The Dispatch Podcast - Threats and Allies in the Indo-Pacific

Episode Date: August 28, 2023

South Korea, Japan, and the US are facing growing tensions against North Korea and China. The trilateral relationship was on full display in a show of strength at Camp David on August. 18th. TMD Reporter Mary Trimble speaks with Michael Beckley, an associate professor of political science at Tufts University and a non-resident senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, to explore the threats towards this alliance and the possible escalating conflicts in the Indo-Pacific region. Show Notes: -Watch this conversation on our YouTube channel -Michael Beckley's profile -Mary's report for The Morning Dispatch Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

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The summit marked the first time the three had gathered for a standalone meeting and represented a deepening of trilateral ties between the three countries on security, the economy, and science and technology. Here to discuss the significance of that summit for the three countries involved and the broader dynamics of the Indo-Pacific region is Michael Beckley, director of the Asia Program at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, associate professor of political science at Tufts University, and a non-resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.

I hope you enjoy this conversation with Michael Beckley. Michael Beckley, welcome for the Dispatch podcast. It's great to be here. Thanks, Mary. So before we dive into the details of this deal, I thought we might start with a little bit of table setting. If our listeners don't follow this region carefully, it might seem kind of obvious that two democracies in the region, two U.S. allies, would dive into this trilateral agreement with the U.S. But why is it actually

kind of surprising that we saw this happen last week? I think it's hard to overstate the amount of antipathy that South Korean society has for Japan because of their brutal history in the first half of the, especially in the first half of the 20th century where Japan annexes Korea in 1910

and basically treats it as a vassal of the Japanese Empire. There was mistreatment, especially of Korean women during that period of time. And then just this feeling within South Korea since then that the Japanese government

hasn't atoned for those sins sufficiently, hasn't really taught future generations of Japanese citizens about the transgressions of previous generations. And so that is really impeded progress.

Plus, I mean, these are just two powerful countries packed together in a very rough neighborhood. And so it's natural that they are wary of each other. And for decades, the United States has struggled to try to get Seoul and Tokyo to see eye-to-eye, even on common threats that they face from, say, North Korea or China.

And so what changed to allow this agreement to come together? I mean, has the antipathy changed? What were those sort of ingredients for this summit? I think, as we've seen so many times throughout history, Sometimes when you're confronted by an even greater threat, you'll make peace with anyone. You know, the United States famously allied with Joseph Stalin and the Soviet Union to fight the Nazis. And so I think what's changed are China and North Korea have just become much more hostile in recent years, especially China. I think in South Korea's case, what was really important was in 2017, South Korea wanted to set up a missile defense system to defend themselves against North Korea.

is expanding arsenal, and China said, well, this missile defense system will threaten our nuclear weapons as if they have some reason to nuke South Korea. And when South Korea proceeded with that missile defense system, Beijing basically launched a full-blown trade war and boycott of South Korean products and didn't allow South Korean tourists and basically shut down a big part of commerce. And so the South Koreans really realized that Beijing would use its economic ties with South Korea as a weapon for political purposes. And then, you know, we've just seen Beijing get much more hostile in its region, you know, building artificial islands in the South China Sea, menacing

Taiwan, swallowing Hong Kong. And even things going on within China have just alarmed people around the world. You've seen these concentration camps set up in Xinjiang. And so I think there's just a perception that China is on the move, that under Xi Jinping, it's likely to become more hostile and that they need to ban together because it's such an overwhelming threat. At the same time that you've had North Korea really make huge advancements on its nuclear missile programs. And so now to move to the agreement itself, what was in it? Was there something in it that stood out to you? What kind of relationship are we looking at going forward? Yeah, so I mean, obviously South Korea and Japan already had bilateral alliances with the United

States. But what makes this unique is it's now a multilateral organization. And the language is just about this commitment to consult each other if you face some kind of security threat. And so some people say, well, that doesn't really commit either side. But if you actually look at the text of alliance treaties that the United States has, whether it's NATO or it's bilateral alliances, those, the language is often very vague. It usually says you have to consult and meet the common danger, you know, together. And so that, you know, I think it's not so much the language, but it's the fact that you have this agreement, which is sort of a light form. of an alliance that basically says we're going to coordinate our military activities. We're going to start exercising together and preparing for joint war operations with each other.

