The Duran Podcast - A US-China Conflict & End of the Ukraine War - John Mearsheimer, Alexander Mercouris & Glenn Diesen

Episode Date: November 15, 2024

A US-China Conflict & End of the Ukraine War - John Mearsheimer, Alexander Mercouris & Glenn Diesen

Hi everyone and welcome. I am joined today by Alexander Merkiris and Professor John Meersheimer. It's good to see the both of you again. So I was thinking today as with all eyes on Ukraine and the Middle East and of course the US election with uncertainty of what a Trump presidency will look like and how it will affect the world. I thought perhaps we could first take glance at China and not just China but also the wider Asia as a region

simply because this is where becoming the center of geopolitical gravity and also because Yujan were well not recently but a few weeks ago got back from visiting both China and

Indonesia and from reading in the media you stayed also with the president of Indonesia, shared your views on how they could handle this position of being this large non-aligned state, especially in this current rivalry between the United States and China. So I was wondering what you can share from your view about what's happening in Asia. Obviously, some of your conversations perhaps are private, but your views on political theory and what's happening in the region is, I guess, up for grabs. Okay, Glenn, I'll say a few words about China, and then we can go back and forth, the three of us. And then if you want to talk about Indonesia, because that's a different case than the Chinese case for all the obvious reasons. My sense is that the Chinese understand that they are engaged in an intense security competition with the United States and that it's not going to end anytime soon and that if anything, it'll probably get worse with the passage of time.

My main takeaway from my visit is that the Chinese belief, unsurprisingly, that the United States, States is responsible for the problem. Lots of Chinese believe that China can rise peacefully and the fact that that's not happening and instead you have this intense security competition with a real possibility of war, not that it's likely, but a real possibility. But this, again, is due to the United States. My point to them is that if you go to the United States and you talk to people about who's responsible for the security competition that is set in, they blame the Chinese. And I tell the Chinese, and I tell Americans this as well, that I don't think this is the fault of the Chinese or the fault of the United States. It's just the way international politics works

in my story. In a system where there's no higher authority, I believe that states have to go to great lengths to make sure they're very powerful. And one of my arguments that always resonates with the Chinese is that I say to them, you remember what happened when you were weak. It's called the century of national humiliation. And therefore, you have a deep-seated interest in making sure you're very powerful. And they, of course, understand that. And I tell them that the problem is that if you become very powerful because power is effectively a zero-sum game. That causes problems for the Americans. So the Americans go to great lengths to be more powerful than you, China, which causes great problems for you and brings back Americans in a century of national humiliation. So the end

result is that you get this competition between the two sides. And this is why I said going back to the early 2000s when hardly anybody thought that the rise of China would lead to trouble of any sort, that there would be big trouble. It was a sort of structural argument. It's not an argument that points the blame at either China or the United States. But I would note that most Chinese people are uncomfortable with that argument, and they prefer to argue that the United States is the principal culprit here. And they emphasize almost, all the Chinese who you talk to, that China has a Confucian culture, and because it has a Confucian culture, it is interested in peaceful coexistence with other countries, and it does

not want to behave according to the sort of realist logic that I lay out. And my final point to you is that my response to the Chinese is, I've heard that argument before in a slightly different guise. In the United States, people say, we live in a liberal culture. We We are a liberal state and liberals are the good guys and we never cause any trouble. It's always the other who causes trouble. My argument is it's neither the Chinese or the United States that's principally responsible to this mess that we're in. Do you think there's any possible chance that an equilibrium could be reached that the Chinese

a certain level of power and that the United States has a certain level of power and that you can find some way to establish a kind of detente like happened in the 60s with the Soviets. I mean, something of that kind is to a little outcome eventually. But you do want to remember just talking about the Cold War, you did have a rather intense security competition from roughly 1945 to 1989. And there were ups and downs. I think what you're describing, Alexander, is the detente that set in in the late 60s, early 70s.

And I think that could happen in the Chinese case, that we could work out something of a modus Vivendi, something of a detente could set in at some point down the road, but it would still be in the context of an intense and dangerous security competition.

So that would be my first point. The second point I would make to you is what makes me very pessimistic about this whole situation is that China is not a status quo power, independent of all this realist logic that I rely on. China wants Taiwan back. It views Taiwan as sacred territory for obvious reasons. And furthermore, the Chinese basically believed that the South China, China Sea is a giant lake and that it should be seen as Chinese territorial waters. And furthermore, they basically think the same way about the East China Sea and those rocks in the East China Sea that the Japanese now control, which the Japanese called the Sintakou Islands and Chinese called the Biao Islands. So you see that the Chinese are bent on expansion,

even if you take the sort of realist logic away. And there's no way the Americans, and truth be told, most of China's neighbors want to see China control the South China Sea. This brings in countries like Indonesia and the Philippines. And with regard to Taiwan, the United States just doesn't want China to conquer Taiwan. But China wants Taiwan back, again, for understandable reasons. And then, you know, when you get into the East China Sea, that's especially dangerous because the Japanese are involved there. And as both of you know well, the Japanese and the Chinese or mortal enemies have been for a long time. And there's no hope that that's going to change anytime soon.

So I just don't see how you work out much of Otis Vivendii, given the fact that China is not a status quo power. But would you consider it to be an expansionist power, though, because when we refer to Taiwan, they never accepted that this was an independent state. Indeed, well, most of the world, including the United States, also recognized that it was officially a part of China. So the goal all along was the gradual, peaceful integration of Taiwan unless, of course, they would take the step of pursuing independence in which the military option would be activated. it. And, well, the South China Sea, would this be part of, do you see this part of the security dilemma in terms of trying to push through the American island chains, which was set up after the Second World War? Or do you, in other words, do you see this as being a reaction or do you see

this as being expansionism? The point I would make, Glenn, is that, you can look at Chinese thinking in two very different ways, right? And they complement each other. One is, let's just take security off the table. Your description of how they think about Taiwan is exactly right. They do not view taking over Taiwan is evidence of expansionism. Taiwan belongs to them.

The United States recognizes that fact, period, end of story. They also think the same way about the South China's cities. you know, when you talk about the 9-dash or 10-dash line, they believe those are the South China Sea is basically Chinese territorial waters, period. If you just sort of look at the historical record, that's clear. So they argue. And the same thing goes with the East China Sea. So you have this set of arguments that they make that have nothing to do with, you know,

realist logic or strategy and have everything to do with what I would call, nationalism, right? What is theirs? What is their sacred territory, their sacred borders? Then, superimposed on top of that, you do have the realist logic, right? And this is the argument that if you're China, you want to control Taiwan, you want to control the South China Sea, and you want to control the East China Sea. As I say when I'm in China, if I were Xi Jinping's national security advisor, I'd want to drive the Americans out of East Asia. The Americans are a ruthless great power. We all know that. If I'm Chinese, I don't want the Americans on my doorstep. I want to push them out of East Asia. So there's a security logic here. It complements, let's call it, the nationalist

logic. And that's what makes this situation so dangerous, in my opinion. Just quickly, one last question. How far do you think the Chinese are going to go? I mean, are they prepared to actually go into a military clash with the United States? I mean, they say that that's not what they want at all, but if Taiwan were to make moves towards overt secession, for example. Would China go to war over it? I think they will. What is your impression?

