, two very different reasons. One structural, one is, I mean, they're both structural, but the trend is because you're in soybeans, corn, oil. Right? like we're in these markets that are affected by weather, cocoa,

things that you're not getting in the normal portfolio. Yeah, I mean, the day that silver, soybeans, the S&P 500 and, and, I don't know,

German bonds are all doing the exact same thing. Then is the day I throw my hands up and say, well, there's not much I can do. You know, the capital markets are where we go looking for risk premium. And if they're all doing the exact same thing at the same time, I don't have no power.

over that. So I'll admit that we don't have any diversification, but I don't think that we're going into that world. I don't know why that would be the world we'd end up in. So I wanted to talk to you a little bit about we were doing some research on our side, kind of looking back at since you launched, since the, that first podcast we were talking about, there's something like 11,000, call it 10,000 funds that were active, mutual funds at the same time. Question one, how many of those do you think have survived, right, that are still here six years later? Yeah, I think you guys got that idea from me. I was doing the same thing using Morningstar Direct.

And I think on the day we launched, which was 1231, 2019, there were almost 11,000 mutual funds and ETFs active in the U.S. So 10,995, something like that. So that's how many funds were active when we launched. today of those funds, I think just about 7,000 are still around. So the other, you know, three plus thousand were either delisted, merged. I guess that's it. And either they were either, you know, shut down or they merged into another fund. So that survival rate is pretty consistent with what I've seen over the past 30 years. So a lot of funds just don't make it. That's crazy. Which comes back to like, okay, are they, what do they do? Did they change at the

ever signed of trouble. Did they get away from what they were designed to do? Or did they just not see critical mass? Who knows? Well, keep in mind, these are mutual funds and ETFs. So a lot of them are tracking indexes. They're like small cap funds. They're trading, you know, like double long, you know, crude oil, you know, there's target date funds in there. I mean, that's basically every mutual fund in ETF that existed that traded in America. So large cap growth, you know, mid-cap value, so on and so forth. So a lot of them fail, I think, just due to lack of demand. You know, there's, you know, it's a lumpy world. You know, most of the assets are in the top, say, you know, three percent of funds, the bulk of maybe five percent of funds, the bulk of the assets. So the success rate in

ETF or mutual fund land is pretty low from a new launch to being alive 10 years later. And do you see a lot of advisors use that as a metric? Like, hey, they've been around five years. I've got confidence they're going to be around another five years yeah i mean the longer year around the more comfortable people get with the fact that you've got a business that's profitable and evidently the marketplace has voted especially if you're if you're raising assets the marketplace is voted there must be some value there that's how the human mind works but you think they use length or assets a lot of them just shortcut to assets right which is a little weird like you could raise a billion dollars in the first year and be like okay they've made it let's let's invest it's both you know they want to

see both. And so speaking of those advisors, what, when you first launched, what did you set out to do? You had talked with them, we talked a little bit about putting these two together and giving the whole product, but what was the, what was on the 10, so to speak, that you were trying to deliver back then? Yeah. So I wanted a product, I wanted this to be my last product, and I wanted this to be my last job. So the idea was launch something that is durable, that gives us the best chance at surviving and thriving, regardless of what kind of market environments we get in the future. So I'm a managed features guy trend. I was long short equity before that. I did a little bit of arbitrage back when I was first out of college, but managed futures and long short equity

is really my area of expertise. So I decided I would build the best, most durable managed features program that I could build. So I did that. And then, you know, you know the lifestyle managed features. People love it when it's hot and they can't stand it when it's going sideways and, you know, they just abandon it. There's an abandonment problem in the industry. You know, if you're doing anything alternative or uncorrelated, the hard, it's not the alpha that's hard. It's not the running a business. It's, it's keeping people invested in it through a full market cycle so that they get the benefit. And what, you know, in the pure managed futures or alternative space, generally speaking, people buy you, you know, the fifth or sixth ending of a bare market.

