The Duran Podcast - End of Escalatory Ladder in Ukraine & MidEast – John Mearsheimer, Alexander Mercouris & Glenn Diesen

Episode Date: April 13, 2024

End of Escalatory Ladder in Ukraine & MidEast – John Mearsheimer, Alexander Mercouris & Glenn Diesen

Welcome, everyone. My name is Glenn Dyson, and today I'm joined by Alexander Mercuris and John Meersheimer. Welcome. Glad to be here, Glenn. Delighted to be back, Glenn. So, the topic really want to focus today on this discontinuous escalation in most of the conflicts, because I think that in international relation, when we refer to escalation dominance, this is usually the privilege of the hegemon. So escalation dominance being this ability to escalate conflicts to a higher level of intensity or violence to effectively put pressure on adversaries with the logic that the stakes can

continuously be increased until the other side is compelled to capitulate. And again, escalation dominance, I think, is a vital instrument for hegemon, but hegemony appears to be over. And with each round of escalation now, it appears that there's only a greater loss of control, as well as the conflicts become even more difficult to resolve, as we see both from Ukraine to the Middle East. But nonetheless, it appears that the only approach is escalation, and we get closer and closer to major wars with seemingly no reverse gear. So I was hoping we could start with Ukraine because it appears now that in Ukraine the front lines are already collapsing and this makes the question, do we then escalate or negotiate? And the French have now threatened to send their troops into Ukraine and I'm not sure how to interpret this.

Is this a way of gaining some leverage ahead of negotiations or is this just escalation effectively? sending a NATO country to fight the Russians directly. How have you guys interpreted the statement from France and, I guess, lesser extent, Romania? I'll start with a quick set of statements, and then Alexander can jump in. I know he's been spending a lot of time talking about these issues. I think if you're going to engage in escalation dominance, which, as you say, Glenn is a viable strategy sometimes for great power. you have to have some reasonable chance of being able to dominate.

And the fact is, we have no reasonable chance of being able to dominate. First of all, I don't think the French are going to be allowed by the Americans and their European allies to send troops into Ukraine. But even if they do, that's not going to lead to escalation dominance. Those troops are going to get torn apart. And it's going to cause huge riffs in the alliance. I mean, the alliance is already in trouble because they're going to lose this war. And the last thing the alliance needs is a huge fight over putting French troops into Ukraine

and then seeing those French troops get cut to dollrags. So I think we have no escalation dominance strategy here. There's just, it's no option. That's my view. I completely agree. I think that is exactly right. I would also add that I very much hope that the French, that the Americans, because it is the Americans at the end of the day, do put their foot down and say to the French, if the French really are thinking to do this stupid thing, absolutely do not do this. This is a completely stupid idea. If you go into Ukraine, do not expect us to come to your rescue. And in fact, better still if the United States, which has the means to prevent French troops going to Ukraine, the French can't get there by themselves. It's been explained to me. I'm not a logistics person, but it's explained to me logistically that they wouldn't be able to sustain a presence in Ukraine

without American help. I think the Americans should now make it absolutely clear to the French. No, under no circumstances. No way. Because if the French, bench get themselves into trouble, which they will, exactly, as John has said, I think that as night follows day, whatever they're saying to the Americans now about, you know, let it happen to us, we will take it on the chin by ourselves. The reality is they will come scampering to the Americans and they will ask, help us. And far better that the United States is not in a position, doesn't find itself in a position where that happens and it has to make a choice

either of taking unimaginable risks of trying to go into Ukraine to help the French get out which I can't imagine anybody in Washington seriously wants to put themselves in that position or worse, well not so bad but still very bad,

have to say no to the French with all the effect that will cause in Europe So I think, I hope people in Washington understand that this is a crazy idea that the French are floating. It's a sign of growing uncertainty and panic and probably also maneuvering amongst the Europeans. But it's an incredibly dangerous plan and it must not happen. It's not going to achieve anything. the only thing it might do, apart from leading to the destruction of the French in Western Ukraine, is the one thing that might incentivise the Russians more than anything else to move westwards into Western Ukraine,

something which incidentally today, or rather yesterday, Putin made statements which I think signals, again that that is not what they want to do. They do not want to move into Western Ukraine, but they made it absolutely clear again, no NATO troops in Ukraine itself, no NATO boots on the ground. So let's hope this very foolish thing doesn't happen. Just to come back in on this and raise a point that I raised earlier that I'd be curious as to what both of you have to say, since you're both located in Europe. It seems to me there is a real danger here that NATO could be fractured in significant ways. I mean, there's a lot of rhetoric today about this claim that the Russian invasion of Ukraine

has unified and solidified and strengthened. in NATO in wonderful ways and just look at the fact that Finland and Sweden now belong to the alliance and so forth and so on. But if you start thinking about where this is all headed, you can tell a story that the alliance ends up badly wounded. And I think that what McCrone did was very foolish in terms of alliance solidarity. All the news reports indicate, and this of course makes perfect sense, that the Germans are furious with Macron for what he did. And I can't believe that the Americans are happy either. So I think one could argue that what the French are doing here is just making a bad situation worse. And what the French should be doing and everybody else in

Europe should be doing is trying to make sure that all of the NATO countries are on the same page so that when this one finally goes south in a major way, they're not already fighting with themselves and have to deal with a major defeat when they're divided. But it doesn't seem that we're heading in that direction, that we're being smart about this. If anything, I think what Macron has done is make a bad situation worse.

Do you guys agree with that? Absolutely. Well, certainly I do. I mean, I think that's entirely right. I would add, by the way, that of course he's also increasing divisions in France itself. And a French opinion is not by no means united at all behind him on this one. And not, no, is it not united, I'd say a preponderance of people.