I think you have to separate the three big flashpoints. The way I look at this, Alexander, there are really five big flashpoints? One is the Korean Peninsula, because the Chinese are pointed at the hip with the North Koreans. You want to remember that it was China that came into the Korean. war in the fall of 1953 when we crossed the 38th parallel because North Korea is a terribly important buffer state from China's point of view. And of course, the Americans are deeply involved in South Korea. So a U.S.-China conflict could break out in the context of a North Korea, South Korea conflict. So that's conflict point one. Conflict point two, where we,

the Americans are not too involved, is the India-China border. And thankfully, things seem to be improving a bit up there. But that's another potential left. And then there are the big three flash points in East Asia that I talked about earlier, East China Sea, Taiwan, and the South China Sea. I think there will not be a war over Taiwan in the foreseeable future as long as Taiwan does not declare its independence. The Chinese made it clear that that's a red line.

maybe the brightest of red lines to use rhetoric we know well from the Ukraine war. And I think given that, the United States will go to great lengths to make sure Taiwan does not declare its independence. I think we would not win a war over Taiwan. The best we could hope for is a stalemate. I think the Chinese probably could not win a war over Taiwan. And if they did win, it would be a Pyrrhic victory. And I think, therefore, they prefer to wait on Taiwan. We prefer to wait on Taiwan. We don't have an interest in a war. They don't have an interest. So I think Taiwan, in a moment, looks fine or looks good in terms of stability, as long as the Taiwanese state of their independence. The South China Sea is the dangerous area. And

Chinese have been militarizing the South China Sea. And by the way, I think from their point of view, they should do this. It's not in America's interest, but from China's interest, you know, you want to project power and, you know, building military capability in the South China Sea makes sense. And again, there's a nationalist logic as well as a realist logic could play here. So if you ask me, where is the data? dangerous flashpoint at this point in time, I would say it's the South China Sea. I was curious on your argument that, well, China will likely act as a great power,

much like the United States. And again, this is the realist idea that it's the international distribution of power which imposes this systemic incentives in terms of how states can react in a rational manner to maximize their security. But for realist, it's also an idea, that most ideas are also a reflection of power. So in other words, when the US colonies initially were weak, there was incentive to embrace ideas such as non-interference or isolationism to stay out of entanglements.

While after the Cold War, when the collective or political West was unconstrained, there was an incentive for us not to embrace ideologies or political theories which advocated mutual constraints. Rather, there was an incentive to, embrace theories of unrestrained power. So again, when Fukuyama comes and, you know, rehashes the Kant's perpetual peace that not only do,

should we not have any constraint on our power, but we are forced for good and we can deliver perpetual peace if we only unleash our full might upon the world, that this becomes a more attractive ideology, which tends to influence the decision-makers. Now, my only point is often in the West, we get a sense that we have a bit of a crusader mentality, which doesn't always follow our national interest. For example, in Ukraine, this makes no sense at all.

The realist would assume that the state would only expand power to the extent it enhanced security. But when you're balanced, such as we are in Ukraine, the realist would advocate for making peace to maximize security as opposed to pushing power at the expense of security. But given that China has grown up in a very different neighborhood, it's surrounded by other large powers. They have the Indonesians, they have the Indians, the Russians, that they're more likely to embrace ideas, such as what they're doing now with this global civilizational initiative where they say, listen, we all have our own different path to modernization development. One country or one civilization shouldn't tell another one what to do. So there's a very Westphalian ideas, aren't there, this idea that, yeah, non-interference, each state should operate on its own. It just seems to be in a bit of a contrast to some of this crusader moral, moral crusader mentality, which we often have in the political West.

Yeah, this is a fascinating subject, Glenn. I think what you're saying is there's a real logic, and then there's, let's call it an ideological logic, okay? and my argument when I talk about the U.S.-China competition is a realist logic and I'm basically treating the United States and China as black boxes. As you know

this is the way realists think about the world and my argument is that the Chinese will behave just like the Americans behave. They will try to dominate Asia and they should try to dominate Asia. Okay, that's the realist logic. Then there's the ideological law.

during the unipolar moment when realism was basically taken off the table because there was only one great power in the system that one great power of course was the United States okay realism's off the table there's no great power of politics because there's no other great powers the United States is free to pursue a liberal foreign policy ideology really takes over

in a very important way. And this can only happen in a unipolar world. And because we are a thoroughly liberal states, the United States, and we have allies like Britain that are thoroughly liberal states, this crusader mentality kicks in, and we run around the world trying to do social engineering, end of a rifle barrel, and get ourselves into untold trouble. Okay. The question you want to ask yourself is what would have happened if the unipole were China? or if the Utipole were the Soviet Union. Now, if the Soviet Union had won the Cold War, the ideology would have been communism, which, like liberalism, is one of these universalistic ideologies where you turn into a crusader state.

So I would argue if the Soviets had won the Cold War, they would have had a Soviet version of Frank Fukuyama, and that would have set them off on a similar disastrous path. I believe if China had won the Cold War, so to speak, and China had emerged as the unipolar moment, it would not have. I think at an ideological level, the Chinese are different than the Americans and the Soviets were during the heyday of communism. But of course, my point is that today, in the multipolar world we live in, ideology has been pushed onto the backseat, and it's realist logic that dominates. Yeah. I'm going to ask one other question, because you're talking about realism. How receptive are the Chinese to realist, to talk the kind of realism that you're talking about?

Because there is a realist tradition in Chinese philosophy. I used to take an interest in Chinese philosophy, but I mean, there's the school known as legalism, which was very, very powerful at the time of China's formation, and which was never completely forgotten, which is distinct from Confucianism. It takes a much more tough-minded view based on power, a more skeptical view of idealism and of idealistic views,

Do you find that the Chinese, when you talk about realism, that they're more receptive to discussing it than, to be frank, I suspect some Americans currently are? Absolutely. I mean, my view on the Chinese is that they are realist to the core. And Confucianism is the velvet glove that they put over their realist. fist. The Chinese are tough customers. You know, I often say that when I go to China, I sometimes start my talks by saying it's good to be back among my people. And what I mean by that is that the Chinese are realists. There's no question about that. They are hardball players. The rhetoric they use is Confucianism, right? We are the good guys. You are the bad guys. But deep down, they understand

the basic logic, and the Chinese understand the importance of being powerful. And the Chinese have over the past few centuries had what I would call a tragic history. And as a result of that tragic history,

they understand the importance of being powerful. And they also understand that you don't want to trust the United States or any other great power. You know, when I first went to China, in the early 2000s, and I made the argument that China could not rise peacefully. I said to the Chinese, I'm amazed my Chinese interlocutors.