And then they abandon you, you know, nine months later, 12 months later, when the S&P's bounced and you're going sideways. So I've watched people do that. I lived a little bit of that lifestyle for a while. Don't ever want to do it again. And I didn't want to invest personally that way either. So I thought, what would I put my own money into? What would I put my mom's money into? And it occurred to me to just mix it all together, you know, build an all-weather style, multi-asset, multi-strategy program and put all the best ideas that we can come up with in there and make sure.

sure it has capacity and don't charge crazy fees and try to keep it tax efficient. So that's what we did. So I took my managers program and I shopped it through all the databases and said, you know, what asset class would best pair up with this in order to get rid of the abandonment problem? And there's a few that worked, but the one that worked the best was simple, buy and hold, market cap way to global equities. Tax efficient has made money for centuries. Capacity is off the charts, easy to manage. So we married those two things together, and then we have a laddered Treasury Bill portfolio for a fixed income for our cash. And by my calculations, that was a great way to really minimize sequence risk, maximize holdability, so that, you know, you've got enough

equity exposure in there that you don't get completely left behind in runaway bull markets, and you've got enough trend in there that you can offset a lot of the losses in bear markets. The tough part is the transitions from bull to bear on the trend side, but it's not that bad. So that's the bet I'm making that this experience will be smoother and more holdable for advisors. It's a great way, I think, to get alts into the portfolio in a way that clients can actually hold them through a full market cycle and reap the benefits. So it checked a lot of boxes. It's how I like to invest.

It was in my wheelhouse. You know, my team and I had the skills and experience. to manage all of these things in-house, not have to outsource it to other people in creating multiple layers of fees. And I thought there was a good product market fit for the marketplace. So because what advisors have been telling me for 30 years that they want from a product, you know, they want something that's competitive on the upside with equities, you know, and not a return drag, but also does something useful to mitigate downside volatility and bear markets. And they want a reasonable fee and no crazy outrageous, you know,

taxes. And I thought, well, this is the best way for me to pursue that. So that's what we did. And here we are in year seven. But put that into the actual metrics, right? So that's kind of, on a resume, those would be soft skills. I wanted it to be comfortable ride and this and that. So what are the actual metrics that we could put against that database of 10,000 we're talking about? Yeah. So what advisors have told me is that, you know, my ideal, old diversifying investment. If I'm going to do something, they're all already doing something. And it's pretty close to 60, 40, most advisors, they've already got their stocks. They got their bonds. Maybe they have a little bit of real estate and, you know, a 5% sleep alternatives. But

their portfolio results look pretty much just like 60, 40 portfolio. So what they've told me pretty consistently for decades now is that, you know, I want it to be competitive with what I've already doing. So don't be a drag on performance. So I've interpreted that to mean outperform a 6040 portfolio, right? Which in and of itself is weird. Like, why not match it? They're saying be competitive, so it'd be like within a band, but I like it. You said, okay, I'll see your whole might be.

Yeah. Yeah, I call it the three questions, right? And then they'll give you the three answers, right? So it's simple. Beat or meet a 6040 portfolio, criteria one. So how many funds did that? So if we go back to the 11,000 funds that were live when we launched, I think less than half were able to actually beat a 60-40 portfolio.

In fact, I have, I wrote those numbers down. Yeah. Well, what we'd already talked about, only 7,000 still survive. So out of those. Yeah, it looks like I have the numbers here in front of me. Right around 3,000 funds outperformed a 60-40 portfolio over the last six and a half years. So it's basically a little less than one-third. were able to meet criteria one, which is B to 6040 portfolio.

