The Duran Podcast - China secondary sanctions escalator

Episode Date: April 17, 2025

China secondary sanctions escalator

All right, Alexander, let's talk about the tariff war between the United States and China. And the terror war is escalating. It is escalating and it does look like the tariff war has been taken over by a certain neocan-ish, let's say, faction in the Trump administration. And they are pushing the Trump policy to get harder and harder against China. They're talking about increasing the tariffs to 240% or 25%. I don't know what effect that really has at this point. Why not make it 500%. I don't know.

But we do have reporting from, I believe it's the Wall Street Journal that claims the strategy now from Bessent is to negotiate with 70 countries, and I wouldn't even call it negotiations, to be quite honest, to tell 70 countries that wants some sort of a betrayed deal with the United States, that the tariffs will be reduced or maybe even zeroed out if those countries cut ties with China, cut trade with China. So it does look. like the Trump administration is moving towards a policy, which is very much a blockade against China in isolation, blockade against China. The Wall Street Journal claims that the Trump administration, guys like Bessent, they're doing this in order to gain leverage over China

and bring them to the negotiating table. But when they say something like that, I just think, why not just contact China? You're looking to do all of these things in order to just get them to bilateral talks when China has already signaled, China has signaled this, that they are open to talks. So, I mean, it seems like the messaging is just way off and very confused. And China has actually said that the messaging is very confused. And they don't quite understand what the Trump administration is up to. China did say, by the way, before you give everybody your thoughts, China did say that Trump has not been so aggressive against Xi Jinping and China, but it's been more of the Trump administration that has been very aggressive towards China. So I think that's an interesting

statement from China. Anyway, your thoughts on the trade war? Well, first of all, I should say that I actually accept what the Wall Street Journal article says. I think this is indeed what has happened. I mean, the information we're getting is that after the reciprocal tariffs were imposed, not just on China, but on lots and lots and lots of different countries. And when there were problems in the financial markets, Besson came along to Trump and said, look, we've got to do away with these reciprocal tariffs on all of these other countries. But let's keep them on China. and then let's use the 90 days to negotiate deals with other countries that will then isolate China and force them into negotiations when we can impose basically our own demands upon them.

Now, I think this is true, and I think this is consistent with what we know about Scott Besson. A couple of about two weeks ago, I saw information which appeared on X, by the way, about how way back in 2011, Bessent was already indicating that he was pretty hostile to China from an economic perspective. He thought basically didn't like China. He didn't like it economically. He rejected, apparently, at the Institute where he was working at the time, he rejected a paper that outlined the various strengths and possibilities of the Chinese economy. He was very dismissive of it. He was already indicating a certain hostility to China at that time.

Now, you said that this is confusing. I think we can understand. We can explain the confusion very simply by saying that these tariffs, so-called, against China, that had been imposed on China, they are not actually tariffs anymore. They are sanctions. We've gone from a policy of tariffs of protectionism to a policy of sanctioning China. And the idea is, the rhetoric is, that it is intended to put pressure on China so that China will be forced to the negotiating table, where the United States will be able to negotiate

with China from a position of strength. Now, if you understand these tariffs of sanctions, then does that not already begin to sound familiar? What does the European Union say about its sanctions against Russia? What did the Biden administration say about its sanctions against Russia? Exactly the same thing. Copy and paste. It's copy and paste.

It's exactly the same policy. You impose sanctions, you force the other side into negotiations from a position of strength, and you basically then dictate terms. Now, it has completely spectacularly failed against Russia. But if you remember, I think it was about two years ago, we did a program when we talked about the very first sanctions that had been imposed on some Chinese officials. And we said in that program that the United States is on an escalatory escalator with sanctions against China. And the iron rule of sanctions is when you get onto that escalator, you can't get off.

It takes you all the way up. And it seems to me that's exactly where we are with China. And we now have all of these attempts to try to isolate China from the rest of the world economy. Isn't that exactly what the Biden people, the neocons in the Biden people, tried to do with Russia? All those threats of secondary sanctions or this constant movement towards more and more secondary sanctions against more and more countries to try to isolate. Russia from the world, the global economy. And again, that didn't work with Russia, but it's been tried all over again with China, except you don't call it sanctions. You call it tariffs. So you say to countries around the world, if you don't agree with us about China, if you don't take steps with us

