The Duran Podcast - Drone attacks and Russia red lines

Episode Date: June 2, 2025

Drone attacks and Russia red lines

All right, Alexander, let's talk about the drone attack into the Russian Federation that happened over the weekend. We can discuss the damage that was done to Russia's nuclear assets. And I guess the first question that I'm going to ask you is, has Russia's red line been crossed? Right? I mean, yes. Has Russia's red line finally been crossed? I doubt it, actually. And I know that's going to sound surprising, but I actually doubt this.

The Russians have never at any time said that they would regard attacks on any of their air bases as crossing a red line, at least not if it is apparently done by Ukraine. Of course, if NATO is involved, and there are many people right across Russia who say, that NATO was involved. There might be some, you know, crossing over a red line in that respect. But I doubt that the Russians are going to treat it in that way. I suspect that, again, maybe to the disappointment of many, many people, the Russians are going to take this in their stride and for a multiplicity of different reasons. And if I can just go through them, first of all, first of all,

First of all, I think it's an important thing to say that this is a very complicated and very, very daring operation that the Ukrainians carried out. But it took them 18 months to do it. They're unlikely to be able to duplicate it again. They've given away how they did it. It's not going to be easy to pull off the same trick a second time. and in terms of Russia's strategic aviation, its air assets, only a certain amount of damage has been done. We don't know how much, but for various reasons that I'm going to go into later in this program, this does not actually affect in any fundamental or decisive way Russia's position as a nuclear power.

And that's, I think, something I wanted to say. The second reason is that, yes, these are strategic bombers, but they were used also in attacks on Ukraine itself. And I think this makes it a different situation from, say, attacks on early warning radars, which Ukraine was attempting to do at one time and was apparently stopped from doing so by the United States. Now, early warning radars are incredibly specialized technology. They are basically only operated against the United States and its nuclear forces, whereas these bombers have been used regularly to attack targets in Ukraine. And I think it's pushing it very hard to say that if you use bombers in a military operation, you cannot

expect attacks to be carried out on those bombers. If we go back to other wars, which the United States has fought, where it too has used strategic bomb as B-52s, for example. The other side, the Vietnamese, for example, managed to shoot several of them down. And I mean, that wasn't seen as crossing a red line. And if the Vietnamese had succeeded in carrying out attacks on American bases in San Diego Garcia, which they never attempted to do, I doubt that that would have been seen as crossing a red line either. So I don't, I don't, I don't think that it has quite the effect that people imagine in those terms. So I know that's going to disappoint a lot of people when I say that, but that is my own feeling.

Me to begin with. Yes. I don't really see this. To me, this looks like as a sabotage operation, which has achieved a certain amount, but which hasn't changed the overall strategic balance. and I don't think that the Russians are going to be deflected from what they're doing, and I don't think they're going to be put off by it in any fundamental way. Now, can I just say a few things about Russia's strategic try and because a lot of people, I think,

confuse it with the American one. The Americans rely very, very heavily on nuclear submarines and on bombers. The Russians also rely very heavily on. nuclear submarines, but they don't rely so heavily on bombers. Most of Russia's strategic assets are land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, things like the Yars and the Toppoll and those types of systems. The strategic bomber force, which has been heavily neglected for a very, very long time, The Russians haven't fielded in quantities a new strategic bomber since the 1950s is not really ever been given the same attention that the Americans have given to their bombers. So I think that is, I think we're looking at things in a somewhat different way.

That's my own feeling anyway. Do you honestly believe that Ukraine carried this by themselves? carry this operation on by themselves? Does Russia honestly believe that they're going to fool people into believing that Ukraine carried this operation by themselves? Does the, I don't know, wait, does the US because Trump put out a statement, or Axios put out a statement saying that Trump was briefed on this, then they put out a statement saying, well, the Trump Whitehouse wasn't briefed on this?

Anyway, does the collective West actually believe they're going to fool people into believing that Ukraine carried out of its operation? No, I don't think anybody's fool. I don't think anybody is fooled by this in any way. I'm absolutely sure that the Russians know perfectly well that the collective was involved in this operation. Was involved in all of this. The collective West was involved in an operation that destroyed Russian bombers all the way into Siberia as well as into the Arctic. Yep.

