The Dispatch Podcast - Is Iran Suicidal? | Interview: Reuel Marc Gerecht

Episode Date: September 23, 2024

Reuel Marc Gerecht, a former Iranian-targets officer in the Central Intelligence Agency and current fellow at the Foundations for the Defense of Democracy, joins Jamie to discuss Israel’s most recent operation against Hezbollah and how Iran might respond. The Agenda: —The effectiveness of Israeli intelligence operations —How did Hezbollah get the pagers? —Is Iran suicidal? —The health of the Ayatollah —Intelligence failure on October 7 —U.S. engagement in the Middle East Show Notes: —TMD's reporting on the attacks Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Welcome to the Dispatch Podcast. I'm Jamie Weinstein. My guest today is Raul Mark Gurek. He is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. He's also a former CIA officer working in the Middle East. And I had him come on to discuss what is going on with Israel and their amazing success in targeting Hezbollah over the last week in Lebanon. Raul is an expert in that region, an expert on Iran. So we get into a Israel's ability to target Hezbollah in the last week in Lebanon, but also the threat of Iran, what Iran's abilities are, the threat of Iran with a nuclear weapon, what that would be, and much more. So I think you're going to find this episode very useful, very educational. So without further ado, I give you Raul Mark Correct. Raul Marc Durek, welcome to the Dispatch podcast. My pleasure. We've had a remarkable several days in the Middle East, particularly Israel, in Lebanon.

Let me just recount a few of the things that have occurred. And I want to go in depth on some of them, but I want to get your broad overview. Several days ago, Pagers went off in Lebanon and other places in Syria as well. Hezbollah members answered them only to find that they exploded, causing thousands of casualties and some deaths of Hezbollah members, the next day at funerals, walkie-talkies that Hezbollah members were carrying, then exploded, causing more casualties and deaths. And today, as we speak, we speak on Friday here, Axios is reporting that an Israeli strike in Lebanon has killed 20 members, the entire leadership of the, and you can correct my pronunciation of this, the Rodwan forces, the I guess special operation forces,

is the entire leadership of the special forces of Hezbollah. Again, I want to go into depth on each of those, but what would this paint what you're seeing, what you make from the last several days of Israeli operations? Well, I mean, I think there are two ways to look at it, and they're not mutually exclusive. One is the Israelis are trying to teach Hezbollah that there is a severe price,

to be paid, particularly amongst the leadership, for their actions and for their attacks on Israel. Second, it may well be now preparation for a much larger Israeli action against Lebanon, including a land invasion. I think the Israelis had been hesitant on this for a couple reasons. First and foremost, until recently, they simply didn't have the stockpiles necessary to engage in that type of an offensive in Lebanon. Two, which is connected to one, is that they were uncertain about Lebanon's capacity to launch its substantial stockpile missiles. I think there is a growing consensus in the IDF that they can actually move against those stockpiles and the missile forces, and that Hizbollah, because it's not a terrorist organization per se

in its structure, it's not, it's a very well-organized military machine that happens to use terrorism, that actually when you take out leadership, you can throw chaos into the system. So I'm not, I wouldn't all be surprised now that what the Israelis have been very wary of for understandable reasons, primarily are Israeli civilian casualties. they are probably moving in the direction of. I don't think a decision has been made on that yet, and I do think the estimates of civilian casualties you hear from IDF folks, which usually range somewhere between 700 and 1,500 deads Israelis,

that is civilians that would come from missile strikes until the Israeli Air Force were able to put those out of action. You know, that has a breaking effect. But I think there is a shift inside of Israel that they can't allow essentially 10% of their territory to go unoccupied. You mentioned the two options here. One is the potential of a larger operation. Some critics, Twitter critics online, said, why would you waste such a sophisticated operation that took obviously many years to put in place as Pager operation without simultaneously striking at that moment? Is that perhaps because we don't know what Israel has planned?

I mean, if one of the, if the calculation is to intimidate and also to soften, which I believe it is, then at any time that you take those out works to your advantage. It takes a long time to prepare someone to become a Hezbollah leader to have the necessary skill set. It's not just simply round robin. You don't get to lose one. Someone replaces him. I think that's true for someone at the bottom of the totem pole. It's not true from someone at the top.

