The Duran Podcast - Desperate Escalations in Middle East & Ukraine - Alastair Crooke, Alexander Mercouris & Glenn Diesen

Episode Date: December 1, 2024

Desperate Escalations in Middle East & Ukraine - Alastair Crooke, Alexander Mercouris & Glenn Diesen

Hi everyone and welcome. I'm Glenn Dyson and I'm joined today by Alexander Mercuris and Alistair Kruk, everyone's favorite British diplomat and analyst on the Middle East. So we're releasing some very extreme escalations now in Ukraine. NATO's appeared to cross new red lines, but we also said that Russia has new several ways of retaliating such as the Origenic missile. But I thought we could first start by addressing the changing situation in the Middle East and perhaps we could start with you Alistair in terms

of what is happening. Can you tell us about Israel's war now with its neighbors? The ceasefire with Lebanon will it hold and I guess we can also address Netanyahu's position within Israel but perhaps beginning with the actual war.

And perhaps also this attack on a leopard. Yes, okay. First of all, I would say, you know, this is a long walk. So what we're seeing at the moment is basically shape-shifting. It's just changing its shape, and it's moving from here to there, and may move back again, or it moves somewhere quite different. It's not, I don't think we're coming to anywhere near the end anyway for someone.

Well, ahead. So, yes, first of all, there is the SISFAR in Lebanon, which I suppose is the first thing that everyone sort of starts from at this point. The SISFAR seems to be working so far, unless there's been sort of breaking news, but seems to be okay. But it's not, it's a truce, not a SESPAR. And I think that for the moment that is sufficient, I think what are the reasons for the SISFAR? I mean, I think there are several from the Israeli point of view.

I think a principal one is really that their military force is overstretched, is tired, I mean, more than tired, exhausted. But they're operating about 20% below the level of manpower they need to fulfill the current orders that they have. If you like, the military requirements placed on the army. They're only about 80%. And there is a big drop-off in reservists who are turning up for duty and who are willing to serve at this point. Some of them have become alienated and have dropped out. And so they haven't been fighting, for example, in Lebanon. The reservists, they pulled them out.

And the Golani, which is the main brigade up there, has suffered huge casualties. So I think it's one element of it is casualties, heavy casualties in Lebanon, very heavy casualties in Lebanon. More injuries perhaps than death, but still high casualties, exhaustion, the army becoming quite obstreperous against the government. You'll have seen they had protests against the government when Gallant was sacked. But I think there's another element, which is maybe two elements, which is just important. One is the coalition, because it's becoming increasingly difficult. to justify, particularly even to the religious nationalist, a part of the coalition,

the idea that it's right for one segment of society to suffer huge casualties and deaths to send their sons off to be killed in the sort of secular, more Ashkenazi part of the army, and that the Aredi, the Orthodox, are still exempt. and this was becoming such an issue of the disparity as these casualties rise that one sector of the population was supposed to carry the have their sons die and the other one was completely exempt from it. And this was threatening to bring down the coalition. It was becoming a very great source of friction within the cabinet

and could bring down. So I think a very important element in the decision was to secure the coalition and to stop it failing over this issue of conscription of the Orthodox. Then according to the Hebrew press reading it today, also the Americans were, if you like, holding back certain JDAM munitions. Biden was. And part of the deal for the ceasefire was that these would be released. These additional

weapons that Israel has asked for would be released. I suppose there's also an element, but I don't necessarily think that Netanyahu would do it solely for this reason, but probably also he wanted to

start clearing the decks for Trump. For his main time, which is to persuade Trump to join Israel in a war on Iran. And that's much more important to him even than Lebanon. So I think those are the sort of reasons for it. How long it'll last, where we just have to wait and see. And so, of course, the war sort of comes to a truce in one part and then starts in Syria in another part.

And this is going to be quite a troublesome thing, I believe. What he goes back to is something that Odoin has been saying for, really from the 10th of this month. But he's talked about the war. Sorry, he just got something in my eye. He's talked about the war. Do you want to take some time off to deal with it if you want, Alice, So we are recording, sir. I think it's not really just, we've got it.

We've got the wind up today from because of depression over Athens. Greeks. I know all about depressions in Athens and I also know all about problems with eyes. So there it is. Okay, let's go on. So some days ago, other one was. saying, you know, we're in a new strategic area. Borders are changing.

A land is being taken. People's are being slaughtered in this in preparation for the arrival before the arrival of Trump for the 20th of January. And so Erdogan was saying, we have to do our part. Turkey has to do our part of this. and take advantage of this situation. And we need to have a major military operation. And the major military operation in Idlib is essentially being run by the Turkish intelligence.

And they are using large numbers. They've mobilized a large number from Idlib, from HTS, which was a sort of a sort of a repackaged of al-Qaeda, but was trained both by the Americans and by the Turks. Now, what he's trying to do is he says that he wants to protect Turks, but by taking Syrian and Iraqi land. So he's talking even about having a buffer zone going from, the Mediterranean to Iran, crossing across northern Syria, taking a slice out of northern Syria

and to the northeast and arriving at Iran. Primarily, he says, to stop the Kurds coming in and causing trouble in Turkey. The Kurds, of course, are not in Idlib. but the Turkish population is very sensitive about the prospect that if Syria comes together at some point as a state that there are a lot of potential refugees about to come to Turkey

and the Turkish people are adamant that they don't want them so he is pursuing really a sort of attempt to carve out Idlib to make it a sort of protectorate under Turkish control in Idlib.

