The Dispatch Podcast - Debating American Involvement in Taiwan | Interview: Lyle Goldstein

Episode Date: November 25, 2024

Jamie is joined by Lyle Goldstein—director of the China Initiative at Brown University and the director of Asia Engagement at Defense Priorities—to discuss Goldstein’s case against American engagement in Taiwan. The Agenda: —Potential Chinese invasion scenarios —Democracy vs. realism —Red lines in the Pacific —Strategic ambiguity —China’s military capability —World War II —Moral considerations Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Welcome to the Dispatch podcast. I'm Jamie Weinstein. My guest today will begin a series that I hoping to do over, oh, I don't know, the next few months, bringing on experts in different flashpoints in the world from different perspectives to talk about these flashpoints because I think they are quite significant. My guest today is Lyle Goldstein. He is the director of the China Initiative in a visiting professor at the Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs at Brown University. He is also the director of Asian Asia engagement at the Washington Think Tank Defense Priorities. He spent 20 years before retiring as on the faculty of the U.S. Naval War College. He is an expert in both China and Russia. And I have him on the podcast today to

discuss what the U.S. should do about the potential conflict between China and Taiwan. He represents a not very heard segment of this argument, which is a a very restrained response, probably different than many people at the dispatch may agree with. But I think it's worth bringing on people from both sides to understand this flashpoint, this, what I think is probably the most dangerous flashpoint in the world. I think you will find the professor interesting, even if you don't necessarily agree with everything he says. So without further ado, I give you Professor Lyle Goldstein. Professor Laura Goldstein, welcome to the Dispatch podcast.

Hi, glad to be here. Thanks, Jamie. Professor, I think you would agree that the China-Taiwan conflict or potential conflict is probably the number one flashpoint in the world in terms of risk to global conflict. like that would be of a scale beyond which we've ever seen before. So one of my goals is to bring people on with different perspectives to understand how they advocate or what they propose to do with the situation. I'm going to start broadly and then try to narrow it down a little bit. If I were just to ask you straight out, what should U.S. policy be towards the issue of China

and Taiwan and how does it differ, if at all, from current policy? How would you answer that? Yeah, thank you. I'm strongly agreeing with you. I'm really glad you're doing this podcast, and I hope you'll keep this kind of focus on it. I do believe, you know, as the cover of the economist said, a few years back, you know, this is, I think, the most dangerous place in the world. I mean, I think one could argue. Ukraine right now is incredibly dangerous too. But this, to me, still exceeds that level of danger here for the United States. So I would, you know, I would counsel to sum up my position that we need to be more cautious than we are. I think at this point, a lot of people want to lean into this problem. They view it as, you know, some people argue, maybe we'll get to this, that Taiwan is the cork in the Chinese bottle.

You know, if you can sort of bottle up Chinese power in this spot, then containment will be a success. And, you know, we will win, you know, this kind of cold war with China. I think that is all specious reasoning. To me, we have to realize that the United States actually does not have any vital interest in the island. We have some kind of historical interests, some cultural interests, some, you know, some economic interest that, you know, I'll grant you those. But it doesn't even close to rise to the issue of a vital interest, not at all. And it's quite misleading for people

to argue that it does. And often when they're pushed, they kind of slip between, well, maybe chips, maybe this, maybe that. And, you know, it just doesn't add up, not even close. So I, I I think if we were to keep that understanding, you know, I mean, then I think we can lean hard on the diplomacy. We can keep our military strong. That's very important. You know, I worked for the Navy for 20 years, so clearly I believe in that. We can keep our powder dry, for sure. And we can think about a feasible defense in the Asia Pacific that doesn't bankrupt us, that doesn't put us.

that doesn't put us on the brink of war all the time, and that, you know, is reasonable and defensible and allows for a, you know, a practical or pragmatic relationship with China, you know, are we going to compete with China? Absolutely. You know, should we balance China here and there? Sure. But look, if you want the 21st century in the 20th century

in the 22nd century, and the centuries after that, to be peaceful. And if we want us not to destroy each other in a nuclear conflict, which is quite possible, I'm giving a lecture at Harvard on December 9, the title is normalizing nuclear war in the Taiwan Strait. We're not that far from that, you know, possibility. It could happen soon. So we need to be extremely cautious. I would, I think the Biden administration has really leaned into this in a problematic way.

And I hope, I'm hoping for different in the Trump administration. But yeah, I'm glad you're putting a focus on this, Jamie. I want to give you an opportunity in a second to respond to some of the critiques that you allude to do that people often raise. But what would you advise the U.S. to do if, however unlikely, it would be that it would happen tomorrow, if we woke up tomorrow and saw that China was mobilizing tomorrow to invade and take over Taiwan? Well, that could happen, honestly. I don't think we're that far from that. You know, China has made its claim to Taiwan very clear. And, you know, I'm a military analyst. I'm studying everything. everything that the Chinese PLA is doing to get ready for this fight. And I believe they're ready. I believe they've been ready.

I don't think they need to wait until 2027. They could go tomorrow. So I'm glad you asked that question. It's exactly the kind of question that needs to be asked frequently. Look, in my view, if that happened, what would we do? Well, you know, of course, we would put our forces on alert and we would batten down the hatches. that's obvious. We might deploy more forces to the region. I say the region, I mean into the Pacific, but I'm not suggesting near Taiwan. And then, you know, I think we would stand by and we

would protect our close allies, that being Japan and Philippines. And I think, you know, we would, you know, if the invasion did occur, I think we can imagine, you know, a series of economic sanctions, you know, something not unlike we've seen in Ukraine. But I would hope that we're much smarter than we have been in Ukraine. Ukraine is also not a vital interest in the United States. We should have known that from the beginning. We shouldn't have kind of hinted to the Ukrainians that we would save them because to me it was amply clear from the beginning that we could not do that because it's not a vital interest in the United States. So, you know, and it's from everything that we've seen, we've seen the patience of the American people's

run its course. They don't want to endlessly send hundreds of billions of dollars to Ukraine, nor do they want to do the same with Taiwan. And so this fundamental asymmetry not only of power, which is obvious to see, you know, just, well, I can amplify. But in asymmetry of will, you just cannot get over that. So, I mean, to me, I would not, you know, bring the United States to war over Taiwan, really in any circumstance. And once we take that off the table, that clarifies a lot of things, Jamie. And at that point, we can have a sound set of policies that ensure that we don't go into a nuclear war over this island. and that we, you know, protect our national interests. Of course, that might involve

increasing defense spending and elevating the status of our alliances. I would fully expect, you know, Japan, for example, in the wake of a invasion of Taiwan to, you know, double or triple its defense spending. Of course they would, you know, that would, and that would be reasonable. But again, no fundamental American interests are at stake in the Taiwan Strait. You mentioned bringing a more military power to the region, but though not near Taiwan, and sanctions. Was that what you think we would do or that we should do if China invaded Taiwan tomorrow? It's what I think we should do. If I was advising the president, that's what I would advise.