And important people in France are against this idea. And if you want to radicalise the political conversation in Europe, the best and most efficient way of doing it is to send troops to Ukraine. It's the same in Britain, by the way. So, yes, divisions between European countries most definitely do exist. The Germans do not want to go into Ukraine, not in any shape, or form. And the publics in Britain and France don't want to do it either. And other European countries are also becoming deeply skeptical. We've had more elections in Slovakia. I think the mood in Other places is also shifting in Italy as well, in Spain.

And I think the Americans also, I'm sure that the Americans do not exactly, as you said, for the reasons we've talked about, they don't want to see this. In fact, I even read somewhere, it might have been in Bloomberg, that the Americans are angry with Macron for bringing this whole topic up, for exactly the reasons, John, that you've said. And I'm sure that is right. Glenn, where do you think NATO is? I mean, when we all get together, assuming we're all still on the planet a year from now,

where do you think NATO will be? It's a good question. I think initially, I think it was good reasons behind this assumption that soldier would be strengthened given this renewed external threat. But I've switched away from this because I think that the strengthening of NATO was largely premised on the West being able to defeat. defeat Russia. Not only would that have strengthened the sense of purpose for NATO, but I also think the Europeans' role will be changed significantly, because after the Cold War, when the United

States tied its security strategy to hegemony, you know, the Europeans effectively have been trying to pursue collective hegemony, that is, the Europeans come together, integrate, in order to have parity with the United States. So you would not just have U.S. hegemony, but the collective hegemony on the West resting on these two pillars. And I think that if they've been able to knock out Russia, this would have strengthened this unipolar moment

under the collective leadership of the West. But this was all premised on victory. I think in defeat, it's quite different. Now we see Europe severely weakened. It cut itself off from the Russians, increasingly the Chinese. Not only are the Europeans weakened, but they become, I think, excessively dependent on the United States, only one power, as they haven't diversified now. And so I think instead of having collective hegemony, I think as a result of defeat in this war, there will be merely strengthened mult polarity.

And I think the Europeans will realize they're not even an independent pole in this new world. So it's a huge defeat from being one of the polls in a collective he's. hegemony to simply being almost a satellite horror, as Macron would have said, vassals of the United States. So I think that would fuel some resentment, but that's only between the Europeans and the Americans. I think also between the Europeans, there's a lot of, as both of you point out, the divisions between the French and the Germans, for example, but also many other lines. the Slovakians, the Hungarians, are not happy about the way the West has behaved. And so I think once the war is over, if there's no victory, I think then people will start to ask very difficult questions. How did we come to this? Was it a good idea to sabotage

the negotiations in March and April of 2022? Who blew up Nord Stream? There's a lot of questions which we could have brushed under the rug if there would have been a victory and we could oppose our will on Russia. But in defeat, I think a lot of these questions will more likely have to be answered and that will only saw more divisions. So I think NATO will probably come out of this severely weakened irrespective of what the media headlines are telling us.

Yeah, I learned a long time ago, whenever you suffer a serious defeat, everybody goes back to the causes. They want to know how did we get into this mess. And when we go back to the causes in this case, I think it will not be a pretty picture for the war party and all the supporters of war in the West. Sorry for intervening.

You didn't interrupt, John. Did you want to continue? No, no, I just wanted to make that quick. I mean, what I would simply say is this, if NATO is to survive, and I think there are still a lot of people in Europe who would prefer that it survived, for many reasons, if only because they still want the Americans as a presence in Europe,

because it may be surprising to hear what a million people like me saying this. But the Americans are, in some respects, a stabilising factor in European affairs. And I think people do want them there, if only for that reason. But if it is to survive, it must be stripped down to more realistic, cool vision. And one important thing that I think has been completely lost sight of is that this expansion of NATO in the way that it has happened has, amongst other things, sucked the United States and some of the core powers of NATO into regional quarrels and grievances that some East European states still have against Russia. And some of these grievances have good, you know, have historical foundations. But there are not a core historical interest of the United States to become drawn into these quarrels. And that's partly what has happened.

So I think what the Americans want need to do is, and not just the Americans, but the big NATO powers, Britain, Germany, France. they need to understand that NATO is useful. If it is really there to preserve the peace of Europe, to provide a kind of mechanism through which problems in Europe can be mediated, that does require some kind of understanding, such as existed during the Cold War, with the other side. NATO worked best when that was the case, when there was some kind of understanding with the Russians. Strangers, as it may sound, I still believe that the Russians themselves would also rather have the Americans still in Europe.

And if having NATO in Europe as a means of keeping the Americans in Europe is the price, I think the Russians are happy to, well, happy, they would pay it because they don't want to see the Germans or the Poles or others chasing off, doing their own things, re-arming, acquiring nuclear weapons, helping help us, having their own quarrels, which might affect the Russians too. So just as happened in the Cold War, in the sort of detente period, I think a mechanism to preserve NATO, in some form, some kind of general overarching agreement within some kind of new security structure is possible. But it does need to be negotiated. And that means accepting that the other side has legitimate security interest. which it is not going to compromise on. That was something that was well understood during the Cold War, and unfortunately, after the Cold War ended, that understanding was lost.

And by the way, at the end of the Cold War, when the Cold War ended, the Soviets did make it clear that they had no problem with NATO remaining intact. They just did not want NATO expansion. And that was the fatal mistake that we made. Exactly. I think that too often it's put into this category, either NATO being all right or all wrong, so you're pro-NATO or anti-NATO,

but I think it must be assessed by just a security institution, its ability to mitigate security competition. And during the Cold War, you know, as long as they could deter without provoking the Soviet Union, you can argue that NATO was a powerful instrument to mitigate security competition. competition. In the absence of an inclusive security architecture, at least I think the alliance system was as good as it could get in those days, given that the two poles couldn't

harmonize. But after the Cold War, when NATO effectively needed a new reason to exist and began to expand, also became interventionists, or as they said, the out-of-air mission. This was the new reason for existing. I think this was all premised on that peace will be insured through hegemony. And this is how they would mitigate security competition. by having no international anarchy, only one central power. But this had many implications. For one, NATO transitioned from being a status quo power preserving the status quo to being revisionist.