So out of all the mutual funds and ETFs in America, about 30% were able to do that. Okay. That's the first thing. All right. We'll go through the three, then we'll circle back, sir. What is it telling me? It's telling me a lot of those funds were either, you know, fixed income,

you know, low-vol type things, just weren't able to keep up with the 60-40. Yeah. Okay. The second criteria they tell me is that they want, they don't want the fund to increase their volatility. You know, they're always looking to mitigate volatility and not increase it for the most part. So the second criteria is that, you know, you have to outperform 6040, but you have to do so with less, you know, downside volatility. So this is where it gets interesting. If you apply that, you're down to about 50 funds. So only 50 funds from the 3,000 outperform to 6040 portfolio, but did it with lower volatility. So that's, and that's, that's a

harder bar than like a higher sharp, right? Because in theory, I could have a higher sharp than the 60, 40 by just having super low vol and a super low return. So, right, it's a higher bar you're saying, I don't know if there's a metric, what that's called, but the absolute, the actual level of return needs to be higher and the actual level of volatility needs to be lower. Right. Yeah, and because and I'm not saying this is the right way to do this. I'm just saying this is what advisors have consistently told me for three decades is they want higher returns in what they're already doing and lower volatility in what they're already doing. If you apply those two criteria, less than 50 funds have actually delivered that over the last six and a half years.

But to that point, most asset managers are saying, go fly a kite. Yeah, everyone wants better returns and lower risk, but it's a pipe dream. So, right? Interesting to me, you said, okay, let's build it instead of saying like, no, go, go fish. Yeah, well, it's surprising. You know, everyone that I tell this statistic to is shocked because that's less than one half of one percent of all funds have done what every fund out there is claiming to try to do and what every advisor says they want. Right. Yeah. So it's a short, very short list. Item three?

Oh, item three is they don't want any more meaningful beta to equities, you know. And again, I'm not saying this is a right way to look at it, but this is what they tell me. So higher returns, lower volatility, and have a low beta. equities. So I just implemented a filter and said, all right, beta is less than 0.5. So 11 funds have met those three criteria over the last six and a half years. Higher returns, lower vol with the beta below 0.5. So it's not the correlation, it's the beta, but essentially similar? Yeah, I mean, correlation just measures their tendency to to zig and zag in the same direction. Beta is more of like how much impact did it have. You know, it's essentially volatility adjusted.

to the benchmark. So some people worry more about correlation, but most people are like, you know, just give me a reasonable beta. And a beta 0.5 is still meaningfully positive, right? If I put this at point three, you might get down to four funds. So think about what this means.

You started with 11,000 funds. Less than a third of them actually outperforms 6040, right? If you wanted lower vault. And only 70% of them even survive. But yeah. Yeah, yeah, so 70% survived. If you wanted lower vault two, you're down to less than 50 funds out of 11,000. And if you want a beta below 0.5, you're down to 11 funds.

That's pretty interesting to me. That what advisors say they want, the industry does not seem to be delivering. And I think I added up the assets. There's $21 billion in those 11 funds, which is 0.05% of total assets in all funds. So that's 5-100s of 1%. weird which is a securities are bought not sold problem sold not bought with that yeah flip that securities are sold not bought right if you'd think in an efficient market the investor knows everything runs these statistics those would have the lion's share of the of the assets now to be thorough

I think I've said twice I'm not saying this is the right way to do this the right way real quick, standpoint is one of the 11. And even when you put, what's, what's standpoints, what's, we call it blend X? What's the actual beta of it in that time period? In that time period, to a 6040 portfolio, the beta is 0.4 to the S&P, the beta is 0.3. And that's about what we were expecting. Yeah, yeah. Which is crazy in and of itself, because it, you would think it should be 0.5, right?

like it's got 50% beta in it. That's true, but the trend side has negative beta to global equities, which is why it helps so much. But that's the whole point of diversification. I'm adding 50% beta and getting a lower beta as a total. Yeah, it's interesting. So it's one of those 11 is the punchline. It is right in the middle of the pack.

Not the best, not the worst. But, hey. I'd call that a success. But that's what investors have noticed. So I cut you off on some caveats on that. Oh, well, I was saying this isn't the ideal way to make this. The right way to do it mathematically would be to look at every fund that's available and integrate it into your 6040 portfolio with, say, a 20 or a 25% allocation

and then calculate your portfolio results and see, did the return go up? Did the ball go down? And did your beta go down? Right. If you do it that way, you get a lot more funds. You know, it goes from 11 to like 50, something like that. And the funds that are being discriminated against in the simple approach. That's not a lot more. It's still like less than 1%.

