The Duran Podcast - Destruction of Syria & Cold Peace in Ukraine - John Mearsheimer, Alexander Mercouris & Glenn Diesen

Episode Date: December 20, 2024

Destruction of Syria & Cold Peace in Ukraine - John Mearsheimer, Alexander Mercouris & Glenn Diesen

Hi, everyone and welcome. My name is Glenn Dyson, and I'm joined today by Alexander Mercurice and Professor John Mearsheimer. So, John, the world has changed a lot in the last month, especially in the Middle East. So the defeat of Syria, obviously has disrupted the regional balance of power. We have a HTS, a terrorist organization, to a large extent now replacing Assad, Turkey invading from the north, Israel invading from the south, while also bombing the so-called liberated Syria. Espol appears to be weakened, also less support for Palestine. The media now, of course, suggests that peace has arrived in Syria, in an overly strange, if not misleading, at least simplistic presentation.

So, yeah, we've been looking forward to speak with you to shed some light on what's been happening. How should we read the current situation with all its complexity? Well, it's a multi-dimensional issue. So if I were to address all the issues at once, it would make me probably about an hour to lay them all out. So I'll just begin to cut in to the issue by raising a few points. I think that if you look at what Syria looked like, before the fall of Assad, it was a hodgepodge of different locations that were occupied by different groups.

It was not a unified country before Assad fell, and it's not a unified country anymore. You want to remember the Americans and the Kurds controlled a huge swath of the eastern part of Syria, before Assad fell, and they're still there. The Turks were involved in the northern part of the country before Assad fell and they're still there. What's changed is that the Israelis now have occupied a reasonably large slice of territory in the south, and it looks like the Turks are going to invade from the north. But there is no prospect of a unified Syria anytime soon. And again, there was not a unified Syria before Assam fell.

And the question you have to ask you is, what is this Syria going to look like moving forward? And I think it's quite stupid that it's going to be chaotic. There's going to be a lot of fighting. There's going to be a lot of killing. and it's not going to be a happy story for the people of Syria. I feel sick to my stomach just sort of looking at what's happening here. Now, the question is, who are the winners and who are the losers? The argument is often made that the Russians are big losers.

I think this is simply not true. I think that the Russians did lose. They were on the losing side, but I don't think it matters that much to them. I think that this was largely a sideshow. And if they leave Syria, they abandoned their two bases, and it's not clear they will, they'll surely go to Libya, where they're already moving military equipment and military forces. So I believe the Russians will continue to maintain their presence in the Middle East. And again, this is largely a side show for them. I think the Iranians are the big losers.

And I think to some extent at this point, Hezbollah is a big loser because there was, southern Syria was a conduit where weapons from Iraq and went through that point. It was like a fool. and that's no longer happening at least at the moment. I think in that sense, Iran was a loser. A lot of people argue that Iran is now more vulnerable than ever. I don't believe that.

I believe that when you talk about the vulnerability of Iran, you're talking about the vulnerability of its nuclear sites. And I don't believe those nuclear sites are more vulnerable than ever. I don't think the Israelis have the capability to take them out by themselves, and it's not clear the Americans do. It's not clear that the Americans and the Israelis together are going to attack Iran in large part because the last thing the United States is another war in Iran. So my bottom line is that Iran is the biggest loser here besides the Syrian people, but it's not that disastrous for Iran. And I think with regard to the Russians, this is not a big loss. It is a loss, but not a big loss.

And then the two winners appear to be Turkey and Israel. It's too early in the game to tell whether they'll really be a mess. It's going to be chaotic. And whether the Turks take advantage of that or whether they get sucked into this vortex remains seen. And by the way, the same thing is true with the Israelis. The Israelis look like they're in the catbird seat because they've now conquered more territory.

But they have to occupy and control that territory, and that will not be easy to do. They're already occupying a large amount of territory that requires huge amounts of, you know, resources and troops to occupy and to control. And furthermore, the conduit, that runs from Rams government Syria

into Lebanon is for sure now closed, but it's not clear that that conduit is going to remain closed forever or that another conduit won't be opened to compensate for the loss of that conduit. So I think at the moment it looks like

Israel and Turkey are the winners and I don't think it's clear that that will remain the case over time. So in a very long-winded way, that's my short answer to your very and excellent question. I would agree with this. I would just add a few things.

Firstly, that Syria as a state is a very constructed thing in the sense that obviously this isn't very ancient, an area of very ancient civilizations. It's an area of very, very long history. But I think I'm right in saying that there has never been a Syrian state controlling all of this territory prior to 1946. So you have all of these different communities that have been brought together. They were largely a product of Westerners drawing lines across Middle Eastern territory. I think Syria did develop a certain identity over that time,

but obviously it can't have been a deep one. And we have many. communities. We have Druze, we have Shia, we have Sunni, we have Alavites, we have Kurds, we have people who speak Turkish in the north, we have Arabs. And even the Arabs, they have also divided, the Sunni Arabs are divided between different communities as well. I think that, I'm going to say, I don't think it is ever going to be put together again, not in the way that it was. I mean, nothing is impossible, but I don't think it's ever going to happen. So what we have at the moment is a vacuum because the state of Syria has collapsed. That's going to almost certainly lead to conflict, very prolonged conflict.

