The Dispatch Podcast - Should the U.S. Defend Taiwan? | Interview: Dan Negrea and Matthew Kroenig

Episode Date: March 18, 2024

Former Trump administration official Dan Negrea and national security strategist Matt Kroenig join Jamie to discuss their book We Win, They Lose. Jamie challenges their thesis that a Trump-Regan foreign policy fusion is possible. The Agenda: -The current international landscape -China’s aggressive military operations and Taiwan -Can Americans stomach backing Taiwan in war? -Trump’s switch on a TikTok ban -The Biden administration’s failure to deter Russia -Is there really a Trump-Regan policy fusion? Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

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And see for yourself how Volvo's legendary safety brings peace of mind to every crisp morning commute. This September, Lisa 2026 X-E-90 plug-in hybrid from $599 biweekly at 3.99% during the Volvo Fall Experience event. Condition supply, visit your local Volvo retailer or go to explorevolvo.com. Welcome to the Dispatch podcast. I'm Jamie Weinstein. My guests today, that's right, two guests are Matthew Kronig and Dan Negrea. Matthew is the vice president and senior director of the Atlantic Council's Stokecroft. Center for Strategy and Security. He's also a professor at Georgetown University and has held positions of the Defense Department. Dan is senior director of the Atlantic Council's Freedom and Prosperity Center. He previously worked in the State Department during the Trump administration.

And before entering the world of politics, he worked on Wall Street after defecting from communist Romania. Both of them are the authors of the new book, We Win, They Lose, Republican Foreign Policy and the Cold War. We talk about what a Republican foreign policy. would look like, whether there really is, as they write in the book, a Trump-Ragan fusion, and much more. I think you'll find the conversation enjoyable and informative, as always, and without further ado, I give you Matt and Dan. Dan and Matt, welcome to the Dispatch podcast. It's great to be here.

Thank you very much for having it. Delighted. Thank you. Let's just start with the broadest question possible. Why did you both decide to write this book? So the book started initially as an early version or an early draft of a national security strategy for the next conservative president of the United States. there we expanded it. So in addition to the dry analysis of America's geostrategic challenges, we also added the, let's say, the guiding principles that will help us analyze these challenges.

And it was then that we came up with the concept of Trump-Ragan fusion that will help us in our analysis. And then, of course, Matt is a professor, so he also added history of thought and compared conservative principles with progressive principles on how we approach this. But at its core, it's a practical tool to deal with the foreign policy challenges that America is facing. And I want to get to kind of the Trump-Ragan fusion. that concept at the end and maybe press you a little bit on that. But let's get maybe to the specific ideas that you lay out in the book and those who have not read it yet, that you go

through countries in terms of what we do have to do in specific countries and kind of coalitions and international landscape. But I kind of just want to start maybe laying the groundwork as what you currently view as our international landscape, what is our greatest challenges, what do you see as, you know, the guiding focus or what will be our focus in terms of threats for the next decade or so? Great. Well, that is part of the reason we decided to write the book as well, is that Dan and I agree that we are in a very dangerous security environment, and the primary threat we face is

from the Chinese Communist Party, and the threat posed by China is in many ways greater than the threat we faced in the first Cold War because China is more capable than the Soviet Union ever was. And so we do, subtitle the book is Republican foreign policy and the new Cold War. And we do think that's an appropriate characterization. But it's not just China. China's, of course, working increasingly closely with other revisionist autocracies, Russia, Iran, North Korea. There's a major war in Europe right now, biggest war since World War II, major conflict in the Middle East, we're trying to deter China from attacking Taiwan. So how can the United States and its allies working together deterred if necessary defeat China, Russia, Iran, North Korea at the same time?

So again, a very dangerous security environment may be more dangerous than any time since the Cold War, but maybe more dangerous than any time since the 1930s on the run-up to the second world. Second World War. Let's not forget to have a disclaimer here. Matt is Senior Director at the Atlantic Council of the Skokroft Center. I'm Senior Director at the Atlantic Council of the Freedom and Prosperity Center. But we are not here to represent the points of view necessarily of the Atlantic Council, but represent just ours.