I said, I'm amazed that you bring me to China, given that I'm arguing that China can't rise peacefully. And usually there were a handful of responses that were made to me. But one of them was that you're the first American we met who's been honest about how ruthless the United States is. Because, of course, all the Americans who went to China would tell the Chinese that the Americans of the good guys were a liberal democracy. Of course, knew better. And they appreciated the fact that I said that the United States is a reasonable. and you should never trust what the United States says any more than you should trust what any great power says.

But the second reason the Chinese invited me was they used to say to me that we believe there is much power in the logic that underpins your argument that China cannot rise peacefully. And why we want to hear you spell out your logic And why we want to interact with you is we want to figure out how we can prove you wrong. We want to find the chink in the armor.

We want to find out where the whole and the logic is that we can therefore exploit to make the case that China can rise peacefully. To which my response was, there is no chink in the armor. China cannot rise to which they would respond. We don't believe that. But all of this, Alexander, gets back to the fact that the Chinese are always very comfortable talking to me about realism. They engage in realist logic or realist intercourse. And that's why I say that, you know, I'm back among my people when I go to China. I agree with the peaceful rights.

I made the argument that a peaceful rise is simply a good of the geoeconomic strategy for a rising power. That is, when it rise builds its strength. A lot of what they could do would be to focus on the internal developments to build their strength. And while you build your strength, you do not want to attract unwanted attention from other great powers who might want to cut you down in size. So of course, this is by almost default, a temporary position, until you reach a certain level, such as Germany surpassing Britain before the First World War, in which they essentially outgrow the system of the regional hegemon, in which they have to challenge. And I think, especially after 2008 and 9, more so after 13 and 14, we see China more willing now, of course, to challenge the United States.

But I do take your point on why they would consider you one of theirs, because it is something great with realists, and you're probably one of the better at this, to be able to put yourself in the shoes of the other guy. That is when you say, this is what America should do, this is what China should do, recognize that these are competing objectives. And because often, yeah, political scientists are assumed to only, well, they're often incapable of showing a lot of understanding. for the opposing side to put yourself in the other guy's shoes. And I think everyone I talk to, they always point this out with Professor Meerschimer. He's able, at least to understand, put yourself in the position of everyone. And I think that's quite refreshing because often when you look at liberal theory. I mean, it's quite optimistic in nature because the idea is you can transform politics.

If politics is determined by the internal characteristic of states, you can overcome the power politics, security competition, but often it's assumed because our, the religion values, government, ideology, whatever it is, this is what dictates your policy. But this is always, behind this optimism, there's always a dark side of the

coin, which is the assumption that is our internal values which are good. So how can we make peace? If other will convert to our ideals or if they will, or they can be contained or defeated. So there's a ugly side behind this. And I feel often, you know, when

Western scholars go to Asia, we might want to lecture them a little bit too much about why they should be a little bit more like us and then there would be peace in the world as opposed to essentially outlining that, yeah, there is security competition. Our competition are increasingly in conflict, which is why we will compete, but, you know, without, while still explaining the understanding for what China should be doing. I want to ask you to guys a question about China, but before, you know, I ask you the question. I just want to make a comment in response to what you just

said, Glenn. In a very important way, the Chinese are more tolerant than the West. And here we're talking mainly about the United States. We believe that the world is divided into good guys and bad guys.

We are the good guys. Period. End the story. And we have no tolerance for anybody or any state that has a different political system. Right. We want to convert everybody into a liberal democracy. If you really think about it, it's an illiberal form of liberalism, because liberalism is supposed to be all about tolerance. Liberalism is supposed to be predicated on the assumption that people can't agree or countries can't agree about first principles, and you give them space to operate according to their own set of first principles.

We in the liberal West do not operate according to that liberal worldview. We run around the world trying to force everybody to look exactly like us. I think in a very important way, the Chinese are much more tolerant. They don't have this notion that we have the ideal political order and we should enforce that on other countries. They have more of a live and let live approach to international politics. which I think will get them over the long term in less trouble than we've gotten into pursuing this liberal, although, as I just said, illiberal, liberal for our policy. But anyway, that's just an observation.

But I wanted to ask you to just, if you're the United States of America, and your task with the question of dealing with China, right, how do you think about China, right? you see it as a threat, not a threat, a quasi-threat? Just how do you guys think about China and how do you think the United States should respond to China? I mean, I've laid out my views and I'm not saying I have the truth. I'm just curious how you to think about international politics. The approach I would take is that I would try and come to some kind of general understanding

with the Chinese about certain key geopolitical things. So absolutely make it clear that the United States is not backing secession on the part of Taiwan, that it is no interest in closing off the South China Sea and anything of that sort. So I would try to come to some general understanding with China, including restrictions on weapons and armaments. on naval power, because we now see this very dangerous naval buildup that is going on, and explaining to the Chinese that the United States is a maritime power. China, at the same extent, is not attempting to come to some kind of understanding with the Chinese on that. I think Chinese

realism, which is a tradition in China, would make the Chinese inclined to go along with that. I think also I would play pretty hardball with the Chinese on economic questions about issues of re-industrialization within the United States repatriation of companies and things of that kind. And again, I think that the Chinese, who are realistic people, would understand where the United States was coming from with that. And I think an understanding would be reached. In other words, it's a question of managing the relationship, maintaining a dialogue and a discussion, doing it in a polite way, not lecturing, not coming along and telling the Chinese, you've got to change your views about what goes on in Xinjiang province or Tibet or that kind of thing.

Approach the Chinese from a very straightforward position of self-interest about Taiwan, about the South China Sea, about naval issues in the Pacific, about economic questions as well. And I think if it's done that way, I think the relationship can be managed. Maybe it would be an adversarial one, but the question is not about making it, you know, a friendly one, or just accepting the fact that it's going to be a relationship for the long term and managing it effectively in a way that would be in the interests of both. That's my approach, basically. Okay, let me ask you a question. The Chinese have made it clear they want Taiwan back and they believe that they should control most of the South China Sea and the East China Sea, including rocks.

Do you think, in terms of working out the modus Vivendi that you described, we should prevent them from doing that? We should, in effect, contain them? Or do you think we should let them take Taiwan back? I mean, how do you think about those three big flashpoints in terms of the strategy you're proposing? I think what China needs could be told is if you start taking overt moves to seize Taiwan, to take control of Taiwan, to take control of the South China Sea, you need to understand that this is something that the United States would be bound to respond to. It would wreck the entire relationship.

it would move the relationship from a situation of just being adversarial to being one of absolute confrontation and belligerence. And I would say that, look, it's not in your interests to go there. You yourself repeatedly say that you're prepared to wait for the outcome in Taiwan. obviously it is important to you that Taiwan does not declare independence, just leave the status quo to continue as it is. Just leave it, just leave the situation as it is at the present time and with the South China Sea. I would say the same.

We don't want a clash with you over the South China Sea. It is not in your interest to have a clash with us. Let us see about scaling down our mutual armaments. You don't need all these aircraft carriers. We don't need to send our warships into the South China Sea all the time. But if you start taking the kind of steps that some of your people have been intimating, well, then, of course, that will destroy the relationship and put you into a confrontation with the United States, which would not be to your advantage.