And just the implicit assumption that, you know, we face a common threat from, especially from China. And if China, say, attacks Japan over some islands in East China Sea or attacks Taiwan, which doesn't even involve Japan or South Korea, just the fact that you have China on the move, trying to take territory and redraw the borders of East Asia as caused these two countries. Now, to effectively declare a sort of light form of alliance together with the United States. And you had Joe Biden be circumspect in terms of describing the meeting as not about China. He said this China came up, of course, but this is not a meeting about China. And they named drop North Korea far more than they specifically named China both in their

official documents that came out of the meeting, but also in the press conference. And so, I mean, I guess my question is why not address that the China threat head on? And what kind of actions would China have to take for that kind of forthright confrontation to happen? Well, I think there is a forthright confrontation already going on. I mean, China has said that it owns, you know, 80% of the East China Sea, the South China Sea. Taiwan is a vital interest of Japan because Japan has islands that are within just a couple hundred miles of Taiwan. And China has basically implied that those would be the next

target once they consolidated control over Taiwan. And then Japan and South Korea are critically and chronically dependent on commerce going through the east and South China seas most of their trade and the vast majority of oil and other critical resources all pass through those sea lanes that they share with China and that China basically claims as Chinese territory. So I think there's a clear conflict of interest among these different countries, plus just the fact that, you know, throughout history, you put powerful countries together where their red lines overlap, their spheres of influence overlap, and inevitably there's going to be tension. So you just have that natural security threat coupled with this very specific, essentially they're all sitting on top

of each other's economic arteries that makes this new combative attitude in Beijing extremely alarming, I think for good reason about Seoul and Tokyo. And so you talked about this as sort of a a soft multilateral alliance. Does this reflect something bigger about Biden's foreign policy? And is that a change in what we have seen in the past in the region? Well, I think it's a big change certainly from the Trump administration policy because the Biden team came in. You know, he declared America is back and they have this. And if you look at the people that are staffing the National Security Council, there are people that have written entire books on the importance of building out alliances. So there's a very strong assumption

that alliances are a critical component of American power. They're also vital to undergird this broader, so-called liberal order that the United States wants to uphold. Where basically it's like you don't allow countries to just swallow each other and wage massive wars of conquest and redraw borders. Instead, the United States, along with its other allies, protect a whole group of smaller countries so that they can basically plug and play with the global economy and that way we can all prosper together. I mean, that's a very ambitious vision of world order, but it's one that's been entrenched, I think, in American policymaking. Trump obviously casts a lot of doubt on that, basically saying this system is not working for the United States.

We're getting a raw end of the trade deals that are coming out of it. We're footing most of the security bill. And he basically treated some of these alliances like extortion rackets where he was saying, well, if the South Koreans want us to protect them, they have to pay a lot more for the American troops that are on their soil. I mean, already South Korea and Japan finance. They pay for the room and board of American soldiers on their territory, but the Trump administration basically wanted payments for the protection, as if the U.S. military is some kind of mercenary organization. And so obviously the Biden team is trying to reverse that. And this is very very, very, very, much part and parcel. I mean, you can see what they've done with Ocus bringing in Australia

and really just trying to show that the United States will uphold its alliance commitments. We just had last night the first GOP primary debate. China didn't get a lot of airtime, but it also was pretty clear that most of the candidates see China as the number one threat to the United States. Trump obviously wasn't there. I don't know if you watch the debates, but if you kind of look at the array of foreign policy views on offer in the Republican Party, if you get a Republican president in 2024, 2025, what might you expect in terms of their understanding of this liberal order you're describing? Would it be more of a revert to the Trump status quo, whether it's Trump or Ron DeSantis or someone like him? or might you see something more akin to the Biden policy?

Since there does seem to be this consensus that China is a threat and this is something we need to counter. Yeah, I think there's clearly a schism within the Republican Party on foreign policy. And in some ways, it's quite classic. I mean, on the one hand, you have the sort of classic isolationists that, you know, think the United States should basically become a rogue superpower and not really worry about defending other countries or wasting its money or ammunition and should basically just be out there to squeeze the best, deal possible out of foe and friend alike. You know, Vivek, Ramoswani is basically saying we should ditch Ukraine and let Russia win its war there. And so that's always, I mean, you saw this in the

1930s with people saying, oh, you know, let Hitler do what he wants. You know, he doesn't seem like that bad of the guy. And then you also have, conversely, the, you know, the engaged sort of, somewhat say, neo-conservative wing of just traditional, you know, American power, the sort of Reagan vision of strength and diplomacy. And the United States really flexibly. its muscles as a hegemonic actor abroad that's really providing security and trying to craft an international order. And so I think you see, you know, Nikki Haley is probably the best representation of that. It seems like Mike Pence also embraces that. And so this, I think this is a critical battleground, not just because one of these people could be president, but even if, say,

Biden or some Democrat is reelected, you know, I think a Republican Party needs to figure out what, in terms of foreign policy, what is our, do we have a united, stance. And I think they reflect fundamentally different worldviews about what the United States is. The isolationists basically think, well, you know, we're here to basically, you know, maximize jobs and liberty for American citizens, whereas this whole other wing says, well, the United States has a unique role to play in the world just given its power, its geographic position, et cetera. So it's fascinating to watch it play out. I think you saw a microcosm of that in the debate last night. On this question specifically, I have multilateralism.