As well as into the Arctic, which would mean that the collective West is sending a message to Russia, which is that we can hit you wherever we choose to hit you. And I agree with you, most likely Russia's not going to do anything. Or if they do do something, it's just going to be some strikes at some airfields. Perhaps they'll hit some drone facilities, and that'll be it. It's the, is it not the collective West telling Russia, we can hit you wherever we want to hit you? And we understand that you're not going to do anything about it. And when you go through the history of, say, the three years of provocations of crossing red lines, whether Russia has said their red lines or not, but they've crossed many red lines.

We have to be honest. They've crossed many, many red lines, the collective West, and Russia has done nothing. So, and we've seen many, many terrorist attacks where many civilians have been killed, targeted civilians, specifically targeted civilians. Let's not forget that there was a targeted strike on a train carrying civilians passengers. This was not a military target by any means. Everyone knew this was not a military target, but they specifically targeted this train in the beginning of the day, and then we had the drone strikes. So, I mean, you've had so many things

over the three years, whether it's journalists, assassinated inside of Russia, bloggers, assassinated inside of Russia. General's assassinated inside of Russia's the crocus attack, attackums into Russian territory, all of these things that have happened. The Angles Air Base, the radar that you mentioned. This is another. and I think this is a much more escalated provocation, crossing of red lines. But it is an escalation. It is a crossing of red lines. And it is a message to Russia, knowing that Russia's response is going to be exactly as you said, it's going to be.

Yeah, a message conveying what exactly, though? I mean, the West is prepared to go to war with Russia because they're not going to do that. a message that is going, that the West is going to participate directly in the war in Ukraine, well, they're not going to do that either. So it seems to me that, yes, I mean, there is no way that Ukraine could have conducted this kind of. British generals are talking about nuclear, about arming. Well, that is a different thing. To repeat again, well, first of all, no British general is talking about providing nuclear

weapons to Ukraine. What was that guy's name at the Odessa? Colonel Richard Kemp, who is not a serving officer of the British Army anymore and is probably better understood as a commentator on the Daily Telegraph, where I have to read his articles pretty much every day. And I don't think anybody in the British military takes him seriously in that regard. And of course, Britain is not in a position to provide Ukraine with nuclear weapons. And there's no conceivable way that anybody is going to do so. because for one reason, if that were to happen, just to follow that through, it would mean the collapse of the whole system of nuclear weapons proliferation. And that is something that the United States itself wants to prevent because it would be the country that would be most quickly targeted if nuclear proliferation were to collapse in that sort of way.

So to repeat again, attacks on air bases have never been, drone attacks on Russian air bases have never been a Russian red line. Missile attacks involving direct involvement of Western technicians, those have been a Russian red line. And the Russians have said so again in connection with the tourist missiles. but drone attacks which do a certain amount of damage, but which cannot knock out an entire airbase, they have never been a Russian red line. The Russians have never said that they are. So yes, I think that this is obviously an incident that the Russians are going to be furious about. It is an incident that has humiliated them. It is a sabotage incident, ultimately, however. and I think they're going to say to themselves, in fact, I'm sure they are saying to themselves

that the best and most effective thing we can do is to continue doing what we're doing, which is winning the wall. Ultimately, these kind of attacks are not going to make any fundamental difference. They're not going to change the strategic picture between us and the United States because our nuclear forces remain intact, a small amount of damage to our air force, to our Air Force, which is all that we know about so far, is not going to change the strategic picture in any fundamental way. This operation cannot be conducted again. What this incident shows, again, is that there are fundamental problems in our own security system. And it is incredible that the Russians still haven't managed to get on top of that. And that I think is perhaps,

So you want to criticize the Russians, that's probably where you ought to be criticizing them. I mean, agents were able, Ukrainian agents were able to operate and locate drones close to, in close proximity to strategic bases. And, you know, that is something that under no circumstances should be possible or should be permitted. Aircraft, again, were left unprotected on these bases. I'm not saying that you should create hold, you know, concrete shelters. I mean, that would be a massive operation for aircraft of this size, but you could at least provide netting and that kind of thing to prevent them from drone attacks, which would be a relatively straightforward thing to do. But I think the Russians will say to themselves that this isn't

ultimately going to change anything in terms of the course of the war. It's not going to change anything in terms of the nuclear balance between the United States and Russia. It is humiliating. It is exasperating. Some people ought to be sacked because of it. But ultimately, the best thing that Russia can do is to go on and win the war. Does this not emboldened the collective West? Is this not? I mean, this is an attack on Russia's nuclear deterrence. I mean, Even though it's not as used, as you explained, it's not as used. It still is an attack on Russia's nuclear triad. I mean, strictly speaking, that is what we've seen happen.