Sorry, go ahead, Jamie. No problem. But let's go right to China, which I think you would say is the kind of sitting above all the other threats in many ways. You write in the book, to maintain deterrence, Washington should change its policy to strategic clarity and be crystal clear that it would defend Taiwan if China attacks. I know in the book you write, this is meant to deter a war to make China think twice about invading Taiwan. But how do you think China would respond to that? We think the goal should be to deter the conflict.

And the status quo essentially works for the United States, for Taiwan, for the free world. But, you know, a strategic ambiguity policy, I think, worked in the past when China didn't really have the ability or maybe even the intent to attack Taiwan, but those things are changing. China's clearly building a military force designed to attack Taiwan. She has said that, in fact, his rhetoric has become more aggressive in terms of military options. or unifying. And so the biggest danger here is that she would miscalculate, that she would think this might be easy. Maybe the United States wouldn't get involved. And so I think our biggest task is to disabuse him of that notion and to make it very clear that if he were to attack, this would

lead to a war with the United States. That's not in his interest. And so he's better off not to do that. But that doesn't mean that we need to change other aspects of the one China policy. So we're not saying Taiwan should declare independence. We're not saying Taiwan should become a formal treaty ally. So these other aspects of the one China policy could remain in place, we're just saying we should change strategic ambiguity to strategic clarity. And I think if we were to say Taiwan declare independence, that would provoke a war from China. But I just think changing from ambiguity to clarity would not do that. And President Biden, to his credit, has said four times now he would defend Taiwan, but then each time his White House walked that back. And so it's

very confusing to everyone, including me and probably including to Xi, and I think we need to correct that. Well, here's a question for you. Let's say China does invade Taiwan, whether we change this policy or not. I suppose from what you've said here, you believe we should go and deter China and fight China doing that. One of the problems I have with that is that no one's ever really explained to the American people clearly why this should be done. Can you explain to the American people why going to a war with China over Taiwan is something that America should do? And do you think that the American people would have the stomach to do that and the type of conflict that could ensue as a result of it? Well, one of the things that we do in the book is discuss the hierarchy

of interests of the United States. So we start with protecting the homeland and the life of American citizens here and abroad. But one of the vital interests of the United States is not allow an adversarial power to dominate one of the strategically critically important regions of the world. If I may step back here, I think one of the very important things that we are contributing in the discussion of America's foreign policy is introduce this concept that we are in a Cold War.

This is not just a theoretically interesting point. It is a statement, and if we are a premise, and if we accept this premise, then certain things flow from that. China is an adversary. It is not a country with which we compete or we cooperate as a country that we are confronting. They intend to occupy Taiwan, which is a country that is strategically important in the first island chain, that controls something like 90% of semiconductors, which is critically important to the economy of the world. So through the South China Sea flows something like two-thirds of the commerce of the world.

And China occupying in a conflict with Taiwan would necessarily involve Japan and possibly other treaty allies of the United States in that conflict. This is a critically important region of the world and a critically important friend of the United States. The United States would necessarily be drawn in a conflict. Well, let me ask you this. Do you think, and we'll get to Ukraine in a second, what lessons do you think China has drawn from Ukraine? And specifically, I wonder, do you think they question now whether their military is capable as they might have thought it was the day before Ukraine that Russia found out that it, you know, maybe a lot of the money that it gave to its military,

military ended up in houses in London. Do you think China has that worry and has that pushed back the potential threat of an invasion of Taiwan? Well, I think, you know, what we would hope is that they would look at what's happening in Ukraine and say, oh, this is maybe harder than we thought. And in addition, China's got the difficult task of needing to project power across water, which is more difficult than just driving tanks across the border, which is what Russia had to do. Unfortunately, my understanding is that the lessons China is probably drawing are different.