Do you see any indications that that more neoconservative wing would be against something like the alliance established at this summit? Or would that maybe be a place where they would be willing to let the status quo ride? Yeah, I think that's where you see alignment. And we are talking about one of the few bipartisan issues, as it's often said in Washington, which is getting tough with China and the debates are really over tactics. And even within that, I think there's a fair amount of consensus that the best tactic would be to marshal all of these alliances to encircle China and contain it rather than try to take on China alone. And Beijing just seems intent on helping that strategy come to fruition with its belligerent behavior. I mean, something

like this trilateral that we just saw would not have been possible if Beijing hadn't ridden so hard on especially South Korea. I don't think August would have been possible if Beijing hadn't launched yet another full-blown trade war against Australia for merely calling for an investigation into where COVID came from. I mean, just the number of own goals by this Chinese regime is pretty astounding. But it just shows that, you know, this is one of the sort of cardinal laws of international politics is that when you're confronted by a major security threat, many other differences can be swept under the rug for the sake of security. So we've talked about the American domestic situation a little bit and what

that might mean for this alliance and alliances like it. But what about in this particular case, the domestic situations in Japan and South Korea? Are there pitfalls there that might threaten the two pegs of the stool there? That's a fantastic question. And I agree. I think they're, you know, this is not a foregone conclusion. So, you know, it's easy to get the summit. You know, you just have to get the leaders together, but to actually get public buy-in, and I would add the United States to that as well. I mean, I think there's a big part of the American population that embraces that idea of why are we still upholding Cold War era alliances and policing the globe and trying to be global cop when we have all of these crises and economic problems,

at least among certain parts of the population here at home. So in Japan, you know, there's a long history of pacifism, obviously, which remains popular, this idea that we can't be a normal country because of what we did in the first half of the 20th century and we certainly don't want to re-militarize now. And in South Korea, you know, there's one, there's a big, a huge part of the population that's like, well, we still need economic ties to China. We are very close to China. A lot of our businesses depend on access to the China market. And so there's only so far we can go confronting Beijing in the security sphere. Plus, our main adversary is actually North Korea and we need to focus on that and can't get too overstretched siding with the Americans

in their new Cold War against China. So I think even though anti-China sentiment is rampant in all three of these countries, you know, in Japan, China's unfavorables are above 80%. And I think it's the same in South Korea. And it's one of the most interesting polls I saw was show that more South Koreans dislike China more than they dislike Japan at this point, which is incredible given the historical baggage that we talked about earlier. But can you translate just hatred of China into support for ambitious foreign policies that could come with severe economic consequences, if not potentially military or hostility or tensions in the region?

I think that remains to be seen. And it's going to require a lot of leadership, frankly, on behalf of all three governments now to take this agreement and sell it to their people. Not long ago, I saw someone go through a sudden loss, and it was a stark reminder of how quickly life can change and why protecting the people you love is so important. Knowing you can take steps to help protect your loved ones and give them that extra layer of security brings real peace of mind. The truth is the consequences of not having life insurance can be serious. That kind of financial strain, on top of everything else, is why life insurance

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Go to Squarespace.com slash dispatch for a free trial. And when you're ready to launch, use offer code dispatch to save 10% off your first purchase of a website or domain. One of the pitfalls that I have seen mentioned is with this deepened security alliance, this deeper information sharing the risk of hacks and this question of information security. If you're sharing intelligence, you want to make sure that that intelligence is secure. And a couple of weeks ago, the Washington Post reported that there had been this fairly severe hack by China against Japan's defense ministry so bad, in fact, that U.S. officials flew to Japan to tell the defense minister in person. So you have that on the one hand. And then you also have incursions by North Korean hackers that we saw this week

had been ongoing trying to gain information about the recent exercises, bilateral exercises between the U.S. and South Korea. So do you see that as a potential pitfall or is the fact that they signed these agreements proof enough that they feel confident in the security of the information that they're sharing? I don't think the hacks will disrupt the diplomatic agreement. If anything, they probably fan the flames of rivalry that are generating the demand for these new security structures. The idea that China is just tapping into all of our vital networks, you know, it's been uncovered that they have basically put in backdoors into critical infrastructure in these countries, presumably so that if there's a war, they can take down electricity grids. I mean, it just shows a level of hostility and distrust between these countries.

