The Duran Podcast - Can India Become a Global Powerhouse? – MK Bhadrakumar, Alexander Mercouris & Glenn Diesen

Episode Date: March 5, 2025

Can India Become a Global Powerhouse? – MK Bhadrakumar, Alexander Mercouris & Glenn Diesen

Hi everyone and welcome. I am joined here today by Alexander Merakurris. And from India we have the ambassador Badra Kumar, who is, I would call a giant in India's diplomacy. He's got 30 years of diplomatic career. He's been an ambassador and held other positions across the world. So it's a great privilege to have the both of you here today. and discussing how the world is changing and also India's role in this, as we see now especially with this restructuring of relations between the United States and Russia. I guess both the Americans and Russians now are recognizing that the world is becoming more multipolar. And in a multipolar world, India will, yeah, unavoidably be one center of power.

and we see, yeah, Modi get along with Trump, Modi gets along with Putin. So if Russia and the United States can change their relationship, how will this change the world and, yeah, what will be India's position in this? Maybe we start with you, Ambassador Badr Kumar. How do you see the role of India in this new multipolar setting? Thank you, Professor, for giving me this privilege.

This is a very prestigious platform and I feel somewhat intimidated, you know, in the presence of you both because you are such giants, you know, every day you are, you know, coming out with very solid ideas, you know, which is highly stimulating for the intellectuals all over the world. Let me try to contribute as best as I can. Well, coming straight to the point that you made, I would respond this way that when it comes to India, India is a role in the emerging world order, the international system, and its capacity to influence world politics, all that taken into account, I must say that it is not in a unilinear line. You know, you need to take a immediate shot. perspective, which I will begin with that. And then there is a medium and long-term perspective where I would suggest modestly

that much of what you said is holding good because let me first separate that first, you know, in the sense that by virtue of its size, the landmass, its geographical location in Asia, the population, and the dynamism that is apparent in the recent decades in its growth and development. With all the aberrations, a certain degree of political stability in terms of the foundations of the foundations of democratic rule, there is a lot of criticism about it going on. all over the world about what India is turning out to be in the most recent years. But I must qualify that still there is a legitimate claim India can have in the community of democracy.

So now that is these are all very important factors. There are many more, but these are very important factors. important factors when you take the global south so therefore if you take and if you agree with this being multiple world the global south is going to be a certain interact with the world but India has its own style, its own idiom in communicating, it has its limitations in terms of the resources at its disposal to win friends and influence people. But nonetheless, there is a certain degree of appeal. Now, this is going back to the national liberation movements and freedom struggle and all that.

And therefore, when India says something, there is a certain, receptivity to what it is saying in the global south. That alone is a very big factor. You know very well that much of the global south, you know, very disdainfully kept distance from the Western world when they wanted these and please to impose sanctions on Russia following the conflict when the conflict directed in Ukraine. But so you see, Global South has

economic clout is limited, but in sheer numbers and in terms of its presence on the world stage, and it's definitely its capacity to influence the course of events as it develops in the medium-term, long-term, in the world order, these things matter. So, medium and long-term, Professor, let me tell you that, you know, I completely go along with you. But the important thing is today, you know, about what India is doing and how it is impacting the present situation, which is a very dangerous situation, which is a dangerous situation, extremely fluid, not only fluid, but extremely dangerous also. I don't think that, you know, that the processes that have begun, on a slightly digress here, the processes that have begun in reopening the communication channels, the clogged communication channels

between the two superpowers, the United States and Russia, I don't think that it is going very smoothly, you know. Both sides are interested, genuinely interested, and both sides also think, each side also thinks that the other, The other side is interested in reopening this communication links. But look at the visits of Macron and Stamar. It shows that, you know, that this is not the whole story, you know. There is, there are certain ambiguities in the situation which we can discuss in detail separately,

particularly with regard to peace talks as and when they begin. I don't think that they have begun seriously. And what can happen? Then when we look into that, many of these things will fall in place. Today, India's preoccupation is in terms of the fact that it is in a position of disadvantage. It has excellent relations with Russia, a time-tested relationship, and it has equally, I can say, equally trustful relationship with the United States in many ways is there, in the sense that technology transfer has begun to take place, something which India wants to source from the United States. investments are possible defense relationship

all these things are working to India's advantage so it is a relationship which is steadily on an upward curve and it is going and there are no major hiccups you know there a little bit

irritants come like you know one or two things I can probably flag if it really matters or not like what happened in the last year last period of the Biden presidency. But that apart, you know, it's like the compasses set. And not only in the US, the relationship with India is very unique here for the, even in the