One, that they do have a superiority complex. They think, oh, well, we're better than the Russians, we'll do better than that. And then second lesson, I think, that they're drawing is, you know, the problem that Putin had is he tried to go in with a light footprint. He thought it was going to be quick and easy, and now it's dragging it. on. So if we do this, we need to make sure this is a short war. We need to go in big, overwhelming, quick, and have it be done before the rest of the world can respond. So unfortunately, I think that's the lesson to the drawing, not that this is so hard we need to forget about it, but rather we need to do better than the Russians. Yeah, I think there is also another thing that they

understand after the Ukraine conflict, which is that the free world is united. It is fascinating how so many concepts from the previous Cold War are becoming again relevant. We have again a free world. We have again a group of non-aligned, the new non-aligned movement. So what China did see was that countries in Europe, in North America, our friends and allies in Asia, got together very quickly a crystallized free world alliance, and the economic consequences for Russia have been sharp, very significant. It's essentially been sanctioned by everybody in critically important ways. It is still important for the CCP to have economic relations with the world because they are still an export-driven economy. So I think they will think long and hard about

engaging into a conflict where they will be isolated economically. And by the way, one of the proposals that we have in the book is that just as we have military exercises, we should have sanctions exercises where countries get together, practice how they quickly and comprehensively impose sanctions on other countries and send the signal that way. Well, another policy you suggest in the book, to do one more question on China, you write, the FBI, and pretty relevant to today, what's going on in the last couple days, you write, the FBI should step up counterintelligence investigations into Chinese spying and shut down Chinese police stations and spirings operating out of Chinese consulates in the

United States. TikTok, Confucius institutes, Hawaii, and other means the CCP uses to harvest data from Americans, and so disinformation in the United States should be banned outright. Well, TikTok is kind of the center of discussion right now, and it does seem to be somewhat of a divide now within the Republican Party. You had former President Trump, who used to be for banning TikTok now seeming not to be banning it? Why should it be banned? And what do you make of the switch on the ban from the president? Yeah, well, I would say it's not banning TikTok, but they do need to be

they do need to be divested from the CCP. So TikTok can operate, but it can't be controlled by the Chinese Communist Party, which is our major adversary. And, you know, to use the Cold War analogy, imagine if during the Cold War NBC News, were run by the Soviet Union, we would have never stood for that. It makes no sense. So same thing today, social media is the NBC News of our day, having one of the most important platforms reporting to our major adversary makes no sense.

And essentially, these are hundreds of millions of sensors around the world, bringing data and other things back to the CCP. If it were announced tomorrow, we've discovered, you know, millions of Chinese censors in the U.S. homeland, there'd be a national crisis, and instead we're inviting that in. So TikTok's a platform. I know that many people enjoy and continue to operate, but just not by our foremost adversary. Ukraine, what do you think the U.S. should do there? What is the conservative strategy on Ukraine? I think that it's becoming very clear that there were misperceptions in the first year, there were misperceptions in the second year.

The misperception in the first year was that the Russians will be in Kiev in three weeks and occupy all of Ukraine, and that was not true. Second year, it looked as if Kiev will break through the front and the Russian lines will collapse. what seems to be the, and that was not true. What is the reality that is sinking in is that Ukraine has lost about the quarter of its population, people who have left the country, that it is facing very serious manpower challenges in stopping the Russian aggression, and that

at the same time and cannot and cannot militarily at least with the resource that it has now push the Russians back. Neither can the Russians advance. So it's a stalemate. The right strategy right now is to force both sides into a peace agreement. And I wrote an article about that piecing together statements that former President Trump made, where the emphasis is not to help Ukraine continue the war, but to force both Ukraine and Russia to end the war, stop the killing. And that would be done in the guiding principle of our book of Peace Through Strength, using the leverage that the United States has in its ability to give offensive weapons to Ukraine that could threaten deep behind Russia's lines to create an incentive for Putin not to continue

the war and come to the negotiating table. And at the same time, for Zelensky, who depends so much, on our aid to have an incentive to come to the negotiating table because we will make it clear that this is in the interest of the United States. Now, it is unrealistic at this point to assume that Ukraine will recover its entire territory, about 17% of Ukraine territory is currently occupied by the Russians. But then again, we've had a situation with East Germany and West Germany, where for a period of time, Germany was not united, Ukraine would not be united, but with guarantees from the

United States and from other Western countries. Ukraine can then continue in its development while waiting for a time to recover all his territory. Couldn't have this been potentially negotiated before the war if they're going to have to give up the territory after the war? I mean, this is the argument on kind of the more, I guess would be termed more non-interventionist isolationist side, is that, you know, if you said before the war that, you know, they're never going to be a member of NATO, Ukraine, gave Putin some of this territory, you might be in the same position you are now. Yes, let me say a couple of things.