I mean, and then to create a buffer zone in the northeast. And Assad is adamant that Syria has to be a single state and that it's not, and he will

not allow this. So, Odoin is doing this. And it's also designed as a sort of secondary, or maybe primary objective as well, now, is to please the Americans and to please Trump coming in. Because he recalls actually Trump stopped him when he tried to make a, I think it was, I can't remember, 20, 2019 or something, when Erdogan wanted to have a larger buffer zone in northeast Syria. he stepped in Trump stepped in and said sent his Pence to stop it

and to tell Odewan he couldn't do it this was at the time I think Trump was thinking of withdrawing all the troops and Erdogan was messing it up but I think he does and I do notice the Turks are also trying to

resurrect their F-35 contract with the Americans, though why an earth they should want to do it? It's such a useless aircraft. I mean, you have to have 55% or only

in service usually at one time. The others are requiring maintenance and work on them to keep them flying. Anyway, he wants to buy them. So a complex thing, and he's going to sell it, of course, to Trump by saying he's cutting the supply lines, the weapons supply lines

of Iran and Hezbollah. And at bottom of it, you know, this is a move against Iran and against Russia in the complicated of Turkish politics in the way, you know, we've heard him being very loud and vociferous about his support for the Palestinian cause and how everyone should support it, and yet the oil still flows from Azerbaijan through the pipelines, Kahan, to Israel. And it's important to survive, I think, 40% of Israeli oil goes through that route. And Erdogan has not raised a finger to stop that or some of the other corridor system going into Israel, even as he's been making these speeches and huge crowds and Turkey

and sounding very nationalist in support of the Palestinians. Two questions. Firstly, about Israel, did they underestimate Hezbollah? I mean, I got very much the impression when they started the campaign against Hezbollah that they thought if they could decapitate the leadership of Hezbollah, kill Nazrallah, kill the man who succeeded him, launch all the pages, all of this, that the whole thing would come collapsing down like a house of cards.

It's not the first time that the Israelis have underestimated their adversary. I've been hearing very contradictory things about the fighting, but it doesn't seem as if they actually even captured a single village in Lebanon, if that is true. That's correct. Did they underestimate Hezbole? Yeah. so that they did well

this is I mean really in a sort of sense it's a cultural thing a white cultural thing I mean for a long time I mean Israel has been convinced and it's a view often shared by America too you know that if you just take out the top person then everything crumbles

and then it's you know leaderless and it just disappears But I was in Lebanon for the 2006 war throughout. And at the end of the, because I was writing about it during it. At the end of it, rather in an unusual way, because they never normally do this, I was taken to the south, and I met the commanders, the Hezbollah military commanders. They never let the military usually talk to anyone.

I've never written that part of it exactly. But I will say this about it. It was astonishing. They were very young. They were 21, something like that, most of the commanders. They were so professional, so well trained. They knew exactly what they were doing. And they had a different sort of concept of,

fighting from the one that we're taught. I asked them, you know, what is the main thing you learn when you, you know, when you're a young officer? And they answered philosophy. And I thought, you know, you never get that from Sandhurst or military college that they studied philosophy. But they do it for the reason of psychology that you need to be able to the philosophical approach allowed you to deal with the, if you like, the exaltation of victory and the depths of depression when things go against you and to maintain a long balance. And so it was about keeping the morale and well established. And the other thing that I asked them was, well, how do you choose your leaders?

What is the quality for that? And, you know, none of the West system of, you know, have you done this course tick a box? Have you done this course tick a box? Have you qualified this? They said, no, we look for people who can spin a magic web over men. That's what we seek. Someone who can draw them in and they will follow even to death. My point, sorry, is not drifting off into 2006, but my point is these were 21 then.

That was about 20 years ago, nearly 20 years ago. They're in their 40s and 50s. Since then, they've had huge experience in Syria and against the jihadists, hard, you know, hand-to-hand fighting. and they're in their prime, much more experience than when they were 21, much more understanding of that sort of war. And the other thing that is important to understand, I mean, of course there was a huge setback.

I mean, you know, people felt it when the whole leadership was killed, unexpectedly like that. And then more of Sapyedin followed on, the air presumptive. So, I mean, there was a time. But first of all, the military wing was never connected to those pages and the walkie-talkies. That was basically for the civilian structures in Hezbollah, that you go into Dahlia, the suburb of Beirut where they're in control.

And, you know, there are police, security, national civil defense, rescue, you know, hospitals, services and all these things. They need pages. They need walkie-talkies. But the military run entirely on fiber optics. And they were deeply aware of the dangers even before 2006 because the senior administration was always trying to cut their communications or to put them under. control of, you know, servers and systems that were mostly under Israeli surveillance. So they then just built their own fiber network. And the other thing is that even then, and that has been a model that has been there and has been

extended to Iran. Even then it was, the aim was that you had self-autonomous units, not so large, but autonomous units. And they were ordered, first of all, to prepare successors, each one of them. And secondly, plans so that they could continue the war for two years, even if all communications cut and the headquarters was totally eliminated. And that they were able to operate by working with the, if you like, their counterparts in the next areas and the next areas in a sort of bottom up, if you like, network structure.

Even though there was no communication from headquarters, they could continue in that basis. So, I mean, you can understand now I'm saying all of this fitted in, and this is why they were able to regroup quickly. And they had been planning and preparing for this for some years how to do it and change their operational mode quite considerably. And yes, I mean, the Israelis got nowhere. I mean, they didn't even get two kilometers into it. They did not reach the Litany. And in some of these cases, they came in, like when they went and sat themselves next to the Irish Unifil grouping, the UN, peacekeepers grouping there. They went in, they brought in the head of Shimbab.