And here I just want to say something. I mean, you know, this is something I've heard from Chinese, which is that they are very, very conscious that in a military confrontation with the United States, they are at a disadvantage. We did a program just the other day on the Duran with a former American Marine officer who pointed out what a very complicated and difficult thing

amphibious operations are. China has never done them. The United States has done them many, many times. If China wants to conduct an amphibious operation in Taiwan, it would almost certainly end in disaster and chaos because the Chinese have no experience in this. You need to fail in this many, many times before you understand properly how to do it.

Now, I think the Chinese know this, actually. I have seen things that the Chinese say. They are aware that it would take them decades before their fleets were in any kind of condition where they would be able to go level with the US Navy. I think this is something which the Chinese understand perfectly well. So I think that they do not want a confrontation with the United States. United States in Taiwan, in the South China Sea, in the East China Sea. But they have been led to think by some people in the Biden administration and elsewhere. And I do believe that we have

handled the signals very, very badly that there are some people in Washington who almost hanker for that. So I think that some kind of modus vivendi, which would find a way of managing the relationship, maintaining contacts, avoiding all. all this rhetoric, which we always get when someone like Blinken goes to Beijing, you know, bringing up Xinjiang, talking about dissidents, this kind of thing, which annoys the Chinese intensely, and again reminds them of the way in which they used to be lectured to during that century of humiliation, which no Chinese has ever forgotten. I think we can just put all that aside, talk to them in a very hard-headed way. So these are, these are.

are our concerns, these are our interests, those are your concerns, those are your interests. We can respect them up to a point, we can respect them a great deal. If you cross our red lines, we too have got red lines, we understand that you've got red lines, we too have red lines. Just let's not cross each other's red lines. It's not in our interest to get into a confrontation with you, but it is certainly not in your interests to get into a confrontation with us and you know it. And I think the Chinese do know it. And I think they're realistic enough to base their policies upon it. That's what I would do. But just very quickly, Alexander, would it be fair to characterize your preferred strategy as a smart containment strategy or a measured containment strategy?

I would prefer to call it a d'etante strategy, an attempt to relax tensions. Again, we had an adversarial relationship in Europe in the 60s and in the 70s. But it was one which allowed both sides to get on with their affairs in the Soviet Union. I personally have no doubt about this. The fact that Daytona happened in the 60s and 70s created significant change and led to a lot of the developments that came later in the 1980s. I think that that is the approach I would take. I think de taunt with China, if you talk about it as containment, especially to the Chinese,

they're bound to see it as aggressive or attending to bottle them in. But I would see it as a de taean strategy, one in which two great powers who are adversarial at many levels seek to manage their relationship in their mutual interest. It might be a face way,

face-saving way of saying it, but face matters. Glenn, I'm curious what you think of what I've said, what Alexander said, sort of how you think about this issue. Well, I think the United States would be better off to take a position which reflects the international distribution of power. Now, what I mean is after the Cold War. I think it was quite natural for the US to pursue a hegemonic peace as it was so dominant. Under a hegemonic peace, the maximization of security of power becomes the

same as maximizing security, because this is when peace depends on effectively dominating every corner of the world. But I think the reality is simply because now we shifted into a multipolar distribution of power, and I think for that reason, the U.S. security strategy would be best served if it actually reflected this balance, because what we see now is the U.S. attempting to, to hold on to global primacy, but what is the result? I think it would predictably be that the United States exhaust itself. It's military overstretch. It exhausts this economy, and all of this will also have domestic implications. When it's growing economic inequalities, social problems, political polarization, all these problems building up in the US. Meanwhile, outside the US,

we see all America's adversaries effectively coming together. So China has now an interest in aligning with all of America's opponents simply because they see the US as being too intrusive. And I think this is the problem because the Chinese at the moment are pushing for an anti-hegemonic system. They want a multipolar system. That's not necessarily anti-American. I think they would benefit from a good working relationship with America as one among many polls.

But an America which insists on asserting primacy, I think they become the primary threat to China. and now they will align themselves with other countries which are opposed to the United States. So I think, yes, the US exhaust itself internally. It builds up collective balancing around the world. And I think this is, I think the US will be better off returning a little bit, withdrawing back to its former role as more of an offshore balancer, which can go back home, lick its wounds, rebuild its strength without going out in the world. and this way, you know, the Chinese, the Indians,

other will have a natural equilibrium or a natural balance of power would assert itself. At the moment, I think, a lot of difference between, at least the Eurasian giants, they're willing to oversee all of this, simply because many see the US demand for global privacy to be the primary challenge. But otherwise, of course,

I wouldn't expect any surrender or anything of the United States. Indeed, when I hear Donald Trump speak of, you know, putting tariffs and all these powerful industrial policies. I actually think this is a good idea. I'm always been a big fan of the American system. I think some economic nationalism is well overdue. However,

I think everything goes overboard because if the United States will decouple itself completely from China try to sabotage its economic rise, it's such an overkill. It can't be done. So I think they're undermining their own economic power by decoupling from, yeah, this supply chains built over the years. I think if the US will take

a more moderate position in terms of only accepting China as a peer, then they could have more, they could do this industrial policies, all these tariffs and subsidies in a moderate way, which would be able to rebuild or re-industrialize America without necessarily causing an economic war with the Chinese, but I don't know, so I see it as being more of an interest in, yeah, pulling back and having, you know,

your capability, like in any strategy, your capabilities should match up with what can actually be done. Otherwise, I think there will be a gradual exhaustion over time. But, yeah, otherwise, just very quickly, in your former comment, I agree with the liberals, because

liberalism has these two components. We're We're supposed to be tolerant and embrace universalism, but we see the universalist impulse always overrun tolerance this day. So, yeah, sorry. Glenn, I just want to ask you a quick question. Tell me what your views are on whether we should defend Taiwan, try to prevent the Chinese from taking over the South China Sea and the East China Sea. Just listening to you talk, it sounds like you think we should not do that. We should pull back. And before you answer, I would note that I actually have a good number of realist friends here in the United States.

These are realists, slightly different realists than me, who believed we should not defend Taiwan. They believed that we're overextended in East Asia and are interested in important ways pulling back and they think that the idea of defending Taiwan is ludicrous, right? These are realists, right? Not me, of course. But I'm just curious because you sound like them. I'm not being critical of you. I'm just trying to get a sense of exactly how you think about a containment strategy, whether you think it's good or bad.