And this is the problem of expanding and military interventionism. So I think if NATO can't be stabilizing hegemon, then one has to ask the question, to what extent is able to mitigate security competition? And today, I think NATO has become the main source of, instability in terms of provoking security competition. Again, this is one of the key reasons why the Russians began to look to the east instead. So I think, again, as NATO failed in this conflict, one has to start to reflect exactly how does NATO contribute to security, because obviously the security competition, I think it's a good argument now to say that NATO intensify security

competition instead of mitigates it. And then you need some reforms. if we're able to reflect that that is. Yeah, two quick points to add to that, Glenn, which I of course agree with. The first is there was a very famous article written at the time in the journal Foreign Policy by Joseph Jaffe, the German journalist, where he referred to the United States as the American pacifier in Europe. And the idea was that America's military presence really mattered for keeping the peace among the various states of Europe. And I believe, by the way, this is why we were very

content with the fact that the Europeans did not spend much money on defense. We wanted them to be relatively weak, militarily, and beholden to us. And they, of course, were more than willing to play that game because they fully understood that we were the pacifier, even though that line of argument was rarely articulated except by Jaffe. Second point I would make is you have a similar logic at play in East Asia, where we have on occasion raised the issue to the Chinese that if we were to leave and the Japanese were on their own, the Japanese would get nuclear weapons. They would have to provide for their own security. And you Chinese know what has happened before. before when the Japanese were providing for their own security. So what you want to do is leave us

in East Asia and let us serve as the East Asian pacifier. Of course, the Chinese are no longer happy with that line of argument and they don't see us as a pacifier just as the Russians don't see us as a pacifier anymore. And of course, that was your point, Glenn, that we have gone from being a pacifier to being a provoker. Yeah, but... I don't know just a very quick comment. But that's what I meant. I don't think it has to be either or.

So I don't think it's a good idea to chase, for example, Americans out of Europe either. I think America can still be a good pacifier as to be there. I just think that within the format of the alliance system, the US contributes to intensifying the security competition. If there was an inclusive format, such as OSCE, with a powerful American presence, I think that the US could still play this role

as a pacifier to preserve the status quo instead of the alliance system, which I think tends to instigate more security competition. Sorry, Alexandra. I mean, I agree with both of what you say. Now, of course, I'm not as familiar with the Japanese-Chinese thing, but I can absolutely see that. But in Europe especially,

especially given the problems that the Russians have had with Europe before and the fact that they are not dominant in over Europe in the way that some people say they are. I mean, they're not going to be able to pacify Europe by themselves. That isn't something that the Russians have the ability to do or either, I think, the desire to do. I think that even now, in spite of what has happened, they probably would say to themselves if they were pushed to it,

that at the end of the day, the best partner we have is the United States. If we get to try and stabilize the situation on our Western borders, it's much easier in the end to do that if we have the Americans working with us than if we have to work against them. Now, getting to that, point after all that has happened over the last 30 years, you know, the problems, the crisis is going to be incredibly difficult. Putin spoke recently about how he no longer trusts anyone. And there is this enormous deficit in trust. But I think that if one holds that fact that the potentials for a

successful American-Russian partnership in Europe are there. and that the Russians don't actually, in their own best interests, probably would not want to see the Americans leave Europe. Then it is possible to see how one could perhaps find a way back. Now, can I just say quickly, we've had comments from Putin, and they were very interesting about Ukraine, and they've been difficult to unscramble, but his press chief also came back.

And it was about Ukraine. And Putin said, yes, we are up for negotiations. And his press spokesman said, yes, Istanbul can form the basis of this. The Istanbul agreement can form the basis of this. And this, in effect, is what the Russian defence minister apparently told the French foreign minister. It can't just be Istanbul. Things have moved on. but we would be prepared to sit down and talk about an Istanbul plus.

So obviously the four regions of Crimea. Now, if Ukrainians aren't getting that back, everybody knows it. Let's accept that. But if we go back to all the other things that we agreed in Istanbul, no NATO membership for Ukraine, security guarantees for Ukraine provided by various other parties, various other arrangements that will present, serve the security of other countries, including our own Russia, we're prepared to sit down and

talk about that. Now, that it seems to me, is not an unreasonable position. And it's something that perhaps, you know, we should bear in mind that there is still a way of that out of this problem as well. If people were prepared to initiate proper diplomatic, dialogue and work towards building trust, some kind of mechanism might exist. And if something could be negotiated to settle this crisis in Ukraine, along the lines of some kind of Istanbul plus, were the Americans involved sitting down with the Russians, and it would have to be the Americans. It's impossible to see anyone else doing it. Then over time, negotiations are developed, just as happened in the 50s and the 60s, you start to build a community of trust, a community

of understanding and we might be able to get back to a position which would be in the interests of the Russians and in the interests of the Americans and in the interests of everyone else as well. And by the way, John, I completely agree with the point about the Americans being the pacifier in terms of Europe's own quarrels. I don't know how things would turn out, for example, Europe between the French and the Germans if the Americans weren't there. It might seem as if this is old history, but I wouldn't count on it myself as somebody who knows both Germany and France very well. Well, you, in the context of Trump re-entering the White House and possibly putting an end to NATO, the Germans have begun to talk about how to provide security for themselves.

