The Dispatch Podcast - What Would a Second Trump Term Mean for Foreign Policy? | Interview: Eliot Cohen

Episode Date: July 22, 2024

Eliot Cohen, professor emeritus at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, thinks a second Trump term won’t have a dramatic effect on American foreign policy. He joins Jamie to debate this point, the risk of pulling out of NATO and abandoning allies, and whether America is bound to retreat from global affairs. NOTE: This episode was recorded on Friday, July 19, 2024—two days before President Joe Biden announced he wouldn’t be running for reelection. The Agenda: —Cohen’s piece in The Atlantic —Pulling out of NATO —The proliferation of nuclear weapons —Relationships with China and Taiwan —Concerns about J.D. Vance advising Trump Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Welcome to the Dispatch podcast. I'm Jamie Weinstein. My guest today is Professor Elliot Cohn. Elliot is the author of several books, including Supreme Command, and most recently The Hollow Crown, Shakespeare on How Leaders Rise, Rule, and Fall. He is the founding creator of the Strategic Studies Program at John Hopkins' SACE and served as the school's ninth dean. He also has advised the Department of State and the Department of Defense. He is currently the Arley-A. Burke chair in strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. The reason I invited him on this week is because he wrote a piece in the Atlantic where he is a contributing writer titled, Cancel the Foreign Policy Apocalypse, and makes the case, as a never-trumper, why we should see some hope that the Trump administration won't be a foreign policy catastrophe. We get into that

column and a column that he wrote a year ago for Joe Biden to step down, among other issues. I think you're you're going to find it interesting, and I hope you enjoy it, as always. So without further ado, I give you Professor Elliott Cohn. Professor Elliot Cohn, welcome to the dispatch podcast. It's good to be with you. I hope I can still call you, Professor. I know that from your articles you are leaving academia, but I will continue to call you professor in this podcast,

but I wanted to have you on after reading a recent Atlantic piece that you wrote, your most recent one in the Atlantic, entitled, Cancel the Foreign Policy Apocalypse, in part because you articulated something that I have been thinking in a much better way that I could put it on paper, both foreign policy, and then we'll allude, we'll get to it later slightly on what maybe the downsides domestically might be. But you write in the article, as hard as I find to admit,

it is possible that things may be less bad than they seem. Despite the warnings, a second Trump term may not be a riot of alliance-shattering isolationism, bellicose war-mongering, or catastrophically stupid diplomacy. Explain what you mean, Professor. And just, you know, as listeners will probably know, you're not necessarily a Trump supporter at all. You were one of the original never-Trumpers. So coming from you, it is perhaps shocking. to see for some readers to say that, you know, maybe this won't be as bad as the worst-case scenario might say. Okay, well, thanks. Yeah, if you want to call me professor, that's fine. I'm a professor emeritus, so it really doesn't make any difference at all. So the, I mean,

the first thing, I have to say, you know, I'm really, I guess I was not surprised by the reaction to the piece among my never-Trump friends. But still, there's just, people are not particularly careful readers, I find. So if you look at the article, it says, I am a unrepentant, unapologetic, never-tremper, always was, always will be. I say, I'm not going to talk about the domestic policy issues where I think the dangers are quite real. And, you know, in the part that you quoted, there's a lot of may, could be not as bad. So, you know, all I'm asking people to do is to consider the possibility that things may, repeat, may not be, you know, necessarily apocalyptic. And I, we'll talk a moment about, you know, the particular reasons why I feel that about

foreign policy. But, you know, given the temper of the times, I think there is something to be said for telling people to get a grip. You know, there is something about Trump that causes most of us, myself too, from time to time, to get downright hysterical that this is the end of the republic. It's not. It could potentially be very bad, and he could do a lot of damage both domestically and internationally. But I think it's also extremely important that people understand and learn to live with the contingent in politics, the way accidents of personality can affect things and the possibility that, you know, the people or crowded people that you're dealing with may be a little bit more complicated than you think. That's really all there is

to it. You know, to lay out the basic argument, the reason why I think it may not be a complete disaster is, first, if you look at the platform, if actually you look at his speech, Even if you look at J.D. Vance's speech, there's nothing in there to suggest really all out kind of Robert Taft-style isolationism. There's the standard America first stuff. But in the platform and in the speeches, I don't really see that. Secondly, if you look particularly at the recent aid package to Ukraine, that was done by somebody who I think most people would think, think of as a Mago Republican, Speaker of the House, Mike Johnson. And it was done with Trump's approval. You know, Johnson went to Mara Lago and basically got him on board. And then I think there are reasons why, again, it may not be as bad as you might think. And that has to do with