And we have powers, very strong powers around who are occupying and have interests in it. And again, if you come from the Balkans, where I do, you would take the view that where such chaotic situations arise, outside powers that become too deeply involved, risk getting sucked in and might find themselves in conflict with each other. So at the time moment, the Turks and the Israelis, I would say that they're accomplices or even accessories, but they're partners in a kind of division of Syria into spheres of influence. Unless they can navigate this with each other carefully, which they don't seem to be the sort of people who you would expect to be able to do that. That might lead to problems between them. And, of course, occupying powers involved in a chaotic situation like this could find themselves in facing major difficulties with local people, because unless they're prepared to establish straightforward colonial governments,

which would be very problematic in themselves, they have no one who has legitimacy and authority with whom they could work. So the terrorists and the Israelis look at the winners at the moment. But there's that old saying, be careful what you wish for. They probably all wished to see the back of Assad. They've got that wish. Now it seems to me that they're left with the broken pieces of a shattered, nation, which, as I said, will never come back together.

And I think that may, in fact, I'm sure that will in time create many, many more problems for them about the other two powers, a defeat for Iran. I agree with John's perspective on the Russians, a much lesser defeat than the Russians. The big losers at the moment, in my opinion, are the Palestinians because the focus of the world has been diverted away from them. Syria, to whatever degree, was perceived as an ally. It's been removed from the scene. Iran has suffered a blow. Hezbollah has suffered a blow. So the Israelis are in a stronger position with the Palestinians than I think I could have imagined a month ago. But that's my own general assessment of it, very essentially the same as John's.

Let me make two points just sort of building on what Alexander said. I think, by the way, that one of the reasons the Russians are looking like they want to get out of Syria is they understand that it's going to be chaotic and they don't want to stay there and get dragged into the fighting in any meaningful way. You know, as Putin said yesterday at his press conference, whether or not they stay is not determined yet. So they may stay. In fact, I think you can imagine a situation where they stay with a reasonable number of forces in Syria, and they also end up with forces in Libya as well. So they're really in two places instead of one. I'm not saying that's going to happen, but it's a possibility. But the point I'm making,

here is I think the Russians understand that this is a place that's potentially very dangerous for them, and it may make sense just to get out of town. So that's my first point. My second point is you have to think about how the Israelis view Syria. The Israelis do not want a unified Syria. They want chaos in Syria. which is very important to understand that. And the Israelis have gone to great lengths to try to create this situation, and I believe they will go to great lengths to maintain it, which means they'll do everything they can to prevent Syria from forming into a coherent state. To add to that, what's become increasingly clear over the past few years since October 7th, is that Israeli policy in American policy are almost indistinguishable.

It's really quite remarkable. They are just joined at the hip. And almost anything the Israelis want, the Americans give them. The Americans may occasionally say a few words in public that show that they disagree somewhat with what Israel is doing or wants to do. But when the rubber hits the road, we go along with the Israel. Israelis. All of that is to say with regard to Syria, I think we will work hand in hand with the Israelis to make sure that Syria remains chaotic. It remains a series of broken pieces that are not put back

together. So I think there's going to be unending trouble in Syria for the foreseeable future. And I think the Israelis and the Americans will basically welcome that situation. I agree, by the way. But besides weakening adversaries in the region, so you both mentioned Iran and Russia, how does the situation look for the allies? Because the anti-Assad alliance would certainly be weakened by the absence of Assad. So, for example, we see Israel now bombing quite heavily in, Syria. The new government there doesn't appear to take over a strong line against Israel yet.

Well, I guess they've been close. But it also makes the question what's going to happen with the relationship now that both United States and Turkey would like a greater say in the new Syria. And indeed, what is the American position? What will be the role for the Kurds? Even the EU, it looks like it's, again, in a bit strange situation because the EU is taken some flag after, well, backing to a large extent, genocide in Palestine. They have now, you see, the EU will refer to Assad as a regime, but now they're talking about the government in Syria, even though they are recognized internationally as terrorist organization. So it just seems with this new setup, how do you recalibrate this region? How won't this fracture some of these partnerships? You want to say a few words?

Well, I'll just say that following on from what John says, I mean, I don't think there's any particular desire on the part of those people who could make a difference in terms of sorting out problems in this part. of the world to recalibrate the region in that kind of way. I didn't think Israel wants a stable Syria, which might once again revert to some of the policies, similar policies, towards Israel that Syrian governments in the past have followed. So I don't think that there's any desire to rebuild or recalibrate Syria very much. On the Israeli side, I don't think there is very much on the American side.

The Europeans probably are worried about refugee flows, but we have seen that they have extremely little influence. And of course, the Turks have their own agendas to follow in various parts of Syria as well. So I don't think anybody really wants to bring this area together again. I'm going to take a very bitter and cynical view. I think what's going to happen is that people are going to forget about Syria and move on. That's going to be the major story in Europe, just as it was after Libya, just to some extent as it was after Iraq. Nobody talks in Europe very much about Libya today, despite this having been a big issue for a brief time.

There's chaos and there's fighting there. Libya is partitioned, just as Syria is going to. to be. Asa, who was the person that the Europeans always talked about, has gone. Now it can be left to the Israelis and the Turks and whoever's left to take care of it. And I don't think that the Europeans are going to be too concerned. That's, unless, as I said, millions of refugees heading towards Europe, which is possible. Let me just add a couple points in response to your question, Glenn. The first point has to do with the question of whether the Israelis and the Turks who have both basically invaded Syria and are expanding their influence, whether those two countries will fight each other.

You see occasional references to that immediate. I think that's highly unlikely, extremely unlikely. I think the last thing either one of those countries wants is to get into a fight with the other one. It's hard to see how either side would win. But furthermore, if you just look at the geography of Syria, the Israelis are in the south and the Turks are in the north. And I think that they're not going to bump into each other. in any meaningful way. I think the much more interesting question is how the Kurds and the Americans

end up relating to the Turks. The Turks want to go in and destroy the Kurds. And the Americans are allied with the Kurds and they view the Kurds as important allies for dealing with ISIS or the resurgence of ISIS. So I think it's going to be imperative for the Americans and the Turks to work out some sort of modus vivendi in Syria. And how they do that remains to be seen. But it is more likely that you'll have trouble between the Turks and the Americans, I think, than between the Turks and the Israelis.