I would advise caution. You know, again, the Ukraine war is very instructive in this way. I mean, the Biden administration has tiptoed very gingerly. In my view, they have been reckless, but they have been quite careful about escalation because, you know, once we have a nuclear war and destroy the planet, we can't come back from that. So, so of course, you know, anyway, I would advise, you know, the utmost caution. as to what we would do, that's a good question, Jamie. And, you know, I would ask that to a lot of

your listeners, but I, you know, occasionally I am, one does hear sound thinking in Washington, and I've heard some people at the top admitting that this is a bridge too far, something that we shouldn't even consider, you know, that China holds all the cards, basically, unfortunately. You know, So one here's hints of realism, and again, if you put the paradigm of Ukraine on, we seem to have, after wasting a lot of money and killing hundreds of thousands of people, we seem to have come around to the conclusion that we are not in control, the situation, we cannot determine the outcome, and probably we should never have tried. So I would hope, you know, that, again, this kind of realism would prevail in these circumstances. But, you know, we all know, Washington, unfortunately, is inhabited by a lot of ideologues, a lot of people who, you know, think that we are on a mission to, you know, save every little country or a group of people who want to separate, you know, a lot of ideologues in Washington. So I'm concerned, you know, and a lot of people, frankly, who are looking for an excuse to go to war with China. Well, that's extremely disturbing because that truly, you know, I can't emphasize how risky that is, especially in these circumstances.

Let me say, here's something that I think is meaningful to people with military background, but, you know, this is truly a bad ground to fight China on. And I used the analogy, I used to give tours of Gettysburg. And when General Buford, a union general came to those hills in Pennsylvania and took a look around, he said, I can win here because this is good ground to defeat the Confederates. And the Confederates had defeated the Union over and over. But this is in a way, you know, it's the opposite. This is good ground for China to fight on. They have every kind of advantage. Let me throw out some of the critiques that you've alluded to do that sometimes people arguing the opposite position put out there.

Well, let me just start with one. You know, you mentioned, you know, some people think that U.S. should defend, I think the way you put it, you know, every small country trying to, you know, separate. In the case of Taiwan, a lot of people would say it's a little different than just, you know, some random country trying to separate. for, you know, it is developed, although it wasn't for its entirety of, since it, since 1945, a democracy, but at least since the late 80s, it's developed a democratic system, robust economic capitalism. Is it, you know, is this as leader of the free world, you know, for us to not stand up for a country like this, does not not give pause to other, other free countries that we think that we're standing that we're behind them that we wouldn't be there

in their their moment of peril well look um i think this is uh this is kind of like lofty rhetoric that i think it's uh hearts going pitter patter but no i don't think that it's about democracy you know we have uh plenty of allies um as you know for instance the saudis who were talking about defending even more robustly, who, you know, who are, as far as I can tell, you know, enemies of democracy. And that's hardly unique. I mean, this happens all over the world. So I, and all throughout our history. So, you know, to me, this is kind of a sort of throwback to Wilsonianism. And, you know, look, I, I'm not such a realist that I dismiss these ideas altogether. It's just that I think whenever these kind of ideological motivations clash with

the realities of power and the balance of power, you know, they immediately fail and mostly are forgotten. You know, I mean, there was a time, I think, Jamie, you and I can both remember when, you know, we said we must stay in Afghanistan for another 20 years or maybe another hundred years to defend the rights of Afghans to, you know, to celebrate their democracy as if they have some kind of great democratic tradition or something like that. You know, and of course we've gone to war so many times for that rationale, right? Once upon a time, we were defending Vietnamese from the predations of the communists to the north. We wanted to defend this little democracy in Southeast Asia. What a horrible

waste of blood and treasure that seriously damaged our national interests. Not even to speak of our reputation, but the amount of blood and treasure that we've wasted in such exercises, I think, is, you know, we literally have put our country at risk by wasting those kind of resources. So, yeah, I think that is completely wrong-headed. I mean, think about this, Jamie. Hong Kong, not a country. It's like a city-state or something like that. By the way, I don't refer to Taiwan as a country.

Either we can, I'm happy to walk you through the history, but it's, you know, nobody recognizes as a country, basically. So we shouldn't talk that way because it gives people the wrong idea. I mean, we can get philosophical here and ask what is a country. Okay, I just kind of stuff and ask you about Taiwan for, second. I mean, I'm somewhat sympathetic to, you know, my views on this is, you know, I can, I can be swayed given the day on the issue. But it is, it sounds a little dismissive of Taiwan. It seems like you don't, you don't, you don't look to Taiwan as something to be impressed by.

I mean, to me, it seems an oppressive country, you know, both developing kind of a democratic system and a great economic system. And, you know, at least. I'd be sad to see it subsumed by China, even if that was the real politic and you couldn't defend it because the risk of nuclear war. It doesn't seem like you would feel all that bad if it was subsumed by China. No, I wouldn't feel all that bad. I mean, it's, you know, if you study international relations and world history, you know, it's the school of hard knocks. So, you know, a lot of sad things happen out there. Speaking of sad things, you know, let's talk about Hong Kong for a minute, you know, like I said, Hong Kong, beautiful city, wonderful people, you know, widely admired around the world, including for its democratic traditions, even if they came about, you know, rather late.

But what I wanted to say, Jamie, is that this democracy was more or less crushed, right, recently. and you know it's sad and I am somebody who I've spent quite a bit of time in Hong Kong less time in Taiwan but quite a bit of time in Hong Kong so you know I am saddened by this and I don't think it had to happen this way I think it could have happened differently but what I want to say Jamie fundamentally is first of all I mean it's not something you think about every day right you can we can still sleep at night even though this this Hong Kong's democracy has been, you know, more or less extinguished. But much more fundamentally, Jamie, it's absolutely of no conceivable national security threats to the United States.