the question of who's going to surround Donald Trump. You know, if it is Tom Cotton and Mike Pompeo, I worry a lot less. If it's people like some of the crazies, Mike Flynn, Cash Patel, and others, I worry quite a bit. And finally, there's a lot we don't really know about Trump himself. We don't know how he's going to be affected by something that shapes all presidents in their second terms. That is to say, they're the way they begin thinking about themselves from the point of view of history with a capital age. We don't know really how he's been affected psychologically by having a near-death experience in that attempted assassination. We don't know what the internal politics of a new administration are going to be.

We don't know the impact of how the fact that foreign leaders, including democratic leaders, have learned how to deal with him. I mean, you know, the fact that Boris Johnson has an hour with him during a conference, convention. And as Johnson made it pretty clear to talk about Ukraine, that says something. What does all that amount to? I don't know. But in a way, that's my point. Nobody does. And so we should hold off on the hysterics until we have good reason for them. I had a curiosity, what was your assessment of his foreign policy during his first term? So I think he toyed with some very dangerous things. He does have this very transactional

view particularly of NATO as something like a protection racket. But for whatever reason, if you, and it was a combination of the people around him, breaking him, deceiving him in some cases, manipulating him and others, the rhetoric was terrible. But in terms of damage he actually did to NATO, I don't really think there was a lot. And there was something that was positive, and I hate to say it, but remains positive, in scaring the Europeans into increasing their own defense spending and contemplating the possibility that they simply cannot rely exclusively on the United States to protect them, that they're going to have to make strenuous efforts. If you look at the policy towards China, and again, a point that I make

in the article is there is always a lot more continuity in American foreign policy than people would like to admit between different kinds of administrations. Honestly, I mean, the Biden administration is following pretty much the same line on China, both certainly militarily, but also I would say in terms of trade policy. That is to say, trying to decrease our reliance on Chinese supply chains. So a lot of stuff that's similar. Both, I would argue, both administrations have neglected Latin America. That's a longstanding American fault. The big difference is Trump, I think, was quite sincere about wanting to control the border. I don't think the Biden people have been particularly interested in it.

So, you know, when you add it all up, do I have tremendous reservations about what they actually did as opposed to how they talk? Yeah, some, but, you know, take the Middle East. I was against the JCPOA deal with Iran, but I also think it was a terrible idea to simply pull out of it and not replace it with something. To his credit, he ordered the killing of Qasem Soleimani, which I think was worth doing. They did broker the Abraham Accords, or at least played an important role. I mean, the locals, UAE and Israel deserve most of the credit for that.

But, you know, was the policy a disastrous one? I can't really say that it was. Now, that doesn't guarantee anything. And again, I want to insist, it is entirely conceivable that they will do some awful things and of which the worst would be to blow up NATO. I'm just saying that you look at the actual record for whatever reasons it was not as bad as you might think. You do mention in the piece you write the biggest potential outlier on this list of

commitments is Europe and specifically NATO. And I know that John Bolton, his former national security advisor who, let's say is estranged from the Trump world these days, believes that Trump's instinct is to, you know, not just threatened to pull out NATO to have NATO put more money into its own defense or build up the individual country's defense budgets, but to actually pull out of NATO. What even the likelihood or potential that is? And what would the consequences of that be? Well, I do think it is his instinct, whether it's an instinct that he gives way to will be dependent on a whole bunch of things. Again, who's around him, whether it's the Tom Cotton's or the Mike Pompeo. I think one of the things

is that we realize with Trump is he finds it very hard to deal with the expert and technocratic class. And John Bolton is sort of at the margins of that, but that's basically what he's part of. He finds it easier to deal with the political people who happen to have, you know, technical expertise, which would be the Tom Cotton's and the Pompeo's. I think he does view alliances as kind of a protection racket. But I also think he likes to talk big as a way of gaining leverage. You know, that's been part of his MO. Would he really want to blow it up if he thought or people were told him, you know, this will destroy your legacy? No. I mean, he's going to be obsessed with what his legacy is going to be. And I think that may induce a certain amount of caution. If he did it and it's