United States, because consensus, so the transition for India from one presidency to another, one presidency to another, the transition is always very uncertain as far as the rest of the world is concerned. whatever is settled in the previous, the compass of the previous presidency never is quite applicable when a new president comes in the power. In India, when you take India's case, there is a bipartisan consensus which is a core factor that Democrats, Republicans, despite the polarization, political polarization in the U.S., there is a certain unanimity there, you know, that this is a very important relationship.

It must be faster and India must receive serious attention and so on, which again is all very well from the Indian point of view. So, you see, it's a relationship which India is not willing to look through the present of the big struggle, the gigantic struggle, the momentous struggle, the epical struggle that is playing out on the global struggle. scene in terms of, you know, the neocon, globalists, and, you know, that part of agenda, if you just look through the Indian rhetoric, you would find that, you know, these things don't figure at all there, you know. And India has come up with a doctrine of multi-alignment. Multi-alignment, if you're a little bit cynical, you can say that it is being opportunistic. That is, it will have the best of everything. But at the same time, it will do cherry picking.

You know, that is what it is about. And don't confuse it with strategic autonomy. This is what India is practicing now. in a point. And in today's world, you know, Internet era and all that, you know, everything is out there and open for people to understand. And people do understand that India is probably one of the few countries which is gained from the Ukraine conflict.

Let me be very frank about it, you know. But at the same time, look at what has happened. The oil trade, if you take, the defense trade if you take. You see, Russia is a country, is the only country with a military-industrial complex, which has been instructed by the political leadership to transfer the cutting-age technologies to India. There's no problem for Russians to do that. They do that willingly. The latest one is this fifth-generation stealth fighter, this SU 56, 57, whatever, SOUIJet, you know.

there was an exhibition in Bangalore in the southern city of India. And it's a major exhibition where even F-35 was displayed there. And there, you know, apparently an offer has come from Russia for co-production of this aircraft in India, you know, with India. So this is the extent to which I mean it's the most advanced aircraft in the Russian defense forces. And so you see, this sort of a willingness to transfer technology, all that is there when it comes to Russia. So it's not a relationship that, you know, India can sort of, what can I say, can marginalize for the sake of building the relationship with the United States. But on the other hand, the relationship with China is very troubled. And if it is improving, in fact, one major reason for it is that, you know, that despite the tension,

at the official government to government level, the Indian business and industry, they are very keen on having a relationship with China. And that is because a number of inputs for the Indian industry, for production, manufacturing industry, they have to come from China. We have quite a pharma industry here, pharmaceutical industry, but many of the chemicals and formulations, you know,

are much of it actually are source from China. A typical example, machine tools, all these things are there. So the business is very much interested and business keeps saying that whatever might be the political differences and tensions, the relationship must be improved. But that has its limitations. So in the whole paradigm, entire paradigm when you take, India is compared to, let me say, Saudi Arabia, compared to

Saudi Arabia, and it comes really to my mind because I'm familiar with that country and that part of the world. But if you compare it to Saudi Arabia, India is at a disadvantage. These three powers there. But look at the Saudis, the traditional allies of the United States, and a very strong relationship with

Russia, including at the top level with Putin. And at the same time, a booming relationship with China, where much technology transfer is taking place, military cooperation, and China even played a role in the rapporteur between Iran and Saudi Arabia. So, you know, there are other countries, you know, which are doing much better than India. Let me say that, you know, India's... So the question is this, that is this all India could have done?