Yeah, but it's a, it's a, you know, 4X increase in the in the scope of funds that you could do due diligence on. So I encourage if anyone who wants to do this kind of work, just use one of, you know, eye charts or portfolio, visualize her Morningstar Direct, and just use Claude or ChatGPT, you know, download the monthly returns and integrate them into your portfolio, and you can see which ones actually would have elevated returns, lowered your ball, and lowered your beta. And then from that list, you can start doing your due diligence. Because it's a short list.

I'm an investor in Anthropics, so use Claude, not chat GPT. Don't you feel Claude's infinitely better, though? Do you use AI, how much you're using it day to day? We're switching topics quickly here. Well, so I use Claude, chat, GBT, and Groch every day. Not for investing or inside the business, but I use it outside the business to do certain kind of analysis. It's a great tool.

You know, it's like having a team of CFAs. Now, you have to know what you're doing and you have to give it proper guidance. I've designed prompts that solve a lot of the hallucination problems. So they're very powerful tools. I've been able to do projects that would have taken me six months and five CFAs. I can do them in, you know, two hours now. And I can verify the results. And I also pit these AIs against each other.

Like I'll do it in GROC, Super GROC, and then I'll do it in, you know, Fable, chat on a Claude. And then the new chat GCT model is actually pretty good too. And make them compare results and then pit them against each other to try to pursue truth. It's great for doing research

and crunching data that otherwise would have taken months. I'm able to do it. I had a lot of ideas when I was younger that just weren't implementable unless you had. a huge staff in plenty of free time and you know most ideas go nowhere the analysis we just talked about where you know only 11 funds actually deliberate what advisors say they want also when you're doing after tax stuff and you have to calculate your own tax cost ratios using SEC methodology

you have to you know pull the nabs all the distributions uh the character of the distributions like it's it's this is a lot of work to do manually but if you set it all upright you set your databases upright you can run it through clod and it can do two weeks worth of work in a couple hours. It's amazing. Yeah, I love. Where are you, I've on this podcast, I've talked a little bit about, I think we have a massive recession coming, like, massive amounts of workforce replaced by Claude, essentially. You think that's coming or not? Yeah, I do. I think that, but it's one of those things where it can create jobs in the short term, you know, essentially, you need to learn how to implement Claude and chat GPT to replace your job. So there's a bump up in the beginning. But, you know, just like my lawyers don't make very much money off of me because I can do all of the work and then submit it to them. And they look through it and they're like, this is excellent. Like this is what we were going to do. We were going to charge you $830 an hour for the next six weeks. But here it is. And it's great. You know, diagnosing illness, crunching data. And just do it. research. Like on really complicated topics, you can tell it. Just go read all the research papers

they were ever published and come back. But it's important that you pit these things against each other because they do hallucinate. But it's very unlikely that all three are going to have the same hallucination. So it's very important to set up agents. And I do this inside of them too, where you set up agents that don't like each other, that don't agree, that are coming at it from different perspectives. I've got the skeptic. I've got the CEO type. I've got the bean counter type, the compliance type. get them to approach it from different perspectives. Yeah, and come together. It's very important.

Okay, back to our regular program. What do you think's happening underneath the hood of why so many of those others aren't delivering? Well, I guess I'll ask first, how many of those 10,000 were actually setting out to do those three things? Who knows, but. Yeah, who knows? I mean, the industry is set up to fill buckets, right? So you're going to have muni bonds and you're going to have, you know, short. duration, you're going to have long duration, you're going to have mid-cap value. The way the industry