They took photographs of themselves, and then out they went. They weren't going to stay around. So, yes, they did, they underestimated the costs. And even the Golani have been decimated that, really decimated. So ambushes, operations. And just as an anecdote at the end, suddenly, because of what I've told you, it wasn't surprising, but suddenly families are finding that, you know, a group of 17 that they lost contact with and everything and thought might be dead,

have suddenly emerged and they were fine and they've been fighting all along. And they just gone on fighting with no communication. And suddenly the family was, I mean, it's happened several things with suddenly the family finds that all their men are coming home. And they've just been quietly going on fighting

with no communication. Why did Hespa? agreed to a ceasefire. I mean, was it because they never actually wanted this battle in the first place, or did they have some

other reason? Well, it touches on something that I did say to you about having a sort of philosophical view. And, you know, it's a little bit like, if you like, a parallel

to make it understand. would be like the Russians. You know, the Russians are never, I think you probably already said this a number of times in your programs probably. There are Russians, you know, don't care about territory. I mean, if it suits them, you know, they'll retreat. And then, you know, the main thing is what is the main objective? and the main objective for Hezbollah is a long attrition of Israel, not just to have a defeat of the Golani in southern Lebanon.

And just to be clear, because some people say, oh, well, they were in this village or something. The only villages that they really were able to occupy in Lebanon or the ones that the SLA, that was South Lebanon, its army that was an Israeli proxy force that was in Lebanon in 2006, and then all had to flee the country. But there were certain well-known villages, one or two of them on the border, whose sympathy lay with Israel. And the Israelis went into those, you know, of course, meaning. straight for those villages.

But they never got beyond sort of two kilometers into Lebanon. I wanted to ask you what you said about Turkey though. I'm curious, to what extent this becomes is this unproblematic this new disposition they have? Because I

saw a similar comment being made by Said Muhammad Marandi who was pointing out that the Turks didn't, while they spoke very louder, they didn't need anything to support the Palestinians or the Lebanese. Meanwhile, now they're instead, you know, launching this attacks against Syria,

actually weakening Lebanon. So to what extent is this, you mentioned that the public, of course, is very concerned about the Kurds and this. Turkish public. Yeah, Turkish public, sorry. But to the extent is this seen as being problematic, given that they're juggling all these different balls at the same time.

Very problematic. I mean, it's a big force, 15,000 some reports say. Big force with tanks, a whole tank division, all with the latest Western equipment, NATO equipment. You know, this is a highly trained force of considerable size. and it's been taken on by the Russian Air Force and the Syrian Air Force who are bombing them

and they are suffering big casualties but they seem to be the last I heard just before coming onto this program was they were on the outskirts of Aleppo they'd got that far and you know this is a

Erdogan has launched a major operation to disrupt Assad, to take territory and occupy territory, and for the Americans, because the Americans, these groups, the Al-Nusra successor groups, I mean, which this is, is, you know, has been working with the Americans throughout this. So, you know, their second job is to cut the supply lines and to attack. Already one Iranian general has been killed in this process. So as I say, you know, this is really a very disruptive event taking place in this.

And, you know, Russia is bombing them with the Air Force really heavily, as is the Syrian Air Force. And the Syrian Army is engaged, but they are well. equip, they have tanks, they have all the facilities. So we have to see what happens. But one should not estimate this. This is not a sort of little, you know, little gang of, you know, militia just sort of jihadists coming together in a group of 13,000 wrong, something like that.

It's, uh-huh, means business. this jihadist, when only trained an armed by Turkey or United States who are involved in preparing this, I guess, ground force? Yes, they were trained by the, yes, by the Americans and the Turks together. That was during the period when they were working together to try and overthrow Assad. So they were trained and paid for by the United States, mainly. But this is a Turkish intelligence. as I understand from the people in the region who are following it very closely.

So another sort of front is really opening out because Syria and Russia are going to push back hard. The Israelis are talking now about trying to use the Kurds as another front against the northeast in northeast Syria. as another front against Iran and against the axis of resistance. So things are getting, you know, not unexpectedly, wholly unexpectedly, but, you know, when a war widens, it brings in, you know, extraneous conflicts into it, and they sort of mesh in, and they can also mess up lots of things at the same time. perhaps we could discuss the Ukrainian situation because in some ways one almost feels that the two that there is always a uniting thread between

connecting all of these there is we have had a massive crisis we had a decision which came out seemed to come out of nowhere that clearly was being flagged and prepared for a long time to allow american missiles to be to launch american missiles into Russia. We've had this massive Russian reaction with this new missile system, which the Americans seem seems to have caught the Americans completely by surprise. We have all these talk about peace plans. General Kellogg has been appointed. The Russians have launched more strikes. They claim to have destroyed more attack, attack, missiles, missile launches.

I got the sense. I was listening to Putin. He's just been in Astana. He's given a big press conference there. He's made a speech there. He seemed to me to feel that he's got the situation pretty much under control. And the things, the latest events, actually,

from a military perspective, by, you know, enabling him to demonstrate this power he has, this military power, are working to his advantage, if anything. And I also got the sense that he's not in any kind of mood to make any concessions about Ukraine at all. And if the Americans think that, then they're sadly mistaken. What was your sense? Well, I didn't. I can't watch it in Russian like you, but I watched it with translation, his speech.