I had been consistently writing that the time is running out for India to seriously improve relations with China. But, you know, we, Daga pulled in the ground and said that, you know, that unless this disengagement and those border issues, you know, in the last three, four years, which cropped up, unless they are resolved, no relationship. I never agreed with that, you know, in the sense that, you know, that I had spent something like 13, 14 years simply on Pakistan relationship. I can tell you, much of my career in the service looks to me now today as a wasteland. Because there's nothing creative about it, you know, improving the relations in Pakistan. Mostly what? Crisis management, tensions, round-the-clock tensions, you know, this was, it is. then a slight mistake has the potential to flare up into a major conflict at the border. So, you're all the time, you know, on the razor's edge.

But, you know, what I'm saying is that this relationship with China would have been handled differently. Because when you have problems with this nature with a country, you should have... You should have intensified your interaction with that country. You should have sought out all avenues available to you, to interact with that country, to put your point of view across, and to work on the relationship. When you want to work on the relationship, you must have some content in the relationship.

But if you pull down the shutters and sit there tightly, and I never believe that China is a country which will succumb to pressure, psychological pressure of this kind, you know. Because one of my senior foreign secretaries in the day when I took over as the head of the Pakistan division once told me that at the beginning, in the beginning when I came back from my posting in Pakistan and was taking over the division in the ministry, he told me that I asked him for advice. So he said, you know, that anything that you take on, of course I knew Pakistan very well by that time, but is there anything that you address, firstly, close your eyes. Just think what must be motivating the other side. It is not as if the other side has no compulsions. There are all these compulsions.

And you cannot handle any situation unless you can have a fair idea of what are the intentions on the other side. So you see, the thing is all this requires communication. In Pakistan, for instance, you know, the relationship was most of the time, you know, you know, in the doldrums, you know, like that. But the communication channels we always kept up. But this government has a problem there. It is stopped communicating with Pakistan. And when it came to the border issues with China, it stopped communicating with China. And this particular period, if you do not have communications, who's going to be the looser?

the country which refuses to interact because this is the time where you know that you must interact with all and sundry and this is the time where you know that you should pass your net while because we are moving into multipolarity but nothing of the sort happened so these things are today telling on the Indian position

India's capacity to influence to mould the world order and so therefore you know what India has to now wait is that Putin said, Monday, Putin said in that interview with the editor in Moscow, he said at the end it's an absolutely brilliant interview. Alexander, you analyzed it. You analyzed it that way. But this particular point you missed, you know, he said at the end, you know, that, well, the big crisis that is coming up on the Ukraine side, if you let me, some ellips is necessary.

is about, you know, this food deployment in Ukraine. And when that was, Putin didn't touch on it. And obviously, you know, it was a interview which was very carefully prepared because there's a Western audience and probably Trump himself. So it was a very unusual interview, you know. And I could see that, you know, that Putin made statements, you know, looking across over the horizon on the other side of the world. Now, therefore, this editor asked him,

about this troop deployment things and so on. Then Putin slipped it in that that morning he had a conversation with Xi Jinping. And he said that they discussed this issue with Xi Jinping. And he was not asked about it about China at all, but he brought it in. He took the opportunity. And then he said, you know, that President Xi Jinping informed him that this Friends of Peace grouping within Bricks

is going to have very soon another meeting in New York. You know, this is the, let me qualify here. This is the China, Brazil, South Africa. You know, that axis, India stayed away. Because, you see, this is why I'm saying, I mentioned this point, because this clearly shows India's problem today. So Putin said, you know, that Xi Jinping informed him that this meeting is there today.

And he left it hanging in the air. It's a clearest, it's a very, very clear messaging to the other side. And this was just before Stamas coming there. And the Russians and the Brits, you know, have a very long history of hostility, 17th century. So, you know, they know each and rather well. And so the Russians probably must have taken this visit with the utmost importance because if there is anyone who can pull aside Trump from the present track of communicating with the Russians and so on,

it is only Britain can do it. And I was noticing the body language for the press conference and so on this morning. And I think Stama did a marvelous show. And he must be going back while feeling rather happy about what they have achieved. So, you see, Putin's intention was to probably, in the way I looked at it, was probably to signal that it is not only the Western world, you know, which can deploy troops there. Because if it comes to that, then China also can. Briggs can. So he brought in Briggs. But then he brought in this group, and the problem now even there is going to be this in the scheme of things, India should have been there.

