The Dispatch Podcast - Is Qatar an Arsonist or a Firefighter? | Interview: Jonathan Schanzer

Episode Date: April 29, 2024

Qatar hosts a major U.S. air base, but its patronage of radical Islamist terror groups has some Americans questioning the alliance. Jonathan Schanzer, senior vice president for research at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, joins Jamie to explain. The Agenda: —Introduction to Qatar —Various actors and terrorist organizations in Qatar —Qatar’s financial influence in Washington —Al Jazeera's relationship with Qatar —Responding to Rep. Dan Crenshaw’s comments on Qatar Show Notes: —Jonathan for The Jerusalem Post: Qatar: ‘The arsonist who then claims to be the firefighter' Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

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Welcome to the Dispatch podcast. I'm Jamie Weinstein. My guest today is Jonathan Shanzer. He is the vice president for research at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. He was also previously a terrorism finance analyst at the U.S. Department of Treasury, where he followed and froze the funding of Hamas and al-Qaeda. He is the perfect guest today to talk about Qatar, which is the subject of the podcast. It is a little bit of the explainer podcast we do from time to time. And with Qatar so much in the news these days, I thought it would be useful. to get a deeper understanding of the country and what Jonathan says is the criticism of it and why they are a real problem. I provide some pushback, the counterargument, and see how he responds to that.

But ultimately, this is an episode to get a better understanding of Qatar. And I think you will get that after listening to the show. So without further ado, I give you Dr. Jonathan Shanzer. Jonathan Shanzer, welcome to the Dispatch podcast. Thanks, Jamie. I want to do kind of an explainer for the audience about Qatar because it's so much in the news recently with what's going on in the Middle East. But let me start here. Can you just explain where Qatar is in relation to the Middle East,

kind of the non-political elements of it? It's an interesting little country where, you know, about 30. million people, 90% of them are foreign workers, but the highest GDP in the world, kind of just the non-political explanation of what Qatar is. Sure. Well, Qatar is a tiny territory on the on the back of Saudi Arabia. It is in the Persian or Arabian Gulf, depending on how you like to describe that body of water. It is smaller than the state of Delaware. And as you noted, there are about three million people there. The vast majority are foreign workers, about 330,000 citizens total. And the country controls about 11% of the world's gas reserves. So they are immensely wealthy.

The people don't need to work, basically. And the leadership has more money than it knows what to do with. And we see them slinging that cash around in Washington and in other capitals. We can talk about what they try to achieve by throwing that money around. But I think the key point to understanding this country is they play in the same space as all these Western governments and legitimate governments around the world. But at the same time, they are sponsors, financial patrons, sometimes hosts, physical hosts, of a wide range of terrorist organizations. So the Taliban has had a headquarters there.

Hamas has a headquarters there. There are former financiers from al-Qaeda and ISIS that have sought refuge in this country. And so they are, you know, as we always say, they are the arsonist and the firefighter in a lot of these challenges that we're facing in the Middle East. And, yeah, I think understanding their financial fortunes really does go a long way and explaining how they're able to do just that. I want to get into all of that. I just had a curiosity, I mean, you're a critic, so I don't think you'd be welcome there.

Have you ever had a chance to visit, Cutter? Yeah, I've been twice. I don't think I'm welcome now. I've been told that I could probably get in, but getting out might be more of a problem. And so, no thanks. It is hot as hell and just like 100% humidity, just really, like, oppressive. I don't recommend going in the summer or even the late. spring or early fall i remember the first time i went there this was i think 2003 uh i was wearing

glasses off the plane walked outside and like they like immediately fogged up and and i just i couldn't get the like the the condensation off of my glasses was just so hot uh and so muggy um there's you what's interesting there is i you know in the in the two times that i've been kataris don't really want to talk to you right they are the elite in the country and they are a minority seeing them out and about is not something that is terribly common, especially the leadership. It's actually, from what I saw, it was more likely that you'd bump into somebody like Khaled Mechal, the head of Hamas, who had a headquarters there.