And, and nobody in their right mind said, oh, you know, we need to, you know, we should apply sanctions, you know, although we did apply some sanctions, but we should, you know, move military forces, you know, and the situation is not very different with Taiwan, which again, I don't, I don't consider Hong Kong country. You know, I know the history really. well. It was taken in the opium war. And I don't consider Taiwan a country. Not long ago, I saw someone go through a sudden loss, and it was a stark reminder of how quickly life can change and why protecting the people you love is so important. Knowing you can take steps to help protect your loved ones and give them that extra layer of security

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And when you're ready to launch, use offer code dispatch to save 10% off your first purchase of a website or domain. Professor, I do believe, just for listening to your lectures, that you do believe there are some red lines in the Pacific that the U.S. should draw. And correct me if I'm wrong.

You know, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, not talking about some of the, what you refer to as rocks, the, the, the, the, the, some of the islands that are uninhabited. I think you referred to one just having goats on it. Um, uh, uh, in the, in the Philippines, but again, not the uninhabited islands, but the actual population centers. Um, you do believe if I'm, if I'm not mistaken, right, that that should be a red line. We wouldn't want China to military, militarily try to conquer those, those countries. That would be something America should fight for. Yeah, I'm glad you raised that, Jamie. I mean, exactly. I mean, first of all, you know, we have to draw a red line somewhere. We have to, you know, to have a coherent defense policy. I mean, the good news to everyone is that, you know, I study Chinese defense policy in politics very carefully. And you won't find any hint of kind of, you know, some kind of Chinese sensibility or idea.

that they should somehow conquer Japan or conquer the Philippines. So, I mean, it's kind of a non-issue. But, yes, I do agree, you know, just for the sake of coherence, yes. But so I guess how do you distinguish between the Philippines, let's say, and Taiwan? What makes you... Yeah, go ahead. Yeah, I mean, great. This is, I think, it's a logical question.

And, you know, to me, a very important part of this Taiwan issue is making that distinction. And I mean, let's start from the very beginning. I mean, we, our country, our government recognizes Japan as a state. It recognizes Philippines as a state. It does not. And we have, you know, alliances that are, you know, long held with those countries. You know, that right there is a really big difference now. But just to the listening audience, I just want to, who might not be aware,

the Taiwan Relations Act, we do not necessarily recognize. We don't recognize Taiwan as a state, as you're saying, just so the listeners who may not realize we do have a policy of strategic ambiguity that doesn't say that Taiwan is a country just for those who may not be aware, that when you say that we do recognize Japan as a state, but we don't recognize Taiwan as a country. Yeah, and that's right. And not only that, it's by design. I mean, it's not kind of, indeed, we did actually recognize Taiwan. We actually had a formal defense treaty, but that was abrogated. And that was, by the way, you know, I think your listeners should know. That was a condition of, you know, creating U.S.-China relations. In other words, we had no formal relations with the PRC until we agreed to not only abrogate the treaty, but also remove our forces. By the way, just again, so your listeners know, we used to deploy nuclear weapons to Taiwan.

So we had a very different policy. But this was all decided a long time ago to stabilize our relations and have an amicable relations with China. This was all, you know, made in a deal, which in my view was a good deal back in the time of Kissinger and Nixon. But getting back to your really good question about why Japan and Philippines are different. So it's not only that we recognize them in the States and we have truly have alliances with them, but here's the key. And I believe this is actually much more important than all that other stuff I said. But what's much more important because, you know, words are cheap and pieces of paper are cheap, you know, I'm a realist.

It comes down to power. And power realities dictate that Japan and the Philippines are countries that are countries that can be defended quite easily. They are, you know, these large island archipelagos, which are more distant from China. So that distance, you know, it may not sound like much, but it's actually. It makes a big difference in military terms in terms of the amount of firepower that China can bring. But also, again, in the Philippines, should you have to, you know, retreat and take blows, initial blows, you can, it has strategic depth. It has vast strategic depth, actually.

So the Philippines would be very difficult for China to conquer. Same with Japan. I mean, that's even more the case. So the concept of them being conquered actually is, you know, quite ridiculous. What would you say, Professor, to those, and I know you've heard this argument before, that say Taiwan, if China took over Taiwan, it makes the others less defensible, that Taiwan is in some ways a barrier, a defense of the Philippines, of Japan? Yeah, I mean, that, you know, it's not a crazy idea.

But, I mean, I think, look, look, I recognize there are some reasons why if China were to conquer Taiwan, that that could put us in a slightly less advantageous position. I mean, right now, in a way, we're an exceedingly advantageous position. I mean, at least from the position of, especially here talking about intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance. since ISR capabilities. So yes, there is some, you know, as it were, penalty to be paid. But I don't think it rises to the level of a major threat. And I don't see Japan or Philippines as, you know, in much more serious danger. Like I said, their defensibility is assured by their geography. But also, I mean, Jamie, hold on. One more fundamental point, I think your listeners need to know, is that and this is actually more fundamental than the geography or the military power or the kind of

whether we're talking about states or not. But China has a very strong claim on Taiwan. The actual constitutional title of the entity on Taiwan is the Republic of China. Okay, that's written in the Constitution. Some people want to change it, but they haven't succeeded in changing it. And by the way, China's made it pretty clear that that would be Akashis Peli, too. But I mean, so we're talking about the People's Republic of China, and we're talking about the Republic of China. And these two entities, you know, clearly anybody who has bothered to look at the history realizes that this is a civil war.

True, it has been dormant for some time, but it is clearly a civil war still. And I'd be happy to give you a lot more evidence along those lines. But what you have to realize is that, again, that is fundamentally different than the history, say, of Philippines and China, which they have their own complex history, but it's not, it's nothing like that. There is no approximation there. And, you know, the official language of Philippines is not Chinese, but the official language of Taiwan is Chinese, actually, Mandarin Chinese. And the same is with Japan. Again, sure, you have some historical linkages, but there's no, not even any thought of an idea that China could have a claim. Now, we could talk about Okinawa, which is a bit of an outlier here, because Okinawa was not always under Japanese rule for some time.