Well, I guess I would go for a middle way. If you look at Taiwan, I think it would be healthier for the United States to make a deal with China again. Let's stick to the one-China policy. So the U.S. should have cultural and economic ties with Taiwan. but these efforts to send the political elites there and the military, that this is a breach of the one China policy. And in return, the Chinese will commit to this idea

that they should only reintegrate Taiwan by economic means. But overall, I would still think that Taiwan, like we have already agreement, that Taiwan is a part of China. The only view is how, yeah, if they should be taken back by military means or economic means. I don't really think it's in the Chinese interest, use military force against Taiwan anyways. I think they would be quite comfortable to let some other time take care of it by having gradual economic integration

and over time win them over. So I think if the US doesn't chip away at the sovereignty of China by seemingly slowly pushing for Taiwan's accession, I think if they make this commitment, I think they can get a good commitment from China not to use force at least in their reintegration initiatives. But overall, yeah, would say Taiwan is China, like the rest of the world, all of the world, but I would find a way of avoiding military solutions to this problem. And I guess the same in the South China Sea, as

opposed to either America rules or China try to transition a bit out of the block system to find some kind of a system for collective security. That is, the alliance system would be replaced by something inclusive of also the main power because I think trying to to construct an East Asian security architecture without the biggest power. China, I think that would result in the same crisis we have in Europe.

But again, one might be able to get some concessions out of the Chinese because the 9-dash line is a bit cocky. Well, cutting off the coastline of all its neighbors. I don't know. If it would be possible to do some deal where, you know, they find some renegotiation around the 9-dash line in return for transitioning from a Chinese containment to inclusive security architecture. I think that would

be better and more suitable for the multiplayer era, which is, you know, really kicking in these days. Thank you. Want me to say a few words just about Indonesia? Yes, please. I was really curious about this, actually. It's a fascinating case. As you, Glenn said it, it's the fourth most populous country in the world. And that tells you that if they really grow their economy, they would be a powerhouse. And the president, the past president, the present president, they're all committed above all else to growing Indonesia's economy. And that makes perfect sense, as we all understand. In the process, there is a use. amount of economic intercourse between China and Indonesia.

And Indonesians, of course, don't want to do anything to damage that situation. They want to continue to trade with China and in the process enrich Indonesia. Their goal, the Indonesian leader's plural goal, is to make Indonesia a more prosperous country, not only for the good of all the people, all the Indonesians, but also because that translates into military might, and you become a more formidable power and you're better able to protect yourself. So they have that sort of dual rationale for growing the Indonesian economy. The problem is that the Indonesians are well aware that there's this intense security competition taking place between the United States and China. And they understand that if they get too close to the United States, that will enrage the Chinese, and that could have economic consequences.

And they don't want that to happen. At the same time, they basically understand that the United States is not a direct military threat in any way to Indonesia. The United States is, you know, thousands of miles away. It's not a military threat. China, on the other hand, is, and I'm choosing my words carefully here, of potentially. military threat to Indonesia because China is a next-door neighbor. It's in the neighborhood. They have to be aware of the China threat. And they go to great lengths to make sure that they don't exacerbate tensions between China and Indonesia. But the problem is that the Chinese

are interested in controlling the South China Sea. And Indonesia has the this exclusive economic zone that the Chinese don't accept. And there's been some tension between the two countries on that front. So the question is, if you're Indonesia, how can you continue to have good economic relations with China and at the same time tilt slightly towards the United States if the security environment, becomes threatening. And I think their great hope is that the security environment won't become threatening because they don't want to get too close to the United States.

From an American point of view, we have a deep-seated interest in bringing the Indonesians full square into a balancing coalition against China. That's what Americans would like to do. From an Indonesian point of view, you don't want to do this unless it's absolutely necessary because your goal is not to get caught in the middle of this security competition and to continue to trade with China and become rich. The $64,000 question moving forward is how ambitious or aggressive will the Chinese be in the South China Sea? What will the consequences of that Chinese policy be for Indonesia in terms of moving closer to the United States?

So that's sort of the situation that they find themselves in. It's a little like the 60s, the 1960s, when Indonesia had the same decisions to make and Sukarno wanted to keep Indonesia non-aligned. But there were other forces within Indonesia that were very hostile, well, saw China as a threat to Indonesia with the results that we all know from the coup that took place. and the events that took place in the mid-60s. So in a sense, the Indonesians are having to navigate through the same kind of problems, even though the balance, the power balance, is shifting again.

I think, Alexander, your rhetoric about China before, I think neatly describes how the Indonesians think about navigating these tricky waters that they're in. They understand that you have to be very careful what you say, and you want to go to great lengths to do everything you can to dampen the military dimension of any possible conflict in the South China Sea. But again, the question is, can they pull that off? Again, I think you do not want to underestimate what hardball players the Chinese are. I think that most of China's neighbors think that the Chinese are hardball players.

And my view on this is that all great powers are ruthless. And if you're a small power in a neighborhood that's dominated or threatened by another great power, you have to be extremely careful how you negotiate your way through those shark-filled borders. And by the way, this gets back to Ukraine, right? The Ukrainians foolishly did not understand that they were living. next door to Russia, which is a great power, and that they, Ukrainians, had to take into account Russian interests. The idea that you could just poke there in the eye and there would be no consequences because Uncle Sam would be there for you was a remarkably foolish policy.

And again, this is the sort of situation that Ukraine, I mean, that Indonesia is sitting next door to China, which is a really powerful country. And the United States is a possible security ally. But you're dealing with the United States, and you've got to be really careful that you don't get caught in the middle of this security competition between these two guerrillas and get your country wrecked. This seems to be a challenge these days, again, as there's more other centers of power, the country's trying to rebalance themselves, not having to be locked down by one

alliance because what Indonesia is going through now is also something that the Australians aspire to do because I lived in Australia for 14 years and I saw every Prime Minister come and go say the same thing. We don't have to choose. We can our main economic partnership with the Chinese and our main security partnership with America. We don't have to choose. And then as the competition intensifies between the Americans and the Chinese, it turns out they kind of had to. And then they leaned very heavily towards the US for a bit, but then, yeah, they got some consequences, especially economic from the Chinese, and now they're trying to do some course correction and rebalance a little bit in the middle.

But, of course, I very much agree Indonesia is a very different case. I mean, in the 60s, they were less than 100 million now. They're almost 280 million people. This is a, and yeah, this is a force to be reckoned with. But I think the Ukrainians, though, and there are you on the course. They tried to appeal a bit to the Europeans, appeal a bit to the Russians, and play both sides and try to get the best deal. But then, of course, they were told that this would not happen.

You had to pick one. When they tried not to pick, when they said to the EU, we can't really pick, so we're going to go with this Russian deal. That's when they got toppled. So I think that was a balancing position which went bad effectively. But as we're on the topic of Ukraine, how do you see the future now? Both of you actually, because there's a huge new variable in play, isn't there?

We have Donald Trump arguing now he's going to bring peace to Ukraine on day one. He seems to be ambitious towards this end, but I'm not sure how successful he will be. Of course, you need first to put the neutrality issue in place, so the foundation of Istanbul plus the territorial changes. So what the Russians are asking for is a pretty big, it's a very big ask. So what do you see any potential or will it cut off Ukraine? Will he put immense pressure on Russia, threatening to strike Moscow if they don't make a deal? Again, it's a bit of a wild card.