And I share the view. I think you have not exactly right. I think, you know, the West is trying to downplay the Orasian and saying, oh, you know, it's nothing really. It's not important. It's, you know, it's just sort of puff from Putin. It's not. It completely changes the whole paradigm. Because really, you know, for a long time since George Kanan wrote the long telegram,

the aim has always been to sort of push and push at Russia. With the aim of sort of exacerbating what they believe to be the deal. contradictions, the internal contradictions within the system, and to cause it to implode. And by the way, Atlantic Council now says, we need the George Canaan model for Iran. So the things, you know, these doctrines don't go away. They just sort of stay on and evolve. And the aim has always been to sort of, you know, push, not necessarily to go to all-out war, but to push at Putin as much as possible in order to force him into an all-or-nothing trap.

Either he has to agree to a negotiation which will serve America's interests, the outcome of it will be favorable to the United States, or he has to escalate and to escalate probably, possibly by nuclear. I mean, that was being discussed when I talked to several people in Moscow about that. And, you know, the question was, you know, the funnel for escalation against Western provocation was becoming narrower and narrower towards a sort of, at least, if you like, a small nuclear weapon, a tactical weapon or something like that is a demonstrative. back. And so he was stuck in a certain extent in this sort of trap. And now what's happened is it's been completely inverted because actually now it's America that is in the trap because they can't now put an all or nothing pressure on Putin because he has every ability now to react

to provocations in a way that is going to be really painful for the. the West, even at their home, even in London or in Paris. I mean, not in a civilian way. He will not do that. But, I mean, it's changed the whole paradigm of the whole Western thinking about, you know, the pressure, whether it is Russia. And as you say, do these things go in parallel? Absolutely, it does. And then Iran.

And the greatest problem, I think really, that both Iran and Russia have, is this, you know, that underlying all-American strategy is this simple proposition. We are strong, Russia is weak. Israel is strong. Iran is weak. And even though, you know, the facts on the ground, and if you study, if you study and you look at it, Anyone like you do been looking at Ukraine very closely during this time, you could see what was happening. But it doesn't get through to the intelligence services in a sense, you know, this conviction of superior technology, superior military. The American military is the best in the world.

It isn't, but that's the conviction. and it's deeply held and that it means that people are willing to ignore any data that comes in that says something different. And they just say, no, no, I'm not prepared to believe that. I think that's wrong and they don't take it. And so really, you know, even with all that you can see and you've seen

and what's happening in Ukraine, that Ukraine is quite clearly moving towards in the direction that's favorable to push. to an outcome that will suit Russia, even though that is obvious. You know, even months ago, it wasn't very long ago that we had the, you know, the head of CIA saying, oh, you know, the Russian army is hopeless, it's poorly trained, they don't have equipment, they're running out of them, you know, blah, blah, blah. But the point was they believed it.

You know, they saw that. There was a very interesting, I saw a very interesting article in Israeli press where the former head of military analysis and research, Todd, he's saying, you know, this was the problem about 7th of October. They just, you know, yes, the worst sign something could be coming. And he said, but no, they couldn't accept it because, you know, his staff and his people said, you know, but how am I? know, Israel is strong and they are weak, so it makes no sense that they should do anything and attack us, come and attack us. Similarly, they don't believe Iran and the resistance, really think that Israel can be imploded by attrition. And he said, and you know that even after the 7th of October, when all of our sort of structures of intelligence collapsed and were

lying in the floor broken, still people didn't believe it, wouldn't believe it. And he said, and this was his point, and my point too, it's cultural. You know, it is a cultural thing. And one of the reasons I think for this is because, you know, it's not just, you know, because we've adopted the end of history meme and, you know, liberal peace and that, which we have. But it goes much further back in the sense that we have this teleological view of the unfolding of history, meta-history, that it's all, you know, linear and progressive and heading up to redemption or whatever you want to call it. But this sort of sense of moving in an inevitability was overlaid then by this end of history meme after the collapse of the Soviet Union and then

became sort of embedded in it that, you know, everything is converging on, if you like, a Western liberal vision of the future for everybody. And so, you know, they just, it's very difficult to break it. And that's the great thing about the rationing, is that it's, you know, even people whose conviction remains, you know, I mean, the United States is so strong. I mean, the expenditure on military is equals, you know, the whole world's military expenditure. We've heard all of this. But, I mean, even then they can't get it.

And this is the great danger in Iran, too. I mean, perhaps even more so. Iran has made two demonstrations to show that they have real military capabilities that the West does not attribute to them, that they have real technical capacity, and that they have innovated, just as Russia has innovated, a new weapon that changes the whole. Iran, over 20 years, has innovated a revolution in warfare, a different type of warfare. The West is stuck in the warfare of air dominance, absolute air dominance, and airborne firepower. Masses of bombs, I mean, what we've been seeing in Beirut and elsewhere.

And, you know, 20 years ago they started thinking, well, what do you do about this? How do you match it? And they've come up with the solution of how to deal with it. how to have an air force without having an air force, how to deal with aircraft with different kinds of air defenses. So it's the same thing. And so what Putin has done in a way which might even penetrate into Western linear teleological consciousness, that actually the paradigm has changed in Russia and that it's necessary. And that's one of the reasons that Iran really is still contemplating another attack on Israel

because, you know, I mean, what happened? After the last one where they demonstrated it clearly, you have people like General Jack Peene going on Fox News and saying very loudly, and he said, You know, the Israelis completely knocked out the air defenses. I mean, they damaged the program. Iran just lies naked before us. They are staggeringly vulnerable. I mean, it's pure fiction. Just nonsense.