is set up was for people to do one thing and do it well and fit into these boxes, right? So then the market environment's going to decide whether these things outperform a 60-40 portfolio. So the three questions that advise, you know, the three things that advisors have told me they want, it's fair to want those things, but it's unfair to expect those things from all these different funds. The funds are in there for different reasons. and they do different things. But nevertheless, that is what they've told me they want. Higher returns, lower vol, low beta. So that's what they're looking for from a diversifier. So we did the analysis and there's 11 funds that have delivered that of the last six and a half years. That's interesting. But the industry, it's way it's set up. I mean, I have this challenge with my own fund. I mean, there are people that call me up from institutions and they're like, we really like your fund, but we don't know where to put it. Ask them, what do you mean? And they're like, well, it's not large cap value and it's not managed futures. And it's It's not, it just doesn't fit into any of these boxes. And I tell them, like, well, the abandonment problem that the industry has, the reason no one can hold true diversifiers through a full market cycle is because of your stupid buckets, right?

You don't have a bucket. Yeah. Well, now I do. Early, I was being nice early on. Because you don't have a bucket for, you know, multi-asset, you know, just a compounding vehicle, like a good diversified compounding vehicle. You don't have a bucket for that. So they just don't know what to do. And there are some, you know, there's like TAMPs and OCIOs and, you know, it's just they don't, they're looking for small cap value or they're looking for, I don't know, macro trading, you know, one thing.

For some, but they like the risk-adjusted returns of these blended products, but they don't know how to fit them into the existing ecosystem. So that's a frustration that will get worked out at some point. I think of it like a settler, pioneer, going down to the river with like five buckets. like one was for wine, one was for grain, one was, but they're all empty. The guy's starving and thirsty. And he's like, no, I don't have the right bucket for this water here. Just fill any of the buckets with the water that you need. Did I use the Chapotle analogy on you during the last couple podcasts?

I don't remember, but let's have it, yeah. Yeah, so it's like, if you go to Chipotle and you're taking a client there and you ask him what he or she wants and they give you the bowl they want, and you stir it up and they eat it, that's great. But what if you made them eat each ingredient one at the time? So eat the tortilla first, then the corn, then the sour cream, then the habanero sauce, you know, then the beans, and then, I don't know, the salsa or whatever. It wouldn't be a very nice experience, but it's the same contents that are in their stomach, right? Same nutrition, but the experience sucked, right? So blending portfolios together the right way is like creating the bowl such that it's a pleasant,

experience that they're going to be willing to repeat and do over, right? So now the advisor will argue that that's their job. You know, they'll pick the pieces and they'll blend them together and then present it to the client. But the industry tends to show the client a report card every quarter. You know, your best performing asset, your second best performing asset, so on and so forth. Yeah, the report card's not set up for that. Right. The report card's not giving you an overall grade and tying it back to the financial plan, are you on track? And the way the human mind works, And I know this because I've done this thousands of thousands of times. If you sit down with someone, if I separate it out, right, they're always going to point to whatever's red and they wouldn't want to get rid of that, you know, because something's wrong.

You know, there's an F on the report card so you get rid of it. So every quarter, if they just fire anything that's red, what they're left with after four quarters is just the best performing asset with no diversification. And then that always ends up biting them in the, you know what, later on because they just fired all their diversification. Now, if you don't do that, if you just roll it all up, you blend them all together and you give them one report card, are you doing well? Are we on track? Then they'll hold their diversifying assets. So that's what we're trying to do is make diversification holdable through time. And now please tell me you don't take clients to Chipotle. No, no. Only in the metaphor. And how do you think about it as, right, you kind of just touch on it. But like you've gotten to the point where does the advisor even know or care that it's trend and that you have energy and that you did this during that period and you're catching this trend? Or do they just want these three things? Like, give me these three things.

I don't really care what's going on under the hood. Like, yes, they need to be a fiduciarian ass, but like, do they really care? They do. Yeah. It's a very rare advisor that's just buying us without understanding what's going on to the hood. Some do. You know, it's a public product so anyone can buy it. So we don't know everyone in the fund.