People, I mean, I remember sitting around a table with expats, people that were working for the U.S. Embassy and the British Embassy. This was my second trip in 2013, sitting around. on the table talking with him. I said, hey, has anybody here seen, you know, Khalid Mechal? And they talked about it like the way that New Yorkers talk about seeing Woody Allen and Manhattan, right? Like, oh, I saw him at the Russian tea room. No, no, no, I saw him at this, you know, and like everybody had seen him somewhere. The other story that I love telling is that I asked U.S. service members if they ever came into contact with the Taliban because we

have our largest air base there fighting against, you know, all manner of terrorist organizations. And during the height of the war in Afghanistan, you had Taliban folks based there and you had U.S. servicemen in the, I mean, in the same territory. And they're fighting each other, you know, hundreds of miles away. And I said, you ever come across anybody from the Taliban in your daily life? And the story I heard was that there was one guy that went to the IKEA. store in Doha and was literally sitting on a couch testing out the you know the cushions and on the other end of the couch was a guy from the Taliban a senior Taliban member this is the essence of Qatar they somehow are able to get away with all of this and I think it's primarily because of the

money they spend it's cash injections in the United States and amongst our allies but also that air base that I mentioned, Al-Dade, as it's known. That's a big reason for our putting up with all of this. Well, let me ask you, let me ask you about that. And again, I want to get to the case against them. But what would you, how would you describe Washington's view of them? As you mentioned, we have a major air base there. We designated them a major non-NATO ally now. What has Washington's view of them been, I guess, cross administrations, because they, you know, no one's moved the base from there since it was established? You know, what is the traditional Washington view of why we can consider Qatar, an ally. Now, I guess, a non-major NATO ally. So it's complicated. And I have to say

the logic is not sound in my view. And it's one of the reasons why I've been a critic. You know, what the Qataris, first of all, they moved in and established this base. It's our combined air operations center, otherwise known as chaos. And they built it to spec for the U.S. military. It costs, you know, more than a billion dollars from what I understand, and they did it, you know, on their dime. And the reason why they did it, just to be clear, is they don't have an army. And they're in a tough neighborhood. And, you know, to have U.S. F-16s and F-35s based there is, I think, quite a deterrent for any would-be enemy that might think about attacking them. But the reason why they were able to set it up is because the Saudis after 9-11 wouldn't host

Americans. And so we needed something close in theater that we would be able to use in our war on terror. And the Qataris raised their hands, paid for it. And ever since then, I would say that the biggest advocate for Qatar in the United States is the U.S. military. And so when, you know, folks from the Pentagon get up in front of Congress and talk about the value of our allies, and they share that with members of Congress, and they say so to the executive, it's kind of hard to, you know, it's hard to deny them that, right? But I think we need to understand that over the years, this has been an incredibly hospitable place for all manner of terrorists, I've already mentioned.

They were major proponents of the Muslim Brotherhood during the Arab Spring. In fact, when the Gaddafi regime fell, this was fascinating. The jihadis in Libya, when they took over the capital, they raised not the Libyan flag. They raised the Qatari flag over the capital. You get a sense here that they were just very thankful for the money and the support that they were getting from the Qataris. Amos has been there, I think, since 2005 or 2000. What's really interesting there, and obviously I've been very critical of the Hamas support network in Doha, is that the Qataris, to this day, insist that the arrangement that they have with Hamas has been brokered with the United States. Except here's the thing. When the U.S. kind of acquiesced to the creation of that headquarters in Doha for Hamas, it came something like,

years after Hamas's presence was already established. In other words, they solidified the support in America for their headquarters after they had already stood it up. And so the idea now is that somehow the Qataris were asked to do this. It's not accurate. The Qataris lie outright when they say this. And we've seen statements that they put out, written statements and statements from their ambassador from the government itself. Their willingness to host these bad actors came well before the U.S. saw some utility. And I have to say that, you know, that was a policy stood up by the Obama administration. It was perpetuated by Trump, and it's now being perpetuated by Biden. So it's now a bipartisan policy that we put up with the Qatari double dealing, that they host

these terror groups, they fund them, and we thank them for doing so. It is truly dysfunctional. In a city like Washington that is already dysfunctional enough, this really drives me crazy. Well, let me ask you, I mean, you laid out their funding of terror. What do you think the motivation is, is it ideological driven that they're supporting these groups because they agree with them? Is it pragmatism that they believe if, you know, the famous Churchill quote, you know, that they fund these groups hoping the alligator will eat them last? You know, if they fund these groups that they won't be the target of attack. And in that context, answering that question, maybe you can help also understand the worldview of their leader, Sheikh bin Hamad al-Thani,