But, I mean, it's dangerous nonsense because, you know, he's a four-star general and others say the same thing. and, you know, these things just didn't happen. Take, for example, you know, the great pain was all over. Oh, look, Israel knocked out this important research station, nuclear research station at Parchin and set back the whole program. This is imaginary war. I mean, it's equivalence, really, to Colin Powell at the UN at the time of the Iraq. war getting up and saying, this is the proof you need of weapons of mass destruction.

It's just as fictitious. I've known it because, you know, I was involved to a certain extent with this nuclear thing when working for Salon. Hachin has been inspected and re-inspected over 20 years. And I remember 10 years or more ago, you know, the Israelis came and said, oh, we've got these samples of sand. and it looks as if there's unexplained uranium deposits. IEA came in, inspected, found no evidence.

Went away again. Then the Israelis said, look, oh, they've laid a layer of tarmac at Parchin. There must be a secret bunker underneath where the research is still. Back they came again from Vienna, inspected it again. And the truth is that all the sensitive, any sensitive work was removed from Pachin in Khatami's time years ago and put deep in the mountains in the big mountain bunkers where it is. There is nothing except run-of-the-mill standards sort of military, you know, research and things going on for things like anti-tank weapons or something. nothing to do with sensitive things at all.

So all of this is fake. It's this sort of, and we are in this imaginary war. I mean, you know, because Netanyahu says, well, we won in Gaza, and now we've won in Lebanon, and now we need to win in Iran. And my only concern is what happens, you know, if Israel does an imaginary war against, Iran, claiming, you know, bombing the bits, Parchin. They didn't actually hit it with any ballistic missiles at all during the big air attack on it.

Parchin is within visible sight of Tehran, and I know from people who watched it, there were no ballistic, you know, detonations from ballistic missiles at all in Parchant. What we know was two buildings, the Ugal 1 and 2 were damaged, but my belief is that they were damaged by drones. And the same with the Sharroa Center, about 1,000 miles from that border, which is the space center, which was at a time that what they call the fuel mixing. I don't understand entirely, but it's for liquid fuel missiles and so on, mixing centers. And that stopped years ago there too. And there was a witness there who watched what happened. So it was very interesting because his house faces north-south and overlooks Chero.

And he said, you know, I woke up three in the morning and these four flying objects came over. Two were shot down and two landed, not with a great flourish. And he said, what was very strange was they were coming from the law. They weren't coming from Iraq. They weren't coming from Tehran. They were coming from the Caspian. In other words, these were drones, probably fired by the M.E.K. Designed to give the appearance of some sort of attack having been achieved.

Because the ballistic missiles were not, I mean, they were launched some of them, but I mean, mostly they only struck in Target's right on the two provinces adjacent to Iraq. They didn't come within 70 kilometers of Iran. So we're in this time where these narratives and things become more important than facts on the ground. And it's very hard to persuade the West because I think, you know, the sort of linearity in this conviction. deep conviction, which in a sense is eschatological, that the West is on the path and the runway to paradise. And we're all going to follow in that path. It is very much difficult to get it through and what Putin has been trying to do, and why he keeps

coming back and saying, do you want another demonstration? I'm going to give you another demonstration. He's promised one at Lestanar, as you heard. He said, okay, because we've had all, I mean, they didn't stop. They didn't get it, just the same as with Iran. They didn't get it. So what happened was there were several attack camps, many attack camps. He mentioned it.

And fatalities and injuries caused, I think, 23rd, and then later you probably have better memory than me. He said, and they've just continued. So there will be probably they're waiting for him to get back, and then he will order another attack, and he suggests it might be on Kiev or it might be on some other place. I do think that he's not going to play the American game. I don't think he's going to try and escalate it into something much hotter, shall we say. I think he will just keep the same process continuing. He's trying to manage the American psyche as much as the American weapons.

I very much agree that a key problem is that we're becoming too narrative driven, of course, telling the stories, making it more difficult to relate to reality. But on this, I like the way you framed it as an imaginary war. But I think this is also a key problem with Russia. At the source or at heart of it, it seems that it's this, repudiation that the Russians are not fighting an existential war, which is causing a lot of the problems because it results in this miscalculation. For example, the idea that if we just escalate enough, put enough pressure on Russia, then they, again, as you mentioned, we'll

discover this internal contradictions and they will begin to collapse. Indeed, when Arstovich, the former advisor of Zelensky, argued in 2019 that Russia would probably be provoked into invading and then we would defeat him. They seem to go along those calculations. But instead, we see that the security concerns which Putin have been uttering for years seems now to have been validated

as NATO is getting more and more directly involved in attacking Russia. And I think the same applies to the assumption of escalating. That is, if we're not buying into the argument that Russia's fighting war for its survival, then escalation

suggests that the cost will go up, the benefits will go down and the Russians will therefore back down and also putting them in front of this dilemma, either escalate risk war with NATO or capitulate. But again, if they're fighting an existential war, then there is no capitulation. So it also, from this seems that the Orishnik missile, of course, gives them this very powerful third option. But do you see this, again, do you see this among the West? Western elites, do they actually believe in what they're saying, or is it just commitment to promoting a narrative?