And I think the Israelis are just, you know, instilling fear, once again, that they're capable of a lot more. And they want to see if they can intimidate the Hezbollah leadership into ceasing and desisting and its missile attacks on northern Israel. I don't think that's possible without an invasion. but I suspect the Israelis will test it for the reasons I mentioned, and that is, even if they go through with it, even if it's a significant success, they're still probably going to have a few hundred Israeli civilians die.

Speaking of the Pager operation and the Wauke-Taki operation in particular, can you put that in some historical context? I mean, you were in the CIA. You're aware of past operations. To me, in my lifetime, is one of the most remarkable things I've ever seen. scene. Yeah, I mean, operationally, it's pretty bloody good. I mean, obviously they got a hold of all the information that Hizbollah needed to, you know, order new pagers. It's fun. It's amusing in the sense that one of the reasons Hizbollah moved to pagers was to get away from cell phones, which they

believe were more easily tracked. So they probably, I don't know when they ordered those pagers, but they probably did it in a manner, obviously, that was sufficiently open. So, they probably, so the Israelis could discover it, and then they intercepted those pages. I suspected the source and rigged them. There's no chance on earth that the agency could have pulled off a similar action. Well, I read, and it's obviously all this is preliminary information and may not turn true that they actually operated a pager company for many years and were actually selling legitimate pagers to other, I mean, I don't know who's using pagers now, but selling legitimate pages to

other organizations waiting for the moment or maybe trying to push, push Hezbollah to the moment where Hezbollah needs to order a lot of pagers. That wouldn't surprise me. I think it would be interesting to look at, you know, Beirut Communications and see if there have been any shifts in technology, upgrading software, et cetera, et cetera, that opened up the opportunity for Mossad, to do what it did. Why did you say that you don't believe the CIA would have the capability of doing that now? I mean, it's one, but just the political overtones of this would be too much for the CIA to handle.

So it would be kicked up to the White House and there it would be lawyer to death. And then you would have the operational details of having to deploy essentially a covert action team long enough to manage this. It's just too long and involved, I suspect, for the agency to do. The agencies, for the most part, really out of covert action, because to do anything of any significance that costs any money, now this may have been a low-cost op, it requires bipartisan support, it requires congressional support, and people can't leak on you. So if there's anywhere in that chain of command that people don't want to do this, they'll simply leak it. That's the end of it. Do you believe that Israel had to have, would this be the type of operation, you would have to have human intelligence on the

ground people? I mean, they certainly was a component part. I mean, I think the Israelis could have picked up a lot via intercept, and they're pretty good at intercept. They're not nearly as good as we are, but they're not bad, particularly if it's a tactical intercept where they can go position things inside of Beirut, which I'm sure they do. So they may have picked it up that way, but I suspect that there was also some human sources involved. Would that mean that people within the organization, Hezbollah, have turned? Or could that be Lebanese who are frustrated and upset that Hezbollah has become such a force in the country are now trying to help Israel?

In particular instance, it could have been either. This didn't require, you know, a serious penetration of the Hezbollah to pull off, I suspect. But it could have been. I mean, they could have had inside information from Hezbollah, as well as picking up information from other Lebanese sources. If the Axios report is true in that the strike today did kill the entire leadership of the Rodwan force, the special forces of Hezbollah, how significant is that? What effect would that have on Hezbollah's ability to strike Israel? Well, I mean, it wouldn't have a significant effect on Hezbollah's capacity to launch missiles, all right? And that's what Israel really worries about.

It's not, you know, special operations units. But it certainly is a serious psychological blow to Hezbollah. They seem to be wide open. So, you know, for both the Hezbollah and for Iran, there have been a series of Israeli operations that certainly, I think, make everyone wonder how deeply penetrated are their services. So it's, the Israelis have introduced a real guessing game. And I think the ramifications for that on Hezbollah and also on Iran, both the Revolutionary Guard Corps and Iranian intelligence service, are significant because one of the factors that the Iranians in particular, and I think it's true also of Hezbollah, have always feared is that their secrets leak.

and that in particular, the Americans for the Iranians, will find out, and it could, you know, the Americans might do something untoward. And now the Israelis really are doing things that the Iranians would consider untoward. So, you know, it tells you that even in Tehran, even in a Revolutionary Guard guesthouse, you're not safe. You mentioned that in and of itself, the killing of the leadership of the special forces wouldn't prevent the, you know, 100 to 200,000 missiles, I guess the estimates are that. Yeah, one knows. I think those gross numbers, I think the IDF leadership, by the way, is correct.