And it is an attack by the collective West on Russia's nuclear triad. Is that not what it is? Well, yes. But also, you have to remember that these bombs, have a conventional bombing role. And that unfortunately makes them targets. I mean, you know, I say unfortunately, unfortunately, from a Russian point of view,

I mean, if strategic missiles submarines were used, were attacked, then that would be different because these are specifically nuclear, those are specifically part of the Russian nuclear deterrence force. Bombers and not just heavy bombers, but tactical bombers, like the Suhoi 34s, which are regularly used across Ukraine, all have the capability to use nuclear weapons. And it's never been said, as far as I know, at any time, that they are out of bounds for attacks if they're used in conventional military operations. So, you know, it is the Russians who chose to use their bombers, if I can put it out. I mean, correctly, by the way.

The inverse then, when NATO sends drones or surveillance aircraft so that they can target Russia, is that not fair game then for the Russian military? Well, yes. Now, that again is that is something that's been much debated and why did the Russians tolerate the presence of surveillance aircraft over the Black Sea, for example. NATO surveillance aircraft at the Black Sea. And up to now, the Russians have, well, apparently they've been more aggressive in keeping these surveillance aircraft away.

They tolerate it. But they tolerate them to a great extent. And arguably, if you want to talk about the Russians exercising restraint, tolerating aggressive behavior by NATO, I would argue that was much more aggressive than this particular. This is my own personal view. Can you not make the same argument? Which was only partly successful, by the way, just a quick year. Yeah, I mean, some bombers were destroyed.

We don't know how many so far. Yeah. And as I said, these are old bombers too, by the way, and probably not particularly effective, used as strategic assets. I mean, this is the other thing to say. I mean, we're talking about bombers designed in the 1950s. Some of them were built in the 1980s, but they are not part of the ones. They're not a critical part of Russia's strategic nuclear force.

His land-based missiles are, its submarines are. Can the same argument be made about Starlink? Well, Starlink wasn't used, by the way, in this attack, but arguably, yes. In the past, it has been. No, it apparently doesn't operate inside Russia, so I understand. So, you know, it can't be used in that kind of way. But about US satellites, it absolutely can be because undoubtedly the Ukrainians are getting satellite data from the United States. I mean, that's clear.

And that's what the whole intelligence sharing operation between the Americans and the Ukrainians is all about. Now, the Russians are saying they cannot be a ceasefire unless and until that ends. So the Russians are responding to that. But then again, you can argue that the Russians should be much more aggressive in dealing with American satellites. They have the capability to bring the satellites down. They haven't used it so far. Because as far as they're concerned, to repeat again, they are winning the war. And why should they throw themselves off course?

by starting a process of escalation, which is not in their interests. That's the calculation they can make. Can't the argument be made that the escalation is happening, whether the Russians show restraint or not? I mean, next up is going to be the tourist missiles. I think the tourist missiles are definitely going to be used in Ukraine. I don't myself have any doubt about this. Can you make the argument? That decision has already been made.

Yeah. It's traveling. Sorry. And Merch is traveling to D.C. Yeah. To speak with Trump. I'm going to get to Trump in a minute as well. Absolutely.

Because I think there's a lot that we need to discuss about Trump. Yeah. Yeah. And what's going on there. But the tourist missiles are coming up next. But can't you make the argument? I mean, I understand the argument that Russia doesn't want to escalate, needlessly escalate as they're winning the war. Okay.

There's no need to bring in NATO or the United States. show restraint when it comes to surveillance, when it comes to satellites and Starling, all these things will show restraint. Command centers in Germany, which we now know, according to the New York Times, are at war with Russia. They're actually commanding and operating the war with Russia, the Polish air base, which we know about, the weapons that pour in from Poland, from Romania, the mercenaries, all of these things.