Or they don't accept that Russia sees this as a fight for its survival? Two things. I think, first of all, the first answer is because a few days ago just asked, well, it was actually the day before Breschnik was fired, a vice admiral from strategic command that lays out the nuclear plans, you may have seen it. And he came on and he said very clearly, The United States is ready to fight a nuclear engagement with Russia and to win and to emerge victorious sufficiently to be able to fight any other adversaries in a nuclear exchange after winning. I mean, you know, again, is that conviction or is there a... How do they come to that sort of conclusion? I mean, it's obviously they believe that they can do a preemptive strike.

That's the only way to understand what this Vice Admiral Buchanan was saying. I mean, and he's from strategic command and responsible for this planet. I mean, that's the only thing that they absolutely convinced that, you know, America with all its strength and with its power will just come in with its nuclear weapons. and Russia will be finished, and America will have enough weapons left over to take on anybody else after winning. I mean, I just think it is fantasy, again, imagine-imaginary war that they're engaged in. And they say because it gives some, you know, you get promoted for saying things like this, and you, you know, you're taken seriously, and people who say, are you sure, is this right? I mean, get shoved aside and don't get their sort of second star or whatever it is.

So I think that, and I do think, you know, you emphasize it, and I agree with you entirely. You know, these narratives, I mean, narratives have trumped facts on the ground. People are more interested in crafting and curating a narrative of ways. winning than actually winning. I mean, sometimes they're losing, but they're still winning in the narrative. And I just don't think it's a very good way. And Buchanan's comments, by the way, electrified the Russian public. I mean, they said, you know, many of them came from that and said,

you see, they are intent on a nuclear war with us. That proves it. And so, you know, it escalates it, and it escalates the pressure on Putin to be tougher, too. You know, it's interesting because your point about the fact that they find it impossible to conceive that they can fail. Just yesterday, we were talking to Severn Doug DeLen, who is a politician in Germany with Zara Vargnecht's party, which is opposed to all of these things. And I also directly, I said to her, do German political leaders, are they capable of believing? Do they really understand that there is an actual process of deindustrialization underway in Germany? Can they conceive of that?

And I got the impression. She basically said, no, they can't. It's not something that they can generally believe will happen. And if you listened to Robert Harbeck, who is the economics minister of Germany, he says there's no recourse of a concern. Germany continues to be the world's third biggest economy, which is not the third biggest economy anyway. But he is the economics minister, and that is what he says.

And I really do wonder sometimes whether we've reached the point where the military people, the intelligence people, have the courage, anymore to do what they ought to be doing, which is telling their political leaders what the true situation is, whether they've lost the ability to tell truth to power, which is what you are supposed to do. I would have thought if you are in a senior position in the military defense, intelligence, foreign policy, establishment of any country. I just wanted to say this. I was listening to Putin very carefully. He was making a lot of very, very interesting points.

One of which he said was that we in our anxiety, in the anxiety that Russia had to be embraced by the West, we made so many concessions that we basically gave the Soviet Union away. A person who says something like this, it seems to me what he's saying is, we've reached the limit. There are no more concessions. we can make. He spoke at length about Angela Merkel in ways that I've never heard him speak before.

The whole wretched business of the dog, you know, the one that he was supposed to have unleashed on her, which has been explained time again. It's a misunderstanding. And she trotted out the whole story again in the memoir, in her memoir that's just been published. And he was absolutely, he was clearly very angry about that coming up all over again. I don't think he has any belief, any trust in the people he's dealing with in the West anymore. I don't think this is a man who is in any mood to make any concessions at all. And I don't think he feels under any great internal pressure to do that either, actually. And I think this is the other misconception that there is within Russia, you know, a vast number of

of people who want to go back to the way things were and who want peace at any price. I think there may be some such people, but I don't think that they exist in any politically significant way. And they make the same mistake, I think, about Iran. About Iran, I know much less. But I think there is a belief that Iran is also a house of cards. If you knock it really hard if you impose more sanctions on it, interrupt its oil, that it will come tumbling down. And I don't get the sense that's true either. But anyway, your thoughts? Well, going back to the first thing you mentioned about it, you see, I think culturally Putin is able to hear and to notice. We have two things that are really affecting us

in the West, I think. One is this, you know, alignment, the whole of society alignment that has been sort of implemented since Obama's time, where we're all supposed to, you know, go along with the same view. So that if you say something, you know,

to someone, well, I don't think Putin is, oh, you can't say that about Putin. I mean, you can't say this about, you know, Iran. I mean, there is, you know, the West don't bother with empathy at all or trying to hear or listen to do it

because we've got AI. You know, get enough data points and we can understand Iran, we can understand China perfectly. But those regressions that they use to do that smooth out and sort of give you a nice

linear sort of pattern. When life isn't like that. And what it excludes is it excluded the small things that are unexpected, unexplained, but meaningful. And, you know, the most meaningful thing came, you know, for me was sort of listening, watching what was going on on the sort of Israeli airwades when suddenly, in the first wave attack on Iran, there was, the Israelis were saying, oh, the pilots are reporting that they've got, they were 70 kilometers there far away.