to isolate China, we will tariff you. That sounds to me exactly like the same point. policy of secondary sanctions that's been applied against Russia all over again. And it shouldn't surprise us because it's quite obvious to me that there is indeed a very powerful neocon faction within the Trump administration. This has allied itself with some sections of the MAGA movement that don't like China. for reasons I can understand, by the way. I mean, I understand why people from industrial regions in the United States who've seen their industries close and who struggle against Chinese competition

might have a particular animus against China. But to repeat again, this is not a protectionist industrial policy anymore. Now, when you understand that, everything else it seems to me, becomes clear. And it also becomes clear why you get brief cutouts of tariffs, just as with Russian sanctions, they allowed themselves to trade in certain types of goods from Russia, oil, LNG, for a certain point in time, though the pressure to go on imposing more and more sanctions on trading those goods was always there. So, you know, oil, for example, initially was not affected by the original sanctions

that were imposed in February 2022. And then we got the oil price gap. And then we've got more oil restrictions in the United States. And then eventually in Europe as well and all of that. And we see the same with certain types of Chinese. goods, which are needed in the US markets. So you lift tariffs on certain types of electronic goods. But ultimately, you're making it pretty clear that your ultimate intention is to slap tariffs on those as well. What you're trying to do in the meantime is either localised production or try to find

some means round and eventually the pressure will grow. So we've gone. from an economic policy, which is one I can understand and relate to, to a geopolitical policy, which is not very different from some of the geopolitical policies that we have seen in the past. And I have to say I'm concerned about this, and I wonder whether the president himself, Donald Trump, who I think on the contrary is somebody who is a genuine particular, protectionist and believes in protection quite understands what has happened to his policy, that it has been distorted in this kind of way, which ultimately will negate its underlying effectiveness.

Right. You go from a policy of saying you want to re-industrialize, you want to protect American industry. You want fair trade deals, fair trade balances. All understandable. All of it is understandable. How you get there, that's another video. Of course, you have many analysts who all take different approaches as you, how to get there, or if that's even possible, if reindustrialization is even possible anymore.

That's a different topic. The problem that the Trump administration has, and I agree with you, is that, you that They started off with protecting U.S. industry, reindustrialization, fair trade deals, and now it's drifted towards sanctions against China. With Russia, they started, provoked a proxy war, and then the sanctions came with the goal of regime change in Russia. That was the goal, remove Putin. So you start the proxy war, then you pile on 60,000 plus sanctions on Russia. You hope for the Putin government to collapse, and all is good if you're the collective West. That was the thinking.

What's the end goal with China? You're starting off, you start with tariffs. At first you say you're going to impose tariffs, Liberation Day and tariffs. They've morphed into sanctions. You're not trying to get other countries on board secondary sanctions to sanction China. So it's as you say, secondary sanctions. So you're trying to get other countries on board. You don't have a proxy war or a hot war, as you did with Russia.

Is that the next step? And what is the end goal? Is it regime change in China? Because that's not going to happen. Is it something else? Is it trying to put China? in its place to weaken China. What is the end goal in all this? Because Russia, the end goal was, I mean, we called out the end goal after three months. Once the sanctions were put on

Russia, you know, we did many videos, we said, okay, that's the purpose to all of this. To sink the Russian economy and to remove Putin. And Biden said as much. What is the end goal here with China? Let's first of all start with the whole, let's unpack all the points that you make. You're absolutely right. We're not yet involved. in a proxy conflict with China. I absolutely believe now that that is coming. It is only a question of time before we have some kind of a military conflict. And you see this in Taiwan.

The new president there has been making incredibly strong comments about China. He's referred to China as a foreign country, which is an absolute red line for the government in Beijing. So, again, very much as in Ukraine, a completely unnecessary crisis is being provoked. Now, can I just say, here, I want to just say something about Taiwan. It's always presented as a zero-sum game. Do you want Taiwan to fall completely under Beijing's control, or do you want to have Taiwan as an independent state? It seems to me that there was a completely workable compromise that worked very, very well for decades and which the Chinese was showing

no signs of being unhappy with or wanting to change, which is that Taiwan continues to function as in effect a kind of de facto independent state. It maintains all kinds of economic contacts and political contacts at a certain level with pretty much every country in the world. But it does so, if you like, under the fiction, that it is a part of China. Now, the Chinese were perfectly happy with that. They had good economic relations with Taiwan throughout that period. In fact, Taiwan was becoming very active and very heavily involved in the Chinese economy. And this really wasn't an issue. If you go back 10, 15 years, there was simply no issue about Taiwan. But now this whole issue of Taiwan is being increasingly brought up.