Yeah, actually... Sorry, Alexander. I'm just going to add one other thing. which is, of course, the other big unanswered question about all of this is, does this process of expanding chaos stop in Syria? The original reason we had a crisis in Syria was because of the collapse of the Iraqi state after the American invasion of Iraq. And that destabilized the situation in Iraq,

and that had repercussions in Syria as well. I'm not saying it was the only reason, but it did play a, significant role as Sunnis in Western Iraq became radicalized and that has an effect, a knock-on effect in Syria. Now, you know, we've had a collapse of a secular government in Syria. Other countries in the region could perhaps be vulnerable. Jordan, we often talk about Jordan, Egypt as well. There's been more. many problems in Egypt. I mean, I'm not an expert in the region.

Maybe these are exaggerated fears. Maybe they're not based on any actual reality. But, you know, when you have a process of state disintegration begin, in a region which, as I said, is perhaps over-dependent on boundaries created by outside powers, the British and the French. once this process gets going, I wonder whether it's easy to say that it's going to stop on the Syrian border, just saying. I was just talking to a friend who was back from Jordan, and he had been at a conference or two in the Middle East. And he was saying to me that the king is in deep trouble in Jordan.

There's a huge amount of dissatisfaction in the body politic, not only because of the economy, but also because of the feeling among the Palestinians, who form a huge chunk of the Jordanian population, that the king has not been doing enough to counter the Israelis and to counter what they're doing to the Palestinians in Gaza. And he was also saying that there's a similar feeling that the government in Egypt is in real trouble. in good part for economic reasons as well. And so you can imagine the governments in both of these countries falling in the not too distant future. I'm not saying that that's going to happen.

I certainly don't have enough knowledge to make any kind of meaningful prediction here. But I was struck by the fact that he, after talking to people in the region, was convinced from listening to these comments by his interlocutors that both of these countries are in real trouble. And it's very important also to emphasize that one of the reasons that both Jordan and Egypt are incapable of putting meaningful pressure on Israel is because they get a tremendous amount of aid from the United States. And the United States is therefore in a position to throttle their economies if they start to get tough with the Israelis. In a very important way, the Americans have bought off the Jordanians and the Egyptians all for the benefit of Israel.

And of course, now you see what's happening in Syria. The Americans played a much larger role than Israel did in bringing down Assad. The Americans played an enormous role. I would argue was the Americans and the Turks who were the tag team that brought down Assad. I don't think the Israelis mattered that much. But again, this is an example of the Americans doing Israel's bidding. If you think about what we've done in Egypt, the United States, what we've done in Jordan, by the way, what we did in Iraq that was heavily influenced by Israeli. Our decision to go into Iraq was heavily influenced by Israeli pressure and the Israel lobby in the United States. And then now we have Syria.

So you see huge influence of Israel on American policy in the region. And of course, that leads to the next question, Iran. What's going to happen there? So there is definitely a reshuffling. And you also see this now with the violence being stepped up. in Syria. I guess a lot of governments can pursue very cold, hard, calculated interest, but as you mentioned, among the public, there will be a greater uproar once you have ignoring basic human rights, for example, from Palestine to Syria. But I did want to ask a bit

about Ukraine, because of course they played a very tiny role, but nonetheless, I think they also had, again, I want to emphasize tiny, but nonetheless, you had some media reporting that they sent drone operators and drones, again, very small significance, but nonetheless,

I'm more curious about their calculations, their interests, because I think in their interest, it would obviously be to create more problems for the Russians in Syria. Indeed, this

was also an American, the US ambassador to, I think to Syria also made this point back in 2015 or 16 that the objective in Syria should be to create a quagmire for the Russians. And I guess this is what would be an interest of Ukrainians as well. But now that Russia is expelled or might be expelled from Syria, how would that effect, would all these weapons, or a lot of it, go to? the theater in Ukraine or would it all go to Libya? Or how would this impact the war in any ways between the Russians and the Ukrainians? This one, yeah, Alexander.

No, no, no, no, go on to. No, you should take it. I'll take a quick. I think what the Ukrainians were. I think it was the Americans. I think the Americans played the key role along with the Turks. Ukraine has very close relations with both Ukraine. Turkey and of course obviously the United States.

I think the Ukrainians chipped in because they wanted to be in on the show to show to their friends in Washington and in Ankara. Well, you know, we're all with you. We can help you in the way that we can. We've got all this skills with drones. We can provide all of these drones and all of this. I think they played an inconsistent. consequential role. We're talking about 20 operators, supposedly, with 150 drones. Now, if you know

anything about the war in Ukraine, you know that these kind of drones only really make a difference if they're used in very, very large quantities. And these were not provided by Ukraine in those kind of quantities because I don't know that Ukraine has those quantities to spare. So I think they went there, they wanted to show again to the Americans, look, we're your loyal friends and we will provide this expertise. But I think the major role in causing Syria to collapse was not the Ukrainians, it was the Americans who obviously, I, and this is my own view, established contacts with all sorts of people up and down Syria within the Syrian government and who made sure that when the collapse came, it came fast and without much resistance.

think that was the real play. Now, about weapons from Syria to Ukraine, I've had various people writing to me about this, including someone who alleges that they know all about it and about the money that the Americans are handing out to it. I would think it extremely unlikely that in the chaotic conditions that we see underway in Syria now, the Americans are going to find many weapons in a usable condition that they can ship to Ukraine. There will be large numbers of small arms and small arms ammunition and that kind of thing in Syria. But that's only going to make the chaotic situation in the country worse. I don't think that can be brought together and shipped to Ukraine and I don't think it's going to make any difference if it is.