So Russia shows restraint. Far more aggressive. Can I just make this point? more aggressive and escalatory things than what we saw with these drone attacks on the air basis. True. I mean, if you have American generals commanding Ukrainian armies that are attacking and killing Russians, I would argue that was already much more, much more escalatory than what we

saw yesterday. And that's, I mean, that's, you know, my own personal view. I mean, it's not as if this is out of line with what. what has already been happening. Now, about tourist missiles, they're already going to Ukraine. I believe they're already in Ukraine. They will be used. I think the Russians are pretty confident that they have again. Is that a red line? Well, the Russians have said that using missiles against them is a red line. They've never said that drone attacks on their air bases is a red line, but that missiles launched into Russia, missiles launched towards Moscow is a red line. Up to now, their response has been to confine

their response inside Ukraine itself, targeting Western positions with missiles, as we know, and things of that kind. Now, we did a program about this. I think the Russians are confident that their air defences can handle the tourist missiles, that they won't need to take even stronger measures than before, because to repeat again, they are winning the wall. But as we discussed in the program that we did about the tourist missiles, if tourist missiles strike targets inside Russia kill civilians there, then that will test, I think, Russian patients in ways that this incident will not do. How about the terrorist attacks on the trains, specifically the civilian and the freight train, and the freight train, but specifically the civilian train that was targeted.

The Russian authorities say that was a sabotage and a terrorist attack. Absolutely. This is a, this comes after a long, a long string of many terrorist attacks by Ukraine. They've taken credit for it against civilians in Russia. No response. And the Americans from Russia. And the Americans up to now have been pretending that they didn't know about it, but now they've been increasingly openly confirming that they've known about this assassination campaign that the Ukrainians have been conducting all along. And in effect, that they've approved it and that they've been giving people like Budan of the green light to do it.

And you're absolutely correct. If we're talking about terrorist attacks, specific terrorist attacks, then they're going to, you're going to be. the attacks on the trains were terrorist attacks. I mean, of that, there is no question. So what does Russia do in that instance? Again, what will the Russians do? I'm going to, if you can't Putin next to you, I will tell you what he would say we would do.

We will win the war. That is what he will say. Just as he did with the Caucasus, when there were also terrorist attacks, much more extreme terrorist attacks than those that we have seen. so far committed by Ukraine, when the Russians also knew that Western intelligence services were involved in those attacks, as Putin has now repeatedly said, and yet the Russians, instead of being provoked into reactions over those, simply went ahead and won the war. Does Putin want them a military victory, or does he want to get a diplomatic settlement

for Istanbul Plus? I think by now he no longer believes that there's going to be a diplomatic settlement. This is my own personal view. I mean, I think that we will see what the negotiations go, but my own sense is that the situation is so far apart. To repeat again, the Russians have shown no sign up to this time of compromising on any of their basic positions. And I don't expect that they will do so in Istanbul. Does NATO continue to escalate? I think that they are reaching the limits of what they can do in terms of escalates. What would come after tourist missiles? Well, that is the question. I'm not sure. I can't really see anything, to be frank.

I mean, drone attacks like this are not going to change the course of the wall. They're not going to do, as I said, dent Russia's strategic forces. missile strikes using tourist missiles are not going to change the course of the war. The F-16s, which nobody ever talks about any longer, have been a complete failure. There was recently an article, somewhere in the American military media confirming as much,

they have achieved absolutely nothing. European troops in Ukraine, which would be a massive escalation, and is the one which the Russians would respond to most aggressively. Apparently that idea has died. I think we are coming very close to the point when the limits of NATO escalation have been reached. Even sanctions, apparently, that's not, people are not so keen on that, at least in the United States anymore. Not just Trump, but apparently the Treasury Department is not keen on the further sanctions either for all sorts of reasons.

So, you know, I think that escalation has probably finally reached its limits. And this drone attack in some way shows this because they spent 18 months planning this whole complex operation and they carried it out. And at the end of the day, once it's over, the situation is the same. So, you know, it's difficult to see what exactly they can do beyond what they've already done, which can change the situation. now. In 2022, when they decided that they were going to conduct a military offensive in Ukraine, using Ukrainian troops, but equipped with Western weapons and commanded by Western generals, with all of the apparatus that the collective West had at its behalf, I think then that that level of escalation at that time was very, very serious.