who is 43 years old, took over when he was in his early 30s, a young guy. Is he ideologically driven or, again, trying to, you know, play all sides so Qatar itself is an attack? Look, I mean, I think you put your finger on two reasons. You know, certainly there's the ideological reasons for this. and the regime is deeply ideological. They are Wahhabi. And what's kind of ironic is, you know, the Saudis are known as kind of the original Wahhabis. They've moderated over time,

and the Qataris have actually become more radical, more Wahhabi, if you will. They are the largest proponent of the Muslim Brotherhood, which is an organization that is ideologically at the core of every terrorist group that we have fought in the United States, every terrorist group that we have designated, right? Within the Sunni world, the Muslim Brotherhood, this is, it's like the gateway drug to jihadism, right? People become Muslim Brotherhood members, and then they graduate to become al-Qaeda or Hamas or ISIS. This is the ideology, and they

promote it actively. They spend a ton of money making sure that Muslim Brotherhood gets the support that it needs around the world. And again, we saw a big push for that in Egypt, in Libya, in a bunch of other places during the Arab Spring, and they haven't stopped. I think there's also defeating the alligators. Can I just ask you about it? I mean, that kind of goes maybe to the point. Are they funding Muslim Brotherhood kind of spreading their ideology in the hopes? I mean, it's one part of the feud between Saudi and the U.E. and Qatar. Are they hoping that, you know, those regimes fear the Muslim Brotherhood, but is Qatar funding them because they agree with the Muslim Brotherhood or because they hope that the Muslim Brotherhood will focus on other regimes

and not try to foment terror attentions within Qatar? I think the answer is yes, right? It's both, right? There's no, I don't think it's either or, and it drives the Saudis crazy. It drives the Emirati's crazy. And they hate the Qatari regime. You may remember in 2017, there was that very open spat where they, essentially put a blockade around Qatar because of its policies and its support for the Muslim

Brotherhood. By the way, Al Jazeera, which is owned by the Qatari regime, this is, I mean, you know, we watch it with frustration in the way that it, you know, I mean, it is essentially encouraged attacks against U.S. servicemen in places like Iraq and in Afghanistan. It has been fomenting radicalization around the region. But initially, it really actually, in its early years, it seemed really like a dedicated tool to hammering the Saudis and to hammering the other pragmatic Gulf states. And it's for this reason that there's this longstanding animosity. This was their soft power. But getting back to why they're doing all of this, yeah, I think there's there's the ideological fervor. There is the desire to maybe keep their enemies at bay.

And then look, there's, I think, one other part of this, which is this gives them leverage. And you can see right now, I mean, the Qataris, I think it's a double-edged sword, by the way. But, you know, people are talking about the Qataris ever since the attacks of 10-7, that they are a core player right now, a diplomatic player, in the attempts to get the hostages released out of Gaza. up. I have to say they were successful in their first iteration of this. They have failed repeatedly since. I have questions about whether they are actually interested in releasing those hostages. They are not an honest broker here. And I think that is really missing in a lot of the coverage that people say, oh, the Qataris, the diplomatic channel, I'm sorry, but if you've been funding Hamas to the tune of $30 million a month since 2018 and the Qataris have been doing that, and you have

have headquarters where they have planned and executed and financed a lot of different terror operations. I would even argue that the 500 to 700 miles of underground tunnels that the Israelis are dealing with, I believe that was financed almost entirely by the Qataris with that 30 million installation per month since 2018. So the question is, are they really there to help? Are they really there, when you say they're arsonist and firefighter, I think they're mostly arsonist pretending to be a firefighter. And somehow, you know, everyone pretends that that's still the case, that they are, you know, there to help. I think we're all lying to ourselves when we say that the Qataris are there with goodwill. And I got to say, for people that have been following the