Well, no, so I meant more than the Russian weaponry. I'll let me just say again, I I couldn't agree more that the Ukrainian contribution to the fall of Assad is insignificant. I just meant if an objective would be to overstretch the Russians, because for the Russians, of course, they still want to negotiate holding on to this basis. But at least what it seems, that they're shipping out a lot of their equipment to, well, reduce their exposure, be less vulnerable. Instead, things would go south very quickly. I'm just wondering all these fighter jets, all the bombs,

all the resources which were allocated for Syria. Will this strengthen Russia's position in Ukraine or is it just different weaponry, I guess? No, my sense is that it's basically the same weaponry. I mean, we're talking about S-400s here and sophisticated fighters, but the Russians did not allocate large numbers of resources to Syria. I mean, what impresses me most about Putin is that he's kept his eye on the ball, as we like to say in the United States. He understands that winning the war in Ukraine is the number one priority, and that it would be foolish in the extreme to let Syria get in the way of achieving that goal. So, excuse me, so what you see is that Putin has not.

his military operation in Ukraine by sending lots of weaponry to Syria. But furthermore, the Syrian army basically collapsed in 12 days. Putin was in no position to move large numbers of assets from Russia to Syria if he wanted to, because the Syrian army had been hollowed out, and it just fell apart. it. There was nothing he could do. You know, there's this rhetoric in the West that Putin abandoned the Syrians in their great moment of need. This is nonsense. He didn't abandon them. The fact is the Syrian army just collapsed. And there was nothing that Putin could do or the Iranians could do to rescue the situation.

It just was impossible to fix it. But that means that additional assets were not sent from Russia to Syria. And again, I believe they would not have been sent anyway. Putin is not full, right? So it just doesn't matter what's happening in Syria or what has happened in Syria for events in Ukraine. And my final point on this is if you read all the accounts in the newspapers about what's happening to the Russian weaponry in Syria, it appears it's going to Libya. Well, if it's going to Libya and it's not going to Russia axiomatically, that basically tells you the Russians don't need that equipment. They're in fine shape.

So I think the Syrian theater is in very important ways, almost completely divorced. from the Ukraine theater. Well, on Ukraine, as a war of his own, where is this going now? Because, again, since the last time we spoke, there's been huge changes as well. I think it appears that the collapse of Ukraine is intensifying, not just loss of territory as the Russians are steadily moving forward,

but also in terms of casualties, the amount of cauldrons being formed now, almost on a daily basis is quite staggering. We see the more people defecting, more desperate attempts to recruit. Again, the problems keep piling up. How long can this really go on? It seems, again, I would have expected something to begin to crack already on the new year, but they probably can go on for a few more months, but this really appears to be reaching an endpoint, doesn't it? I'll defer to you out.

In military terms, yes. But of course, now we have this complication in that Donald Trump is talking about some kind of negotiations and some kind of talks, and the Russians, for their own reasons,

don't want to appear to slam the door shut on that. So we're going to probably see, even as these events on the battlefronts, which I think you're describing very accurately, play out some kind of negotiation take place. I'm not even sure negotiation is the right way, but some kind of discussion take place in which presumably some attempt is going to be made on the American side to prevent, you know, humpty dumpty falling off the wall and breaking and smashing all over the place.

So I don't quite know how that's going to play out. I get the sense that the Russians are basically completely skeptical about this whole idea of talks. But they don't want to be seen shutting the door. And for that reason, I think that they're going to play along. And they're going to leave it to Zelensky and the Ukrainian government. and those people to basically torpedo the negotiations for them, which I think is what we're likely to see also. So I think you're probably right. We are heading in military terms towards an end game, but end games, if you play chess, can be very complicated and difficult things.

And precisely maybe because we're going towards a military end game, we're seeing sort of a attempts to try to get some kind of diplomatic process far too late in the day underway, even when the point of it, by now, I would have thought from a Russian point of view, has largely gone. Yeah, just to build on what Alexander said, I think that the Russians are very smart to play along with the Trump administration or the incoming Trump administration and make it clear that they're happy to talk. But the question you have to ask yourself is, where are these discussions going to lead? It's quite clear that the Americans would like a ceasefire. And it's also quite clear that the Russians,

for obvious reasons, are not interested in this ceasefire. It would be remarkably foolish when you're winning the war and the adversary represents an existential threat to agree to a ceasefire so that the adversary can rebuild its forces and attack in a more advantageous position down the road. This makes no sense. And Putin is a smart man and I don't believe he's going to agree to a cease fire. What Putin wants is a negotiated settlement. I think he said yesterday in his press conference. that he wants a long-term peace agreement. And that makes eminently good sense for him. And he has made it manifestly clear,

starting on June 14th of this year, that before he will enter negotiations, for the purposes of achieving that long-term peace agreement, the West and Ukraine have to agree to two things. One is they have to recognize the annexation of those four oblasts, plus Crimea by Russia. And furthermore, they have to pledge

that Ukraine will never become a member of NATO, either de jure or de facto. And that's just two conditions that have to be met to get the negotiations going, right? And I find it hard to believe that either the Americans, and certainly the Ukrainians would agree to those two conditions. Anatol Levin has recently written a piece that says that we should not let Ukraine be involved in the negotiations to begin with,

because Anatole, who's a very smart man, understands that the Ukrainians would be a huge roadblock to making any sort of meaningful concessions to Putin. So he wants the Americans or the West more generally to negotiate with Putin and see if he can get the ball rolling, then bring the Ukrainians in. All of this just highlights how difficult, if not impossible, it's going to be to get the Ukrainians to agree to those two conditions that Putin demands be met before they, even start the negotiations.