We've got lock on, unexplained, unexpected air defense systems of our targetings. And then they scrapped the second wave, which was the one that was going to come in and do the heavy bombing. Now, just that one comment, you know, this is why, you know, I feel that we still go on seeing the world in a sort of Newtonian way as a machine that, you know, you've only got to get to the bottom of the laws and the patterns, and then you can predict everything clearly. And we don't seem to have understood that there have been other developments in physics, like quantum physics and chaos theory, which tells us something very different, that there may not even be such a thing as cause and effect, because everything is intercosality linked by

causes. So, I mean, I do think we have this real, real problem with it. And it's, it's in a funny way, it happens anyway. When we were living in Beirut, I used to take people, Westerns, many of them, to meet with Hezbollah. And I would sit through them meeting and they'd talk and they'd sort of argue with the leaders that they met. And at the end of that they come away and they said, It was strange, he said, X, Y, Z. And I said, but he didn't. Oh, no, I asked the question, are you going to do this? And clearly, you know, that was the reply.

And I said, but did you not hear his story? There was a story attached and allegory. And he answered you in the allegory, not in a yes, no form. he answered you by telling you a story. And I would say, well, the people, you know, the number of people who could actually hear what was said to them by a movement like that were very, very few, very, very few. They were just culturally blocked from being able to hear.

There wasn't, it wasn't that they were, I mean, they didn't approach it. I'm not suggesting they were sort of deliberately doing it, or that they were so hostile that they wanted. It was difficult for them to, it's a failing of empathy to be able to listen and hear and take what people say. And, you know, I know the Supreme Leader does the same thing. You know, he says, have you read a book?

There's this really interesting book. and some Lebanese came and they wanted him to disarm his buller and he gives the story of the end of the I mean cutting it short but I mean the story was about how you know it was a sort of replay of that famous poem about the barbarians

you know Gavafi he's one of your people and he and you know well maybe where have all the barbarians gone? We need those people. They were going to be our saviour in the end.

So he read a little story somewhat like that. That was the end of the discussion. And, you know, there are just different ways of communicating and listening. And we don't do that much. And I think this is a key problem with the Ukraine. Middle East or with the economy, this is, yeah, the narrative issue. I don't think people appreciate how important it is because you really have to buy into the different narratives to be relevant, as you mentioned, also to be promoted or be allowed

even to speak, which is why I also noticed in the Ukraine issue, even if you talk about, you know, the solid evidence that the Ukrainians didn't want to join NATO before 2014, that Istanbul was sabotaged and Nord Stream, you know, the failure of sanctions. I often encounter that people often don't stay, even though they counter with facts which can't be disputed, the main response is often, well, why would you challenge the narrative? Because this is Moscow's narrative, this is ours. So you have to sign up for hours, otherwise you're taking the other side effectively. So we, it seems like we have decoupled a bit from facts, which is probably one of the source of irrationality. But I did just one, yeah, my final question, I guess it was, yeah, the elephant in the room, which is Trump.

because a lot of the issues now happening both with Ukraine and the Middle East, this assumption that the situation will change radically after he's come to power. So let's hold out for another few weeks. But what do you see? How will the coming of Trump influence, both in terms of how the actors will behave before Trump comes into power, and also to what extent do we have any maybe too optimistic about what Trump can actually do once he's in power?

You know, I mean, he's had an incredible effect even before he comes into power. Simply by the way in which he has said very clearly that he just overturned, if you like, the master narrative of the West. The master narrative in terms of, you know, that we are, you know, we are heading towards this, and the West is there to guide you and why did end of history, peaceful, liberal peace, all of this.

He said, you know, no more forever wars, no more. why should I intervene in these countries? I find it hard enough to manage this country, let alone try and take on managing the country like Iran or something. Now, whether he actually does that or implements it, it was like, in a sense, you know, in a stuffy, sultry atmosphere, someone opens a window and fresh air blows in, saying something like that, and said, I'm going to get rid of the, you know, whatever you want to call it,

the interagency, the permanent security state, I'm going to get rid of them too. And people are going to be able to say what they think without getting censored or debanked or lose their jobs. And suddenly, you know, it was the end of an era with a new era still struggling to be born. it isn't ready yet. It's not come out yet, Kazan or anything, but it's struggling to get out and coming.

But he opened this window, and that had a huge effect. And I see the whole, everything is sort of in the process of inverting and changing. And in the region, it's so clear. I mean, how long ago,

a little while ago, you know, the Sunni, Gulf states, were, you know, embraced by Washington. And Iran, which was the great path from the 19th century with the Shah and everything, from that period in 2006, with the deal between Dick Cheney and Prince Bandar, was the attempt to change the whole region in another direction and put the Sunni world on top and demote the Iranian world to being the Shi world to being outlives.

But it's quite difficult to do because overall across the Middle East, it's about 50-50, Shia is Sunni. I mean, it isn't when you start ending, adding in Indonesia and Malaysia, then the balance changes completely in a Sunnis. But the whole swath of that region is Xi. they have great differences with Iran. They're not proxies or puppets of Iran, but nonetheless Iran is the mothership. It is the home of Shias. So you're not, it's, you know,

this is inverting and people are becoming radicalized. And I think whether some months ago, when I was in St. Petersburg, I was talking about it and saying to the Russians then, I thought a counter-revolution was gathering. I don't know whether it would happen or not, but I thought it was gathering in the West. Now, when I come back from London, people were saying, talking to me about an awakening, not just in the Middle East, but in the West too, for different reasons, quite different judgment.