Anyway, but that's the kind of small footnote, I think. Semiconductors, obviously that's a topic that comes up quite a bit talking about Chinese takeover of Taiwan. we learned the importance of semiconductors during the pandemic. They're obviously crucial to the way so much operates in the U.S. What do you think of that as the argument, that we can't allow China to take over Taiwan, if only because of our economic interests? Yeah, I don't think that holds water at all, Jamie. To me, you know, this has been going on a lot lately,

this kind of mixing of national security arguments and economic arguments. And I think, I often think, you know, we as national security experts need to kind of just, how to put it, you know, raise the bullshit flag, sorry, to be crude, but but and just say it doesn't hold water. I mean, look, markets would readjust, you know, the fact that Taiwan has become a leader in this area is kind of a, it's kind of just an anomaly and a kind of weird fact of history. but like a lot of the expertise that went into Taiwan becoming the leader in the field came from California. There are plenty of other people that make quality chips. You know, Taiwan makes some of the highest quality chips that are important for things like

phones. But actually, we had a chip expert visit Brown University and it was talking about, you know, the military implications. This is a guy who literally studies the, you know, an economist who studies the business of chip fabrication. He explained, you know, really, there is no military, there are no military implications of this because these chips are not useful for like missiles or anything like that. The chips that go into missiles don't have to be small, actually. The chips that go in phones need to be really, really small and precise, but it just doesn't, it's not such a big factor

in the military field. So anyway, but the larger impact, if, you know, God, forbid if a war does happen and i say god forbid because nobody you know who's you know has any humanitarian impulse wants to see um you know a war like this occur where where millions could definitely die on both sides uh and by the way if i think if we're too you know if we if we if the u.s gets too involved in this we actually may make the war more likely and i'll like to spell that out for you. But the actual economic consequences to the United States would be probably similar to what we saw with the Ukraine war. That is, you know, a lot of headaches made by sanctions, probably some substantial inflation. But no, you know, I think within a few years, as it were, markets would

readjust. When you said if the U.S. gets too involved in this, it may make more likely, were you talking about semiconductors? No, no, sorry. I'm talking about, may I elaborate, I think that the, what's dangerous here is, well, not only that we could quite likely cross one of these red lines that China has put out, I'll give you an example. I mean, China has made it clear that any return of U.S. forces to the island is going over a red line. Now, there have been a lot of hints that there are U.S. forces on the islands. And I could tell you from my last trip there, I saw a lot of guys with short haircuts

and who looked like Americans. They were not in uniform. But I'm just saying, this is, it's crossed my mind that we may have already crossed the red line there. So that's disturbing. But here's another scenario that I'm very concerned with, which is that right now we're pushing a lot of weapons into,

sorry, into Taiwan. And we probably would be doing that faster if a lot of them weren't going to Ukraine. But to the extent, you know, there are a lot of weapons flowing to Taiwan. And I'm quite concerned that we may at some point, again, cross sort of China's threshold. China is, you know, China's concern that this may make, you know, Taiwan separation irreversible. And they may think, okay, we just have to go now because it's going to only, you know, in five years, it's going to be a lot worse situation. So we will take our chances now. So I'm afraid actually that may be pushing us that factor. Let's say this idea that the window is closing on China's strategic opportunity to achieve unification. So, you know, if I were, again, advising the

president, I would say we should not be rushing arms into Taiwan. We should be, you know, We could advise the Taiwanese to pour lots of concrete, sure. But pushing arms sales after arm sales after arm sales to the tune of tens of billions or more is maybe putting Taiwan more under threat than, quote, saving Taiwan. One more kind of argument that often comes up is that if the U.S. allowed China to take over Taiwan or didn't respond robustly, other allies of ours in Asia and maybe elsewhere would not look to us as a reliable ally, defense ally in a time of need if they were in trouble and therefore then look elsewhere.

Well, right. It's the old credibility argument that we've heard a lot. You know, I think I think this argument is really foolish. It's led to all kinds of terrible distortions in U.S. foreign policy. You know, I think this argument was often used in view. Vietnam. You know, in fact, from my own research, I've realized that we briefly considered actually fighting a war in Laos, actually. I think this was sort of like about 1961. And, you know, again, the fear was if we let another, you know, the domino theory and so forth. But, but we said, no, no,

we will fight in Vietnam. We'll stop the, forget Laos. We'll fight in Vietnam. And that will, you know, ensure the credibility of our alliances. And of course, what a disaster that led to so many Americans who never came home and our national wealth frittered away in such a waste, never mind the millions of Vietnamese, Cambodians who died in that war. So I mean, you know, I just cannot believe that these arguments are still made seriously at this time. But, you know, you saw the same arguments made in Afghanistan. You know, how could we possibly leave Afghanistan? Well, guess what? The world is much better off. The United States is, is much better off for having left Afghanistan.

I'll go even so far as to say that Afghanistan is better off for us having left. In other words, not having a civil war and having civil wars end, even if they, you know, you find the regime that takes over is despicable. That's often better, actually. And I've actually had a report from an American who was in Afghanistan recently who said, you know, people are glad the war is over. I'll leave the Afghan debate for another time. I do think that probably at least that the Afghans are better off is certainly a debatable proposition, or at least for women and some others.

Well, Jamie, I'll be happy to debate Afghanistan for you. I spent some time in Central Asia. I was in Tashkent recently, and it's, you know, imagine a country that has seen 40 years of devastating war. Yeah. And then the war thing. So, yeah, I mean, I agree Afghan women are not happy, but some of them are happy that their husbands and sons are not being killed. Let me ask you, how much time would we have, how long would we know, like, how long would a buildup take for China in an invasion of Taiwan? Would it, I mean, presumably they would have to, you know, mass some sort of troops.

or Armada or something, or could it be done without a buildup? Yeah, that's a great question, and I think deserves a lot of thinking here. But, I mean, the conventional wisdom in Washington is that we will have a lot of time to think this over and make up our mind. But I think that's completely untrue. I think this could happen very fast. It could happen. Like I said, I believe it could happen tomorrow.