Qataris, they've been following the Middle East, most people take a dim view of what they do. They may say that there is still some utility in it, but they are under no illusions that this is somehow an organization that is truly here to help. They're there to help themselves. Not long ago, I saw someone go through a sudden loss, and it was a stark reminder of how quickly life can change and why protecting the people you love is so important. Knowing you can take steps to help protect your loved ones and give them that extra layer of security brings real peace of mind. The truth is, the consequences of not having life insurance can be serious. That kind of financial strain on top of everything else is why life insurance indeed matters. Ethos is an online platform

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It makes no sense to me that, like, we have these groups designated. And some individuals have been specifically identified by either the UN or the U.S. And the Qataris have done nothing to bring them to justice. That is insane that we would reward them with a major non-U.S. ally status. Then I think there's a bigger problem that we're going to need to deal with, which is, is this a country where we should have our chaos, where Al-Udei, that base, whether that combined air operations center is truly the best place for us to be operating out of.

Do we trust this country? There were, by the way, rumors, and, you know, the Qataris have denied it, but I've heard otherwise that they refuse to allow the U.S. to attack or actually to neutralize those Iranian missiles and drones that were fired on the night of April 13th, the morning of April 14th, that they refused to allow the U.S. to be involved. So if that is true, and again, we're hearing mixed messages, but if that is true, do we really want a base where we're going to have limited? operations, limited ability to, you know, actively participate in combat operations when they're needed, especially when we're talking about defensive operations as these were, right, shooting down these missiles and drones. Beyond that, I think there are some other things that probably should happen. I mean, we should be forcing, publicly demanding that Hamas kick out its, or that Qatar kick out its Hamas leaders from the country, right? If they are,

and they are refusing to make a deal for the release of hostages. And the Qatari channel, like the whole reason that they say this channel exists is to be able to broker things for the United States in the Middle East. If Hamas is refusing to work with the Qataris, that's the narrative we're hearing, then what good is this channel? Why are we keeping them there? Why are the Qataris not paying a price for this? So there's that.

I think there's other either individuals or entities that maybe could be arrested, jail, deported. I mean, if the Qataris are truly an American ally, then they should be willing to work with us as a superpower, tenuous as that may be right now. We are still the stronger party here. We have the leverage. We simply don't use it. We are somehow deferential to this tiny country of 330,000 citizens. That's like a neighborhood in Manhattan. It's not even a city in America, right?

This is a tiny country with very little leverage, but a lot of money. We can say, great. You want to make investments? Perfect. You want to work with us? You want to have our air base there? Great. We're still going to be telling you what our policies are.

I mean, I look at the way in which the U.S. has been hammering the Israelis for its conduct in the war in Gaza, a war that they did not invite and a war that, they see as existential. And the criticism, the public, scathing criticism that we see by the Biden administration to Israel is shocking, right? We don't talk to allies this way. And we certainly don't talk to the Qataris this way, even when they have failed to deliver the things that we ask them to do. We're deferential to them. I think that tone needs to change. And I just don't see any reason why we would be tiptoeing around them.

It makes me ask the question, what do they have on us? And this, I have to say, has never been answered. But I got to say, I don't trust this, that somehow we keep tiptoeing around them. It doesn't make any sense. Doesn't add up. So what do you think, I mean, when you say what do they have on us, do you think they have, and because it's cross-by-partisan administrations.

So, I mean, it couldn't be one particular administration or party. It seems cross administrations that they've allied with Qatar. So when you say, what do they have, what could they have? That would, that was. So it's a good question. And look, let me first say this. You have to follow the money trail right now, which is something that I've done for most of my professional life. And we can say with certainty right now that there's somewhere in the order of $6 billion

that the Qataris have invested in American universities, which, by the way, if you're asking yourself why there's chaos on campus right now, maybe that has something to do with it. I would actually argue that the amount of money that the Qatari's have thrown at schools have actually obviated the need to rely on traditional alumni networks. And so they can do whatever the hell they want because alumni funding will not even come close to the amount of cash that is flowing from the Qatari regime. So, but put that aside for a minute. Let's look at what they have going on in Washington. They have most of the major white shoe law firms, lobby firms, and major PR firms,

like the top flight ones, they're all on retainer, which means that they're conflicted out whenever Qatar makes the news in negative ways. The Qataris have an army, basically, of lawyers and lobbyists that they're ready to deploy. They sponsor the congressional baseball game every year. They sponsored parties during the White House correspondence dinner. They kept the metro open during the Stanley Cup run up by the capitals in, I think it was 2018. They spend a huge amount of money buying influence in our capital. And then on top of that, they will invest massive amounts in states.