But I think we've now reached the limits. And I did it. There's very much more than can be done realistically. I mean, given that direct fighting between Ukraine and the West and Russia doesn't seem to be something that anybody particularly wants to do. The last thing, perhaps, and this is the one thing that is being talked about, And which people, by the way, when I was in St. Petersburg were discussing there was possible attempts to seize Russian ships in the Black Sea. But the Russians are apparently already starting preparations in terms of their Navy to handle that. And I gather that the Chinese are also indicating that they would be participating in that too. Right. So let's talk about Trump. How much did he know?

I think, well, I'll tell you the part that incriminates Trump, if you want to phrase it like that, is that truth social post where he says that Putin is playing with fire and what else did he say? I'm saving Putin from something very bad or something like that. He said, I'm saving Putin from very bad things happening. He's playing with fire. Yeah. I believe that post, whether Trump knew something. Yeah. Whether Trump knew nothing, whether he was briefed fully on what was about to happen,

or maybe he was just given a hint that something is going to go down. I mean, I don't know to what extent the information was passed on to Trump. But it's that post that to me hints at some sort of knowledge. that something was being planned and something was going to happen. I mean, Axios, they put out this article and they say Trump was briefed. Yes. They get a call from the State Department. They get a call from the White House.

They retract it almost immediately. And they say, no, no, Trump was not briefed by Ukraine. That's what Axios said. The Ukraine briefed Trump. And then about an hour later, maybe even less than an hour. Axios comes up with a retraction, they say, no, no, no, Ukraine did not breathe Trump. So, I mean, that was a very quick retraction from Axios. But you have that message from Trump, which is that very bad things are going to happen.

Putin's playing with fire. Now, we did a video, and we thought that when Trump put out that message, he was putting out that message because of the drone swarms over the past. month, the 1,000 plus drones that were launched into Russia, and specifically during Victory Day, May 9th had no effect. They did not accomplish what people like Kellogg and the military officials were telling Trump. This would give you leverage over Ukraine, over Russia negotiations. Just give it a month.

Let the drones do their thing, and you'll have some negotiating leverage. It didn't happen. And Trump got upset, and he lashed out at Putin, knowing that the tourist missiles are probably coming next as well. And people probably told him those tourist missiles are coming. So we have another thing up our sleeve. But perhaps it wasn't the Taurus that he was told about. Perhaps he was told, okay, Mr. President, we know you're angry because we told you that on

Victory Day and over the next month, Russia is going to really get hit hard by drones. We're probably angry with us. But we have Operation Spider-Web in the works. I won't get into the details, Mr. President, as to what it is. But trust us. It's going to really have a big effect on Russia and it's going to give you the negotiating leverage. Maybe it wasn't the tourist missiles that he was told about when he put out that message on Truth Social. Maybe he was told about Operation Spider-Web or they hinted at some sort of operation that would hit Russia's nuclear triad and would hit all of these Russian planes.

Forty Russian planes will be destroyed, Mr. President. The most important strategic bombers, it's going to give you all the leverage you need over Putin and Russia will eventually capitulate of I have to accept some of Kellogg's 22 point piece plan, which is the plan that's being floated out in Istanbul, by the way, it is Kellogg's plan that you crazy. Anyway, to wrap up the video, your thoughts on what I said, because I have to be honest with you, Alexander, to everyone watch it, that post on true social. Yes, yes, yes. You know, that it's sitting with me, that post.

And the trip from Lindsay Graham, by the way. I also want you to comment on that. Yes, yes. I'm going to take back what I just said of a moment ago, because I think you're probably right, actually, following through what you've been saying. Now, this plan, we're told Operation Spiders Web was launched 18 months ago, which makes sense.

It was such a complicated operation. It would take a very, very long time. So at that time, of course, that would be during the Biden. During the Biden era, exactly. It says a Biden era escalation. that we've seen. That was when the decision was taken.

Jake Sullivan and Tony Blinken were running things at that time. All the same people, you know, we're running the CIA, the intelligence agencies, all of that. So this is a Biden-era operation. And I did wonder whether perhaps having cleared it then, somebody in the bureaucracy decided that they'd keep it away from Trump because Trump might have perhaps felt that you know, he probably wouldn't want a countenance a thing like this. But I wonder whether, the way you set it out, I wonder whether you might be right, actually,

whether Trump was told at some point over the last couple of days, look, Mr. President, we're really in the strong position. Putin thinks he's in the strong position, but actually it's we who are in the strong position. We've got this massive drone offensive coming against Russia, which, by the way, would also have been set in motion, maybe not as long ago as 18 months ago, but at least a year ago. So it's, again, something initiated before Trump became present.