There are a lot of reasons for that, but, you know, more or less the pieces, the critical pieces of the invasion, actually, the very initial stage, and here I'm talking about missile forces, you know, drone forces, helicopter forces, airborne forces, you know, parachute and so forth, that all can can move extremely quickly, you know. it. I think this, so in that sense, I think we would have maybe a couple of hours notice. But I mean, of course, China is doing everything it can to prevent us from realizing what's going on. So, you know, it's, look, China in the wars that it's fought in the modern era has done a good job in achieving surprise. And then I think as far as mobilizing, like for, you know, actual to actually to, actually to, to convey forces across the strait, that I'm also convinced that they could do that extremely quickly. So that, I think, could take less than a week in general. I mean, of course, not all the forces, but, and so, you know, that would, that week, during that week, you would, but you, you would already have probably substantial forces there brought, again, by a parachute, by a helicopter, and this kind of devastating air and missile attacks. So, yeah, basically what I'm saying is I, you know, some smart people are on record saying

we will have years of warning more recently. Washington, I think, is coalescing around that we would have about a month of warning. I think we would have a few hours of warning. Professor, am I right to say that you favor the current policy of strategic ambiguity as long as we don't put arms in Taiwan and make what you view as provocations, as you mentioned, putting actual soldiers there maybe to help train.

Would you maintain the current policy of strategic ambiguity? Yeah, I think this has served us pretty well, and I'm comfortable with it. I think, what I think, though, is we have to add, not really add, but take one piece and, you know, highlighted salience, and that is this. You know, not only should we, look, we should stop acting like we might go to war there. I do think that doesn't help the situation.

I mean, I'm sure people could argue that adds to the ambiguity, but to me, we've put kind of all our chips in the deterrence basket, but we haven't faced the other part. of this ambiguity, which is reassurance that we need to strongly reassure Beijing that we do not seek permanent separation of Taiwan. Now, how do we do that? I mean, for one, like I said, we could lower the pace of exercises and we can calm down the whole kind of arm sales thing. By the way, a lot of our arms sales are basically just make some Americans rich. They don't really, you know, the F-16s, for example, completely worth it. in my view, they'll be destroyed in the first few hours of an attack. They'll never get off the

ground. So, I mean, but, you know, hey, that's American jobs, I guess. But to me, often those are not worthwhile. You know, if Taiwan really wants to defend itself, it should be digging deep. You know, I think that's one lesson of Ukraine, you know, that prepared defenses can be, can hold out pretty well. But getting back to changes in policy, you know, here I would like to see us. I mean, you kind of hear our leaders occasionally will say, well, we support the one China policy, but then, you know, quickly they walk it back in all respects. And I can amplify there. But to me, we'll do a lot better if we actually act like there is a one China policy. And, you know, that should mean, you know, lowering all.

all this constant rounds of visitation by Congress people. I mean, what's the point of that, actually? But would you advise a president to say we would not go to war over Taiwan? Would that and perhaps make hasten a takeover of Taiwan by China if a U.S. president came out and said, you know, going to war for Taiwan is off the table? Look, I'm sympathetic to moving that direction. Probably you can appreciate that. But because I think ambiguity, it doesn't just confuse the Chinese and confuse the people on Taiwan.

It also confuses Americans, right? And so that's one reason we're having this debate. And so, yeah, clarity would be kind of nice. And that way we could at least hold it. You do think that an American reason is. Look, I think there are some advantage. is there. But I also, I appreciate that being realistic, that strategic ambiguity is for the foreseeable future, a better policy. And, you know, keeping the Chinese uncertain. Look, I think there is some deterrence factor. But I just think we have to be, I hope, we as Americans can agree that we're not going to put the,

our country at risk over this. And, but, but what I want to say is we have to walk the walk on this one China policy. And not just, it's not just a throwaway line. It is, we actually believe it. That is, we do not actually believe Taiwan as a country. We do not have an embassy there. And we are not seeking, you know, it's permanent separation. You know, I think that would go a long way.

I would even go further and say, I would like to see a president who advocates for, you know, rapprochement across the strait. That is actual negotiations between Taipei and Beijing. And, you know, hold on, hold on. If you know what's going on across the street, generally, you realize that that's not outlandish at all. That's quite feasible and realistic. and if we promoted that and told our friends in Taipei that they really need to get into these negotiations, then I think the whole situation will calm down quite a bit.

By the way, if my view is that if we take less interest in Taiwan, if we make it fairly clear that we're not going to fight a war over this, then I do think the tensions across the straight will calm down considerably. The real reason China is so crazy about this island is because they don't want a U.S. base sitting right next to them. And it's hard not to argue that that's what they have.

You brought up an interesting point earlier, which I think with regards to Ukraine that I think pertains to Taiwan. If Taiwan knew that the U.S. would not go to war, in its defense, how do you think that would change the way Taiwan, Taiwan's government operates and views their relationship with China? Yeah, I mean, it could go a number of directions, and I don't want to pretend that I'm, that I, you know, know, everything about Taiwan and Taiwan politics is very, you know, it's very

interesting, it's very complex. But here's my guess, Jamie, and you do hear some, and you do hear some reasonable voices on Taiwan who say that the more, you know, these are Taiwan people saying the more we cozy up with Uncle Sam, the more dangerous our situation gets. And, you know, take that a step further to use your Ukraine analogy, they don't want to become Ukraine, you know, and by ending up as a kind of U.S. de facto ally, an outpost, you know, you know, and, you know, and end up in a kind of proxy war, if you will, and end up destroyed. Like, Ukraine is completely destroyed in every dimension, to my judgment.

I watched that war very closely. So, look, could it be different, Jamie? Yes, I think so. I think politicians on Taiwan could, I think, take the mature route and say, we're in a tough situation. We're not going to be independent. And a lot of them recognize that that's not happening. And say, we go for confederation.

or, you know, we, and, you know, look, the fundamental mistake that was made in Hong Kong, and I watched that situation very closely, I was there, walking through the yellow umbrellas when they were out there, and I can tell you, they were trying to, you know, those people, they were sticking it right in the face of the Chinese Communist Party. They were determined to, you know, assert these rights. You know, China, Beijing was also determined, but, I mean, and then the, came to a question of power, and it was decided very quickly. Now, look, is there a way to get around that, though? I mean, you know, maybe before what happened to Hong Kong, maybe it would be easier

to imagine a deal, maybe the Taiwanese could imagine a deal with China. How do you get around what happened to Hong Kong in any type of promise of autonomy? Look, I think there's a lot of room there. What I'm saying is you, if you're in a situation where you're in a negotiation with somebody, you know, with an entity that is much more powerful than you. I mean, in the case of Hong Kong, there's no question. I mean, Hong Kong has no distinct military and was never going to be able to resist, you know, more than just throwing a lot of people out on the street to block highways and throw Molotov cocktails and things like that. What I'm saying, if you're in that situation, you want to be a bit cautious, you know, maybe rein in some of your most extreme

goals and try to, you know, get along. Now, look, I get it. I'm not saying Americans should do that. We're not in a position like that with China. We're in a very strong position and our territory is not threatened and we're, you know, we are in a position of strength with China and I'm not terribly concerned about that. You know, I hope we get to that at some point. to what extent is China actually, aside from Taiwan, a threat to the United States? But what I'm saying is for Taiwan, its options are pretty narrow. But to my estimate, Jamie, and I don't know, you seem like open to considering this, at least, that there is a way forward to explore Taiwan's autonomy within Chinese sovereignty.