And unsurprisingly, there has been a new discussion about Germany getting nuclear weapons. Now, I'm not saying that's going to happen, but once Germany has to provide security for itself, and it doesn't have the American security umbrella, especially the American nuclear umbrella over its head, and given Germany's geographical location in Europe, it will begin to think about nuclear weapons. And it will care much more about what happens in East Europe as it has in the past. And this is not a good thing. And this gets back to our earlier discussion about why the Russians, excuse me, why the Soviets initially and even the Russians after that were happy to keep the Americans in Europe because they understood that we were the pacifier. And by the way, the Germans

understood that we were the pacifier. They did not want to provide for their own security. And so you can see that if the Americans were to leave and the Europeans were on their own, you would not have a unified Europe. You would have a Europe that was quite disputatious. And this would all be in the wake of this war in Ukraine, which is so on all sorts of poison across the continent. And I think that's the French now wanting to send troops. I think it could be seen in that context as well. They see themselves as if Germany was the economic leader, then they're the military leader within the EU.

So if the Americans seem to withdraw a bit from Ukraine, then this is when the French should rise to the occasion, essentially replace American leadership. So I can see the security company or the rivalry between the Europeans increasing if the United States go out. But I was curious what was said about the Istanbul 2.0, if you will, because I think everyone recognizes at the foundation of any peace agreement, there has to be the issue of neutrality, because this was, as everyone recognized, the Ukrainians and negotiators in early 2022, this is the only. or main thing the Russians wanted. Everything else was negotiable. Obviously, after the US and the UK convinced the Ukrainians to abandon this agreement and instead fight the Russians and we'll get everything they wanted,

you know, two years has passed. Now, obviously, the territory has been lost. Now, the conflict is much more difficult to resolve. As on top of neutrality, you also have the territorial dispute now. But this is what I don't understand. Even the mainstream media now is starting to wake up to the fact that the Ukraine is being decimated, that their war is being lost. The way at least I see it, it looks like a collapse is more or less unavoidable by the summertime. So, again, I don't want to put a specific time limit.

A lot can change, but it appears to be entering the final chapter. But if this is a case, wouldn't you now seek to find a settlement? And because I see people like Stoltenberg or Kirby, they continue to insist that Ukraine will join NATO. And this is, again, this eliminates the basic foundation for any peaceful settlement. And I can't understand why they would do it. And on one hand, yes, this is the one thing that will keep the Ukrainians fighting, you know, bleeding the Russians a little bit more. But it's also the one thing that will keep the Russians fighting because this is the most important thing. You can't have a peace without neutrality for Ukraine.

So how can you explain this insistence on joining NATO at this point in time when Ukraine is losing? It does very strange to me. Well, I think that these individuals at the top are so deeply invested in winning this war that they can't bring themselves to face reality. It's like turning a super tanker around in the water when you're dealing with people like that. It's just going to take them a good period of time to shift their views. The same thing true is true with regard to Zelensky. Why doesn't Zelensky understand that this is a lost war and now is the time to try to work out some sort of diplomatic deal? so you minimize your losses and maximize your gains.

But he's talking just like Stoltenberg and the Americans and the West Europeans more generally. It's remarkably foolish. But I want to raise a point here in response to what Alexander was saying before. I think all three of us agree that the core of any diplomatic solution, which we should move to immediately, is a neutral Ukraine. Okay? My question is, what is the relationship between the United States and Ukraine moving forward? Now, Alexander, I think your comments implied the Americans have to be involved, and the American-Ukrainian relationship still has to be somewhat intact.

I have a different view. I think, and I'm not saying this is going to happen, but I think to satisfy the Russians, the U.S. Ukrainian link has to be almost completely severed. And if you talk about in Istanbul too, or you talk about bringing Naftali Bennett back to negotiate, you have to do it the way you did it the last time, which is the Ukrainians and the Russians negotiate. They can do it through Nftali Bennett or they can do it through Erdogan and Istanbul. But you've got to keep the Americans out. And you have to sever almost all ties that ties.

That aid package, that economic and military aid package of $61 billion, that has to just be put to an end. And if anybody provides economic support, it has to be the Europeans or a little bit of military support. And this has to be done in conjunction with the Russians. The Russians are in the driver's seat here. we have to work out some sort of diplomatic agreement that satisfies the Russians so that we can save the Ukrainians. I mean, that's the real, and from my perspective, that's the really important issue. This does not matter that much to the United States. That's what makes it so amazing that we ever got into this giant mess to begin with.

The United States is an incredibly powerful and secure country. The country that is being destroyed is Ukraine. And what we should want to do at this point from both a strategic and a moral point of view is do everything we can to put an end to it. But anyway, Alexander, I'd be very curious to know what you think about my argument that you don't understand how completely we have to sever that tie between the United States and Ukraine. I think the Russians must be reading you and listening to you, John, because in fact, if you went and listened further to Putin,

statements. He was actually talking again about how this process is going to happen, and he was talking about Lukashenko, who was there being the mediator, which in effect cuts out the Americans. He said, you know, if we ever get to the situation where we're in negotiations, I will turn to you, I will go to you. And he said that in Lukashenka was just next thing. And you can act again as the mediator and the broker. Apparently, he's also in touch with Erdogan in Turkey as well. I think what has to happen at the moment, and I think this is where the Americans are very important, the ultimate decision to break the impasse must be weighed in Washington, because nobody else is going to make it. The Ukrainians Zelensky can't. I think that for whatever reason, personal, psychological, political,

whatever it is, he doesn't seem capable of advancing a negotiation process by himself. the NATO bureaucracy, as we've seen, they can't do it, and the Europeans can't get their act together either. The Americans, what they need to do is talk to the Russians, tell them, look, and the Ukrainians, look, we want to see the end of the war. American interests aren't engaged. We're not really concerned about Ukraine. I think they have to be very clear to the Ukrainians about this. sit down and sort it out and Istanbul too, if that's what comes, we're not going to be concerned about that. The agreement that I was talking about is about the general security situation in Europe.