But India is not there. India is not there because Modi himself, during his visit to the United States, he took a position with supposedly neutral position. His remarks were oriented in a certain direction to mark a distance from the Russian interests and Russian position. I thought it was going too far, in my opinion. There was no requirement. We don't need to justify our policies towards another country towards Trump. You know, we don't have to justify it to him. It's quite clear that we are looking after our interests.

And what is the point in therefore mentioning that this is not an era of wars? When I went to Moscow, I also went to Kiev. You know, I mean, who asked about all this? There's no requirement for it. He was marking a distance from Russia. And now the point is Russians give a very long rope to India in these last two years, you know, and would have liked, in fact, you know, India to have expressed itself from what I can see in a forthright rule about this. But none of the Indian commentaries, none of the Indian commentaries at the official level,

ever spoke about the Ukraine conflict except as a conflict. Now, we are all erudite enough to understand that this conflict is only the same. symptom of a much bigger malays and there are root causes behind it and then you're free to trace it back to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the unfinished business of the collapse of the Soviet Union from the Western point of view or you can come down to 2014 and you know look at the coup and say it all started from there or you can go to 1994 and say Bill Clinton began this drama about NATO enlargement. So whatever it be, there is a history behind it. So when you say this

is not an era of wars Russia launched a war. It's a fact. Now, why did it happen? The Indian position just does not get into that at all. Because the point is even Trump, when we look at it with all the good things that he has done in justicing the narrative, he is far from admitting that the United States is primarily responsible for this conflict. Who asked Bill Clinton and Stroke Talbot to open this can of worms on NATO expansion? There was no pressure at all from any quarter at that time. In fact, Russia was willingly playing Boris Hill since Russia a very cooperative role. So, you know, the Americans themselves ought to be blamed for this.

And when Trump says, this is where I say that Trump also is, you know, this began because of NATO and it was mishandled, but that is in a political way in relation to the happenings during the Biden presidency. But this is a old problem. I was in Moscow in the embassy. When the embassy, when the, uh, collapsed took place, the final period of Gorbachev, you know. And, you know, all kinds of things took place at that time. Let's not forget that Margaret Thatcher came to Moscow to plead with Gorbachev to go slow in disbanding Warsaw pact. That Britain is not ready for it. And the same thing, you know, was the French position at that time on the unification of Germany. German question was the residues of it still were there in the 80s, in the West Wing. This is the kind of scenario in which we need to look at the Ukraine conflict.

Otherwise, you know, we are not being fair to ourselves when we opinionate on this conflict. But India never once did that. India has not brought into this question at all of NATO. expansion. China, which has taken a neutral position, has not shied away from it at all. Chinese commentaries openly speak about it. And Chinese commentaries today, Chinese pronouncements openly say that the root causes of the conflict must be addressed. You know, what is, this is, it's euphemistically putting that, you know, that NATO's role, etc., etc. need to be addressed. Without that, they cannot be a settlement.

So, coming back to the point where we began, in the immediate and short term, India has to wait and fill its fingers to see what emerges out of this. And when it emerges out of this, I give it to my S-12 colleagues in the foreign policy establishment. For very, very high level of nationalism exists in that thing of the Indian government even today. I'm very sure that they will look for optimally taking advantage of the situation and they will interpolate the Indian interests on this emerging situation and will derive conclusions out of it, will work on it, and will inform the political leadership that this is how we should go about it, this is where our interests lie.

So it's not going to be the end of the world. But in the immediate and short term, I think India has painted itself in very far. And I have tried to explain, maybe I'm sounding a little harsh, but I am also quite aware of the fact that India has its limitations in the present situation. So therefore, you know, let's not exaggerate the role that India can play today. Now, or that the role that India is playing in. That is all I'm trying to say. Well, thank you very, very much for that.