And those gross numbers don't tell you all that much. The real issue is how many missiles, how many missile launchers can you launch before the IDF blows them up? And can you then relaunch with the IDF blowing you up again? So there is a certain rate of fire, which is probably the maximum that Hezbollah can sustain. And, you know, 150,000, 100,000, 200,000, whatever that number is, probably doesn't tell you all that much. My question, though, is the communication aspect to launch those missiles? If they're afraid of using their cell phone because Israel can then target them, and now they don't have pagers because Israel will target them and walkie-talkies are blowing up. And when they meet together as a leadership, they're all getting taken out by, you know, an Israeli jet.

How, I mean, do they need good communications to make the orders to launch the missiles? Is there a way to coordinate launches without using technology that Israel may have intercepted? Well, yes. I mean, I think they could figure out ways to do it, but it obviously won't be instantaneous. So the process of figuring out how to communicate without the Israelis intercepting you. I mean, I suspect that right now, Hezbollah has had substantial conversations with the Iranians, who, and they're working on ways to get better encrypted communication technology to

Hezbollah that will make it much more difficult for the Israelis to intercept them. You know, the Iranians are capable of doing that. And certainly, since they're so closely allied with the Russians, the Russian capacity to encrypt communications is almost as good as ours, maybe as good. So the advantage that the Israelis currently have there will probably evanes. I was going to ask you about the Iranians. What are they thinking now? Because you mentioned trying to get the Hezbollah better encrypted equipment,

how long would that process take? I mean, would that be a month's long to get that set up, for many months? That's an excellent question. I think for the top of the leadership, it would be very quick. To be able to spread encrypted equipment down at lower ranks, you know, that will take a bit of time. It depends how many, you know, spare units of encrypted telephones and things like that that

the Iranians possess. I don't know that number. I would guess it's not enormous. So, you know, the Iranians might call on the Russians to help there. Not long ago, I saw someone go through a sudden loss, and it was a stark reminder of how quickly life can change and why protecting the people you love is so important. Knowing you can take steps to help protect your loved ones and give them that extra layer of security brings real peace of mind.

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Shortly before we began this podcast, there was a report that the chief of staff to Iran's supreme leader said that Israel should expect the response for the killing of Ismail Haniyah, the leader of Hamas, I guess at least a month ago now or two months ago, in Tehran. attack against Israel response to that should be soon. Before it gets nuclear weapons or until it gets nuclear weapons, what type of attack would you most worry about if you're an Israeli from Iran, or do you believe this is saber-rattel? Well, I mean, there's no doubt that the Supreme Leader wanted to attack after Hania was killed in a Revolutionary Guard guesthouse. but I think he was probably deterred from doing so by the successful American-led effort to intercept the 300-plus missiles and drones that were fired at Israel in April. So the means for them to strike at Israel are limited and probably unsatisfying.

I mean, every time an Israeli or a Jew dies by their hand, it gives them a certain frisson, a certain joy. But, you know, the odd terrorist strike launched by a proxy, you know, it's not that satisfying. That is probably where they're going. They're just more proxy attacks. If they could figure out a way to blow something substantial up, some Israeli diplomatic facility, which is pretty bloody hard, then I think they would go in that direction. That's where Iranians have generally gone is through some type of terrorist action that they can plausibly deny and causes sufficient bloodshed to be satisfying.

I don't expect to see a missile attack. I think, and also it's important to remember, the Iranians are very, very close to getting a nuclear weapon. The last thing they want is to possibly draw the Americans who are obviously very reluctant to engage the Iranians, militarily, to draw them into a conflict where their nuclear facilities might be put in danger. I think they worry less about the Israeli capacity to blow those up, but I think they worry a lot about the American capacity to blow those up. And even though, in our eyes, it's pretty clear that the Biden administration, that's the last thing on earth that they would want to do, in Iranian eyes, it's not so clear that the conspiracies and American awe is still fairly substantial there or well aware of what America's conventional capacities are. I want to get to the nuclear question in a second, but you mentioned the April 13th attack against Israel with missiles from Iran. Obviously, for those who don't remember, on April 1st, Israel bombed an annex building next to the Iranian consulate in Damascus, killing senior leader of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard and some several other members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard.