So I was curious what both of you actually thought about how, yeah, Ukraine, what this will mean for Ukraine, the entry of Trump that is. I'll defer to Alexander I mean I don't think that Donald Trump has any plan for Ukraine I think his instinct is that he doesn't want to become further involved in what I suspect he does understand is an emerging debacle there and I think he's got some people around him

who are advising him that way I think he's got his vice president and I think he's got a few other people who are telling him, look, Ukraine hasn't turned out well. Whatever it was that the previous administration thought it was doing in Ukraine clearly hasn't worked. We've got other much more serious and important things to worry about in China, in the Middle East, domestically in the United States. So let's see whether we can perhaps reestablish some kind of contact with the Russians and see whether we can limit the damage. And at the same time, let's try and scale down as far as we can from Ukraine

and tell the Europeans, look, if you want to continue with this, it's up to you and tell the Ukrainians, look, if you want to negotiate, we're all in favor. But if you want to continue the war, well, there's not very much we can do. beyond what has already been done and don't have too high expectations of us. So I think that is what the Trump people are heading towards. I don't think there's going to be a Trump master plan to solve the problem. I think if there is, there's night follows day the Russians will reject it, and probably the Ukrainians will too.

I agree with Alexander. Trump talks about settling this, implying it's easy to do. I think it's almost impossible to do. Putin has made it clear there are two conditions that have to be accepted before he will even agree to negotiate, to seriously negotiate. One is that Ukraine has to be genuinely neutral, can't be in NATO, can't be any security relationship between the West and Ukraine. And number two, the West and Ukraine have to accept that those four Oblast plus Crimea are permanently Russian territory. So Trump has to accept that just to get negotiations going. I find it hard to imagine Trump accepting that.

It's just not likely. And if anything, there'll be lots of hot rhetoric out of the administration because there are all these hawks that have been appointed. to key positions like National Security Advisor and Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense. And that will just give Putin an added incentive to take more territory and make sure that Ukraine is truly a dysfunctional rump state that can never become part of NATO. So I think this one's going to be settled on the battlefield. And I think the only interesting question is when will the Ukrainians break? and how much territory will the Russians end up taking?

And the end result is you will then get a frozen conflict. And that will lead to unending trouble for long past, for the foreseeable future. But surely, I thought, because I watched this interview, I think was yesterday with Marco Rubio, now he will be Secretary of State. We're arguing, listen, I don't like to say it, but he said we're financing a stalemate. I think this is obviously incorrect. The stalemate is, there was a stalemate, not in terms of attrition rates, but the stalemate in terms of the front lines are not moving,

but once, now that we see the Ukrainian army becoming exhausted and these frontlines collapsing, I think there's a huge amount of loss of territory, and I think this is why it becomes, well, overall, it's not in the interest anymore of NATO. I think as, you know, as Zelensky once argued back, in March of 2022, you know, a lot of Western countries would like to exhaust, would like a long war because they can exhaust the Russians, even though it means the destruction of Ukraine.

Now, I think this is what we're going for. This is what made it a good war, if you will, for NATO. We got to bleed the Russians without as long as there was a stalemate or no territorial changes, no big ones. But now that the Ukrainians have been completely exhausted and the territory begins to fall at the increasing rate, I would say, because there's some huge changes undergoing now. And it seems that with every collapse in Ukraine, the Russians are able to encircle even larger groups, and it has this cascading effect. So as long as the Ukrainians and the Russians were just killing each other and the frontlines not moving, I think it was considered a good war.

But now that the territory is being lost to the Russians, one would assume there would be an actual national interest in pushing for stopping this. But it looks like the main ideas coming out from the West is still another Minsk. We'll just freeze the front lines. We won't accept the territorial changes, but you can hold it temporary while we armed the Ukrainians to the teeth again and fight you another day. And it seems this is something that Trump might be leaning to us as well.

But it's just hard to see why the Russians could possibly accept this after suffering so much in order to finally get their victory, they're disclosed to victory, and now they're going to do another Minsk agreement. It seems preposterous. It's not going to happen. I agree completely. I mean, there's no question that Trump has lost interest in funding the Ukrainians.

And even if he withdraws meaningful support to the Ukrainians, that just means the Ukrainians are going to lose, and you're going to get a frozen conflict. The question is, can you get a meaningful peace agreement? I mean, these are the two alternatives moving forward. A meaningful peace agreement or a frozen conflict. You can't get a meaningful peace agreement unless you accept that Russia has annexed these territories and is allowed to keep them.

And unless you agree, Ukraine will be a really neutral state. And I find it hard to imagine us and the Ukrainians agreeing to that. And therefore, I think you're going to get a frozen conflict. And that's going to have the potential to blow up in our face somewhere down the road. I think that's exactly right. I don't think there's any political acceptance in the United States of the kind of conditions, which are the minimum conditions that the Russians would accept. It is as simple as that.

I don't think even Donald Trump is prepared to go foreign. far enough in that way to deliver that kind of peace. And the Europeans also. So I just don't see any diplomatic way out to this. I think what's going to happen is the Americans are going to put some pressure on the Ukrainians to sit down and talk to the Russians. Those talks may occur or they may not. They're not going to result in any outcome. the Russians will continue to move forward.

They're completely cynical by this point about anything that the West proposes. They no longer believe in it. And the outcome of the war will be determined on the battlefield and it will be the Russians who decide where they stop. Now, what could happen and it will be very, very difficult to do indeed is for the Americans and the Russians to start talking to each other,

perhaps to some extent about the kind of limits about what they might do in Europe and perhaps about other things, the Middle East, strategic weapons, that sort of thing, at a very basic level for a while. But there might be some kind of a resumption of dialogue on that kind. But certainly I can't see a negotiation about the settlement of the crisis in Ukraine. I just think that is politically possible, either on the American side or on the Russian. One side or the other, in order for that to happen, would have to make concessions which are politically unacceptable, and indeed so unacceptable as to be inconceivable.

I think I agree completely with that. I also think an interesting question is whether there's a possibility that the Ukrainians will, effectively collapse before Trump moves into the White House, or it will happen after Trump moves into the White House. Because from Trump's point of view, it would be best if Ukraine clearly lost the war before he became president. Because if Ukraine collapses after he's president, he will be accused of having lost Ukraine. Right. This is why you see the Democrats doing everything possible, or the Biden administration, doing everything possible to prop up the Ukrainians now, so that between now and January 20th, Ukraine manages to hang on. But this is not going to work

over the long term, especially because the Ukrainians are on the ropes already, as we both know. They are in really deep trouble. And now you have this situation where President Trump has made it clear, President Elect Trump has made it clear that he wants to pull the plug on the Ukrainians. So if you're a Ukrainian soldier, right, you know, your morale is already down in the dumps. The news that Trump has been elected and is going to cut off aid in all meaningful ways in the future can only lead to even greater despair. And one would think this is at some point going to lead to the cracking of the Ukrainian military. It's just hard to believe that they're going to continue fighting when their principal benefactor is bailing out on them.

I agree, but I was curious, though, if territorial settlement is actually required, because the main fault of Minsk was, you know, the front lines were frozen in Donbass back in 2015. But then the West began to pump up, pumping military and build a large, powerful Ukrainian army so they could eventually ignore the Minsk agreement and resolve this on the battlefield. But if NATO and Russia can agree, no NATO, you know, this stops, doesn't go into Ukraine something. You know, Trump doesn't seem to be too closely attached to NATO. If this is something could agree to, then would the Russians really need, then the recognition that these territories would be Russian.