conceivable. It would be a disaster. It would, for the moment, increase Russian influence and control in Europe immensely. It might very well lead to further wars, because I think the Russians would like to gobble the Baltics back up. I think in a somewhat longer run, it means the proliferation of nuclear weapons. I think if NATO falls apart, particularly because of what we have done, the only logical thing for every country from Finland to Poland to Turkey to Kazakhstan is to acquire nuclear weapons. And if that happens, you're going to get a cascade of nuclear proliferation around the world. And at a certain point, if you have instead of half a dozen or so countries having nuclear weapons, you have 20 or 30 or 40, it's only a matter of time

before somebody used this one. Let me ask you about some recent foreign policy comments that Trump made just days ago in an interview that was released by Bloomberg, which may be another outlier on Taiwan. He told the interviewers, look, a couple of things. Number one, Taiwan, I know the people very well, respect them greatly. They did take about 100% of our chip business. I think Taiwan should pay for us for our defense. You know, we're no different than an insurance company.

Taiwan doesn't give us anything. Taiwan is 9,500 miles away, it's 68 miles away from China, a slight advantage, and China's a massive piece of land, they could just bombard it. In one sense, it's what you said with NATO, that this could be a negotiating position. But the fact that he is kind of suggesting that this is much more important to China, it's closer to China. Could you envision Trump not seeing the threat of war with China or a potential war or conflict with China worth it and trying to come to some sort of deal that would bring back Taiwan into China in some way, maybe like the, you know, a 50-year plan to allow, like they had with Hong Kong, which China violated, to bring China,

Taiwan back into China's orbit? I mean, is that an imaginable scenario to you? It's imaginable. But the thing that's dangerous is there are a lot of American business leaders who feel that way. There are a lot of American liberals who feel that way. This is not just a Trump problem. It's a broader problem. And I completely agree with that. Now, again, it depends on who his advisors are is going to matter. So his China expert on the NSC was Matthew Pottinger, who may or may not play a role in the next if Trump is elected. Pottinger's a China hawk. And Pottinger will understand that. Also, let's remember, too, Trump, I mean, he's an incurious man. He's not a well-read man, he's not a guy who actually follows foreign policy, he entered the administration extremely

hostile to the Japanese. And I suspect that that's because somewhere in the recesses of his mind, he remembers in the 1980s, Ezra Vogels, Japan is number one, and the Japanese are eating us a lot. By the end of his administration, he actually had a reasonable relationship with the Japanese. So I think, you know, his starting position is one of ignorance and belligerence and transactionalism. Whether he ends up that way, again, I would just say we don't know. I mean, that, what I'm, I just want to insist. I'm saying we don't know. I'm not saying it will be okay.

I'm just saying we don't know. For those who don't, who are, as you said, there are some people who don't understand why. I mean, just explain, in your view, strategically, why America should support Taiwan and case of conflict. And I would presume this would be potentially a nuclear conflict when you enter a conflict with China. What is it, what, what is the risk of America losing or Taiwan being assumed by China and America not doing anything? Okay. So let me set aside for the moment, the fact that Taiwan is a thriving democracy, to have a democracy, a substantial thriving democracy wiped out by a authoritarian, semi-totalitarian aggressor, is a very bad thing for

liberal democracy around the world. And that's one of the reasons why we should care about Ukraine as well, by the way. And this was something that Americans came to understand after World War II. Let's say those arguments don't convince you, although they should certainly weigh with you. There are a couple of things. One is the Taiwanese economy is, what, the 17th or 20th, something like that largest. The world is a substantial economy. It does have, it is the world's chip manufacturer. Trump is sort of right on that one.

For that asset to fall into Chinese hands is a big deal. It's also a big deal if they have that island, not only with its resources of people and high technology, but just its physical position, the danger that it then poses for Japan and other countries. Furthermore, if after everything we have done and said about Taiwan, we let it slip into the hands of China, there again, I think either the local Asian powers simply make their peace with China and accommodate it as the hegemon, or equally likely, I think in the case of Japan and possibly Australia, they say, okay, we've got to get nuclear weapons.

And I think that's not a world that we want. I mean, we are just not used to the idea that you could have a cascade of nuclear proliferation and what that might mean. And I just think people are not, they don't take it seriously enough and they don't pause to consider what are the implications. But I mean, I'll just, let me just finish with this.