In response, Iran fired hundreds of drones, cruise missiles, towards Israel, 99 percent of which were intercepted. by either Israel or its allies. At the time, there were some experts or military people who claimed that this was all a coordinated effort between America and Israel and Iran so that Iran would have, at least, looking like they're retaliating without drawing Israel to a greater strike. My sense, that was crazy because it made Iran look impotent. Why would they send hundreds of missiles to show impotence? What was your view of that? That was crazy. I mean, no, I think the Supreme Leader really wanted to draw blood.

And I think he was probably deeply, deeply embarrassed that the only person wounded was an Arab-Betuan girl. So now, there's no, the notion that they were mutually signaling into the Iranians, wanted the Americans to blow out of the sky, all of their cruise missiles and drones is just absurd. It did get circulated in certain quarters. I think it usually gets circulated in those quarters that tend to be apologetic for the Islamic Republic. But, no, I think the Supreme Leader intended and certainly expected that missiles would get through. Some missiles would get through, and there would be significant Israeli casualties. Before we get to nuclear weapons, when Russia invaded Ukraine, there was a belief by many that this would be a six-day operation.

Russia would, you know, decapitate Kiev and take over. And we turned out that everyone overestimated the ability of the Russian army. Are we overestimating, or not we, but does the foreign policy establishment overestimate the ability of the Iranian regime that we make it out to be stronger than it is, but was, you know, but then we see they're unable, after firing 200 missiles to get all but a few to land in Israel itself. Well, I mean, if it depends. I mean, you can, If you talk to American commanders, I mean, they're well aware that Iran's conventional capacity is pretty pathetic, which is one reason why they've developed and deployed rather brilliantly at times a proxy strategy.

And also, they've invested so heavily in nuclear weapons because they aren't conventionally very good. So conventionally, they couldn't stand their ground at all with the United States. The issue is terrorism, and if they develop the bomb, and I believe they will, unless something surprising happens, you know, they'll use the type of leverage you can get from a nuclear weapon to intimidate others and try to secure them from, you know, either an Israeli or American strike on Iranian territory. You know, I think the Biden administration, like the Obama administration before, and to be fair, it's also, it's been somewhat of a bipartisan reflex, are just scared of, you know, further confrontation of the Middle East. after the experiences of Iraq and Afghanistan, no one wants to go there. So Americans are profoundly gun-shy, and they're worried about the slippery slope to some substantial engagement in the Middle East, or even continuing low-scale terrorist engagement.

So I think the Americans are just gun-shy. They're nervous. So they don't want to use their substantial advantage. and conventional force. Do you believe Israel has the capability to set back, if not destroy, the Iranian program? Or is that only something the Americans are able to do? I mean, I'd have to say it would be a real stretch for the Israelis. I mean, is it possible?

Theoretically possible, yes. But the more advanced those centrifuges become, the deeper the underground facilities are. the more difficult it becomes for the Israelis who just simply don't have the throw capacity that the American Air Force has. So, you know, there's a reason why, several reasons why BB and Netanyahu's, you know, bark is always worse than his bite. But one of the reasons why the Israelis who repeatedly threatened to militarily go after the Iranian nuclear program haven't, and I think that's because they realize,

it's a real stretch for the IDF. If Israel cannot set back Iran's nuclear program through military force and the United States is unwilling to do so, you mentioned you believe Iran will get a nuclear weapon or capability. What does that mean for Israel? What does that mean for the United States? Well, I mean, the United States has been already checked in its desire to take the fight to Iran. So I'm not sure the nuclear weapon will just amplify that anxiety. For the Israelis, it's more problematic.