So the drone offensive is coming into play. Now we're going to conduct this, maybe the, you know, we've got something else coming as well. This is going to be really, really bad for the Russians. It will give you, it will shock. them, it will upset them, it will give you leverage over them. And it's quite possible that he did think that. Now, if that is true, and I think you might be right, by the way, and I think that the strange story of Axios first saying that he'd been briefed and then contradicting

itself and saying that he hadn't been briefed. And Axis is usually quite well in full, suggests that something, he was at least told something. Well, he's going to be disappointed because, as I said already, I don't think it's going to change anything. I don't think it's going to change Russia's diplomatic strategy. I don't think it's going to change his military strategy. I think what Trump was going to discover is just, as happened with the drone strikes, on Moscow, which failed, this particular strike on the Russian air bases is something that the

Russians, angry though they will be and humiliated though they are about it, will simply shrug off. They will continue with their ongoing military offensive, which is gaining ground and is causing increasing alarm, and which has resulted, by the way, in the commander of the Ukrainian land forces resigning. Now, you see, he's given a reason for this, that it's all because of an attack on a training centre. But it looked to me, actually, more likely that this man is bailing out, That was my own reading of this. But anyway, the Russians are just going to continue with all of that. And when the tourist missiles comes, the Russians will absorb that too.

And Trump again is going to discover that not only has he not obtained any leverage over the Russians as a result of all of these various threats, but that his claims about Russia being on fire, that Russia be at risk of destruction and all of that is far from the reality and that all that has been achieved is that he's dissipated goodwill. Yeah, Putin's been silenced since the attack, which is interesting. He hasn't said anything since the attack. Well, there's apparently going to be a meeting of the Security Council. And it's likely that there will be a formal briefing, and I suspect we'll be getting some more

information when that comes through. Just a final question on diplomacy front. What does that tell you about Trump? What is Russia thinking about Trump, the man, the person, who they said they have, they understand. He has, he's shown a desire to want to end the conflict. I mean, they've said these types of statements, Peskov, Putin, Lavrov. The Trump administration has shown a desire for a peaceful settlement. We can trust or we have trust in Trump, the person.

his administration that they do want to solve the Ukraine conflict. I mean, given that this might be the scenario, and I say might, because I don't know. I mean, I'm guessing about that post on true social. I'm just trying to put some pieces together. But let's just say that was the thinking going on in the Trump administration. And that's why he put out that post, knowing that something's going to happen. What does that tell you about the Trump administration, the way they handle foreign policy? It's deceptive, isn't it? How are the Russians going to look at this? As they're now talking and they're negotiating with Trump, and allegedly they have some sort of trust in Trump.

I'm using their words, not my words. Allegedly, they have some trust in Trump and what he says. How does that change the dynamic? What we're saying is indeed the case. Well, I said a moment ago that it will dissipate goodwill. It will end goodwill. I think at some point the Russians will say to themselves, this man is no different than Joe Biden. He says one thing and does enough.

So they probably at some level do understand that what he's trying to do is gain leverage over them. They know perfectly well that he has no leverage over them. But obviously, if he is authorizing attacks on their country, then they will say this isn't a man that we can do business with. I mean, I think that we're heading that direction anyway, by the way. So you're talking Wittkoff plant and all that? Well, remember, Wittgolf was supposed to visit Moscow, apparently, two weeks ago, three weeks ago, bringing Kellogg's 22-point plan with him. And according to Bloomberg, the Russians refused to let him come.

They said no. They shut the door in his face, and Putin refused to meet with Wittgoff. Now, Wittkoff did deny this. this story, but didn't deny it very convincingly, as far as I could see. And it does seem to me is that the Russians aren't interested in this 22-point plan, and they're not interested in any of the other plans that Kellogg is coming up with. And my sense in reading the Russian media is that they're preparing to take a very hard line. They don't consider it, by the way, a hard line. They consider it, you know, the only possible line. But the line that they have consistently taken,

when the parties meet in Istanbul. And I think that the Russians probably sense that this process of interchange with Trump and the diplomacy with him is coming to an end anyway. And if they conclude, which they're quite likely to, that he did indeed know about this operation, then they will be even less willing to negotiate with him in future. mind, they were warning everybody when he became president, not to have too high expectations of what he could do. I have to ask one final question.