Before I respond, I just wanted to make one quick observation, which is that I would like to mention your blog, Indian Punchline. I read it whenever you post an article, it's one of the very few places that I go to always, whenever something new appears. And it's one of the places, one of the places where I get my ideas and they shape them and I find it most interesting. I think anybody who is interested in international affairs should go and read your blog whenever anything appears. Just to say that, I would just like to add that as well. Now, thank you for that. Really absolutely fascinating explanation of the strengths

and weaknesses of the Indian position. Now, this is before my time. I wasn't there when it happened. But I heard many, many people talk about this. I remember hearing about this in my childhood, from diplomats, from Greek diplomats, and all kinds of people, about how in the 1950s,

relations between India and China were very good. There was a strong relationship, or at least the peer to be, between Zhou and Lai and Bandit Nairu. And this greatly shaped the international situation at that time it played a critical role in enabling the non-aligned movement, as it then was, to establish itself and to become a force in world affairs. And importantly, it made India more relevant in Washington. The Americans had to take it much more seriously, precisely, because it had this perspective at that time of the relationship with, China and indeed with the Soviet Union being very good and India seemed to be at that time something

of a significant player. Well, then there was the conflict in the 1960s, which we don't need to talk about but which clearly still casts a very, very long shadow. Relations with China ever since have become, to put it mildly, very complicated. They've had their ups and they've had their downs, but they've never really sorted themselves out. We've never gone back to that situation that existed briefly in the 1950s. And is it perhaps the case? And I ask this question because it seems to me also to relate a lot to Indian domestic politics and to the Indian media, which I find difficult to follow, actually.

I mean, the print media, the television media is now becoming different, and you have television stations like Wyon who are not publishing, you know, they're different. But there's always seen to me to be a very strong sort of regionalism about Indian policy that is very, very focused on its own immediate neighbourhood. The conflict with Pakistan is given overriding importance. I wonder whether that has also had an effect on shaping Indian domestic politics. I ask these questions because these are open questions.

I don't know the answers to this, whether to some extent Hindutvah and all of this, which has had a long history in India, but whether it's partly risen to prominence because of the fact that there is this perennial conflict with Pakistan the relationship with China has got mixed up into all of this in some way. And one of the factors that has been holding India back as a result is a narrow focus on local affairs, regional affairs, and above all, a lack of self-confidence. And it's that lack of self-confidence which distinguishes India so much from. China. I've had dealings of people in China. And they have this in overwhelming self-confidence, this absolute sense that they can do anything. They can do anything domestically.

They're able to build railways and do whatever it is because they feel they can. India could do the same, could be doing very similar things. But it doesn't have that sense of exuberant self-confidence that China does. And what is the cause of this? Is this, is it possibly the conflict with Pakistan? Is it a legacy of partition? I ask these are very open questions. It's just that I'm trying to understand why India does punch below its weight in the way that it does at the present time. And what is the, why is it doing so more today? than perhaps it did briefly in the 1950s. Alexander, if you live in India,

certain things will occur to you, which will show you that the realities are to be seen in an entirely different way. I don't think the neighborhood policies, any country takes interest in particular interest in neighborhood, but I don't think that that is a, really the factor here. Most countries, most serious countries made, adjusted themselves to the post-Soviet reality in world politics.

But, you know, from the Indian perspective, when you look at it, the 1990s was a lost decade in that sense. That decade was completely lost because Indian economy. was in a shambles, you know, this old socialist style of growth that was switching over to market economy because that failed to deliver 2%, 3% growth rate and was not coping with the needs of the country or the economy. So there's this transition taking place. And foreign exchange resources were absolutely non-existent. We have to pawn our gold resource in Britain.

And recently only we took out the gold. It's like in a number of countries. India is also heard that the gold is there or not, we really don't even know. So we took away much of it. We brought back, you know, because all kinds of stories are in circulation. But seriously, the collapse of the Soviet Union

unnerved India. And I think it was not justified. It was unnerved India because the relationship with the United States was in a very bad shape at that point. And there was even some kind of a ranker towards India, you know, that it sided with the Soviet Union on X, Y, Z issues. So, you know, the entire focus was on building a relationship with. the United States. And you know the Americans well enough that if you allow them to come into the tent, then they take over the tent. Towards the second half of the 1990s, you would find that the strategic discourse is in the country. We are all geared to this end, how to build the relationship

with the United States, etc., etc. And then alongside on a parallel track, there was also the retreat of, you know, the dull role of the Soviet presence, you know, you could hear the retreat. Boris Helson's early teams, foreign policy team, they had no knowledge of India, no experience with India, and no interest with India. The first foreign minister, I wouldn't mention the name, foreign minister, never even cared to pay a visit to India. You see, they were all.