I mean, they don't want to continue this fighting forever. And also, I think in the absence of a deal, I agree, if they think that NATO is going to come in after the war and take over Ukraine, or at least they make it a member state, there's no way, if the option is between a, you know, NATO, Odessa or Russian-Odessa, they will make it definitely a Russian-Desa. But if the option is between, you know, a Ukrainian or Odessa and a neutral-U-Dessa,

Ukraine versus Russia, Nodesa, I think they can make their peace with a possibly neutral one. But I'm just wondering if the recognition of territory, as long as it's controlled by Russia, no one tries to take it back and the West doesn't arm Ukraine or try to bring it into NATO, does it really matter? I'm saying because I just got back from the Valdezai meeting, and I noticed changing moods over the years. Because in 2022, you know, they were very anxious, I felt. They were concerned that, you know, they've been, after Istanbul, they were lured into this war of attrition, which they weren't prepared for and didn't want. By 2023, they had, you know, built up this powerful army and they were, the Ukrainians had, you know, exhausted themselves.

They're counter-offensive. So the Russians were very confident. And now this year, I heard more and more people talking about, you know, how can you win the peace? Because, of course, you know, the Russians can take everything now. You know, NATO does not have more weapons to send the Ukraine. Ukrainians looks like they're the cusp of collapse. However, if they collapse now, and Russia simply takes all the territory from Karkovo to Odessa and, as you say, make a dysfunctional romp state out of the rest, it's going to create a lot of insecurity for Ukrainians. It's going to

make instability for the Russians. They're going to have tensions which can play out anywhere, even Moldova or other places with the Europeans and Americans. It would be good to get a settlement, something where the Americans want to go to Asia. anyways, the Russians have, you know, they would like to focus also on their new friends in Asia. Everyone wants to would like to move on. So it just looks as if, you know, they would be willing to make a peace. That's what I was wondering, is it really necessary, though, to get territorial recognition? Well, I think there is a final deal that could lead to peace. and Russia gets to keep the four Oblast plus Crimea,

Ukraine breaks all security ties with the West to obviously include not being in NATO. And third, which we've not talked about, and this was present in the Istanbul negotiations, is there have to be negotiated limits on the size and power of the Ukrainian military, right? Because the Russians don't want, want a powerful Ukraine that can go on a rampage and take back territory.

I think that if you could work out all three of those elements of the deal, you could have a meaningful peace agreement. I don't think the Ukrainians will accept that deal, and I don't think the West will accept that deal. And that's why I think you're going to get a frozen conflict. I agree. I think that the United States, even Donald Trump, will not compromise on NATO's right to expand. Agree a veto, a Russian veto of NATO expansion.

This has become now such an issue in the West that I think it would be very, very, difficult politically, even for a very strong president indeed to be able to ram through something like that, I think there will be far too much opposition and far too much resistance. And I think Donald Trump, frankly, will want to take that on. I mean, that's my instinct. As of the Russians, their problem is that whatever deal they come to with the United States or think they've come to with the United States and indeed the West about NATO membership of Ukraine. They no longer probably believe or tell themselves that they can have any confidence that it will stick. And that's the problem. Now, it is the problem for the Russians that they haven't really

found a way to win the peace. Now, I think this is true, but that's partly because they haven't formulated a plan yet. I mean, they haven't really come up with any. I don't get this, we've discussed this before. I don't get any sense that the Russians have worked out themselves what it is that they're planning to do or going to do in Ukraine once the war is won. I don't think they've really thought this through at all. And hopefully, at some point, now, it has to be now. they start actually sitting down and thinking about that and thinking exactly what it is that they're going to look to achieve in Ukraine once the war is won.

Do they want a government in Kiev that retains whatever possible independence it has? If that they do set up a government of that kind, you know, it has to have some legitimacy within Ukraine itself in order to be able to function. It needs some degree of international recognition as well. How do the Russians achieve that? How do they affect economic stabilization in Ukraine? Who's going to help them to do that? Because the Russians would struggle to do it by themselves. What are they going to do about the Black Sea and the coast of the Black Sea and the Dessa and all of these places?

I'm just throwing out things. I'm not saying any of this is going to be part of any Russian plan. But these are issues that the Russians need to start thinking about themselves. to now, it's been, first of all, carrying what the West is going to do, you know, since Istanbul fell apart, dealing with the sanctions, dealing with the military problems, winning the war. Now that they're on the brink of doing that, they have to start thinking more seriously about the peace, and they need to start discussing that with themselves. And when they do, then perhaps we can start to see how realistic

these ideas that they might be coming up with really are. Just on your various points, Alexander, I think your point that the Russians can't trust the West to renege on their promise that Ukraine would never become part of NATO is a very important point. I mean, Americans can say today, Ukraine will not become part of NATO. They can sign a piece of paper that says that. But in 10 years, a new president could throw that piece of paper in the garbage and once again say Ukraine will become part of NATO. So if this possibility exists, and you know the Russians think that the West has double crossed them in the past, the Minsk negotiations being the prime example, you therefore have an incentive to take as much Ukraine. territory is possible now when you're on a role, when things are working out. And furthermore,

you have a deep-seated interest to make sure that Ukraine turns into a dysfunctional rum state, a truly dysfunctional rum state. And that means controlling Odessa. So Russians just have very powerful incentives, given what's happened in the past, to take as much as they can. And that will lead to a frozen conflict, not to any meaningful peace agreement. Yeah, someone in Valdaa, someone asked Lavrov about this, you know, how, have you thought about, you know, how to win the peace effectively? You know, along, yeah, some of different words, but this was the question. And he did go on a long, not a rant, but he went on for a very long time about how, you know, you can't trust the West. You know, they tricked us, you know, back in Kiev, back in 2014.

They fooled us for seven years with Minsk. they sabotaged Istanbul so you know there's no it's not worth anything what they promise us so and then he went on you know all the things that the NATO had done but he didn't actually get to the question so this is all fair enough I think we did

double cross the Russians over and over again and but it didn't of course I didn't expect to play all with an open hand they might have had some conversation and not ready to share with the public yet but nonetheless it's I think it's time to start to shift a little bit

what kind of peace they actually want because it just seems like a big overkill in Ukraine in terms of the territory they take and the conditions they pose on the Ukrainians. It could be very, it could impact what happens thereafter. And often when you go through a long, painful war like this, you have a lot of animosity towards the adversary. But it's a good idea to find a way that your defeated opponent feel secure after the war. And, you know, the Ukrainians have suffered greatly in this war. They've been, you know, not just losing so many men, but they lost a lot of territory. They have reasons to want some security guarantees.