The relationship between Ukraine and Russia, I agree. Neutrality, Russia, relations with Ukraine, Europe, relations with the Ukraine, but the Russians will certainly not want the United States there. And if this is going to work, the Americans must accept that and acknowledge that whatever it was that they were trying to do in Ukraine has only created a disaster. And the best thing they can do is to just pull out and leave Ukraine to take care of itself. I think that would actually stabilized the situation. And I think once that was done and that recognition was made, then we would start to see a significant easing in the tensions in Europe. What I come back to

saying is it is a decision that has to be made in Washington. Until the Americans understand that, until the Americans push all the other parties to negotiate, we're not going to get peace, because by themselves they can't do it. I also think it's important to have a complete severing because a key problem is this incrementalism, the drip-drip, because it's not either in Ukraine in NATO or outside NATO. The main problem between 2014 and 2022 wasn't that membership was pending. It was becoming a de facto member.

The Russians were seeing gradually all the Western weapons system entering, training, right-wing militias. you had the New York Times was an eight or 12 CIA basis along the border to Russia. You had, you know, the Ukrainian ports being modernized to fits the American warships. They kind of sued that so that this incrementalism only made it year by year more difficult to eventually dislodge NATO from Ukraine, which is why that one point put this red line saying, listen, no more. Here's the piece.

We need the security agreement. otherwise will take action. Obviously, the main problem when you act on red lines, by definition, it's easy to sell it as an overreaction or unprovoked. But again, they were responding to the gradual developments over eight years. So I also think it's necessary to have a more straight agreement, something, you know, neutrality can't simply mean not be a part of NATO. Again, as was the advisor of President Sarkozy, well, former President Sarkozy, of France, who, who made the argument that after November of 2021,

when the US and Ukraine signed this strategic partnership agreement, I forgot the exact name. Anyways, he made this argument and that this convinced the Russians. In his words, they have to attack or be attacked. You know, this is quite severe. So it kind of makes the point. It's not either in-nate or outside, because obviously we're able to create a very powerful Ukrainian proxy army

during those eight years. but I guess the motivation for seeking a peace is gone now and I'm thinking back in November of 2022 General Millie he made this argument

that in the last half of 2020 the Russians had suffered greatly and now finally we're in the best position the Ukrainians were standing strong the Russians had suffered there wouldn't be any better moment than now to sue for peace but

and again that was very correct that would have been the ideal moment I would say November 22, but you know, he had to walk this back because you're not allowed to call for peace. And this is the main idea. We need complete victory. And I think that was the main follow. But how can we build a momentum for peace negotiations now? Because now Russia is at its strongest and Ukraine is at its weakest. So in Millis, war, this is the worst time to start to negotiate. Of course, if things are only getting worse from here, you can argue that this is still

a reason to negotiate, but, you know, given the absence of ability to turn the tide, what is the objective now? How can the West start to, you know, reconsider peace? It seems to me that what's going on here is that every day the Ukrainian situation on the battlefield field deteriorates more and more. And furthermore, every day, the Russian air offensive against Ukraine's energy infrastructure becomes more and more effective. And it becomes clearer and clearer to more and more people that Ukraine is going to lose. And you begin to see stories in the papers, which I saw the...

morning, which said that high-level officials in the Biden administration acknowledge that there's a serious possibility that the Ukrainian army will collapse. That's their language. And if you listen to General Kovoli, who is the leading American general in Europe speak, he's a very smart man. He's very articulate. He fully understands that the existing balance of power is shifting rapidly so that the Russians are becoming increasingly powerful over time, which is consistent with the argument that there is a danger of collapse. Now, they may move those people in Washington who are in charge, the Biden people may move to try and put an end to the fighting

and move towards a diplomatic solution before the collapse takes place. But if they don't do that, it just seems to me it's some, point, the Ukrainian military is going to collapse or it's going to be steadily pushed back by the Russians in ways that make it clear to everybody that this is lost. Now, some people may want to say, oh, if we get this aid package through Congress, that will rectify the problem. I think anybody who makes that argument, I even think anybody who's making that argument now is delusional, right? That eight package is simply not going to matter, as the three of us and many other smart people have said. So there's no rescuing the situation militarily, and it's going to steadily deteriorate, and at some point they're going to have to recognize what's happening.

And the real problem is, and we, of course, all agree on this, the real problem is the Ukrainians could get a better deal now than if they continue to fight. and continue to lose more and more territory and more and more people. And that's why it would make eminently good sense to do something now. But again, we have a situation where the elites in the West are so invested in this war, and the elites in Ukraine are so invested in this war, that they can't go the diplomatic route, it appears. I'm afraid I agree. And one, two points to make.

The first is that if that's why I say, if there's going to be a, change, a breakthrough, a diplomatic move that makes a difference. It has to come from the Americans because nobody else's agency. In America, there is still a level of debate about this. Stephen Walt was writing in, I think, was foreign affairs the other day. I saw a piece that he wrote. This is man, Matthew Blackburn. He wrote a good piece in the national interest. We don't have articles like that appearing in comparable media outlets here in. London and that's a major problem and that's also true right across Europe. The fundamental problem, the roadblock is in the administration and those around it.

And I was reading again with real despair because there's an article today in Bloomberg in which they say that they have only got plan A. They don't have a plan B even as plan A collapses all around them. Now, I said that Putin is talking about, you know, Istanbul 2 or Istanbul Plus. He's floating that idea. But his ambassador went to at the United Nations, was talking in a very different way. And I'm sure he did that with, you know, getting a green light from Moscow. Also, he said that, you know, before very long, the only subject that we'll be discussing in international conferences will be the unconditional surrender.

of Kiev. Now, you can take all that with a pinch of salt, but you can see, you can see where he's coming. He's clearly saying, saying, you know, if we don't get a compromise, which we can work with in our own interests, which perhaps we would rather prefer, then we are going to dictate terms. We're going to win this war, and we are going to dictate terms. And it might, might be that the outcome then is even less to your liking than the outcome of a negotiated settlement would be now, but we are in a position to do that. I still think the Russians would prefer to have terms. I still think they would prefer to have an agreement that was accepted internationally that didn't involve them in more problems in Europe, that didn't draw them into Western

Ukraine where they don't really feel that they want to be. I think they would that is their optimal outcome. That's why Putin is saying, you know, setting out these balloons about Istanbul Plus. But the alternative is total defeat for Ukraine, a debacle for us in the West and prolonged period of very, very deep confrontation in Europe. I would have thought we would want to avoid the last. Let me just piggyback on what Alexander said and sort of add another dimension to this. A lot of our discussion here today, and of course a lot of the discussion in the media, is all about shutting this war down now and getting some sort of agreement. But there are two types of agreement you can get. One is you can get a frozen conflict.