Western oriented, the Ailsenstein at that time. Which began changing by mid-1990s. But by then, the Americans had moved in a big way. And to be fair, to the Russians, they didn't have the kind of resources at that time to project

themselves in capitals like India, which was not the top priority at that time. Even for Russia, the top priority was the United States. So, the American presence, so much so that one of our strategic writers, you know, who's still around, he wrote a book. And that book was, his title was Crossing the Rubicon.

You know, that was the title of that book. That is clearly metaphorically, that is what took place. We crossed the Rubicon at that time. And then the, then now you find, for instance, you know, I don't even get invited now to the seminar circuit because this is all a close-door thing today. And more many of the think tanks are funded by the Americans. Most of the think tanks are funded by the Americans. And their interaction is primarily with the Americans, not by the neighboring countries.

Sitting in Delhi, I can tell you this, that neighboring countries do not fit up to that extent here. If you look at our newspapers, any little bit happening in the United States is big news. Any small descent from the United States, the prime minister's door gets opened. But, you know, other countries, if you look at it, even with the United States, even with the United States, the prime minister's door gets opened. this Ukraine and so on. Now, look at it last week, for example, the kind of attention that Russia paid to Sadikistan, Putin himself, you know, was so active on that. And I was reading in the press that yesterday, before yesterday, an African leader was there, you know. So, you see, there is a big picture. And you're working on that big picture and nothing gets neglected in that.

And that is really the behavioral pattern of a serious country. But in case of India, it is not happening. So, therefore, you know, if you go for seminars or conferences or everywhere, it's all one type of narrative. Mind you, let me tell you that first two years, almost into the third year, the feeling here was Russia was going to lose in Ukraine. Lock, Stock and Barrel, the narrative was, we lapped up the narratives, our media, we mentioned one media organization. There is a very telling example, that one itself.

You know, the way they lapped up this one, you know, this version of events there. So everything was actually absorbed from the Western media. And I was a lone voice, in fact, at that time in 2022 to say that this is not. a war that Russia can afford to lose. Because you and I know that this war is not between Russia and Ukraine. And that, you know, that this is an existential struggle for Russia. And Russia has gone through this in modern history, you know, all along. And therefore, you know, and moving the kind of reserves, the intellectual resources and the reserves that it has got the Russian nation, I know that, you know, there's no question of Russia being defeated in this struggle.

You know, it will mobilize its resources, its mother Russia, you know, that kind of thing. But the picture here was entirely different. The press was hostile towards Russia. All kinds of, I mean, every morning it is such an irritating thing to see this silly kind of reporting taking place in the Indian media about the war in Ukraine. But since America was involved in the war, it again became a big news in India also immediately. Because whatever American interests are there, Americans there, I'm sure, you know, to some extent they get good briefings in that side also. So the media was poor American, the pink-thansa pro-American,

and the leadership was also pro-American, you know, in India, in the post-Soviet period if you've taken it. You know, even the Indo-Soviet relationship, this problem existed, that the, what made the difference was that the political leadership led, in fact, you know, lit from the front. This conviction that the relationship with the Soviet Union is extremely important for India. I don't think at the political level, that sort of a commitment existed.

Perhaps at the level of Mr. Modi, we had a personal equation, but then it's of a different kind. It is in terms of personal diplomacy. But I don't believe in it. To some extent, you know, it can give an atmospherics to the relationship. The optics look quite exciting. But for enduring relationships, you know, the harmony needs to be worked out, you know, in terms of the concluence of interest and so on.

That never took place, you know, in the post-Soviet period with regard to Russia. so much so that 10 years back, the common refrain in India was this, that Russia is finished. It has no future. Why 10 years, even five years back? Even at the time, you know, when we, there were no awareness of what took place in 2014 in Europe, in the Indian intellectual circles. What really? We all were reading even in the Western press about Victoria Noland,

going in, distributing biscuits or cookies to the, and by the na-in-on to the protesters, this strange fellows, you know, opening fire at the crowd, provoking violence. And all those things, you know, they're all blacked out from the Indian consciousness. So what the place is a very sad thing to happen. When you recollect the 1950s and 60s, India had actually a much greater awareness of the world's situation than today. You are absolutely right in saying that India shrunk and has become simply everything is put in terms of our interests, our interests. and even when it champions and claims that it was a mantle of leadership in the global south, what does it do for the global south?