There's talk about independence. The new president, who's taken over from the previous pro-independence president, seems even more keen to push forward with this and essentially is talking about independence in a way which is going to provoke Beijing. It's inevitably going to. The Chinese have said this is a red line for them. They're taking military steps to prevent it. And, well, it's difficult to see how if there's going to be a military clash over between China and Taiwan, that the United States is not going to be involved.

Now, people who say that what will then happen will not be a proxy war and that for that reason it's different from, say, Ukraine, should. should go back and read that New York Times article about the war in Ukraine, which we discussed, because ultimately, it's now clear, the war in Ukraine was also not a proxy war. It was a war in which the United States was directly involved on a much bigger scale than it admitted. You're talking about the New York Times article from two weeks ago with the German command center. Exactly. That's what you're referencing. Exactly.

the Wiesbaden Command Center and all that. So, you know, we are drifting into exactly the same scenario, only this time it's difficult to see how the United States will be able to conceal its involvement in the same way that, to a certain extent, it managed to do in Ukraine. So we are heading towards this. Now, so that already is very alarming. But what is the ultimate endgame. Well, one part of the end game, obviously, is to prevent China from becoming an economic rival to the United States, building up alternative economic relationships to those of the United States, superseding the United States as the dominant player in the world economy, all of that. But I think in the end, if you manage to get some of the people who promote this

policy to one side and talk to them one for one, it's quite obvious to me that the ultimate objective, again, is regime change in China. That is what it is all about. If you listen to the rhetoric they use about the Chinese government, about the Communist Party of China, about Xi Xi Jinping in particular, the ultimate end goal is the same. Now, it failed disastrously in Russia. Putin is there, stronger than ever, more popular than ever. I'm sure it's going to fail in exactly the same way in China. But as we've discussed so many times in so many programs, these people don't have a reverse gear. When they start on these policies, they cannot ever give them up and we are on a steady push towards escalation. Now, in terms of Ukraine, Donald Trump has come in

and he's put this to his enormous credit. The one thing he's managed to do with Ukraine is he's brought this whole thing to a stop and shows sign of wanting to reverse it. What I don't think he appreciates is that he is on the same trajectory with China as the Biden people were in Ukraine. I don't think he is fully sold on this policy. And maybe just possibly when he understands that this is where this is going, he will put a stop on it also. But he needs to understand or somebody needs to explain to him that this is exactly where this is going and that that is the objective that ultimately these people are aiming for.

It is the only logical end point for their policies, if their policies were ever to be successful, which of course they cannot be. Bloomberg is saying Chinese officials are confused by conflicting signals from Washington, while Trump's tone on Chinese president Xi Jinping has been moderate, hawkish comments from other high-ranking White House officials have conflicted. Without a clear and consistent U.S. position, China sees little value in engagement. It's basically China saying, look, we're okay if we sit down with you and we talk about a managed, controlled divorce. A decoupling, whatever you want to call it, a soft landing. Let's go our separate ways, but let's manage it. Yes. And then we can completely, you know, be separate.

Maybe a little trade here and there, but we're fine with it. But let's manage this thing. And it seems as if the Chinese realize that Trump has one vision of where he wanted to go, which was, as you stated, protecting U.S. industry, reindustrialization, et cetera. But they also seem to understand that hawkish, that's the word that they use, hawkish force, inside the administration have taken over. And now this thing is going in a completely different direction. Correct.

Yeah. Is there someone in the Trump administration that also understands this? If the Chinese understand this, you've got to imagine that there are people in the Trump administration who understand this, and they can bring Trump, the president, back into focus of where you want to go with Liberation Day. Yes. Well, exactly. I mean, I think they're all very.

intelligent people in the Trump administration. That's the first thing to say. I think that over time, they will begin to understand this. And I'm hoping that we will eventually see the brakes being put on. Can I just repeat again? If this is a policy for rebuilding American industry and using protection to do it, then that is a worthy objective. And I am. not somebody who is in principle opposed to the use of tariffs. I can understand the point about what that kind of protectionism is all about. But notice some of the rhetoric that is being now used. It's about stopping Chinese predatory economic policies, not just against the United States, but all other countries. They're talking about. They're talking about,

in other words, blocking Chinese trade with everybody, which makes it clearly a geopolitical project. Now, it's not going to work. It cannot work. Far too many countries rely upon depend on China now for their trade. And anyway, I'm not even sure that this is put aside any, you know, the morals of this policy. I'm sorry, whether it's workable as a policy economically, which I don't think it is. I'm not sure that it's even a, you know, ethical policy, frankly, imposing an economic blockade of this kind against one particular country in this kind of way.