If you give up on Taiwan after, and certainly if the administration were to give up on Ukraine as well, America's word will be mud. And what people don't understand is that so much of our power in the world and our ability to set the rules and our ability to create a world order that benefits us, which isn't something that Trump always understands, is because of our alliance systems. And to jeopardize those is to do tremendous damage to the United States as well as the rest of the world. Not long ago, I saw someone go through a sudden loss, and it was a stark reminder of how quickly life can change and why protecting the people you love is so important. Knowing you can take steps to help protect your loved ones and give them that extra layer of security brings real peace of mind. The truth is, the consequences of not having life insurance can be serious. That kind of financial strain, on top of everything else, is why life insurance indeed matters. Ethos is an online platform that makes getting life insurance fast and easy to protect your family's future in minutes, not months.

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integrated. Go to Squarespace.com slash dispatch for a free trial, and when you're ready to launch, use offer code dispatch to save 10% off your first purchase of a website or domain. I know that you believe that the Biden administration should have done more and helped Ukraine more than it has or allowed them to do more to fight the Russians. But given that they didn't, I wonder if you think the U.S. would actually come and do the types of things that you think are necessary to defend Taiwan in that situation if China invaded. And if not, if it was going to be like Ukraine where they're going to give some weapons but not, you know, allow for total victory or not give enough to have total victory. and ultimately settle for some type of some truce where Russia gets some of the territory. Should we not tell Taiwan that beforehand

to have them make their decision? If they think that we're gonna be, have their back in a significant way, and the reality is President Trump wouldn't, and maybe Joe Biden wouldn't do what they think is gonna happen. Shouldn't they have that knowledge to make a decision whether they really, really wanna risk a major war with China?

So the geography of the two countries matters, You know, the fact that Ukraine is the land war, this would be a naval conflict of some kind. An amphibious assault would be very, very difficult. I think the more likely scenario is a Chinese, and the Chinese play things differently than the Russians did. I think it would be more a question of blockade, harassment, that sort of thing.

So the measures that would be required are very different. I mean, you're onto something in that we've got the Taiwan that we've created. over the last 50 years, where we have basically told the Taiwanese, shut up, sit in a corner, don't disturb anybody, and you can get on with your lives. Under those conditions, it's not surprising that they don't all have those New Hampshire license plates that say live free or die. I mean, if they cannot be sure that we will show up, then, you know, why should they be prepared to die to the last man or woman? Now, we are gradually. doing things, but we could be doing a lot more. So, for example, we now have American military

personnel on the island who are doing kind of regular training, assisting the Taiwanese training. We don't let them wear uniforms in public. We should stop that. We should let them wear uniforms in public so that people know we're there. You know, we do not really exercise together with the Taiwanese military. We train them to some extent or do some training, but we don't do the kinds of things that you really need to do if you're going to prepare a country for war. So there's a lot more that you could do. And I think in the Taiwanese case, the more you do, the more they are likely to do. I wonder kind of conversely to what I, my last question, is what effect seeing the Russian army not be as strong as they, as Putin thought it was

in Ukraine in the beginning, has had on Xi and his belief that the Chinese military is as as strong as he might think it is. Yeah, I mean, the short answer is I don't know. I'm not sure anybody does. I think, you know, bear in mind, both Russia and China have somewhat racist views of one another, and I suspect that the Chinese are disdainful of the Russians, and so she may have more confidence in his own military. On the other hand, the fact that he's been purging them left and right, including the head of their strategic rocket forces, tells you that he may not have full confidence in them. I think there's probably something sobering

in watching what the Chinese seem to have thought would be kind of a very quick campaign turned into something much, much longer and bloodier. So it may have induced a certain amount of caution. But any leader of a country, a great country, operates in some sort of informational bubble. I mean, that's clearly true of President Biden right now. It's true for any American president. It's a much worse problem if it's a dictatorship of the either the Putin or the she variety. So we don't really know

what information he's getting and how he's processing it. One other point you bring up in your piece is that essentially you say, you know, Donald Trump picked Vance to support his views, not, you know, picking Vance to support his vice president's views, that Vance won't have the influence that maybe many ascribe to him now that he is the vice president. Just to be devil's advocate, isn't the concern perhaps that he'll be the last person