Russians take positions, Chinese take positions, but India refuses to take positions because it's not an quote-unquote India's interests to voice opinions on issues which do not concern us. This is the kind of thing. Is it the sign of a world power? and India has still not defined, except in terms of its population size and economy and so on, what is its real claim to be a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council? What does it plan to uphold?

And what are its principles? So, you know, when you do not have the courage of contributions, you withdrawing to yourself and you know you keep battling with this kind of things. kind of things, you know, the personal diplomacy at the leadership level and the optics of it being transferred for political gains in the domestic politics in India, that we are a world leader, India's prestige is soaring high, and recently one serious intellectual here, very thoughtful intellectual, wrote a piece in Banu Pratab Mehta. I don't know if you've heard of him. It's a very serious intellectual, you know, very thoughtful intellectual.

He wrote a piece in the Indian Express newspaper that we are living in a fantasy land, you know, imagining that, you know, we are a world power, that we carry a lot of weight in the world around us. And, you know, some of the things you mentioned yourself, India is a stuttering voice in the... He said it's not really so. Nobody gives a damn. And for that to happen, India has to pull itself up and be something else entirely, something else. So that is not happening.

So, you know, in our discussion, we must have a sense of proportions when you place India, you know, situate India in the present-day world situation. It's a small And you know the In a

A paradox here is That you might imagine That the industry lobby In India The corporate lobby Must be so Damn powerful That it must be

You know Taking India in this direction Towards the West Not really like that They are the ones You know Who are probably The strongest

Advocates of Strategic Economy Because the industry has come to a certainty of development that it doesn't want, in fact, you know, this sort of a favoriteism. Now, papers are full of news that Elon Musk is going to be given a fast track. So what about the guys who are already making electric cars in India, you know, and people are buying these electric cars?

And today's newspaper said that, you know, more and though people are buying it and by 2030 or something 30% of the costs would be in a five years time, 30% of all costs would be electric cars. So, none of them is foreign-made. They are all made in India. So the industry is not really enamored of this, that you know, that you should open the dose for the Americans to come in. This is all, in my opinion, therefore, very succinctly put, this is all our own creation, this sort of a parochial you put it regional but I would even go down to say

it's sort of a parochial mindset you know and we have a tunnel vision as a result of that yeah you bring up all of interesting topics the awareness of India the world around it's I guess the lack of

taking position on key issues such as NATO expansion given the huge consequences had and the of course, not falling behind in the rise of great powers in this multilateral system. And of course, the need to improve relations with China. I think this is really at the front and center of what India should be focusing on. But it would also be interesting, of course, to see to what extent India, one of those benefits, of course, is that given that it gets along with everyone,

that it could actually not provide security guarantees, but have a role in observing the peace, hopefully if a peace is negotiated in Ukraine. But, yeah, we're almost out of time. So I wanted to ask Alexander also, and you, Patrick Kumar, if you have any final thoughts, how India could possibly move forward of this? Well, I will be very, very brief, because I have to say, I found this an exceptionally interesting program. And can I just say thank you for that?

I've learned a huge amount today. And I'm going to circulate it to a number of people I know, because I think it's essential that people listen to the points that you've been making, Ambassador. But can I just ask, is perhaps the key to unlocking India's potential as a great power? And can I say this? My own huge sense is that most countries in the world would welcome a bigger role by India. They would want to see India playing a much more active role in the world.