One, I don't think we could have gotten that deal before the war because I think Putin's goal is to take all of Ukraine into control of Kiev. I don't think he'd be satisfied long term with the territory he has now. So I think if he thought he could take all of Ukraine militarily then or at some point in the future, he would try to do that. What I would say, you know, in the book, we don't get into details of what should our tactics and operations be for Ukraine because we knew we were trying to hit a moving target. We finished the book a year ago. So the book just talks, says that, you know, Republicans agree that the Biden administration did fail to deter this. the second further invasion of Ukraine.

Second, that the Biden administration hasn't laid out a clear strategy for what it's trying to accomplish, and that's hurting the war effort. And then third, the statement that to fight as long as it takes also doesn't really make sense. The goal should be to end the war in a way that advances American interests quickly, not to fight as long as it takes, which brings to mind forever wars and other things. And that we have an incentive to stop Putin from taking all of Ukraine. So that's what we say in the book. And then Dan was talking about a recent op-ed.

He wrote about a Ukraine strategy that I think is smart. I also have a recent op-ed that was in the Wall Street Journal laying out a strategy. But I do think Dan and I agree that Ukraine shifting more of a defensive position, preventing Russia from taking additional territory and trying to wind down the conflict along the current lines make sense. Dan said peace agreement. I don't think peace agreement is quite right. I don't think we want to sign an agreement turning the territory over to Putin,

but I think more of the static but stable line of contact is maybe what we could hope for as a acceptable outcome in the foreseeable future. Yeah, an agreement that doesn't concede the territory to Putin, but recognizes the reality. Not long ago, I saw someone go through a sudden loss and it was a stark reminder of how quickly life can change and why protecting the people you love is so important. Knowing you can take steps to help protect your loved ones and give them that extra layer of security brings real peace of mind. The truth is the consequences of not having life insurance can be serious. That kind of

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slash dispatch. That's E-T-H-O-S dot com slash dispatch. Application times may vary. Rates may vary. This episode is brought to you by Squarespace. Squarespace is the platform that helps you create a polished professional home online. Whether you're building a site for your business, your writing, or a new project, Squarespace brings everything together in one place. With Squarespace's cutting-edge design tools, you can launch a website that looks sharp from day One. Use one of their award-winning templates or try the new Blueprint AI, which tailors a site for you based on your goals and style. It's quick, intuitive, and requires zero coding experience. You can also tap into built-in analytics and see who's engaging with your site and email campaigns to stay connected with subscribers or clients. And Squarespace goes beyond design. You can offer services, book appointments, and receive payments directly through your site.

It's a single hub for managing your work and reaching your audience. without having to piece together a bunch of different tools. All seamlessly integrated. Go to Squarespace.com slash dispatch for a free trial. And when you're ready to launch, use offer code dispatch to save 10% off your first purchase of a website or domain. I wonder from Ukraine's perspective and Taiwan's perspective. I think of this question where Ukraine probably thinks they were going to get more from the United States in this conflict, that they thought, you know, they were told that, you know, we're going to be with you and to the end.