So this tells me, as I've been argued for a long time, that this one's going to be settled on the battlefield. It's not going to be settled diplomatically. I just don't see how you can do it. I read the article by Levin. I actually thought it was a good point behind this, that the whole idea that we can't negotiate without the Ukrainians at the table. Yeah, I agree that.

I think we should even say. starting negotiations without the Ukrainians, also simply because of them the key objectives, which is a lot of this war doesn't really have all that much to do with Ukraine. If you think about the source of the war, which is this lack of a mutually acceptable European security architecture, this is to a large extent the conflict between NATO and Russia. But this is what I was wondering if the wider discussion before, of course, discussing territorial concessions. obviously you need the Ukrainians but on the issue of

continued NATO expansion as the overarching issue it looks as if there's a historical opportunity here though if Trump doesn't seem that committed to NATO as opposed to the main political class both in the United States and Europe

where there's an ideological commitment that we can't say no to expansionism that this has become a sort of manifestation of the advancement of liberal democracy. But with Trump, if he's able to put this effectively on the table, there will be no more NATO expansion. It looks as if this would be too difficult for the Russians to say no to.

Of course, you also have all the other issues to address. And also, I think it would be very difficult. I saw that in financial times only was it today or yesterday, the EU foreign policy chief. Kayakala, she was warning that we shouldn't pressure Zelensky into any peace talks. I mean, this is, and she herself doesn't think it's in a point to have even diplomacy with Russia, because she doesn't care for their policies and their actions. But this is kind of the main people, the Russians usually would have to negotiate with. But I'm thinking if Trump comes along and he's actually willing to do what it says in terms of possibly taking NATO expansion of the table,

if we can get the Europeans on board somehow, this looks like it could be a, you'll resolve the wider challenge we have in Europe, which is that we reinvent, well, we recreated the Sarosan block politics. I just make a couple quick points on that. I think if Trump was free to do whatever he wanted, he wouldn't put an end to NATO, right?

have no problem saying Ukraine's not going to be a NATO because there wouldn't be any NATO. The problem is that there is huge support for providing security guarantees of one support of one kind of another or another to Ukraine in the West and in the incoming Trump administration. The incoming Trump administration is filled with super hawks. It's filled with people who are deeply infected with russophobia. And we have made this enormous commitment Ukraine over time to completely walk away from it now. I mean, that's what we're talking about, abandoning Ukraine, basically saying to Ukraine, you're on your own. We're not providing security for you.

Trump would do that. Again, I want to make that clear. I believe he would do that. But he's only one person and the President of the United States has limits. I can't imagine what an outcry there would be in the West if he made that decision. Maybe I'm wrong. But I just don't see it happening. I have to say, I agree.

Now, I think if we go back to what the Russians want, I don't think that they expect anything to come out of this negotiation process that we have been hearing about so much over the last few weeks, basically since Trump was elected. But they do want to come to some kind of long-term understanding with the Americans. And the only way that can happen, I think, is for them to create a situation in Ukraine where the whole idea, of Ukraine joining NATO is permanently taken off the table in the sense that there isn't really enough left of Ukraine to make it worthwhile. Nobody has to concede anything because I also have to say, I think that conceding on the principle of NATO expansion or of Ukraine's NATO entry is going to be politically difficult, not just in the United States, in Europe, the Europeans would be horrified

now, if such a thing were to happen. In a kind of a sense, because NATO has expanded so much, Ukraine is the only big place left for NATO to expand too. If the Russians, by winning some kind of conflict there, are able to take that off the table, then they can perhaps at some point move forward. to some kind of general understanding with the Americans about what the boundaries and the red lines are. And we could start to move from this present situation of conflict to one of an easy piece.

And I think the Russians would want that. I think they would prefer a situation where they were talking to the Americans to one where they were not. And that's why they're not slamming the door. I mean, they've got other reasons. They've got reasons that their friends would probably like them to talk to the Americans. They got those sort of read. But I think the underlying one is that they value a dialogue with the United States, primarily for that reason.

The United States is the only country that can basically secure. or Russia's western border, just as the United States is the country which eventually, in some other form, the Russians want to reestablish a connection to, so that they can once again become a full-spectrum geopolitical great power that is able to talk to every country and which is able to conduct trade in whatever form with every country. So this is where I think the Russians are aiming for, but I don't think they see discussions with the Americans at this time as a way towards achieving a peace in Ukraine. I'd like to think so. At moments, I have thought so.

But I've been looking at what's been coming out of the Trump administration. And I get the very strong sense that Trump wants to end the conflict, at least to get the American United States. away from the conflict to the extent that he can. He also wants some process of de-escalation with the Russians, but I don't think he's prepared or in a position to make the big compromises that he would need to make in order to bring the war itself to an end. Of course, I agree with that.

And I just like to make a couple additional points. I do think, Alexander, there's another, big piece of real estate out there that NATO would expand into if it could. But it's off the table at this point in time. And that's Belarus. I think when Lukashenko goes, don't be surprised if the West tries to foster a color revolution there. But of course, given events in Ukraine, Belarus and NATO is not a serious topic of discussion at this point in time. But again, you do not want to underestimate the West's appetite for its band to NATO eastward. Second point I would make is that it's not simply saying that Ukraine will not be a NATO that will satisfy the Russians.