I would say we know two-thirds of the people that are in the fund. And the vast majority of them are curious, and they feel like it's their duty to understand what's going on in the fund. I agree with them. So it's the rare advisor that doesn't, you know, care what we're doing, and they just care about the outcome. I can't even think of one person. Sometimes I wish it was more like that,

but I understand why it's not. You know, I would want to know, too, if I were them. Like, what are you doing? Why does it work? When does it not work? what should I expect? Those are fair questions. Yeah.

If I were a better podcast host, I could ask it better, but it's weird to me that it's, like here, I've put the burrito together, you're eating it whole, it's meeting these three items you want. Like, essentially don't worry about what's going on under the hood, even though you need to know about it.

I don't know. Maybe that's why it's just one of these, these 11 don't have all the assets because people overthink it and need to know too much what's going on under the hood then like, hey, you can understand why it's doing this and of course know what's happening but just be more focused on what's happening yeah we call that the sausage problem you know yeah everyone loves sausage but

they really don't want an education on what went into the sausage yeah but you go to a nice restaurant and you look at the menu you know there's going to be a name of the dish and underneath it they'll tell you what's in the dish shrimp scallops noodles whatever so that's okay I think it's smart to know because maybe it's elephant meat and you don't want to eat elephant I don't know but I guess that's a good point I can I should know super blend Tuscan right you're the super blend and then it has equities global equity is trend do I really need to know like every inch of what's happening inside the trend yeah we don't have very many clients that are really demanding like position level data

but the vast majority of them you know they have a due diligence they have compliance and And they are curious, like, what are you doing and why? And they want to see, like, you know, the big picture, but also, like, what are the components? You know, that's just par for the course. And we're happy to discuss that with people. Yeah, I'm not trying to lessen people's need or want to, but I just want them to realize the three things you ask for. Here it is. I know some secondhand that you have these talks with two friends of mine from time to time.

We don't need to name them, but you guys are talking. talking all sorts of research and trend and alternatives. Give me a little, to finish up, give me a little anecdote or some of the fun conversations that happen there. You know, how to position oneself to do a good job for clients and have product market fit. You know, like one of the things, you know, ETFs, everyone's talking about ETFs,

and that's where all the asset growth is. And our strategy, you know, when we launched it, the ETF was not the ideal vehicle for that. Now it's pretty close to being a legit vehicle. It's still not better than the mutual fund structure, but it's doable to put a strategy like ours in an ETF, and we may do that at some point in the not too distant future. It's just it's an option.

And if the marketplace wants that from us, we'll probably do that in the next couple of years. You know, we talk about... Or convert over. We wouldn't do a full conversion or just offer an ETF that's the same strategy. Yeah. Taxes, you know, markets that you can bring into the portfolio. There's been a lot of talk about tail risk hedging and ways to inoculate the portfolio from,

you know, the kind of things that happened in April 25, crash of 87, things like that. Yeah. Yeah. It's like, well, you know, you know you're going to give something up by doing that, but is it worth it? What else? So distribution, the thing I talked about earlier where, you know, the institutions are all operating off of, you know, 1980s technology and philosophy with the buckets and whatnot. And if you do what's necessary to deliver, you know, decent returns with lower voluminance.

with lower volatility and lower beta, you kind of necessarily don't fit into any of the buckets. So what to do about that? The abandonment problem, but now have the bucket problem. Well, and I would say that I would argue that they're related, right? The lack of adoption is the bucket problem. But if you force it in there,

because it doesn't get a, you know, a natural place, it's always considered satellite position. Those are much easier to abandon. and alts are easy to abandon. So what we've done is create something that has delivered results that don't look like people would want to abandon it, but we don't fit into one of the natural legacy buckets. And I try to tell them the reason it looks the way it does is because it doesn't fit into a bucket. Like they're mutually exclusive, right?

So you guys have to fix it on your end or I have to rip everything apart and offer the individual ingredients. And we're right back to the abandonment of problem. What category are you in in Morningstar now? I know they launched a few new categories. Well, at a high level, they consider us a Liquid Alt, which is fine. You know, I think there's 90 funds in the Liquid Alt's category. If you come down one level, they've got a multi-asset overlay. Multi-asset overlay, which is this new adding beta to the alpha?