Well, look, it's a great question, Jamie. I wish this was explored regularly in the, you know, the pages of the New York Times and in the major... I mean, this is what we should be talking about. What is the compromise space? I think it's very ample, you know, from my explorations here. You know, there are, guess what? They're huge cultural ties across the street. Immense.

I mean, almost unimaginable. You know, by the way, you know, the largest museum of Chinese antiquities is located where? Somewhere in, you know, in Yunnan province or in Heilongjiang? No, it's in Taiwan. The largest museum of Chinese antiquities is in Taipei, okay? And it's beautiful. I mean, they have, why is it beautiful? Why do they care on Taiwan about Chinese antiquities?

Because it's their pride. So you have these cultural links, right, that are extremely deep. By the way, every road in Taipei is named after a Chinese province or a Chinese city. Not a Taiwan province or Taiwan city, a Chinese, okay? So again, you know, the links are strong. I do believe they can find a compromise space, and it would not be that difficult. the leaders of Taiwan and China met in 2015 that had a very good meeting. So I don't think this is outlandish at all.

Now, one more thing, Jamie, you don't want to put it on the table. Previously, I don't know if this is still on the table from Beijing side, but previously, Beijing had actually committed to saying they're open to a deal, you know, with Taiwan for autonomy that does not involve any CCP or PLA troops on the island. Think about that. I mean, if that was, now I don't know if that's, That's still the deal, but I think it was under Zhang Zemin or Deng Xiaoping that that was, I think Jiang Zemin, this was put out on the table as China's official opening position, not the final

position of negotiating, the opening position. So presumably the deal that Taiwan gets would be much better than that. And I think there's every reason to believe it would be. I mean, Taiwan, unlike Hong Kong, Taiwan does have a military. It's not a joke. And I don't think China wants to fight this war. it would be very bloody. No question about it. So, I mean, I'm just saying the hope for autonomy over the long term in Taiwan is pretty good. You mentioned you hope I bring up what threat

does China pose to the U.S. I want to bring it up in this context. It seems, and correct me if my framework you think is ridiculous, that maybe the way you see the issue of China versus the world, China versus Taiwan, through the lens of World War I, where these alliances will get us into a large conflict, where maybe some of the people that disagree with you see it through the lens of World War II where China is going to start with Taiwan and go on to other places from there.

Is that a fair framing of where the differences come from? And why should we see it more through the lens of World War I than World War II? Yeah, I think that is a fair framing. I mean, I think you make a good point. And, I mean, I will just say this, that, and I mean, maybe we'll have time to talk about, you know, whether, you know, appeasement is the right word. I think this is customarily the word that is always, you know, kind of a trope or cudgel, I think used by people to, to criticize any kind of attempt at compromise here, even though there's a, ample space for compromise here. But I mean, I mean, for one, I think the World War II analogy

falls down in so many respects. But I mean, where to begin? But I mean, let's start with nuclear weapons that, I mean, in a nuclear armed world, I just think, and Ukraine has made this very clear, that the options are very narrow for, you know, I mean, you may think that, I mean, I don't, but one could argue that Ukraine is, you know, a democracy. And, you know, a democracy. one that's worthy of being defended, and Europe has to be defended, so we should go to war. But that logic all breaks down when you consider the nuclear risks, right? So, I mean, that's a very fundamental way in which I think the World War II analogy falls down. But then here again, you know, to me, we constantly deploy the World War II analogy, you know,

the Munich analogy, and we're assuming that all these leaders are Hitler. in one way or another, and I just think again and again, it just proves not to be the case. I mean, and Hitler is a singular figure in history who's very unusual, and, you know, to assume that every person we or country that we have a problem with is Hitler, I think it's just led us astray and into all kinds of horrible wars that were unnecessary. And then, you know, let's raise one more issue, which is that if you look at countries and how they use force, you know, look, I don't think Putin is Hitler either, not nearly. And I think we, you know, I sort of deplore the use of that analogy in that context, too,

this idea that, you know, if they conquer Ukraine, then the Baltics will be next. for that, Poland, and soon they'll be in Berlin and Paris. You know, I think that's ridiculous. There's no intention. And it's, you know, it's honestly quite crazy. But again, that would be the kind of the World War II analogy applied. But at least, at least in the case of Putin, you can say, well, he did use force against Georgia in 2008. He did use force against, you know, he did annex the Crimea by force in 2014, 2015. So, I mean, at least there's something there there. But here, I mean, in the case of China, you know, China, I believe it's been, what, now,

almost 40 years, I think, since China used force on a large scale. I mean, that's really an incredible record of restraint. I'm certainly, I mean, certainly very different than Hitler, than Nazi Germany. I think the comparisons fall away pretty quickly. Look, as I often say, I do not rule out the case. in which this world becomes so stricken with great power rivalry that that, you know, in a sense, if we call China an enemy so many times, they start believing it themselves. So far, they've been pretty good about dismissing it as, you know, American, crazy American domestic

politics. But if they really begin to believe this, then I am concerned that it could develop into a very, you know, a classic kind of security dilemma. And you see some of this, especially what's going on with the Philippines, where, you know, China has no interest in conquering the Philippines. And yet, we, you know, people, I believe, you know, responsible officials in Washington or so-called responsible officials have even said, well, you know, there has been, you know, an act of war against the Philippines or something like that. You know, to me that this is kind of crazy talk, but how did we get here? Well, it's been kind of the cycle of escalation. By the way, I believe a lot of that has been related to Taiwan. But to me,

it would be much wiser to realize that, you know, great powers throw their weight around. I mean, get real. Like, that's just how the world works. Russia throws its weight around. The U.S. throws his weight around a lot. You know, so here's a paradox, Jamie, that I see everywhere, is that when you scratch a little, you find out that these realists who, you I consider myself a realist, but I disagree with a lot of realists, you know, Friedberg, Meersheimer, all these people who are so worried about the China threat. But if you look around in the writings of these realists, what they're really afraid of, Jamie, is that China will turn into the United States.