countries and China that I think is further cementing the alliance among the United States and Japan and South Korea. But I just think there's obviously crisis instability risks because in the cyber age, you know, you can really do severe damage very quickly to another country and really impose severe pain on their population. And that then heightens the fear that if you don't act first, that the other side will get a one up on you. And so that obviously can escalate crisis much faster than if you didn't have the cyber weapons. But in terms of the how it's going, you know, the political warfare attempts that Beijing has tried to marshal, I think I've been tactically effective, like they've been able to hack into systems, but strategically

counterproductive because they've just alarmed everyone and pushed all of China's enemies even closer together because they're just such a latent signal of hostile intent from Beijing. I'm curious if you have seen anything in the response from China and North Korea to this agreement leading up to the summit, Thursday night before the Friday summit, there was this flotilla of Russian and Japanese, or excuse me, Russian and Chinese ships that floated off the coast of Japan. The same thing happened across the Pacific off the coast of Alaska earlier. So is there anything in the reaction after this summit that has surprised you, or is it a typical North Korea-China playbook? I would say the latter so far. It's basically been a bigger version of stuff that we've already seen. And so, you know, I think that's basically what they had ready to go at the time.

And so that could be sort of the initial reaction or salvo to show their displeasure with these developments. But, you know, I think it would be a mistake to view this as sort of like tit for tat. You know, you can focus on a specific reaction to a specific provocation as opposed to this is all part of a broader cycle of each side ramping up the militarization. You know, from China's perspective, these kind of alliances, which the U.S. views as sort of a vital insurance and security barrier. You know, China, of course, views this as hostile encirclement. And they're not wrong about that.

But I think they also discount the extent to which their own. behavior has triggered this. These countries aren't just doing this for fun. I mean, they're doing it an obvious reaction to Beijing's actions. So, you know, in other words, we haven't seen the end of this. You know, you had the initial response. You know, let's do some exercises, a show of force. But I would bet that, you know, I think it's likely somewhere down the line that China's going to be supplying Russia with a lot more material support in the war in Ukraine. I think what we've already seen, where you have China and Russia colluding with Iran, North. North Korea, Belarus, you know, trading around weapons to help each other out, you know,

developing back channels and basically really coalescing into this sort of land-oriented central autocratic axis. I would expect that to intensify in reaction to these alliances that the United States is standing up. And unfortunately, this is just what we tend to see in world politics. Once these geopolitical fault lines get drawn, there's this period of really where they become rigid, locks arrayed against each other. And so I think at this point, you know, I'm someone that feels, I take a very pessimistic view. I think the best we can hope for is a sort of Cold War style standoff between this emerging Russia-China axis and the United States and its allies. And we just have to hope that, you know, each side can deter each other from turning it into a hot war.

And what kind of event do you see triggering a hot war? Is it an outright invasion of Taiwan, for example, or is it some kind of military mishap? You know, they've been, the Chinese have buzzed American planes and cut in front of U.S. ships. Is it an accident on that smaller level where, you know, their provocations go a little bit too far and someone gets hurt? Or is it something bigger like an invasion? I don't think history shows, I don't think wars happen by accident. So, in other words, you know, they happen because of a deliberate decision by one side. So a lot of people look at World War I, which they think started because the Archduke, you know, of Austria-Hunger of Serbia is assassinated.

But that's that, you know, those kind of provocations, they're like streetcars. You know, if it's not this one, there's plenty of others that you could always find. It was actually the deliberate decision by the Germans to want to wage a massive war across Europe to establish their hegemonic position there. And I think the same thing would be true in East Asia. So I worry that China, you know, wants to take back Taiwan one way or another. All Chinese leaders have made it clear that it's just a question of when and how and not a question of if. But I think the problem for China is that peaceful reunification measures, I think, are rapidly disappearing just given where public opinion is going in Taiwan, given the election results in Taiwan, and just giving Taiwan's growing international status and its deepening relationships. with the United States. I think that all has to be very worrying for Beijing. So my concern

is just that Beijing, on the one hand, has fewer peaceful options for taking care of this and feels that Taiwan may be slipping away. On the other hand, Beijing has this powerful military that it's built up. And so maybe has a favorable but finite military advantage because now it's looking ahead maybe five or ten years. And I think the U.S. and Taiwan and other allies in East Asia, in five or ten years, I think their militaries will be much more formidable. You of all these countries, increasing their defense spending significantly forming these kind of alliances and realizing from the war in Ukraine that conquest can happen and that you have to prepare for it. So I just worried about this sort of window of opportunity dynamic taking hold