There also cannot be security guarantees from the West to Ukraine. This is what I call de facto NATO membership. You could argue that. today, Ukraine almost is a de facto member of NATO. I wouldn't go quite that far, but it's close. And the Russians do not want that, right? They do not want the West to be in a position where it can give security guarantees over the long term for Ukraine. And as you know better than I do, Alexander, the Russians have also demanded that there be limits on how big the Ukrainian military can be. They want to really take the Ukrainian military threat off the table. And then the final point I want to make is to agree with you that the Russians, as time goes by, have more and more of an interest

in making Ukraine more and more of a dysfunctional rump state so that it can never join NATO, or if it does join NATO, it's kind of meaningless. And this is why all this discussion about, you know, maintaining security guarantees, maybe bringing NATO, Ukraine into NATO down the road, just incentivizes the Russians to wreck Ukraine even more than it's correct and is completely counterproductive from Ukraine's point of view. But nevertheless, we continue to persist because we're not doing the dying on the battlefield, and it is the Ukrainians who are doing the dying. I would agree on the

Belarusian issue because I think the main cold war we have now with the Russians really to find out where to draw the new dividing lines on the continent. And I think the main four countries would obviously be in Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova and Belarus now.

Ukraine, of course, currently being fought Georgia appears to be pulling away. Moldova are less significant. But But Belarus, of course, this is an important piece to wrestle away from the Russians, I think, from NATO's perspective. By the way, I don't disagree with the two of you regarding the prospects of a peaceful settlement. I'm trying to be a devil's advocate, but I'm also quite pessimistic, to be honest.

But the issue of security guarantees, so it's quite interesting because the main argument we often hear in the West is in the absence of NATO membership. surely the Ukrainians need other security guarantees. I can even empathize with it given the horrific war they've been going through that they want some security. But I don't understand what exactly this could be. And I see two problems. One, any security guarantee would be seen as a threat to Russia, which is, again, why we have this war to begin with. But second, it would also, I'm wondering if NATO would actually want significant security guarantees to Ukraine, because this would discredit NATO to a large extent.

Obviously, the Ukrainians, if they want their territories back in the future, they have an interest in pulling in NATO into a conflict with the Russians, but NATO wouldn't be very interested in this. So if you put all your troops or put any troops in Ukraine and they ended up becoming killed, at least you have casualties, and NATO is not in a position to do anything really against Russia, wouldn't this discredit the alliance as well? So it just seems as if, well, will all this talk about security guarantees?

Will it go anywhere? Or is this simply going to be, we have two big gap now between the rhetoric we committed ourselves in terms of doing everything for Ukraine and slowly, you know, reality is seeping in? I'd just say on security guarantees, the only country that can give Ukraine a meaningful security guarantee is the United States of America. And what Trump wants to do is he wants to sort of move away from a situation where we're giving security guarantees and move to one where the Europeans do it.

But the Europeans have pathetic militaries. There's no way they can provide a meaningful guarantee, a meaningful security guarantee to Ukraine. And if anything, those military establishments in Europe are going to get weaker with the passage of time, not more powerful. And the Russian military today, despite all the nonsense in the West that you hear about how weak the Russians are today and how they have been bled white over time and so forth and so on, As General Cabolo has said, if you look at the Russian military today, it is much more formidable fighting force than it was when the war started. And the Russians have recruited a huge number of troops this year, and there's no evidence that the pipeline is drying up.

They're doing very well on the battlefield. And tell me how in that world Europeans can provide a security. guarantee. They can't. It's the Americans. And the Americans, as long as Trump is in the White House, are not going to have any interest in doing that. Well, that is absolutely correct. And very going back to Anatole Levin, he's actually written another article. He's written some very good articles recently, in which he's made this very same point. He says, I mean, one of the things about security guarantees, one of the ways to guarantee the observance of the, you know, the observance of this ceasefire that people are talking about and to which the Russians will never agree,

is sending European troops, large numbers of European troops to Ukraine. Now, put aside that the Russians will never agree to that. The Europeans are apparently saying that they will only send their troops to Ukraine if the United States guarantees to protect them. So going exactly back to the point that John was making now, it always in the end comes back to the United States. The Europeans need the Americans for those kind of guarantees. The Ukrainians need the Americans for those sort of guarantees.

The only real way that this can be resolved is, as I said, previously, for the Russians and the Americans to come to some kind of understanding. It cannot be a treaty. The Senate will never pass it. come to some kind of understanding on what the basic rules of the game in Eastern Europe from now are not going to be. And I'm afraid that's going to come far too late for Ukraine. And Ukraine is a problem in terms of agreeing that. You need to end, you need the war in Ukraine to end before that can happen. So it seems to me. Just one additional point on this whole subject is both of you know extremely well. There's all this hype in the West about the Russian threat,

the belief that once the Russians are done with Ukraine, they're going to reestablish their empire in Eastern Europe, and this is going to be a threat to Western Europe. Well, if this were true, then you would see the Europeans, and this includes countries like Germany, France, and Britain, moving rapidly to really build up their military forces to deal with this ominous threat. But I actually believe that despite all the rhetoric, the Europeans, especially the publics, know that this is threat inflation of the first order. And as a consequence, the European countries are not building up their defenses. The threat inflation is not working.

and in the end, what you see happening is the militaries in these various countries are getting weaker and weaker. For one thing, they've given huge numbers of their weapons inventory to the Ukrainians. Furthermore, they just don't have formidable fighting forces. The Russians have an army that's prepared for major war because they've been fighting a major war for the past three years. Have the Europeans? No. So the idea that these countries with their hurting economies and their real sense that there's no great threat out there are going to turn things around and produce militaries that can give security guarantees to Ukraine is it's delusional. Yeah, the economic aspect definitely is worth taking into mind because I'm looking at Germany as well. And they're not just one country.

of course they're the one holding up the EU to a large extent. And with this de-industrialization, the economic decline, at this point in time, to begin to build a huge army when they will simply put, running out of money, it seems to be absurd. And yes, John pointed out as well, it doesn't seem as if we're buying into our own rhetoric here because if we did expect Russia to move on to Poland for whatever reason after Ukraine, surely, again, it's ludicrous even to say, but we would have put some more money and efforts into the military.