In other words, we can shut it down, but there's still a conflictual relationship between the Russians on one side and Ukraine and the West on the other. Or you could get a genuine peace agreement. And the reason this distinction matters, and it matters enormously, is because it says a great deal about the future, right? We may be able to shut this war down. People may listen to what folks like us are saying. We may get a diplomatic negotiation that results in a frozen conflict. But the end result will be that both sides will be trying to undermine each other forever and ever. And there are all sorts of potential flashpoints here where that cold or a frozen conflict could turn into a hot war again.

Just think the Black Sea, Moldova, Belarus, so forth and so on. So I think it's very important that at this juncture, we think not simply about the present, but also about the future, and that we try to shut this one down in ways that allow the Ukrainians to live a decent life in the future. That neutral Ukraine, right, is a somewhat viable state. It's not, you know, a dysfunctional rump state. And the relations between the Europeans, the Norwegians, for example, and the Russians are not poisonous for as far as the eye can see.

So we want to think about the future as well as the present when we talk about a negotiated settlement. I completely agree. Can I ask a quick side question? You refer to Norway there for a second because this is the relations are as a consequence of this war getting a little bit out of control. Even before, of course, the Russians invaded, the Americans. negotiated to set up a military basis on the soil of Norway and now it's only increased dramatically so many now see this is outsourcing the foreign policy i was just wondering what what are your perspectives on what what path we're going down here is it is this uh the united

states preparing to challenge the russians in the arctic or how how do you see this development i don't know it's a bit detached from the ukrainian issue but it's a direct consequence or partly a consequence. No, I think that what's going to happen here is the United States and its European allies and the Ukrainians will do everything they can to challenge the Russians at every turn, right? Just think about what happens when Lukashenko leaves in Belarus. Are we going to try to foster a color revolution? I bet a lot of money we try to do that.

That's the way we operate. Is this going to lead to big Trump? you better believe it, because that's the other piece of real estate that the Russians care about enormously for all the obvious strategic reasons and historical reasons, right? The Arctic, the potential for trouble up there is enormous, and the Americans will try to stick it to the Russians in the Arctic. The Russians have now invited the Chinese to come up to the Arctic with them because they know they're outnumbered up there, seven to one. and you have all sorts of potential for security competition and trouble up there. I could go on and on as you guys could on this issue. And this is why I'm saying if we don't get some sort of meaningful agreement

where we have a modus vivendiiv between the two sides, the potential for trouble is not going to go away. And I'm sad to say I don't see much hope here simply because of the United States. I think Alexander is exactly right about the Russians. I think the Russians, because there are a much weaker power than the United States, are not interested in throwing their weight around all over Europe and all around the planet. They don't think in the same way that we Americans think. Americans have an imperialistic impulse built into them these days.

They want to dominate the world. And they're not going to be happy about losing to Russia and Ukraine, and they're going to want revenge. And we're very powerful, and we think we can fight here, there, and everywhere. So I think that the Americans will be the principal source of the problem. And the ethnic Ukrainians who are on the right-hand side of the political spectrum will be a huge problem as well. They will want revenge. They want to conquer all the territory they can get back.

So it'll be forces inside Ukraine and forces in the West, mainly the Americans. And a lot of America's allies will go along with this provocative policy. I read about the Swedes every day. Sweden is a very hardline country filled with Russophobia. And you know that's true in both Norway and Britain. So the future here is not a promising one. I'm afraid I also agree with that. I mean, I said what I think could happen, that the option to go back,

back to a detente period is possible. Because detente was based on an acceptance by the United States, that the other side, even if they were not equal to the United States, which they were not equal than the 1960s. They were nonetheless supremely powerful. They were very, very powerful. And there could be a balance. The United States does not accept that there's a possibility.

There's a reason to balance the Russians. They will feel that the Russians winning. in Ukraine can be reversed by putting pressure on the Russians in other places. And I don't really think, I'm afraid I agree with this. I don't really think that there is that understanding in the United States, in the leadership, in the government of the United States. There are among many people in the United States, but not within the top leadership of the United States,

that in America's own interests, it needs. needs to stabilize the situation in Europe. Because, of course, a prolonged confrontation in Europe against the Russians who are still powerful is going to be a huge distraction and require a big commitment of American resources, which the United States could perhaps better use in other places. Just to add to this, I think one of the problems that the Americans have is that they have no sense, and I'm talking here about the governing elites, the foreign policy establishment, almost all people in that establishment have hardly any sense of the limits of military force. And you could be a very powerful country in international politics.

You can be the most powerful country on the planet. But there are real limits to what you can do. The United States lost in Vietnam, the United States lost in Afghanistan, the Soviet Union lost in Afghanistan. If you look at the Israelis in Gaza, the papers are now beginning to fill up with stories about how Israel is going to lose in Gaza. There's a piece in the Wall Street Journal today on the front page. There's a piece in Horat's making this argument. And obviously the IDF is far more powerful than Hamas is, if you look at the traditional indicators of military power. But again, there are just limits to what you can do with military power. And if you don't understand that, you're going to get yourself into a whole heck of a lot of trouble.