I don't believe that they're in danger of Tel Aviv being nuked because the Iranians are well aware Israel would nuke several Iranian cities. But mutually assured destruction works against the Israelis. That means that the Iranians, I suspect, will feel. they can engage in more proxy actions, more lethal proxy actions against the Israelis without fear of attacks against the Iranian homeland. And the Iranians have already demonstrated that they have a rather large capacity to watch their allies die in numbers to draw Israeli blood.

I mean, that's an important view then. You don't believe that the Iranian regime, the Supreme Leader, is suicidal, that they they would destroy Israel and accept the damage to Iran, to hasten the end times and bring back the hidden imam? No, they've never demonstrated that aspiration. So now, it's possible that if you had, you know, some change of power, some internal tumult inside of the Islam Republic and, you know, more fire breathers got a lot. hold of the nuke. I suppose it's possible, but I don't believe the Iranian Theocracy has any

desire to risk Iranian cities being destroyed. That doesn't mean that they won't use the nuke as leverage, and they won't try to checkmate the Israelis and the Americans, and it doesn't mean that they're going to behave better. They'll behave worse. It's just that they aren't suicidal. How is this, you know, it feels like for almost 20 years I've been hearing that the Supreme Leader is sick and that, you know, reports come out that he's days away from death. Do we know how his health is and what comes after him when he dies? Yeah, you know, I was in the agency, I always had a real John's view of all health intelligence because it usually turned out to be wrong. I mean, clerics lead a pretty healthy life. They eat

well. They don't drink. You know, they usually have sex until they're quite old. You know, they tend to last. And, you know, the Supreme Leader has obviously been sick in the past, but I do remember a friend of mine remark that, you know, when you saw a picture of him getting a COVID shot, he had his sleeves rolled up, that, you know, his muscular definition looked pretty good. So, I don't know. I mean, could he die tomorrow, sure, but clerics do tend to have a long life. What do you think comes after him whenever he passes is going to be potentially a better outcome? No, I don't think it's a better outcome.

I think the Islamic Republic has shown since the reform movement was utterly crushed in 1999 that the regime is hardening, not softening. So, and the supreme leaders had plenty of time to handpick those individuals that will continue his legacy, who are as ideologically hardcore as he is. So I would not expect, I would expect the theocracy to hold. I don't think you'd see a dictatorship of the Revolutionary Guard Corps. I think the theocracy will hold. but I would not expect to see a moderation. I mean, people have been expecting Thermador in the Islamic Republic

even before Ayatollah Khomeini died in 1989, and, you know, Thermador hasn't really arrived. What do you think the Biden administration, what do you think Americans more generally need to understand about Iran that they don't? What is a misconception that's out there with Americans dealing with Iran now? and in the past. Well, I think there's been a big historical one. I mean, Americans from almost after the success of the Islamic Republic, Americans always

do, and it's a bipartisan reflex, they try to say hi. You know, they try to engage. And the Iranian revolutionaries, for the most part, you know, have responded to that by saying, you know, Biloch, which in Persian is not a very nice word, basically up yours. So I think that's what, that's generally been the level of communications. Now, it is changed a bit since Obama is that the, I think the Iranian leadership, Khomeini in particular, has realized there's an exploitable difference between Democrats and Republicans. And he's tried to use that. The nuclear deal is, is part of that exploration.

So the biggest thing that Americans need to realize is that the Iranian regime, the neocry is dead serious about their beliefs and dead serious about their ideology. It's not some, you know, realist ploy. It's real. And so you need to pay attention to what they say. And much of it, most of it, you should believe it. Now, that doesn't mean that the Iranians are 10 feet tall. That doesn't mean that they're a reincarnation of al-Qaeda.

They're not. But they do intend us harm. And they really, really, really would like to drive the West and westernized rulers in the Middle East down. So that's probably the most important thing to remember. That doesn't mean you can't engage Iranians. I mean, I'm all in favor of American officials, you know, if they're trying to get Iranians to talk to them. I think that's fine. In fact, every time you meet them, you should say, you know, open up the U.S. embassy in Tehran.