So it does appear that the rhetoric is, yeah, we're openly becoming more obviously flawed or weakened. But it does beg the question. Where would we probably be going from here? Because it seems as if a continuous theme has been this strategic vacuum because we keep saying we can't have a peaceful settlement with the, no, we can't negotiate with the Russians, we can't reward them for aggression. Meanwhile, I think everyone is coming to terms with the idea that the war has lost it. For a while, it looked as if the Europeans were really holding on while the Americans were pulling a bit away.

but even now across Europe it seems there's more and more recognition that we lost this war but we don't really seem to have any willingness to end it and I just add I agree with the both of you in terms of what the Russians are after as Alexander said they don't have much belief in in a political settlement and it reminds me of an article written by Edward Lutvak in the I think it was in the 90s He was called to give war a chance. The whole argument was often we end wars without a settlement and they drag on for decades and decades. And I think, yes, his argument then was it's better to just impose a settlement by having a clear victory. And I think that's essentially the logic the Russians will be going with because anything that the West comes up with appears to be, again, a temporary ceasefire.

Let's just stop the fighting. not going to solve any of the differences, we'll give it some time and rebuild. And I think this is what they really want to avoid at all costs. But at the other side of the spectrum, if they go for a complete victory, it could be too humiliating for the Western countries to do nothing. So, yeah, so I guess my last question as we're running out of time is, well, where are we going with this? Will it simply be like Afghanistan?

We just stop talking about it, or Libya will stop talking about it. or will there be, yeah, some strategic, you know, what's someone looking for? Yeah, some strategy that we're following. Well, just to answer the last question, we can't just stop talking about it. I mean, we can stop talking about Afghanistan, and we can stop talking about Libya.

We can't stop talking about Russia. I mean, Russia is a part of our, you know, geography, And it's just, it's going to be there. It's not going to go away. There was a British Defence Minister some years ago who actually said that. He says, I wish Russia would just shut up and go away. It's not going to go away. So we can't just ignore the problem.

But we're not going to do the things. I mean, John was absolutely right. We're not going to do the things that we say we are about building up our militaries and are industrial base to support the militaries and do any of those things because the economic and social situations, conditions in Europe, absolutely make that impossible. And based on what I know of the two major European countries that I know, which are Britain and Germany,

John is also absolutely right. The people of these countries are not prepared to fight Russia, not if Ukraine collapses, not at all at the moment. Obviously, I mean, if the Russians were to march all the way to the West, then it might change. But not whilst the Russians remain where we are. So I have to say I'm very unhappy and bleak about this. I think we are going to be in a very, very long period of very cold peace, there'll be minimal political and diplomatic contacts with the Russians,

but certainly within Europe. I think that some kind of a dialogue with the United States will take place because I think the Americans are far less boxed in somehow, both mentally and geographically. They seem to have much more ability to look beyond these issues than we can in Europe. So I think the Americans and the Russians will decide and talk about things. But I think we in Europe will be there on the margins, as all of these discussions take place above us. And looking at the medium-term picture in Europe, both in terms of our relations with Russia and our domestic situations.

I think the future is bleak. I can't say that I have any better optimism than that. Maybe in time, you know, when the present leaders go, when, you know, the political class changes, things will change again. And people who are less invested in Ukraine and in all of the rhetoric and ideology of the last 30 years when they've moved from the scene, then maybe we can start again.

But, you know, that is realistically going to take a long time. And I'm not sure I'll be there to see it. Yeah, I, of course, agree with Alexander completely. But let me make just a couple sort of additional points and come at the points he made from a somewhat different angle. I think what you're going to get here is a frozen conflict. you're not going to get a meaningful peace agreement. And there's no way, in my opinion, that the Russians can decisively defeat Ukraine

because they would have to conquer the western half of Ukraine. And that would be a colossal mistake because it's filled with ethnic Ukrainians who hate the Russians. And the Russians would be in so much trouble if they tried to do that. So I think even if the Russians win on the battlefield, there's going to be a dysfunctional rump state that's left, and the West is going to continue to ally itself with that dysfunctional rump state, and you'll get a frozen conflict. Now, I've long argued that this frozen conflict is especially dangerous, not only because Ukraine may blow up again, but because there are a series of other flashpoints that are interlinked with the Ukraine conflict. One is the Arctic, two is the

Baltic, where you recently had an incident involving a German and a Russian ship. Three is Kaliningrad. Four, as we talked about before, is Belarus. Five is Moldova. Excuse me, six is the Black Sea. They're just a series of very dangerous flashpoints that are superimposed on this Ukrainian frozen conflict that we expect to get. So the potential for trouble here moving forward is very great. And that brings me to sort of my final three points. Number one is when you look at that April 2008 decision to expand NATO, into Ukraine, you see very clearly that was a catastrophic decision. Just truly amazing what the negative consequences of that decision were. And it was not just the April 2008 decision. It was the fact that we doubled down consistently over time until we got a war in February 2022, and then we doubled down again. Second point I'd make to you is if you look at the situation in Germany, And this boggles my mind.