So Texas, for example, the energy sector, South Carolina. We see a massive amount of investment in the defense industry and beyond. What that essentially does is it provides jobs and it helps the economy in these places. And then you start to see that members of Congress are maybe a little less willing to engage and to fight back against some of the things that they're seeing that they're not comfortable with. You know, it looks like golden handcuffs is what it looks like to me. I was going to get to this a little later. But isn't that true of a lot of parties in the Middle East? I mean, I have gone to the Children's Hospital here with my child, my children once or twice,

and that is funded by the UAE, or at least the statue of the UAE leaders out front is a major donor. UAE, Saudi Arabia, spend a lot of money in the United States in different ways for good or ill. You could argue that Qatar is more ill based on what they're doing now, but is it unusual for a country that's oil-rich to spend a lot of money with, various parties in the Middle East. It seems, to me, in D.C., fairly common. No, it is. But I would say that the Qataris somehow have evaded scrutiny from the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, otherwise known as Scythias. And this is an entity that has gone around and actually blocked investments from other countries that would run counter to American national security. And, you know, there was an attempt by Dubai

ports to buy infrastructure here in the United States after 9-11, and we blocked that. And that was probably a good thing. The Saudis came under immense scrutiny after 9-11 for the investments that they had here in the United States. And I think we and they began to rebalance the way in which some of that money was being spent. But I think the bigger picture here is that the Saudis and the Emirates have become more moderate over time. They have become. become more pragmatic. They have a vision now for the Middle East that, you know, really tries to block out the influence of Islamism. And that is not what we're seeing from the Qataris. And by the way, I didn't even get into the fact that the Qataris have, I mean,

they've stopped doing it now, but at one point they were providing millions of dollars a year to Brookings, a think tank, competitor think tank. Now that's stopped. And I'm glad to see it. But is that really something that, you know, we think is a legitimate use of foreign government's funds? This seems like something that we ought to be looking into. And we know that they're trying to, you know, gain access to our media. Their media, by the way, is really interesting, too. They have Al JZERA and English, and they have something called AJ Plus, which is their online news designed for, you know, millennial consumption. that media outlet was actually, the U.S. government, this was in 2020,

actually called upon AJ Plus to register as a foreign agent, and they have refused. So you just get a sense there is an atmosphere of impunity here. And somehow the Qataris have evaded scrutiny. And again, I don't know exactly what it is that is preventing the U.S. government from digging in a little bit more. Maybe it's the base. Maybe it's the hot cash. Maybe it's the support for a range of other institutions

and businesses that are key to a lot of our key legislators and decision makers. But somehow the Qataris have been demified themselves from the kind of scrutiny that I think is so overdue and yet we continue to punt. Let me read a quote.

I had Dan Crenshaw on a few months ago and I asked him, is Qatar a friend or foe? This is what he said. exactly what it is. It plays both sides, and it openly plays both sides. For Americans, you just don't understand the Middle East, this is like their first time they've looked at the Middle East. They're like, what is this deal? It's cutter. I'm like, that's just cutter. And so those of us who've been doing this for a long time, it's like, yeah, they play both sides. They're a 20-minute flight from

Iran. Do you think they're not playing both sides? They have to. By matter of their own, just to exist, they have to play both sides. And we take advantage of that. So we don't view them as friends or foes. We view them as partners when we need them. And frankly, that's, that's, that's, that's, that's, that's, that's the way to view pretty much all relationships in the Middle East, except Israelis, there's, there's more of a moral bond between us and Israel. But that's not the case with Saudi Arabia or Qatar. It's just, it is, it is, look, we're we're, we're, we're partners out of necessity where our interests align. And so we use you, like we, we, we need a base. And so we have a base in Qatar. It's a very important base to us. So they gave us that. And we know

that they talk to others. And because they talk to others that we don't like talking to, we can use Cutter as that sort of that neutral place. I don't, I don't like that they fund these things. But I think it's, I think people think it's some big conspiracy when it's actually just completely out in the open. And that's Middle East politics. How would you respond to Dan Crenshaw? Look, I, look, I, I, I'm a big fan of Dan Crenshaw. I think he's a great American and I think he does incredible things for the country. But I fundamentally disagree with him on this issue. You want to talk about countries that are neither here nor there or they play both sides. Fine, we can do that.