Well, let me, I want to get to at the end a little bit where you're diving to the nature of the Chinese regime. But before I do, I do have two questions based on Ukraine. And I found that you've written articles kind of based on those. So I know that you have answers to them. You know, Jamie, I speak Russian and I have been to Ukraine and I have studied, you know, the former Soviet Union a lot. So, and in fact, I'm on my way to Kazakhstan in a few weeks. So anyway, yes, I have been following the war very closely and I haven't to discuss that.

One lesson that I took away, and I wonder if this applies to China in any way, is that sometimes dictators think they have a really great army only to discover on the battlefield that their army, like all the money ended up in London. houses for the generals in Mayfair. How sure are we that the Chinese military is as strong as it thinks, as she thinks it is? Right. I mean, I think I agree with you that Putin had a little bit of a, more than a little bit of a shock when he realized that his army was not ready to go and could not carry out is the rather ambitious operation, although I think it's worth saying that Russia has whatever conquered, I think, now what, 20% of Ukraine, and Ukraine is the largest country in

Europe, so that's, you know, amounts to something. But, but I mean, look, I think our first take on the Ukraine war was that boy, the Russian army is a joke. And they'll easily fall on their face. I mean, and in Kiev campaign, they indeed did fall on their face. But, but, I mean, since then, I think we've seen that the Russians have pulled together a reasonably competent set of efforts. And they do seem to be winning on the battlefield now. So anyway, so I'm a bit cautious about the whole idea. Yeah. But look, I do think, I also think there are fundamental reasons why the Chinese military is probably significantly better than the Russian military. Why? Well, a number of reasons, but let's start with the most basic. I think, at least for a while, certainly pre-2020, their budget, the Chinese military budget, you know, in aggregate was something like almost 500.

five times what the Russian budget was. So, I mean, you know the numbers for sure, though? I mean, is China transparent enough to know how much they're actually spending? I mean, if anything, it was more than that, right? I mean, but here's the point, Jamie, is that Russian military spending before 2022 was appallingly low. I mean, you know, their budget was something like 120th of the NATO aggregate, one-20th. Okay. So, I mean, that alone should tell you that they were not going to be probably capable of conquering Ukraine, let alone, you know. And remember, Russia is a huge country. So they're also maintaining armed forces in the Pacific in Central Asia and, you know, and vast nuclear forces. So, I mean, you could, you know, you could literally just look at that figure and say, Russia, we don't have to really worry about them very much. And like I said, I'm not worried about Russia rolling into Poland or anywhere else.

except, you know, I do think they will take their bite out of Ukraine, but let's get back to China. I mean, yeah, so I think the spending has been there. China, you know, is, I don't want to say lavish, but they have been, you know, is very clear that their forces are being modernized at a very rapid clip. And we see them taking on training, which is, you know, really advanced. I also, I would say, you know, I watch a lot of Chinese military news and so forth, and so I'm quite well acquainted. And I think the esprit of core, the prestige in society, this is key, Jamie. In Russia, again, I've been to Russia many times and also China, so I'm in a good place to compare them. But the prestige of the Russian military throughout the post-Soviet period has been pretty low. I mean, in other words, they were not getting, you know, both had a low. morale. It was not seen as a prestigious profession. And it's really the opposite in China. I mean, in China, you have high morale, good pay, good facilities, you know, good training, clear mission. That's another thing I want to bring out here is that when, like, you know,

they interviewed some of those prisoners who were taken, you know, initially in the war. And then it said, you know, did you know anything? thing about this war in Ukraine and be like, no, you know, the Russian soldiers would be like, we had no idea, you know, we never thought we would go to war against Ukraine. We would, you know, we were just given orders to go somewhere on a map and not told, you know, what this is about or anything. So, I mean, no kind of psychological preparation. And indeed, I think a lot of Russians at that time in that initial phase were questioning what, what are we doing here? I don't think that'd be the case at all in a Taiwan scenario. I mean, you know, the whole purpose for the existence of the PLA

They make no bones about it, is to achieve a national unification. And in that sense, you know, the military, you know, it's ingrained into them from day one of their service that they are part of this campaign. So, you know, I could go on and on. But I think you're going to get a much higher spree de corps, a much, you know, higher level of understanding. No, I mean, it's not to say they wouldn't, there wouldn't be any, as it were, morale problems or psychological issues. I mean, it's often said, you know, Chinese will not kill Chinese. So, you know, in that sense, yeah, there could be some problems on both sides, by the way, for the Taiwanese, too. But because these are people who speak the same language.

Like I said, it's a civil war. So and some of that going on in Ukraine, too. I mean, it doesn't take, you don't have to be that well-versed in the history of Eastern Europe to know that the people in fighting in Ukraine, you know, they all speak Russian on both. sides, and so they can talk to each other, and they do. The second question I have about the Chinese military is, as I remember, I was at Schoenberg Palace in Austria, when it kind of struck me that when World War I began, there wasn't a single general in the Austrian-Hungarian Empire who had seen battle, because the last major battle that occurred there was 60 years ago. It's been decades since China

has been in a major war. How confident are you that a military that has not, you know, engaged in a major military war in decades would operate very well in the conflict that they, you know, in specifically the Taiwan taking over Taiwan. Yeah. I mean, it's a good point. And I think, you know, we could expect a lot of, a lot of problems in that respect. And, you know, it's a fair point that the, you know, as is often said, you know, among people who do this for a living, you know, who watch the Chinese military say, you know, we let's not make the mistake of thinking the PLA is 10 feet tall, you know. They're probably not two feet tall, but they're probably not 10 feet tall either. Now, so I take the point, Jamie,

but let me also respond this way that keep in mind that to what extent is the United States combat experienced. We're combat experienced in Iraq. We're combat experienced in Afghanistan. I guess we've probably had advisors all over Ukraine, so we're learning there, too. But what I'm saying, Jamie, is that, you know, the two services that would be most engaged in a war in the Taiwan war, the United States, that is the United States Navy and the United States Air Force.