How does Putin look after this? I mean, does this not damage Putin's persona, his reputation as being perhaps someone who, or emboldened. It reinforces. It reinforces the thinking of hardliners with regards to Putin that he is more interested in diplomacy or he is a more of a moderate or softer type of leader. Does this incident and reinforce that maybe inside of Russia or maybe even outside of Russia as well? Maybe the Chinese or India. I don't know. Do they look at this and say, you know, Putin is, you know, he doesn't really, he shows too much restraint. I don't know. I'm just throwing stuff out there, just to get your feel of things.

I have been following and reading Russian telegram channels and other things. It may surprise people, but I've not come across myself a massive demand for massive retaliatory measures in response to this particular attack. I mean, there was much, much more of that, for example, after the Crocus City Hall episode than there was over this one. But there is very, very considerable anger that an operation like this could be carried out at all by the Ukrainians inside Russia. And a lot of people are saying, you know, why does this happen?

We're supposed to be a state which has developed strong security services. Why aren't we able to protect our bases? Why are we obviously tolerating levels of negligence and incompetence in terms of our security services, which we would never have tolerated in the Soviet era, for example? And inevitably, the blame for that is being pointed to Putin himself. There's a perception that he's too soft in terms of his own officials. and tolerates too much incompetence and mismanagement on their part. Now, that I have seen some evidence of this people were saying, I mean, you know,

this wouldn't have been possible in Stalinstein, which by the way is true. But, I mean, people are saying things like that. So it has damaged Putin in that respect, in that, as I said, he is seen. I mean, he is, it is true generally that he is seen. as somebody who relies too much on diplomacy as opposed to, you know, taking a tough line. This has been a long-running complaint about him, extending all the way back to the time when he first became president, by the way.

But I think over this particular incident, the criticism is different, that he's too lax, that he doesn't take on corruption. It doesn't take corruption. And a lot of people are assuming that there was corruption involved in this operation, that people were bribed and were enabled to get close to the air bases in that way, that he's too lax, that he tolerates or allows corruption too much, that people who behave badly aren't held to account properly. That is the criticism that is being made of Putin today. And I think that there is some truth of that too, by the way. I think that, you know, we imagine Putin to be a tough, ruthless disciplinarian leader.

Many Russians would say if only it was so. They don't think of him that way. They think of him as somebody who's, you know, very, very always follows procedure, is tied down by legal process, that kind of thing. and that that enables corruption to fester in ways that shouldn't be permitted in Russia, especially at a time when the country is effectively at war. Yeah, the collective West has done a very good job of presenting a different Putin than probably what Russians see Putin as.

I'm not saying bad or good. I'm just saying the collective West has presented a Putin that is the exact opposite of what you said, a hardliner, an authoritarian, a dictator that controls every single little. aspect that goes on in Russia. Every single little, it's a bitsy thing that is happening in Russia, Putin knows about it and around the world as well, because he's to blame for everything. But in Russia, I think there's a different perception of Qaeda. I mean, he's respected and he's popular and he's loved for the most part by the Russians, but there is this perception. That is moderate. That is a diplomat. He's a lawyer. He's moderate. He's moderate. He's moderate.

Yes. That he relies too much on diplomacy, is too involved in dialogue, that he's not enough and tough enough when he needs to be, and that he doesn't strictly hold officials to account in the way that he should do. I mean, you know, as I said, if people are saying, you know, if he'd been Stalin's time and something like this had happened, all the people responsible for the, for the, for the breach of security would have been up against the wall. And I'm saying, I'm not saying that people necessarily demand that today.

But they are saying at the very least, there ought to be prison sentences or exemplary punishments carried out. And they never are. And people are very frustrated about. Why can't, why can't Russia bring the people that are behind all of these terrorist attacks to justice? Well, I'm not talking about catching the little, you know, the little guys that are going through the borders, all of this stuff, which they do. and they parade them in front of the channels and all this stuff. But I mean, everyone knows that behind all of these guys are much bigger, more powerful forces. How come Russia can never...