And maybe that's why they decided not to try to do some type of deal in the beginning. I mean, are we sure? When we tell Taiwan that we're going to be there and we're going to fight a war, a war that could be a very large war, how sure are you that a U.S. sitting president, Donald Trump or Joe Biden, would decide if it came to that, that they're ready to go to war, potentially a very large war. over this. And if they're not sure, shouldn't we let Taiwan know that, you know, we're just saying that we're going to come to your aid in a significant way, but if things really got to this point,

look what we're doing with Ukraine. We might decide that after a couple years, that this victory can't be had. And it is that unfair to them in a certain way, if we're really not going to come to the aid. So let me make a few comments. I'm sure Matt would have comments also. First of all, I think it's very important, both in the case of Ukraine and in the case of Taiwan, to emphasize that this is not solely the United States' responsibility to support countries that are in conflict, that it is also very much the responsibility of our friends and allies in that particular region. Dan, I agree. We can just jump in there. I mean, I think that's true, but I highly doubt that Taiwan or Ukraine is like, Germany said they're going to be

with me. I'm now confident that we're ready to take on the Soviets. They're depending on the United States. They're wanting to see what the United States is saying before they go into conflict, how much support they have. They're not looking to Sweden, what role they're going to play. It's the United States support that gives them confidence, does it not? Yeah, it is true. It is true, but at the same time, the United States needs to demand from its allies that they do significantly more. And a world in which the allies which are nearby are doing significantly more, it's a world in which the United States will also, the United States government can more easily go to the American people and make demands for the American people.

people to get engaged in international affairs. So I think that's a very important point to make. So for example, coming back to Ukraine, the idea that the United States is a 3% of GDP in military expenditures, and Europe is not. And European countries that have a war on their continent are not carrying their weight makes it that much more difficult for an American president, whether Trump or Biden, to go to the American people and make that point. Thanks.

And I'll jump in on the Taiwan part of it. So I think Dan is right. Taiwan's not doing everything that it needs to do for its defense. Its defense spending is too low. I'm not sure they, I was just there in August. And I think they need to do more to shift more of an asymmetric strategy. But you're right, Jamie. the United States piece is critical.

And so one, China and Taiwan are more important to U.S. interests than Russia and Ukraine. China is 18% of global GDP, Russia less than two. And so stopping China is a higher priority issue for the United States. And if China took Taiwan, I don't think it would stay there. It would become kind of an aircraft carrier that it could use to project military power out in the Pacific, better threatened other U.S. allies in the region. So keeping China bottled up, I think, is an important national interest. And so I do think that we should, and obviously if we get the deterrence strategy right, we don't have to fight the war. So the

important part is let's deter them. And so having the right presidential statements, I think, is part of the deterrent strategy. You're also right, though. It's going to be up to the president at any given moment, and even if a president, like Biden, has said, I'll depend in Taiwan, he can change his mind in the future. So I think part of what we're trying to do in this book is to persuade other foreign policy experts, politicians, why China and Taiwan is such a critical national security interest and why we need to have an effective deterrence strategy. One more major conflict zone that is going on at the moment is obviously the Middle East, Israel, Gazor, what should the U.S., what does a conservative foreign policy strategy look like

there? Well, what is critically important in the Middle East is to understand that behind all the problems that exist in the Middle East, all the troubles that exist in the Middle East, the conflicts, the terrorism is Iran. What happened during the Trump administration, was that it exited that Iran treaty that Biden funded and entered into a maximum pressure campaign against Iran, constraining their ability to finance terror and to develop, to continue to develop, their military capabilities by restricting their ability to export oil, which is basically the only thing that they produce. So at the end of the Trump administration, the foreign exchange reserves of Iran were about

$4 billion. Now they are something between $25 and $35 billion. And those are resources that they can give to the Houthis, to Hezbollah, to Hamas. So the first thing that would have to happen would be to return to the economics, the comprehensive economic sanctions that have not been lifted, but are not being enforced by the BIF administration. So that's the economic dimension. But then there is also a military dimension. The response that needs to happen against the Houthis needs to be much, much stronger. we know where their where their missiles are the response need i mean they need to be taken out and the response is not strong enough right now i want to end with a couple questions on kind of the broader concept that you lay out in this book and you talk that this book came out of

i think a jackson hole meeting that you both attended uh between a broad spectrum of the conservative movement in republican party and that's how you came to the trump uh reggae fusion. And I guess I just want to challenge whether there really is a Trump-Ragan fusion, whether there is a unified foreign policy on what you'd call the right of center in the Republican Party today. Obviously, over Ukraine, there's big differences on what the U.S. should do there, from maybe the Tucker Carlson wing of the party to a more hawkish wing. You mentioned in the book about, I think you write, that American exceptionalism, America is the greatest country in the world. And it's a key piece of conservative position when it comes to U.S. values. There's a lot of