Germany is in deep economic trouble. And it looks like it's not going to be able to pull itself out of this tailspid anytime soon. And it's largely due to the fact that Russia is no longer providing cheap energy to Germany. This has had disastrous effects on the German economy, which again just shows you how. disastrous that April 2008 decision was and a decision to go to war against Russia over Ukraine. And then finally, just to talk about Trump, if you think about what we're saying and what it means for Trump, the idea that Trump is going to come in and fix these problems, not only in Ukraine, but in the Middle East and with regard to China and that we're going to live happily

ever after in the United States, I do not think. that's going to happen. He's inheriting what I call a bed of nails. There's no simple solution in Ukraine, and he, by the way, is now acknowledging that. He recently said, contrary to his boasts about shutting down the war in Ukraine in one day, even before he moved into the White House, he's now saying publicly that he recognizes that this is a very complicated case, which, of course, as we all know, is putting it mildly. And then you go to the Middle East and you take what I was saying about the United States being joined at the hip with Israel.

Israel is a country that's in deep trouble. It's got all these different problems that it's facing in places like Gaza, with regard to Hezbollah, Iran, Syria, so forth and so on. That means the United States is going to be deeply involved there because we're joined at the hip with the Israelis. So we have an unending serious. of problems facing us on the foreign policy front, which has no simple solutions. So I think Donald Trump is going to very quickly find himself in deep trouble for a policy

front, contrary to all his boasting. And again, my final point, which I cannot emphasize enough, is that that April 2008 decision was a catastrophic decision. My, my lord, as my mother used to say. Just hard to believe we did. The great irony, though, is we kind of, not just academics, but or commentators or journalists, but also the political leaders themselves recognized not just the European side, but on the American side as well, from Gates and other leaders within the Bush administration recognized that this would be disastrous. What we effectively did was commit our

to taking in Ukraine into NATO, even though knowing that this would be considered an existential threat by Russia. So we put ourselves on this collision course. And I know, of course, you John have been one of the main people warning that this would happen over the years. And still, there's never any course correction and nothing. And otherwise, yeah, I think I probably agree with the prognosis both for the mid-year-old. Middle East and Russia. I think we set up these conflicts. I think toppling Assad obviously was going to lead to a prolonged problematic disruption of the whole region, but nonetheless we still gone this way. And I don't think there's any real good solutions to any of these conflicts anymore.

All I think is perhaps with a greater balance being restored, maybe some of the maximalist positions will be taken away, but Trump's idea of moving away from war and this forever wars and finishing them all, I think yeah, I mean, people probably become quite disappointed given that, yeah, we don't have a solution to Ukraine anymore.

There's no real good solution in the Middle East either, so I think at least if, yeah, we allow some of these conflicts to not die out, but reduce its intensity at least, yeah, perhaps that's as good as it gets, but yeah, he's being handled at quite a poor deal, and it seems to some of this, to some extent, is it being done quite deliberately, at least on the Biden administration in Ukraine, all this escalations in the last minutes to make the situation too difficult to resolve.

It's quite a, yeah, it's quite a mess who put ourselves in. anyways John Alexander any final thoughts before we go I think I think John put it very well the 2008 decision was an astonishing one

and the most powerful leader in Europe Angela Merkel has now confirmed that she knew it was a disastrous one she says so effects essentially she doesn't quite put it like that but she says in the book that she thought it was wrong

but yet she did it I mean, it's a failure of statesmanship that is just impossible to understand and to overestimate the consequences of. It was always easier to do what George W. Bush wanted than to take steps to protect peace in Europe. Just one final point on this. it is very important to remember that the decision to expand NATO was made in 1994 by the Clinton administration. Throughout the 1990s, there was huge opposition in the foreign policy establishment inside the United States, the NATO expansion.

And the subject was not Ukraine. It was just NATO expansion in general. and George Kennan wrote a very famous piece in the New York Times that said this was going to lead to disaster. Bill Perry, who was the Secretary of Defense, he was, Bill Clinton's Secretary of Defense, was so adamantly opposed that he thought about resigning over the issue. Talks like Paul Nitson opposed it. There was a whole body of very smart, mainstream establishment people who said this would lead to it. disaster well before the 2008 decision. And of course, they proved correct. Yeah, Merkel once said that it would be interpreted NATO expansion to Ukraine as a declaration of war.

So this is quite a strong language. Even the former NATO Secretary General, Schaeffer, Yabde Hoop Sheffer, he also recognized that 2008 was a mistake. But I think this is our problem. I think we recognized it before. This would be a mistake. We've done it nonetheless. And I think this whole discussion, at least the discourse in 90s, people could come out. Even as you mentioned, even Hawks could come out and anti-Russian hawks saying,

this is a very bad idea. These days, there's no discussion anymore, really. There's, I think the discussion has been silenced to a large extent. But perhaps with some of the enthusiasm for a non-resteakness, NATO expansion being removed with the consequences piling up. Perhaps what we can hope for is return to a discussion at least, whether or not this is a great idea. This has been a very dangerous consensus, I think, over the past 30 years that suddenly NATO expansion is unproblematic.

But anyways, thank you, John. Thank you, Alexander. Let's do this again sometime soon. And may I wish you a very happy Christmas, by the way, just a second. Yes, Merry Christmas to both of you guys, and I thoroughly enjoyed it today, and look forward to repeating it in 2025 on more than one occasion. Thank you, John.