Yeah, they think of it as portable alpha plus beta. I don't completely agree with that, but, you know, it's, you can't make everyone happy. So multi-asset overlay, I'm fine. I mean, I look at it and say it's just a multi-strategy fund, but multi-asset overlay is kind of a cousin of that, and if that's where they're going to stick us, fine. But that's back to my point. Like, you're not trying to sell this as a managed futures product per se, right?

Yeah. It's a, it's solving for one, two, three. Yeah, there's plenty of good managed futures standalone products out there. So anyone who's looking for, you know, high octane or even, you know, low-val managed futures, there's, you know, 10, 12, 14 of them to choose from. You got ETFs, you got mutual funds. And then it's your job to manage the abandonment problem. And good luck with that. I've seen many, many, many people smarter than me try that for decades. And no one has come back and said it was a great experience.

So management is wonderful. I love it. That's my industry that I came from. But clients just can't stick with it through a full market cycle. So you can not do it. Say, I don't want it. I'm just going to do stocks and bonds. That's great until you get a decade like the 1970s. And it's not going to be so great. Or a year. like 2022. Yeah, we can get a bunch of years like 20, 22, if we get a decade like the 70s. You know, and bonds, you know, I've never been a bond guy. You know, I've done the math on bonds for a long time.

After fees, taxes, and inflation, bonds really just don't have a real return that's compelling to me. And they've had, you know, decades where they had a negative real return. I think from 1940 to 1980, you know, most bonds had a negative real rate of return. And it's not something I'm interested in. Equities I love, they've got a positive real rate of return. There will come a time where bonds soar and equities go down. I have no doubt that will happen.

But as an asset, as a compounding geometric growth asset, bonds just don't do anything for me. I much prefer managed features. They get your bonds in there and then get out of them. Yeah, I think bonds and gold both belong in the tactical portfolio. This is my opinion, right? They belong in the tactical portfolio. portfolio. If you're going to buy and hold anything, it should be equities. I like cap-weighted indexes. I like trend-fowing on equities, too. It's just that cap-weighted indexes are a better

partner for managed futures, in my opinion, than trend-following on individual equities. Single-stock futures are coming back out. Yeah, don't care. We never cared about those. No, I've never cared about those. But some people are going to build cool products around that. It's just the main thing will be a 4x Nvidia ETF using those. right. Just what you need. Yeah. So on our new website, I don't know if you've checked it out yet,

we have the liquid also on there, and we put you in the alternative blends category. We kind of did our own categorization knowing this bucket problem firsthand ourselves. So yeah, go check that out. Yeah, I will. All right, we'll leave it there. I was going to ask you, yeah, we'll leave it there.

When you come to Chicago? Never. It's a good question. I've never actually been to Chicago. What? Let's go. Come on. What's the best time of year?

Now, yeah. No. We were terrible. We had all that Canadian smoke was like literally blanketing the city. You couldn't go outside. I'll lie and say that's how I lost my voice, but it wasn't really. How's the economic and political situation there? It's a whole other podcast, but yeah.

Bleak to somewhat bleak. Still? Still? Still? Are things recovering? Is there like a hope of like a renaissance? Wise, it's perfectly fine. There's some population, right, people moving out, high earners moving out.

We had a guy on a podcast a little bit ago, real estate saying, you know, the demand's still there. It's fine. The political is hard. We need a new mayor. That's coming. And then we need a ticket out from the trillions. and I don't think it's

billions in pension debt. That's the big problem. Anyway, so we're another podcast. Okay. All right, Eric, thank you so much.

Thanks, ma'am. Okay, that's it for the pod. Thanks to Eric for coming on. Thanks to R Sam for sponsoring. Thanks to you, guests for enduring my, lost my voice last week, was in Vancouver Island

doing some surfing in the freezing cold water. So lost my voice somehow without talking. Anyway, we'll be back next week. Peace. You've been listening to The Deriviv. Links from this episode will be in the episode description of this channel.

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