conservatives now who think that we're no better than Russia, comparing what's happening to Donald Trump to Alexi Navalny. In fact, Donald Trump himself in 2015 was asked, does he believe in American exceptionalism? He said absolutely not. He thought it was kind of an arrogant thing to believe in. Is there really a Trump-Ragan fusion? So I think there is. And we make the case in the book. And you're right, Jamie, that there are some real differences in the party. I think when it comes to Ukraine, that's one of the examples. But I think there's a lot of agreement that gets overlooked by focusing on these differences over things like Ukraine. So one is we point out in the book, we start with what is a conservative worldview? What is a progressive worldview? how does that lead to consistent differences in foreign policy? I think Reaganites and Trumpians are both within that conservative camp and in terms of basic worldview, very different from a progressive view on global affairs.

And then we go through major pillars in defense policy. I think both the Trumpians and the Reaganites are proponents of peace through strength, which is different, again, I think from where the Democrats are and where even the neo-conservatives from, you know, the Bush. years were. And then in economic policy, I think that they're both proponents of free and fair trade. In fact, I think Trump's economic policies in a way have now become not just the Republican consensus, but the bipartisan consensus with Biden keeping many of Trump's economic policies in place. I think there is agreement in American exceptionalism. Reagan's shining city on a hill

and Trump's America first, of course, are different variants of that. But I think there is a sense that America is a special country that needs to come first. And then on almost every major issue, China is the greatest threat to the country. NATO allies need to do more. The climate threat is exaggerated. We need to get tougher on Iran. The southern border is in crisis, and we need to stop illegal immigration. I think these are all points of consensus within the party.

So you're right, there are some important differences, like on Ukraine, but I think taking a step back and looking at a big picture, there is more unity than many people appreciate. Let me just give one push back there and see how you respond, which I think is a very key point, which is, I think you said there's unity of NATO allies want to do more. And I actually don't think that is different than Bob Gates was saying in much harsher terms when he was Obama's defense secretary. I think what's different is the real threat, according to John Bolton, he believes it's a real threat that Donald Trump wants to pull out of NATO, his threat he wants to pull out of South Korea unless they get paid more for our troops being stationed there, maybe wants to even pull back from Germany, which does

seem to be different than the Reagan consensus does seem to be different than I don't think, you know, Joe Biden wants to do that and seems to be different from what your book articulates of what you would want to see. And in fact, those are areas you think we should maybe be, for, focusing on putting more troops, I believe, in one point in Europe? I would have thought of it, but I will quote Secretary Pompeo, who on a recent podcast was asked exactly the same thing. And his answer was, I can say whatever I want to say about what Trump will do in the future, but it's less persuasive than to point out to what he actually It did. But there, I mean, it's a matter of, I mean, there is at least a belief, and you can

dissuade me of this, that there are people that were in the administration that were dissuading him of his worst instincts, Secretary Pompeo being one of them, trying to explain to him why you shouldn't pull out of these places. Don't do this. And I guess, you know, people that are now critical of Trump that were in the administration believe that left unfettered, left without those people in the administration, he may very well pull out of some, about of NATO or South Korea. I mean, I understand that's what, he didn't do it then, but he was. Yeah, but I was in the Trump administration, not in a position senior enough to work directly with the president, but I work with people who have worked with him.

Secretary Pompeo plans to be again, by the way, in the next administration, if there is a Trump administration, Secretary Pompeo said he would be honored to serve again. Nobody dissuaded President Trump. If you wanted to do something, he did it. He did talk about the possibility of the United States reconsidering aspects of the NATO Treaty, but in the end he didn't do it. And the effects were salutary. The NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg wrote an article in the Wall Street Journal saying that because of the very loud, I call them New York clarity with which President Trump talked to the allies, they contributed something like 400 billion more that didn't exist before, and Stoltenberg talked

about it. So I think there is always this discussion that he may do something radical, but he could would have done it in the previous administration and he didn't do that. I would also just add that people saying that Trump's going to pull out, there are other people saying Trump's going to pull out of NATO. Trump himself isn't saying that. And so I think there are people worrying about what a Trump administration might do, but I think paying attention to what Trump himself is saying.