in many decisions to speak to Trump? And it's usually that last person that influences him. So the first thing about Vance is this guy's an opportunist, this guy is unprincipled. If you look at his stands on Trump, you know, the somersault that he is done. It's contemptible to begin with, but it just tells you something about who

he really is. If he's told not to be an isolationist, I guarantee you he will stop being an isolationist. Secondly, at the moment, of course, they're riding high, and I think Trump likes that. Inevitably, what's going to happen in a Trump second term is people will begin talking about Vance as the kind of the crown prince, who's the heir to Maga. Trump will not like that. Trump's family will not like that. I mean, I think, you know, Don Jr., among others, have begun to think of the presidency as, you know, one of the Trump family businesses. So there'll be a lot of people eager to cut him down to size, including quite possibly Trump. Let's remember what it's like to work for Donald Trump. Sooner or later, it involves humiliation and

betrayal. And I'm quite sure that'll happen eventually to Vans, who, you know, to protect himself, and I think because it's in his nature, will abase himself as much as is necessary, as he thinks is necessary. Some vice presidents are very influential, and some are not. You know, we've gotten used to the idea that, say, Dick Cheney was very influential. He was actually very influential in President Bush's first term, not so much in his second term. As I point out in the piece, let's remember, Vance is the one who's going to be the neophyte to executive office. Trump is the one who's been there before, and the people around him will be, have been there before in all likelihood. So I think the idea that he's really going to carry the day by force of his Yale law school,

educated genius. I just, I don't, I don't see that. Parathetically, I will say is I would expect a fair amount of internal discord in this administration. You know, they do not agree with each other on things like abortion. They don't really agree with each other on things like tariffs. There will be this contest for the succession, which Trump probably won't like, or if he does like it, he'll play them off against each other, they will, some of their policies or, you know, particularly the economic policies will produce in very short order consequences that'll be fairly ugly. And so the result is they're going to get consumed with internal fighting. Again, it gets to the heart of what I was saying at the beginning. I think if you reject Trump, as thoroughly as I do, as a human being and

as a leader. There is this terrible temptation to think a Trump administration would be this smoothly running monolith as well organized and executed as the Republican Convention was. And it was very well run, very well executed, very well conceived. That's not what government is like. That's not, I mean, the convention you can control, and they did. Governance of the United States, you cannot control. I think the piece does a very good job. of painting why Donald Trump might not be cataclysmic. He wants to be seen as a winner. And I think you could probably make a similar case on the economy. He doesn't, he wants to end up as being viewed as a great president and winning for America. So he looks good. But you mentioned what I

think, and I've always said to me, is where I think the problem will be. You write, the gravest concerns are domestic, will Trump attempt to unleash the FBI and IRS on political opponents, or as he might think of them, enemies? Do you imagine, you know, even if Trump turns out to be, you know, okay to pretty good internationally or okay to pretty good with the economy, for most people might be fine, but for people like General Millie or some of the people that he views as people, General Kelly, that they may find themselves at the end of the FBI or an attorney general that he has put in place that he will sick on them, that these people will be hounded during his presidency? I think it's conceivable. And, you know, there are a number of

reasons why I remain, as I said, unrepentant, unapologetic, never trumper. And that's one of him. And I will, however reluctantly pull the lever for President Biden, who I think is at this point senescent, rather than have that. I guess one area in which I find myself diverging from some of my fellow conservatives, I think, and certainly a lot of liberals, I think the system is more resilient. You know, I think the guardrails held. Now, some people say, well, barely, and I take that point. But I think they held. And I don't think he'll be able to suborn the courts. I think they may be able to purge some of the bureaucracy. I don't think they'll be able to purge all of it. And again, you know, there will be life after Trump, and the people around him

will be thinking about that from day one. This is the reason why most president's second terms are not particularly happy. Everybody around them has already begun thinking about what's the next thing. And particularly after the midterms, you know, usually presidents get creamed in the midterms. Well, let's say, for example, worst case scenario, Biden refuses to step down. It's a slaughter in November, which it could well be because he will drag down an awful lot of the ticket. By the time you get to 2026, he'll be out of the picture. You'll have, you know, the Democrats will come roaring back. There'll be plenty of money to fund them. They will be energized and you would have to expect that the Republicans will take some major, and they will have done stupid and dishonorable