Let's look at a country like Kuwait, right? Kuwait is a country. We liberated them, right, after the 1991 Gulf War. We have, if it weren't for us, they wouldn't be here right now. And they are deeply anti-American and they support Hamas and they, you know, rub elbows with Iran and a whole bunch of bad groups. and we know that there's illicit finance that flows through there. But they don't pretend to be honest brokers. And they don't allow for terrorist groups to operate on their soil.

They don't fund Hamas to the tune of $30 million a month in like bulk cash while pretending to try to bring a certain measure of calm to the region. They know their place. They're small, their relative. weak. They know they need to play both sides, but there is a limit to what they're willing to do. The Qataris don't have those limits, and they are far more active, and I think they're doing far more damage. And by the way, okay, you know, you want to say that this is what countries, weak countries will do, and we just need to hold our nose. Great. Don't call them major non-NATO U.S.

allies. Don't bestow upon them this, you know, pretty remarkable. you know, honor, I would say. Not everybody gets that kind of respect and treatment. And the idea that somehow we're willing to do that because, oh, well, they, you know, they play both sides. I mean, that just doesn't add up for me. The Qataris take that idea of needing to talk to everybody for survival, and they put it on steroids, and they back it up with billions of dollars.

That's my problem with the Qataris. What do you make of the argument? The other argument, some people will try it out. And I think you've addressed a little bit is that Israel, or I guess the more specific allegation is that Israel saw Qatar as a conduit to give money to Gaza, to Hamas, to try to maintain stability, and that they were open in, you know, allowing this arrangement to occur. So yes, Qatar funded Hamas, and Israel was okay with that as long as it maintained stability. in Gaza.

Yeah, I mean, look, I've asked a lot of folks in Israel about this because, I mean, I'll just full disclosure, when we learned about this channel that the Qataris had opened and the cash was flowing, I was, you know, I mean, I read the Israelis the Riot Act. The folks that I talked to, I just said, you have no idea who you're dealing with and you are making a big mistake. And they said, well, you know, it's above my pay grade. and it was, you know, like the prime minister and the Mossad made this choice. And from what I understand, actually, it was primarily driven by the Mossad, that they were able for a time.

I don't know if they're still able right now, but they were operating out of Qatar. And in exchange for their ability to be closer to Iran, as you noted, right across the Persian Gulf, right? Where they had much closer access to their primary enemy. In exchange for that, they were willing to hold their nose. but you got to understand eventually these things, right, it's blowback. Eventually these things come back to bite you in the keister, and that is exactly what happened here. The Israelis were somehow willing to look the other way throughout all of this.

Hamas grew from a tactical threat, which is how, this is why the Israelis, I think, were willing to hold their nose. They didn't see them as a significant threat. But if you allow a terrorist organization to have six, seven years of relative safety and $30 million a month to build a military infrastructure and to train for a war, they can become a strategic threat and now look at what's happened.

Hamas has brought the entire Middle East to the break of war. So it was a massive mistake, I think, on Israel's part, a massive mistake on Qatar's part. There were many mistakes that were made, but I don't believe that there was an intention to just say, oh, screw it, we'll just let them do this.

it was kind of like, look, we have to make choices between our priorities. Here's what I think we're going to do right now. And I think it just limped along for a while, and it is disastrous when we look at the consequences. Last few questions. And I think this question gets to what I've been asking about. What is kind of the ideological orientation of the regime itself in Qatar? You retweeted this.

And I'm wondering if there was more context. I've seen it retweeted all over. It's a video from, I guess, a few days ago of a representative from Qatar in the Arab League saying apparently October 7th is the only the beginning will eliminate all the Jews. Do you have any more context to that? That seems like, you know, pretty flagrant opening if he's a representative of Qatar saying, by the way, this is our real ideological orientation. Yeah, unfortunately, this is not really new. I mean, you know, if you watch Al Jazeera, that is like common on Al Jazeera. You will see statements made by, you know, not always Qatari leaders.