And this is what's happened with the Israelis, I believe, in Gaza. And I believe it's what's happened to the United States. during the unipolar moment when we fought all these wars that we lost, and with regard to Ukraine. Again, getting back to General Millie, I just saw a clip of the interview that he gave back in the fall of 2022. And he sounds like a genius, right? He called it. That was the high watermark for Ukraine. That's when a deal should have been cut. But I believe that Millie, because he's a military officer, and I believe he was being fed good intelligence that told them what the balance would look like moving forward, he understood that, you know, military force has

its limits, you know, sometimes you're successful, but you don't want to go too far, you don't want to pursue a bridge too far, let's cut a deal now. But the American foreign policy elites, and here we're talking mainly about the civilians, they think that, you know, you can double down and use just a bit more military force and you'll win and you'll get your way. They believe power grows out of the end of a rifle barrel. And there's a lot of truth in that, but you've got to qualify that in all sorts of ways if you don't want to end up getting into serious trouble. And I think we're incapable of that.

That's why I brought up merely earlier because I thought the analysis was impeccable. It was exactly correct. But he had to walk it back just because, and that kind of explains how the decision-making kind of goes against rationality as per-defined by this analysis. But also on the topic of limits of the US power, there's also a remarkable headline in Financial Times. It goes something like the United States asked China to tell Iran not to retaliate against Israel. And I thought this was the most spectacular headline because essentially they're asking China, which they're fighting an economic war with, which could escalate into a military war, ask the Chinese to tell Iran, which America's abandoned all diplomatic contact with, or at least the embassies and all. And also they're also fighting a covert war against each other, hijacking each other's oil tankers. And in order not to retaliate against Israel, which is supposed to be a satellite almost of America.

Instead, America has no ability to rein in, to constrain it or influence. Israel does what it wants and tells America what to do. So this sentence just for me, I thought about actually you, John, when I read it, this is limits of power. Obviously, the 90s are over, I thought. But on this topic of Israel, I thought, again, this headline was also interesting, because where is this going now? So it seems as if a real war now between Israel and Iran could be a real possibility even by the time in this video is posted. But what exactly is your question?

Do you want to talk about what's happening with Iran? Yeah. Do you see a war coming? Do you think Iran will retaliate after the attack on its consulates? Or do you? Or that's true to the both of you, actually. I'll start off and say it appears to me, and I am speculating to a large extent here, it appears to me the Iranians have to retaliate.

And the interesting question is, what does the retaliation look like? And it's quite clear the Americans want to make sure that the retaliation is limited so that the Americans don't have to get involved. And number two, so that the Israelis don't retaliate and then this thing escalates. And of course, then the danger is we get dragged in. The United States gets dragged in. But I think the Americans are deeply fearful of escalation and for good reason. I mean, if you think about what's going on here, the Americans didn't not want to get into a fight with Iran. we have made that manifestly clear.

The Iranians have made it manifestly clear. They don't want to get into a fight with us or with Israel. They want to stay on the sidelines. But what's happened here is that the Israelis, I think, took it upon themselves. I find it hard to believe the Americans did this with the Israelis. The Israelis went off and they bombed the Iranian consulate or mission. in the mosque. And they created this terrible situation for us, because we may get dragged into a war with Iran.

And the last thing the United States needs is a war in the Middle East that involves Iran. By the way, we're trying to back out now of the war with the Houthis. We now recognize that we've lost that war with the Houthis, trying to get out of that one. The last thing we want to do is get into a war with Iran. And of course, the Israelis want to drag us into a war with Iran, right? The Israelis are behind this. And we're trying desperately to make sure it doesn't escalate. Whether we succeed is hard to say.

Yeah, I can just quickly turn to John's point about the limits of military power. I've argued this very point with some people from the United States and with many, many people in Britain. many people in Britain on this issue about American military power are more royalists than the king. They get incredibly offended whenever you suggest to them that there is a limit to what Western American plus British, not that we actually contribute very much, power can actually do. It's somehow considered indecent to make this point when in fact, unless you're, you understand that, unless you understand that power has limits, in fact, not just military power, but all power has limits, that that is, the intelligent application of power is

acknowledging that it has limits. Unless you understand that, you are inevitably going to get yourself into all kinds of trouble and all sorts of places in all the time. If you cast aside all limits, think to yourself that you can do anything, anywhere, all the time, that you will lose. No one can be strong everywhere, not even a country as powerful as the United States. But as I said, I've come up against this argument. I've tried to make this point. I've always failed, as I said, people I've made it to, somehow think that there's something immoral when I've tried to make it.

about Iran, John, I completely agree about the United States. I completely agree. I completely agree on by Israel also. The attack on the diplomatic mission in Damascus was, to me, it looked like a transparent attempt by Israel to try to involve the United States in some bigger conflict with Iran because Israel is obviously clearly in severe trouble in Gaza. It's not achieving its objectives there. Its military campaign has been a failure. Its economy has suffered as a result. I remember you're going back to military people.

I went on a program with Lieutenant Colonel Davis, whom I think you know. He made that very point right at the very start before the Israelis went in. He said, whatever the Israelis think they're going to achieve in Gaza, they're not going to achieve it. It's going to fail. and it's going to fail disastrously. They'll be shocking loss of life. There'll be terrible devastation, but they won't win because they can't.

And he went through all the reasons why they wouldn't win in the air. And he was right. But I think that is what the Israelis want. They want a conflict with the Iranians, and they want to involve the Americans. And the Iranians do have to intervene because, of course, they have pressure from people on their own side, not just within Iran, but their allies or proxies look to Iran to be strong.

I mean, I think the Iranians also understand very well that this is a trap for them. It's an all too obvious trap. And they will try to act in a measured and calibrated way to avoid getting themselves strong into this huge conflict that the Israelis are wanting to draw them into, and which the United States doesn't want to be involved in either. And I think that will just about hold. But yet again, going back, another example of an ally of the United States trying to manipulate the United States in its own interests

and the United States apparently having almost no ability to control its own ally. Two quick points. One is, with regard to Israel, in your description of the problems with Hamas, which is on the money, we also don't want to lose sight of the fact that they have their hands full with Hezbollah in the north, and they have no plausible strategy for winning that one. And there's talk in Israel that the 60,000 Israelis who have been displaced from the north are not going to be able to go back to their homes in the foreseeable future.