Because if that embassy ever opens, then that's the end of the Islamic Revolution. What did you mean when you said they're not a re-evention of al-Qaeda in a positive way, meaning that you don't believe that... Yeah, I mean, the Iranians aren't, like, the Iranians aren't suicidal. They're not nihilists. There was a real nihilist core to al-Qaeda. Shiaite radicals that now rule the Islamic Republic are of a different, they're of a different stripe, a different creature. They're much more complicated. They have a real culture behind them. There's nationalism playing inside. The Iranian revolutionary is a fascinating and complicated creature, but he's quite deadly. And Americans have, have not necessarily appreciated that. If I had to, you know, if you had the power to rewind the clock, I'd like to take the clock back to, you know, 1983 after the bombings in Beirut.

And I really wish, you know, Secretary Joel Schultz had won the day in the argument where he wanted to take a reprisal directly back to Iran for those terrorist actions. But he was, he lost the debate and Casper Weinberger, the second. Secretary of Defense won it. I think we've been paying the price for that ever since. Let me close on a couple more questions. What do you make of the allegations of Iranian hacking into the Trump campaign? How. I mean, is there a strategy there? Are they trying to do something? Anything about Donald Trump, we don't already know. Is it just no chaos? I mean, what would be the purpose of them to do this? Oh, I mean, if they could do it, I mean, to have fun.

So, I mean, it'd be fun to hack into, you know, but does it really, really matter? No. I think this discussion of, you know, foreign hacking of the United States is a bit overdone politically. You know, it's the, it's like the discussion of Iranian influence operations in the United States. I mean, let's be, let's be serious. The former foreign minister, Zarif, I lived in the United States for 23 years. I mean, all he would do is absorb the left-wing American critiques of the United States and shoot them back at us.

So he's not influencing us. We're influencing him. So it's the reverse of the way people talk about this. So do I fear Iranian influence operations? No. Do you fear any, is there how risky or is it overblown the idea that there are, has operatives in the U.S. that if we were to attack Iran, that they would. It's overblown. I think the opportunities for Hizbollah to have demonstrated themselves

have been many, and they haven't shown their heads. Also, the Iranians have truly engaged in rather pathetic assassination attempts in the United States. You should treat them seriously. But if you actually look at the operational details of them, one is not impressed. I mean, the Hezbollah and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps operate like that. So if Hezbollah had had operatives of a competent, lethal caliber in the United States, I think they would have already been deployed. Iran loves to assassinate its dissidents. It's just a passion for them. So I think we would have seen the Hezbollah deployed for,

Iran, if they've been capable of doing so. That doesn't mean that there aren't certain terrains that I think they have operated in better. It doesn't mean that Hezbollah and the Ronan Intelligence Ministry and Revolutionary Guard Corps can't learn and get better. They can. They've certainly demonstrated the capacity to do that in other fields. but I am not impressed so far with Hispil laws, you know, a network of the United States. I doubt if it's that deep.

Final question. Let me close with this. We're approaching the year anniversary of the October 7th attack in Israel. In October 7th, certainly I was shocked that the Israelis intelligence failed in the way it did. A year later, we're seeing maybe one of the greatest. intelligence operations or anywhere with the pager attacks, then the walkie-talkie attacks within Lebanon. What do we take away from that failure, you know, incredible failure a year ago and this incredible success a year later in understanding the capacity of Israeli intelligence?

Yeah, well, without knowing all the details of what happened with the I would say Mossad would tell you first that, listen, when it comes to the Palestinians, Shinbet and the military is responsible. They're not. So they would walk away from the October 7th disaster as fast as they possibly could. Now, I don't know if Mossad had failures, too. Obviously, Shinbet and the IDF had enormous ones. I would say this about Mossad operations. You know, it wasn't that long ago that they were making just a series of troops. truly embarrassing mistakes in their operations. And they've turned it around.

And the operations that they've done in the Levant, in Iran itself, in particular, I think the most impressive operation, which was the stealing, breaking into and stealing the Iranian nuclear archives, is just, I mean, that's world class. There's no way the agency would have been able to do that. So I, in my hats off to them. So I'm not sure that you would, I think October 7th just means the gloves have come off. So the Israeli intelligence, Mossad, and military intelligence now is able to do more things probably than they were willing, who were able to do before. And that the political leadership of Israel is more willing to do more audacious things.

than they were before. And I suspect that audacity will continue. Rahul Mark Correct. Thank you for joining the Dispatch Podcast. My pleasure. You know,