But, all right, leave that aside. The focus should be on the United States itself. By all means, have tariffs. If that's what you think is going to work, you can have 10% flat tariffs and you can put in stronger tariffs to protect particular industries, as has already happened, with automobiles, with coal, with steel, with aluminium, whatever, whatever you think needs particular protection, you can have tariffs which apply against all trading countries to protect American industry. You can develop a program to develop American industry behind those tariff barriers,

exactly as was the case in the 19th century. That is a policy. It may not be one that most economists would agree with, but it is a policy and it has an objective. And I'm not myself going to come and simply say it's going to fail before it's tried. But... And China can't object to that because... China cannot object to it. It's the US's sovereign right to do these things.

To do these things. Exactly. Well, you can... they will say the World Trade Organization. But who pays any attention to that anymore? To say it bluntly. But it is a policy. China cannot object to it. But don't try in that case to interfere with China's trade with other countries as well.

And the United States is every... All of the things are in place to enable the United States to rebuild its industrial economy that way. It has a massive consumer market, still the biggest in the world, even though it's now only 30% of world demand. But that is still enormous demand. There is huge demand for goods in the United States. You can rebuild America, the industries of the world.

of America in that sort of way. But the risk you run, if you convert this into an economic war, is that you will lose your focus on that. You will stop thinking about the people in the industrial towns and coal mines in Pennsylvania, in all of the other industrial places of the United States. Because you will become drawn into a long drawn-out economic, war, which will then become a geopolitical war and perhaps ultimately a military struggle with China, the most powerful adversary you have ever taken on since the end of the Second World War. And in the meantime, all of those places in the United States, which you set out to try and help, will just continue to rot because you're going to have to win over friends

to around the world. You're going to look for allies. to help you fight this geopolitical struggle with China. And how are you going to do that? Well, Scott Bessent is already indicating the way you're going to do it. You're going to cut trade deals, which are going to be favorable to those friends. And they will then take advantage of that to export their goods into the United States. So instead of being faced with Chinese imports, you're going to have imports. from Europe, from Mexico, from wherever, South Korea, Thailand, whatever country.

I mean, I'm not saying any particular country. Well, you're going to lose focus on reindustrialization at the United States. You're going to sacrifice the American economy again to the pursuit of this geopolitical struggle. So it is ultimately self-defeating. Yeah. I agree. Spheres of influence, end globalism.

He ended globalism. Trump ended globalism in a way, reindustrialized the United States. Stay focused. Stay focused on these things. The minute it becomes a geopolitical project, it turns into a disaster. It really does remind me of the European Union in a way as well. You know, the European Union started out very good. Movement of labor, movement of capital.

and an economic union, all is good for the benefit of the member states of the EU and it turned into a geopolitical freaking nightmare. Yeah, exactly. And that's what could happen with all of this in the United States. They need to stop pursuing these geopolitical initiatives. It doesn't do anyone any good, especially the American people. It doesn't do the American people any good. It did absolutely.

I would, the starting point for any policy of protectionism, I would say, is to go back to the president, the American, who for me remains by far the greatest American president, who actually, in many respects, initiated the program of protectionism,

who is Lincoln. Most people have shown very little interest in Lincoln's economic, policies in the 1860s, but he was the person who basically launched the United States on the program of protection and who created the framework for the industrialization of America and for the agricultural development of America as well. Anyway, go to his last speech, his last public speech, his second inaugural address, which the last passage, which starts with the words, he's the last speech, which starts with the words,

you know, with malice towards none, with charity for all. But it ends with the words that America would seek a just and lasting peace with ourselves and all nations. And that ought to be the policy. That was what Lincoln understood. If you're going to develop the United States, you need peace. You don't look for enemies all over the place. There were many people in the United States at that time who were looking for enemies. And by the way, Britain was the country that they were talking about at that time.

Lincoln said, forget all about that. We impose protection. We defend American industry. We build it up. And we can engage in a massive program of industrialization and economic development. And administrations that followed pursued his policies. and the result was that the United States became the economic colossus that it was by the beginning of the 20th century. That is where a policy of protectionism should begin.

A just and lasting peace with ourselves and all nations. All right. We will end the video there. The durand.com. We are on Rumble Odyssey, pitch, Telegram, Rockfinite, and X. go to the Duran Shop pick up some merch. The link is in the description box down below. Take care.