And it seems like the focus is not on getting out of NATO, but of allies stepping up and doing their fair share. And then, of course, he did make this statement about, you know, if they don't do their fair share, that Putin can do whatever the hell he wants. But then people close to the campaign said, well, that's not a literal statement of policy. That was an off-the-cuff remark. And I do think that one of the things we learned about Trump in the first term is, you know, the famous quote, we should take them seriously, but not literally. So I think he's making a serious point about burden sharing. I don't think he's making a literal point

about encouraging Russia to attack. I guess I'll just end on that one. In terms of speaking clearly, so adversaries understand what you're saying, they're literally not figurative of a thing. How does that work in foreign policy when you're hoping that

China or Russia are listening to what your policies are going to be in your red lines? I think it works superbly because we didn't have a war in Trump's days, Because our adversaries knew that he's a decisive leader and didn't challenge the United States. The reality remains that Putin invaded in the Obama-Biden administration invaded Ukraine.

There was a statement by the former NATO Supreme Allied commander in Europe saying that the backal in Afghanistan, the backal in Afghanistan, Afghanistan, encouraged Putin to invade Ukraine the second time. By the way, Georgia was invaded by Putin in W. Bush's time. But nobody invaded anybody during Trump's time. And Iran, Soleimani was killed, and they didn't retaliate. So I think peace through strength, which we advocate in our book, is the policy that will send a message to America's adversaries that they would expect a steep price if they challenge us. Well, let me just close with asking you, is there any, what do you hope that people,

when they finish reading the book? What is, if there's one or two thoughts that you hope they leave after reading the book, what would those be? I'll go first and maybe ask Dan to add. One, I think that the Republican Party is more unified on foreign policy than many people appreciate. Yes, there are some important differences, but I think we fixate on the differences and forget the broader unity. Second, to our progressive and international colleagues, I think sometimes Dan and I, we say this in the introduction, working at a nonpartisan think tank. we often have progressive and international colleagues saying, oh, the Republican parties in disarray. You have no coherent foreign policy, body of thought, and to be able to hand them the book and say, no, there is a coherent conservative approach to international affairs, and this is what it is.

And in our view, if you look at the record and in the book, we go back through various administrations, Reagan, Clinton, Bush, others. we think that these more kind of conservative strategies have worked well in the past and are really what is needed now that we're entering a new Cold War with China and others. Speaking for myself, actually, I will check with Matt if you agrees with me or not. But I would say that the most important thing I would like a reader of the book to take away is that we are in a Cold War. Because out of – if somebody accepts that premise, then there are – important policy consequences. So, for example, for the second time this week, the Wall

Street Journal is commenting on how in President Biden's National Defense Authorization Act, he is proposing 1% as an increase in defense between now and next year. That's a cut in defense in real terms, adjusted for inflation. The Wall Street Journal in an earlier article this week talks about the managed decline in our defense spending from 3.1% now going to 2035 to 2.4%. President Duda of Poland came to the White House as a guest and he said, we should ask the Europeans to contribute 3% of their GDP.

Poland is in an existential threat situation, and they are at 4%. Israel is at 4.5%. And the White has responded the next day saying, that's too ambitious, 3%. Let's get everybody to 2%. If we are in a Cold War, then we need to increase defense spending, not decrease it to 2.4% over time. And we should encourage our allies to increase their defense spending. And the goal should not be 2%.

The goal should be 3%, which was the lower end of their spending during the previous Cold War. So this is an important premise, an important statement. And it's on the cover of the book. If you accept that, a lot of important consequences fall. Dan and Matt, thank you for joining the Dispatch podcast. It's a pleasure to be here. Thank you very much, Jamie. Thank you, Jake.

You know, Thank you.