Can't give the reason? And I mean, it goes directly to the criticism of Putin that I've just made, which is that Putin. And he's been quite open about this. He wants to put all of these... He wants to capture them eventually and put them all on trial. So he wants to put Daneth and Zelensky and all of them on trial one day. He doesn't want to hunt them down and kill them in that fashion because he's already planning, apparently, all kinds of tribunals for this.

It's not something which most Russians would give much time to. I mean, they would say, you know, for heaven's sake, whilst you're building up your case for people who might always elude you, you know, they're able to. do all of these things inside our country. And in fact, that is a criticism that you often hear. But it goes again back to the issue of Putin, the lawyer, the man who stuck with procedures, who is very, very legalistic in his approaches to everything. More often than not, it works to his advantage.

But sometimes it does, it does, shall we say, exact. aspirate people in Russia, and this is a case in point. What I would make, by the way, is that this particular operation, I mean, the Ukrainians will pay a price for it in the sense that almost certainly conducting an operation of this complexity will now have compromised their networks. I mean, they spend an awful lot of time building up their agent networks in Russia. Now, apparently some of the people who were involved that be captured, they will talk, people will find out more about who they are. Eventually, as I said, the networks will be brought down.

So there is that price that Ukraine is going to pay. But it's not one that most Russians know or care very much about, to be honest. I mean, as far as they concerned, Budanov and Zelensky, and people like that are still out there and still free. Right. Okay. We'll end it there. Do you have anything else to add? Yeah, I mean, one thing I would say simply this. I mean, we've had lots of operations like this over the course of this conflict. They create enormous shock when they happen and then the shock dissipates and the Russians grind on. And I think that we will probably find the same here. So that's one thing I will say.

But the other thing I get to say is this. You talked about intelligence operations. My own guess is that once again, the people who are probably most heavily involved in this, or at least who provide some of the inspiration here, are not the Americans. Part of the British. The British have always been addicted to this kind of thing. they did it an awful lot during the Second World War. I mean, you know, you've seen all the films, the guns, Navarone and the cockleshell heroes and that sort of thing.

And if you read the British media, they continue to be filled with that sort of thing, James Bond type stuff. And it didn't make any difference to the war, the Second World War. It's not really going to make much difference now. but I suspect that they have been once again very influential in Washington in getting the Americans to support these sort of operations by Ukraine in Russia. And of course, it's the British media at the moment who are being most busy, as far as I can see, fanning the story that this has been a major achievement and victory by Ukraine, which in my opinion it hasn't. Yeah, well, I think we differ on that one. I don't think it's a major victory, but I think it was shocking. It wasn't a victory.

I mean, they destroyed some. Would you say it's a tactical? It was a tactical. It was, unquestioning like the sinking of the Mascavara, you know, the attacks on the air base in Crimea. It was a, it was a real tactical win. But in war, you always have to ask yourself this question. Is it a tactical win that,

brings you closer to achieving your underlying objective. Absolutely. And the answer is no. And that's where, as I said, the British have never really grasped this. And I did it the Ukrainians have either. The only benefit I could see for Ukraine in this is as they hype it up, as the British media hypes it up. No. Perhaps it brings more of the collective West to believe that if they just give more money and more

weapons, then Ukraine can achieve so much more. Look what they did the other day by hitting the airfield. So if we just continue to support them, then they're going to be able to win this. I mean, I think it could build some more hope for some collective West leaders, maybe even for the United States. I mean, Lindsay Graham, for example, is case in point. You mentioned it. I mean, he's just been to Kiev. He said it's not true that Ukraine is losing the war. Ukraine's actually doing fine. Look at the map. Nothing has changed. Not true, by the way, but that's what he said. And of course, it's quite likely that the Ukrainians did brief him about this Operation Spider-Web. I would imagine. He's very impressed. I mean, he's the kind of person

who would for this kind of thing. And absolutely, I mean, it does influence people like him. And he's not somebody to be disregarded at all. I mean, he's now going to be emboldened. He's going to go back to Washington. He's going to come tell Trump. look, Mr. President, you see the Ukrainians are, you can't count them out at all, they're able to conduct these kind of strikes and do this sort of damage, and, you know, we should continue to back them. And back them, perhaps we will, back them further until there's nothing of their country left, because that's all that backing them up to this point is achieved. With every day and week and month that passes, there's less of Ukraine.

All right, we'll end the video there. Take care, everybody.