in China. We've seen that in the past with, say, Imperial Japan or Imperial Germany launching these wars. Even though they knew they were the weaker side, they just felt it's sort of now or never. I think that is the scenario that scares me the most and the most likely one that would cause a war. The other would obviously be some escalation in the war in Ukraine, where if Russia looks like it's going down to defeat, China may ramp up its material support for Russia, and that could obviously catalyze a crisis because now China is just a full-blown accomplice of the war. And Putin may, you know, turn to weapons of mass destruction, too, rather than just admit to

defeat. So we'd be in a whole different world at that point. So I think it's the combination of those two things that is really concerning right now. Not so much like a ship runs into another ship or something like that. There's been a lot of bad news about the Chinese economy coming out in the last few weeks and months. Does that contribute to this sort of window of opportunity moment? Does an economic slowdown of what has otherwise been sort of an economic miracle of the last 20 years, contribute to this idea that we're running out of time? I worry that it could because, you know, I mean, if you just look at it objectively, if you're sitting there in Beijing, you know, if your economy is growing at 10% a year, if you're not

getting your way on something like Taiwan or the South China Sea, you can afford to wait for brighter days ahead because you're only going to gain in power and prestige. And so you can afford to take a peaceful and patient approach to expanding your influence. But if your economy is going down the toilet, then you're not going to have the resources to build up comprehensive national power. And this may be as good as it gets, at least in relative power terms, then it does trigger those sort of now or never dynamics that I think can cause, just make them much more risk acceptance. There might be more willing to take greater risks than they would if they had a booming economy and everyone was sort of cowtowing to get access to their market. So I worry that, you know, and my own research suggests that when rising powers slow down economically, they don't mellow out and dial back their ambitions and say, well, I guess we

gave it a good try, but now we'll integrate into the existing order that we didn't get to design. No, usually instead they say, we're not giving up our ambitions. We just have to find other ways to accomplish them and, hey, we have this big military and let's spend even more on that in the short term. And B, maybe let's do a smash and grab operation and try to to grab what we need before the other side really has its act together. We're at the very least, let's expand abroad to try to find new revenue sources, new markets, new resources. I think China's already been doing this through something like Belt and Road.

It's Belt and Road initiative. And that inadvertently often leads to more great power conflict as you've expanded your economic footprint. Then you've got to build a big military to protect your far-flung assets. And then you inevitably bump, you know, step on the toes of other great powers. and that itself can cause, you know, tensions, maybe even a war. I mean, prior to World War I, the European great powers were competing for colonies, you know, across the global south.

And so I just worry about maybe not an exact kind of dynamic like that, but just this idea of China feels it has to expand to solve its economic problems. And that brings it further into conflict with the United States, other major powers in the world. So one thing I like to ask at the end of interviews like this is, Is there anything that we're missing in this story? Is there an element that we're not talking enough about? Or just something that you think our listeners should really take away from the dynamics at play here? Well, I think the North Korea issue is one that if things weren't, if there wasn't a massive war going on in Europe and China wasn't becoming increasingly belligerent at the same time that its economy is going down, we'd be talking a lot more about,

North Korea, because U.S. intelligence suggests that North Korea will soon be able to put a nuclear warhead on a long-range intercontinental ballistic missile that can reach the U.S. mainland. And that just puts the United States in a very different position with regard to, I mean, its power, but also specifically its alliance with South Korea. It's one thing to say you're going to defend South Korea if the worst thing that can happen to you is your allies are going to get hit, you know, Japan or the South Korea. with nuclear weapons, but now that the United States would literally have to be risking Seattle for the sake of Seoul, you know, and that, I think that it's not a foregone conclusion

that the United States and that Americans really understand that, if they did, that they would be cool with that situation. So I think the fact that Northbury is racing ahead is using really the chaos that's going on, and the fact there's so much else going on in the world to really they've been accelerating all of their tests on their missiles and their nuclear warheads. And so they're really pushing for rapid progress. And so I think if they get this capability, that's a step shift up in their power, a huge threat to the United States. And one that is giving almost no coverage amidst everything else that's going on. Well, hopefully we can do some of that coverage here at the dispatch. Michael Beckley, thank you so much for joining me. Yeah, I'm sure this conversation

will continue in the future. I'm going to be. Thank you.