Now, the problem is you can't get it from NATO, given that NATO entry expansion is what triggered a security competition and the war to begin with. So it's a very difficult issue to get out of. And I even saw, I think it was in Wall Street Journal. There was an argument about what the peace agreement could look like. So, you know, you're a Korean solution of freezing. the front line, but then, and a commitment from Ukraine not to try to join NATO for 20 years. So it was even made

NATO passive. It's not NATO promises not to expand. It's they can keep the door open. They put the responsibility in Ukraine. So there's a new government in Ukraine tomorrow and say, oh, we want to join anyways. Well, NATO's not breaching anything. So it already looks like we're setting

up a new deal for failure. And even the way that I think was a Czech president who even said the same list. We're going to have to make a peace, you know, you have to give up, you know, accept that you can't get the territories back from Russia, but give it time, you can take it later. So we're already talking about another Minsk effectively.

So it's, it's, but again, Trump might be different, though. We don't know what is willing to do. Because I think also besides spending too much money on Ukraine, I think it's also expressed more, worry more than once that this is pushing the Ukraine, the Russians a bit too close to the Chinese, and also the wider implications of these sanctions that even friends of America, such as India, are now, you know, pulling investments, their assets, other places, you know, they're picking up their, even their physical gold and shipping it back home.

There's a very little trust these days in the Western financial system and, in general, after all this economic coercion, so he might be willing to do some big moves. I'm not sure if you, yeah. I would just say very quickly, the United States is in really deep trouble. We're in deep trouble in the Middle East. There's nothing but unending conflicts, unending trouble for us there. We're deep trouble in East Asia, right? Alexander was talking about the importance of smartly managing the relationship

between the United States and China, which I agree with. But I think when you look at the cast of characters who are moving in Trump administration, smartly managing that conflict will not look like it's. in the cards. We've just discussed, it's hard to see how you can put some sort of meaningful end to the war in Ukraine.

And then we talk about problems the United States has on the home front, the problems, you know, the economic problems that we have, what's happened to America's standing around the world in part because of our support of the genocide, but just because of our heavy

handedness with regard to things like sanctions. We're just at really, really deep Trump. And Trump's opinion is not, you know, he's not a real sophisticated Machiavelli, right? He's not the kind of person

to use all the power that he now has in smart ways to solve a handful of these problems. I think he's careless and not very thoughtful, and he's employed a number of lieutenants who do not look like they're going to help him,

and in fact, if anything, are going to hinder him. So I'm very pessimistic about where the United States, and of course, where the West is more generally, heading forward. I agree with that. I mean, just to say, I mean, we haven't even started on the Middle East because the people that he's appointed seem to me to have very, very dangerous ideas about the Middle East, and I can easily see that that could go horribly wrong, fairly quickly and very disastrously for the US as well.

He can do some things. I mean, one thing he can do, and I think it would make a difference, and it would make a difference in the international atmosphere, and it would help a bit with the Russians, is that he could change or do away with some of the sanctions, specifically some of the energy sanctions. I mean, lift this price cap on Russian trade. oil, which has been an absolute disaster and make it possible for energy, for oil and gas,

to be traded more normally again. So we don't have absurd situations where the Europeans are buying Russian oil from India and pretending that it's Indian oil, which is happening all the time, and where oil is traded and it's mixed, you know, you buy Russian oil, you add a 1% of Algerian oil and pretend it's not Russian anymore. I mean, I should say I've got people in the shipping world who I know, I know this sort of thing, is going on all of the time. I think if he did away with that, it would help a little in the economic situation. It might take off some of the sting from the inflation and it would simplify things. And I think the Russians would notice. And it might help things a little. But I agree. Overall,

he doesn't have the sophistication to conduct the kind of very, very sophisticated foreign policy that would be needed to sort of damp out all the fires. And he just recruited a whole lot of people to his administration, who have very, very fixed ideas about certain things, and who, frankly, I mean, don't look very impressive. I mean, they haven't run anything. I mean, you know, people could be television hosts and representatives and the House of Representatives and things of that kind,

but who haven't had the experience and the knowledge to actually conduct the kind of very sophisticated diplomacy that is needed at this time. So I think he's going to walk away from Ukraine because he understands that in his interest. He's not going to come up with any plans. The mess is going to be left as it is. there might be some kind of rudimentary dialogue with the Russians.

The Middle East, probably the situation there is going to get worse, and with the Chinese. I was talking about managing the relationship. I don't think he's going to manage the relationship at all well. That's my interview. Anyway, there we are. All very pessimistic, if I have to say. Yeah, I very much agree.

But I also think that this art of the deal, if you will, is making big business deals. It's not always transferable into. great power of politics in terms of this maximum pressure, because once the deal isn't made, there's more consequences in politics. It's completely wrong. And I said somebody who used to mediate deals in business,

the fundamental thing to understand about diplomacy is that the other side is always there. You have to deal with them all the time. You can, deals are complete, commercial deals, business deals are completely different things. from the way the diplomacy is. Transferring what you think you know about the one to the other is a formula for complete failure.

Exactly. China and Russia aren't going anywhere. So if you don't get the deal you want, you can't simply walk away anymore because then you have a different problem. But I do like his pragmatism, though, the idea that it can actually go to North Korea, you can meet with Putin. These things Western leaders can't do anymore.

Indeed, this is the problem, I think. I think our political leaders been sitting for three years watching this mass killings go on hundreds of thousands dead and they done nothing. They don't even sit down with the Russians, but they take some kind of

pride in it, that this is a sign of virtue that we're not talking to them. So we're doing nothing to prevent this disaster. And this is, again, an expression of virtue. So I do like the fact that Trump at least seems to be divorced from this, that he's capable of speaking with the people

disagree with, you know, what originally diplomacy was all about. But anyways, I think we have exhausted our time. So John, Alexander, any last words? And yes, too bad we didn't talk about the Middle East, by the way. But one very last word, which is that it is good to hear that the Russians are now thinking, or talking to themselves about the fact that we've got to think about how to win the peace. Because I haven't seen anything of that until now. and at least if they're thinking about that

and have an open debate about it and I hope they do have an open debate about it because plans decided entirely in secret can often be horribly wrong maybe something will come of that so that's about the one that is one hopeful thing that I take from what you've heard in Valdei

Glenn even if we haven't yet had any result from it well not so much from the political leadership. So I would have loved to hear that as well, because so far I hear there's no diplomacy with the West. They don't even talk. They have a

and they can't be trusted. Whatever deal they possibly make, you know, we can assume it will be breached, so which means, yeah, the limits, well, what they will be prepared to accept. I know, but if there's a bus, if there's talk even from people who are not at the top

of the leadership about these things, you know, sometimes this sort of filter filters out with. I'd like to think so anyway. John, any last thoughts? I hope that our analysis, which I think is excellent, that's a self-serving statement, of course, I think our excellent analysis, and of course we agree on almost all points,

but I hope we're wrong. Yeah, that's a very good point, actually. I think it's a very good point. Okay. Yeah, that's a good point. Realist pessimist. It's it. We're wrong. Yeah.

Okay. John, Alexander, thank you both so much. I appreciate the time. Thank you. My pleasure. Thank you, Glenn. Thank you, Alexander. As always, it was much fun discussing these thoroughly depressing issues.

Thank you, John.