I mean, neither of those services have seen, you know, intensive, great power, warfare since, you know, since 1945. Okay. So, I mean, this is especially the case in the Navy, but it's certainly true of the Air Force, too. So, I mean, I'm just saying, yeah, I mean, some segments of the Marines and the Army have got some combat experience. But, again, you're fighting against an enemy in, like, the Taliban in Afghanistan. I mean, they, you know, we're lucky to have ammunition for.

their AK-47s and maybe some RPGs, but I mean, you know, in other words, you're not, this is not like a peer-to-peer fight. You have massive control of the air. What I'm saying is that you can take away from that a combat experience all the wrong lessons, right? So it could actually be, we could actually be worse off here. There was an article in the Chinese military press. You know, I read a lot of Chinese military analyses. And they actually, you know, you raised the issue of World War I. They raised this question of military performance in World War I. And they said, actually, before World War I, the British and the French armies had much more combat experience than the German army. But paradoxically, the German army tended to

fight, you know, just, you know, if you go engagement by engagement, tended to be much more effective, particularly in the opening set of battles. Why? And the argument they made, and I, you know, I guess I'm not enough of an expert to say whether this is true or not, but they argued that the reason that the British armies fought worse is because the British armies, although they were more combat experience, but the armies they were fighting were these imperial wars, like in the Boer War in Africa. I mean, in other words, they were engaged. Yes, they were fighting, but they were wars that were totally different in their nature,

whereas the German army was focused on fighting against a pier. I hate to say it, but that, you know, that argument could be correct here. In other words, China, we've been fighting in Afghanistan, fighting in, you know, sort of in Ukraine and in the Middle East all over the place. These have been big distractions. We have not been focused until very recently, at least on peer to peer to peer. Great Power War. China has been focused on the possibility of this war over the Taiwan Strait for, you know, since at least 1996, but of course probably decades before that. So that kind of focus, you know, that will give them, I think, an advantage. And we've seen that. You know,

when we look at the platform, platform for platform, they're way ahead of us in many respects, not in every respect, but, you know, take hypersonic weapons, for example. They're, you know, they have a deployed weapon since 2017. We still don't have a deployed hypersonic weapon. Let me close on the nature of the regime. You can have, someone could have your view of the Chinese Taiwan issue that there's no choice because of the risk of nuclear conflict other than a diplomatic solution, but, you know, feel sad that you're losing a democracy. Do you view Taiwan as a more moral government than China?

Do you wish that it was Taiwan subsuming the mainland China versus vice versa? Well, I mean, sure, you know, there's a lot to like in Taiwan, an awful lot to like. By the way, it's often said, you know, the Chinese food is much better. And by the way, I mean, it's worth saying, I mentioned this museum of Chinese antiquities. I believe they have like 700,000 pieces. They're cared for with, you know, with great love. Why? Because they cherish their history and they always have their Chinese history.

In China, by contrast, for a period during the high period of Maoism, you know, in the cultural revolution, they destroyed these relics. So, I mean, there's this paradox where you can find better Chinese history and antiquities in Taiwan. Okay, so I mean, so yeah, I mean, there's a lot to like in Taiwan. Sure, if it could all be different, it'll be nice. But it can't. And we have to deal with the cards we're given. And here, the cause of world peace, basically the future of the world depends on the U.S. and China finding a way to get along. We don't have to like them, but we have to get along with them one way or another.

And so challenging their core interest here, they're, you know, as we would say in our lexicon, we'd say vital national interest. If we're going to challenge their vital national interest again and again and again on almost a daily basis, we're going to end up in a war. and maybe sooner rather than later. Let me ask it in a different way. I would listen to one podcast we talked about. You were a Russian kind of expert first and still are, but you studied Russian and learned Russian first. And you looked to Gorbachev because you believed he was he who ended the Cold War.

When Reagan, were you someone who, when Reagan called the Soviets an evil empire? He didn't like that. You recoiled at that. Boy, you've done your research, Jamie. You know, as a kid, I had a post-referral. of Gorby, you know, Gorbachev on my wall. I think we're all taken away with this, taken with this idealism. And sure, I mean, there's a lot to like there. And look, I've been to China many times. I'll be in China in a couple of months and I've been to Taiwan. Look, there's a lot

that Americans don't like about China and there's a lot that I don't like about China. But again, You know, we just don't, we just don't have a choice. And I believe, you know, what was it, Professor Walt at Harvard, who called it the hell of good intentions, that unfortunately, you know, America's disposition to kind of save everyone and save every, you know, group of people and wipe out oppression or something and, you know, spread freedom everywhere, that this disposition, unfortunately, has, you know, caused a lot of problems and that we would be much better off, Jamie. If we focused at home, did our best to make the best, you know, America that we can, sure, we should retain some alliances, but we shouldn't be on the edge of war, you know, with multiple countries

every other month. That's just, you know, this is, we've got to end that period in American foreign policy. we can be more humble, be more safe, and again, put our major, and I think the recent election vindicates this point of view that we have neglected Americans by supporting, you know, causes all over the world, whether it be in Afghanistan or Ukraine or Taiwan, but the American people want our focus at home, and let's focus on making this the best America that we can, as strong as we can, as wealthy and prosperous as we can, and that nobody will dare challenge us. when we're in that mode, you know, and that has been our secret all along as our founding

fathers knew, and we should get back to that. Good listeners might have realized that I think we just had an earthquake here out in California, but while you're giving your last answer. But that was my last question. Oh, I am. Before I let you go, one last question, actually. Who do you think is the most compelling person you debate against who has a different view than you that I should have on the show to give me the other side?

goodness there are a lot of people on the other side and including some friends and people I do respect well I think my I've had a kind of running debate with Bridge Colby and he is a skilled debater and a gentleman and he takes you know arguments seriously I think he's wrong about a lot of things I've read his book very carefully but but yeah I think you're listeners should hear the other side, and he does quite a good job on that. And I also think, you know, I share some, we agree on some things, too. And he wants to see, I think, a kind of more modest approach. And he, I should say, although he does favor the defense of Taiwan, you know, he's very clear about that, but he's also quite clear that he does not see ourselves

in like some kind of ideological contest with China. He doesn't think we should be sort of pursuing regime change and sort of extreme measures of that kind. But, you know, he thinks we have to ultimately get along with China, but he does want to try to defend Taiwan. Professor Lyle Goldstein, thank you for joining the Dispatch podcast. Yeah, so glad to talk with a gentleman. You know what I'm going to do.