But people are seething in the West and in the Global South about, you know, women and children dying. pictures of children with their limbs off and things like that. I mean, really angry. And it's changing the whole process. Now, I know I'm drifting from your question, which was what called Trump? Will he be able to do this? I think it's going to be very difficult for Trump. I think unless he listens, you know, if he goes in with a sort of, I read art of,

the deal. I know what he does is, you know, he waves a big stick and he gets people in his team who shout loudly, we're going to bomb, bomb you. And then when he plays that for a little while, then he slips in behind and does a deal, you know, after all the loud noises and the sort of clashing and waving of sticks and so on like this. It won't work for diplomacy. It's a maybe okay for business, real estate? I don't know. I'm not in that field. But it won't work. Now, if he listens, actually Putin gave him the answer. Again, it's one of these things about you have, you know, can people pick it up or not. You will remember in that first speech, I'm sure, because I know you listened to that. Putin then said at a point he said, you know, it was a great mistake

to end the intermediate treaty, intermediate missile treaty in 2019. I think America made a mistake. Well, it was Trump who did it at that point. Now, you know, I think Putin is giving him a very clear signal saying, don't come here and tell me what to do with Ukraine and this and that. You come here and you say, now, Mr. Putin, I thought that was very interesting what you said about the intermediate missile system, treating, and about limiting it. Now, what do you have in mind? What are your thoughts about this? And how do you see it going on?

And then afterwards, then, you know, the conversation. might turn to Ukraine, but you don't go in like this. You know, what's your bottom line? Come on, which way let's cut a deal. It's not going to be like that.

But he's given, I think if he was listening, that was a plea. Say to me, that was an interesting comment. Maybe we should explore it. That's all. And then

he'll get there. He won't get there by sending some general, I think, his envoy to beard Putin in his lair or whatever he imagines. So I think it's going to be difficult. And in Iran, more so, because he was the one who murdered Qasem Soleimani. and it still wrinkles deeply or just with the elites but with the people you know he was you know like a football star he was but he was

you know a man of the people and they loved him so he's not going to find it that easy to get over it just to quickly say I completely agree and endorse having been involved in many many commercial negotiations

in my time. Diplomacy is nothing like it. Trump thinks that this is about doing deals, that he is completely mistaken. Diplomacy is about dealing with someone who is always there. I mean, with a deal, you can do a deal and you can move on, and you can find someone else, and you can do more deals all the time. But diplomacy isn't like that. It's about having a constant conversation, coming to agreements, finding ways forward, sometimes managing problems.

It's the culture is completely unlike. If Trump doesn't understand that, then he's potentially going to get himself into lots of trouble. And I agree, by the way. I think the Russians, I think Putin, I mean, it was another very interesting thing that he said was that, you know, I'm, when you ask me, am I prepared to negotiate?

I always am. I have always been there. I've never set preconditions for negotiations. If you want an agreement, well, then I have my clear positions and my terms, and I've already set out what they are. It's quite different. I mean, he's, because one of the, one of the things about the Kellogg report, it was all about saying that the report, the general Kellogg co-drug, it's about trying to push the Russians into agreeing to negotiations. The Russians have never refused to sit down and negotiate.

Again, it's something, again, that in commercial life, you sometimes encounter, that it's sometimes, or in, you know, the legal world, it's sometimes very difficult to get the other sides to acknowledge that there is something to talk about. but negotiations, diplomacy, should be conducted, is conducted, all the time. And I just don't think, as I said, that the Americans, at least this administration,

this coming administration, Trump himself, despite the fact that he's been president already, has fully understood that. So unless you want to make an observation, further observation about that, I really nothing more to say. I think you've answered one. Yes, I just have one thing.

I just have one thing to say. I agree completely. Well, I also agree. Also with this, the comment about opening up the window. I think that might be the greatest contribution by Trump and Vance. Even so speech by J.D. Vance, where he was making the point that over the past years, America has been bullying other countries trying to lecture them, tell them what to do, being while the China's been building roads, infrastructure, who bring people out of poverty.

and this is why we're losing. And for me, this is very crazy to hear because, of course, this makes a lot of sense, but I didn't know we were allowed to say it. And I think we locked ourselves into very ridiculous and dangerous narratives, which has no room

for maneuver. And as Alexander pointed out, this narrative also that we have to pressure the Russians to talking. I find this to be so strange, because for almost three years, it was our politicians now who boycotted diplomacy. He didn't, forget about negotiations, but even sitting down and talking with the adversary, as hundreds of thousands of people dying, nobody wanted to talk.

It is quite strange, and then we say, well, we have to pressure the Russians to sit down, but I even ask Putin about this in Valdane. He was, you know, we didn't close our door to anyone. We are, you know, ready to speak. So it's very strange to me that we keep spinning these narratives, and everyone have to pretend as if it's real. So I like to watch it. about this, the fact that they're allowing now the discourse to open up a bit.

I think this could be very healthy. Anyways, any final comments before we log off? Just a thank, thanks to Alistair for coming on our program again. It's very insightful. And I just wanted to say, Alistair, I think I said to you when we met recently, privately, that when you disclosed your information some weeks ago about the Israeli strike, and the fact that the Israelis was confirming that their aircraft were being tracked, an awful lot of people across the entire media space notice.

It was quite extraordinary to see the effect. Well, I'm glad if a bit of reality permeates sometimes. Thanks again. But it's still a dangerous time. Very dangerous. Anyway. Thank you so much for inviting me. I do actually.

I have enjoyed it. I hope it wasn't to sort of remove from the nitty gritty for your audience. But sometimes it's good to sort of try and dig behind and understand. I was going to say exactly that point. We deal with the nitty gritty all the time. Having somebody who could take an overview is very refreshing for our viewers as well. Thank you very much. Thank you.