India actually potentially has many friends. But is the key to this improving relations with China? that this is ultimately the single thing that perhaps can help to resolve this issue of parochialism that you mentioned, this single-minded focus on the United States. And what do you think perhaps are the prospects the chances of that? You know, I agree with you 100%. And I've been plugging this line throughout that for India's foreign policy

strategy to be anywhere near optimal because you know I am not I'm not a pro-China man or any such thing I am not advocating anything from an ideological point of view either the point is even if you take interest, national interest, as the lipist test. I believe that, you know, Indian economy's growth trajectory taken into account, the market conditions taken into account, the economic realities in terms of the imperatives for job creation is taken into account. All these across the board,

China is an irreplaceable partner for India. And these three years, three and a half years, we cannot cannot overlook the fact that they were lost years and when so much is happening in the world the fact is in the Chinese commentaries it often comes but in the Indian commentaries I am really

yet to see sporadically once in a way it figures the point is Chinese keeps saying that if the two countries can stand together even while they have differences or disputes stand together on areas where they have shared common interests, it has a multiplier effect internationally.

I am completely in agreement with that. We see occasionally a sign of it when you come to areas like trade and so on. You come to them. But even in trade when you look at it, everything is taking. as Chinese position is taken with an element of suspicion. And of course, the Western powers encourage India to move in that kind of direction. Now, today and yesterday, the Ursula von der Leyen is in Delhi on a visit with all the commissioners of the European Union. I was reading a commentary this morning by the European counterpart of the European.

CFR, Council for Foreign Relations in New York. There is a Brussels-based think tank on the EU side. And you know the argument that they have peddled a commentary on this service, that European Union and India are sailing in the same boat because the United States is undependable. Can I imagine? Now, the point is, I am sure this is the kind of thing that is being told today. Indians.

And this, so, you know, the erudition is lacking, first of all. Erudition is not there. And unless we have an erudition, I really don't have an answer to this, how we can bring about this sort of a proximity between India and China. And if they can work together, both will have advantages. And if they don't work together, Chinese commentators have even said that even China is a loser if, you know, it is not able to carry India along. This is the extent to which the Chinese side have said. So I think Russians have built up and there is a model available

for India in fact, you know, I mean, I was in the Soviet Union, you know, two terms I had. And at that time, and the Chinese negotiator who was discussing the border situation, border issues, a Russia hand, a Soviet hand in the Chinese foreign policy team, came as ambassador to Tashken. And when I was there as ambassador, and we exchanged notes and we were being great friends while in Tashken. And he was telling me, you know, that what a torturous thing it was and how, you know, then suddenly, it's like one fine day the tune changed, you know, with the collapse of the Soviet Union,

or with Gorbachev coming, the tune changed. So, you know, China has its concerns in terms of, you know, where India is going to the United States. Now, look, I'll stop at this point. Briefly, let me tell you, the Trump won and India's first priority is to host a – is to arrange a meeting for Modi with Trump, you know. and move on from there to get Trump to come to India because India is hosting the court. I don't know whether Modi

that is one of Trump's priorities to come to India for a quad summit. You know, you know, the... Cross in the country. So, you know, all these things, you know, I mean, we are on the one track, we're building with China, we are on the other side, you know, we are doing this kind of things and Qad is, in my opinion, is a completely useless affair.

It has no future. Neglecting bricks. Now, Professor mentioned about this, you know, that peacekeeping role in Ukraine coming up. But if it is coming up under the bricks rubric, see, the three countries that are there, India is not one of them. Why couldn't India have been part of it? India, because we're afraid.

Brazil also has a very strong relationship with the United States, but it doesn't mean that it doesn't have an independent stance on Ukraine. So there are very serious problems. It's very worrisome, serious problems. So all I can say is that, you know, that India is... And our latest mantra is this, that, you know, the India and Russia and Ukraine should sort out this issue. You see, what does it mean? You know, it means that they don't know the ABC of the Ukraine conflict.

See, this is where it is. This is the problem. This is a challenge of being the leading state in the non-aligned movement as well, if not taking a position at all, it's going to be more difficult for India to assert its position in the world. But anyways, I want to thank you both of you very much for your time

and, yeah, I found this to be very interesting. Yes, so did I. Very. Thank you, Alexander, I thank you. Thank you very much. I wish you both very well. You are really, you know, very placarious in the... intellectual world in introducing thought processes of weak import in the kind of situation that is developing day to day. And I wish you all success in that and would learn more from you in the coming days. Thank you. Well, thank you for that, sir. And can I just again say, if people can read Indian

punchline, they will learn a huge amount. I do so whenever I read any one of your articles. Again, essential reading for anybody interested in international affairs. Thank you.