and possibly criminal things. And the Democrats will come roaring back. And then, you know, everybody around Trump is going to be thinking, okay, how do I avoid jail? Because let's remember one thing. I am sure that a lot of the people around Trump have internalized what happened to the January 6th rioters and we'll be thinking yeah maybe I could you know we can throw Mark Millie in jail and then what's going to happen when the Democrats come back and they come after me I wonder if you think there is a risk of all this because I'm not saying the word right but of the doomsdayism only seeing the worst case scenario some people on the never Trump right or on the left, seeing the end of democracy. Whereas while that, I think you

admit in this piece, there's the tail risk of that is the reason why you shouldn't vote for Trump. But if you only see that and see his election as the end of the country, aren't you in some ways, if no one cooperates with him post-election, leading to a worst-case scenario than trying to paint a bridge to a better scenario with Trump, trying to push him in a direction that would be, you know, less bad than just totally disengaging from him? You know, I don't know. The problem is I think people like me are basically powerless to exercise any influence over Trump.

The people who can perhaps are the Tom Cotton's and the Mike Pompeo's and the Matt Pottenger's and people like that and I'll place my hopes in them. I think the more subtle danger is it gets in the way of people, particularly on the left, understanding why this guy is so pocket. Now, some of it has to do with certain skills that he has. He has some narrow but very deep political skills. He's a showman. He has, like many would-be dictators, a kind of feral instinct for people's weaknesses

and knows how to play on them. But there are other things at work here. And I think, you know, thoughtful Democrats like Roy DeSherra, John Judas, have been warning for quite some time. Look, the Democratic Party kind of abandoned the working class. You know, the left made a terrible mistake in endorsing a combination of grievance and identity politics. There's a reason, I think, why the Republican right

really has rejected the old Republican elites, of which I, you know, I suppose I was at least an honor, member, you know, that sort of accounting can be delayed or distorted if, you know, you're spending all of your time whipping yourself into a frenzy thinking this is the end of the United States of America. You mentioned that you think Joe Biden is, let's say, not quite the same person he was at least several years ago. In fact, you wrote a year ago in a column called step aside, Joe. If history is any guide and ailing and declining president does not simply say, you're right, Doc, time for me to hand over the reins to the Veep. Rather, as Woodrow

Rilsson, Franklin Roosevelt, and others have done, they delay and deny, aided and abetted by families and close advisors who refuse to accept that reality. It seems that's exactly what is occurring now, if you believe, some of the reports around Biden. He didn't obviously listen to you a year ago. He may finally listen. How do you think history will view his refusal to leave a year ago? Because even if he leaves now, it does seem he brought the Democratic Party to the brink of catastrophe. How will history view him for maybe selfishly staying on? I think if he bails out now, he'll be viewed as a flawed and what he is, sort of a decent media. who nonetheless, you know, rescued this country from a possible Trump second term in the, in the 2020

election, and who was not a great president, but not a terrible president either. I think that he can still recover that. If he stays to the end, and I would be quite harsh, I mean, I think he is senescent. He may, unfortunately, have some illness like Parkinson's. I'm not a doctor, I can't tell, but I've had close family members with Parkinson's, and it has that feel to me. Then his reputation will be awful. His reputation will be of a selfish, vain man who did terrible damage to this country and terrible damage quite possibly to the world by refusing to step aside and let a younger

generation come forward. So what I'm hoping is that that message is finally getting through to his family and his immediate advisors. I think the way this looks to me is I think you have an orchestrated campaign led by some very competent people like Nancy Pelosi to apply more and more and more pressure on him. He is a notoriously stubborn and willful man. So this will be very hard. I think I have no idea what goes on in his family, but I think probably. the most important thing will be if there's a moment where his wife, you know, comes to realize the thing that I just said, you know, that's the hope that he will step down. And for the sake of

the country, and his sake, but frankly, I care more about the country. I absolutely hope that he will step down. I will say one other thing, which I think may I hope explain his reluctance to step down, but more importantly, the reluctance of the family to let him step down. often people who've had a live consumed by politics and by high office declined very fast once they retire. I mean, that was the story of LBJ, President Johnson. And I think it could be his story, too. So they may be literally of the view that a, you know, stepping down now would be a death sentence.

Professor, thank you for joining the dispatch podcast. My pleasure. You know, Thank you.