I mean, I think this was kind of a rare one in the sense that the Qatari, you know, a Qatari official comes out and says this openly. But yeah, I'll also have to remember that the Arab League, you know, they're all frothing at the mouth. They all need to get their shots in against Israel, make public comments so that their people back home can appreciate. their positions as it relates to the hated Zionist entity, right? So there's a lot of grandstanding that goes on at the Arab League. But if you look at, I mean, Al Jazeera, they had a cleric who actually was the first one to endorse suicide bombings. This was several years ago already, but a guy by the name of Yusuf Cardali, his show used to

just regularly advocate for killing Jews and engaging in suicide bombings, right? This is not really abnormal for the Qatari regime. Again, speaking out of both sides of their mouths. I think Kardawi actually said at one point, he asked Allah to help bring another Holocaust to the region. Right. Yeah, he was, it was very radical. And let me just close on this. And we talked a little bit about this funding, kind of shadow funding war within D.C.

You mentioned Qatar. I see UAE also funds places, Saudi does. as well. I think I tend to agree with your answer, but explain why, more specifically, Qatar funding is more infidious and problematic than the funding that the UAE and Saudi Arabia does. Because it might not be the same answer 10 years ago. It might be, I think it's a different answer now. No, it's changed because the Gulf has changed. And if you've been to Saudi Arabia or UAE in the last 10 years, you will have seen that they're going through remarkable changes. They are pragmatic countries that have eschewed radicalism.

They have rejected the sort of previous paradigms that they were associated with where they were giving money to groups like Hamas or whatever. They now understand that focusing on economics and business and stability is the key to the region. You know, there's this vision 2030 that the Saudis have, this idea of transforming their society and getting them off of oil and having more people participate dialing back entirely on the radicalism that at one point they were so responsible for. And then you look at the Qataris and they're still funding Hamas. They're still harboring Hamas. They're still funding and harboring the Taliban and legitimizing this very

illegitimate government. I would, by the way, argue that they engineered our collapse in Afghanistan. They engineered our embarrassing and disastrous withdrawal. They engineered the Abbey Gate disaster, essentially. They have, again, they harbor people from Al-Qaeda and Hamas that are on UN designation lists where they should be brought to justice, but they're not. All manner of Islamist groups around the region, you will see them. It's like, we always say it's like the Star Wars canteen scene in Doha. And the idea of, that that is okay, the idea that we're willing to shrug at all of that and not try to temper any of it, not admonish them for it, not force the exile of some of these leaders, not forcing to bring

them to justice after something like 10-7. This is, to me, it shocks the conscience. It really does. We look like we are asleep at the switch. I know people say we're not fighting a war on terror any longer. I disagree. I would argue that since 10-7, the war on terror has come roaring back that you see, and you see it on campus right now, right? I mean, you see it everywhere. The ideology of jihadism is making a resurgence. We tried to pivot to Asia. We tried to pivot to great power competition. I'm sorry, we're going to have to do both, right? We're going to have to walk and chew gum here. And the key to trying to contain the war on terrorism component of the challenges we face right now, a big part of that actually starts with the Qataris and we have

the leverage. Why don't we use it? That's the question I keep asking. We don't need, by the way, to start like a full-blown diplomatic battle with them. We just need to make demands and force them to comply. We have the leverage. We don't use it. And just to note, so people don't say this is the UAE, you know, funding FDD. FDD always says that the UAE does not take foreign funding, because I've seen the allegations. It takes zero foreign funding. There was, you know, terrible rumors that went around several years ago that we did or that we inadvertently did.

As far as we know, we've never actually even taken, you know, anything that has even a scent of foreign influence. We are fiercely proud of the fact that we make our own calls as it relates to foreign policy. Nobody tells us the policies that we embrace. No one dictates them. We come up with our own research and then we bring it to members of Congress. And you can actually see we've been remarkably consistent about the Qataris dating back to 2010 or so. was when we started looking into this.

So for 14 years, we have not wavered in terms of the criticism that we have brought to the Qatari regime. It is a problematic regime, and it must be addressed. Jonathan Shanzer, thank you for joining the Dispatch podcast. Thanks, Jamie.

Good to be with you. You know,