This is really quite shocking. So the Israelis have multiple problems. Hamas is just one of them, probably the biggest, but Hezbollah is a huge problem. Second point I want to make to you, folks, is let's assume that a war breaks out between Iran and Israel or Iran and the United States. what is the strategy that either the Israelis or the Americans use that leads to a happy ending, right? I remember a number of years ago when we were negotiating the JCPOA. That was the nuclear agreement between Iran and mainly the United States. And there was all sorts of talk about forgetting, pushing aside to JCPOA, forgetting,

negotiations and just bombing the nuclear sites in Iran. But almost everybody agreed that if you bomb the Iranian nuclear sites, you would set back the program five years at the most, but they would eventually develop nuclear weapons because they could build the capability to produce weapons inside of mountains. They could hide that capability. And we couldn't go on, we couldn't continue bombing Iran forever and ever to prevent them from getting nuclear weapons. So we reached the conclusion that an arms control agreement was better than attacking Iran's nuclear capabilities because it didn't solve the problem. So attacking Iran now will just lead to a war and we will not win a victory, whether we go after the nuclear sites or other sites.

If we turn the dogs loose and we bomb huge numbers of buildings or infrastructure in Iran, okay, but what does that do? Are the Iranians going to throw their hands up and say, we quit, you won, we'll do what you want now? Of course they're not going to do that, any more than Hamas did that, or Hezbollah does that. These people fight back. They have a second strike. And we don't win. So there is nothing to be gained that I can see in a war with Iran.

And that includes shutting down their nuclear capability once and for all. You cannot do that via military means. I agree with that also completely. I mean, I have to say I've just had an argument about this with someone. And I actually ask you what do you think is going to happen if there is a combined American Israeli attack on Iran. And he said, I'm not making this up. And this is not an unrepresentative,

but person who is involved in these things. He came forward and he said, well, there'll be a general uprising in Iran and they will overthrow the government there. I said, are you seriously? You really think that's going to happen? I mean, what makes you think that's going to happen? I mean, what is your evidence?

And of course, it's not the question of evidence. is a question of belief. And of course, that's what I hear all the time for people talking this way. And there are many of them. They exist in Britain, too, by the way. They assume that Iran is this rickety vessel held together only by coercion and oppression, and that if it's attacked, you know, all you need to do is kick, and the whole thing will come tumbling down.

And there is no plan, as far as I know. I mean, if there does exist, I don't know what the plan is. There is no plan if that doesn't happen. All the evidence in the scholarly literature is that exactly the opposite happens. If you attack another country, that the population in that country rallies around the flag. And all you have to do is look at what happened when the Russians invaded Ukraine. There's no question that the Ukrainians rallied around the flag. Ukrainian nationalism became a much more powerful force because the Russians had attacked Ukraine.

So the idea that we're going to attack Iran and decapitate the regime and get the population to turn against the regime or that we're going to turn Ukraine, I mean, Iran into a liberal democracy, and then we're all going to live happily every. after is lunacy. I just don't understand how people can even think this. By the way, if you're interested in making sure, or let me put it differently, if you want to maximize the prospects of Iran not getting nuclear weapons, the best way to do it is to stop threatening Iran. The reason Iran should want nuclear weapons. I'm not saying this is right from an American point of view. But from an Iranian point of view, the reason you should want nuclear weapons is because the Israelis and the Americans are threatening you all the time. If you take the threat away, it is more likely, not guaranteed, more likely that Iran won't need, want nuclear weapons because it won't need nuclear weapons to deter its adversaries. But you can't sell that argument in the West.

I think that has been one of the wrong lessons communicated to the world because countries such as Libya, in Iraq who gave up on their nuclear weapons program, they were destroyed. And countries like North Korea and Pakistan, which just did it in secret, they might get sanctioned, but once they're at the other end and they have the nuclear weapons, they're safe. This is the worst possible signal you actually want to put out and send to the world. But I would just add one thing on this rally around the flag, because I would argue you can apply the same to Russia, because I was talking to a lot of Russians when they first invaded

Ukraine in February of 2022 and it was not a very popular decision. Many people were quite critical they see the Ukrainians as being brotherly people so to speak and if the West hadn't done anything and Russia would only have

done a lot of harm to the Ukrainians I think it could have been one of the very unpopular wars which would have made it a very unpopular government but instead this very open sending all this weapon the capabilities, but also expressing our intentions quite openly. Oh, we just want to bleed the Russians to weaken them.

You know, we effectively confirmed what the Kremlin had said, that this was a NATO war on Russia, which began in 2014, and it was a war of survival. And suddenly now, you know, Putin is more popular than ever. And I don't think people recognize this. If you wanted to destabilize, this was a Bismarck's argument back in days as well. nothing made the Russians come stronger together than this external threat. So, you know, same with Iran.

Stop threatening these countries because obviously this is the main thing that's going to, there's not going to be any regime change in Iran. But there's always this wishful thinking, I think. Whenever we have tensions with another government, the first impulse is never to, well, how can we find a compromise? How can we harmonize their interests, resolve our differences? It's always, even if there's allies such as Turkey, it's always, maybe if we have a regime change, get rid of Erdogan,

oh, Russia, maybe regime change. China, regime change. It's always, if you can just change the leadership, then the natural condition would be that everyone would do as they're told. It's as if recognition of competing interest is no longer part of the calculation. So it's a very strange approach to international security. You also want to think about the effects of the terrorist attack in Moscow this past March. It caused Russians to rally around the flag.

Great. It's just another example. Absolutely. Apparently more people join the army in response because this is their way of defending the motherland from this kind of thing. And it has traction everywhere in every country. This thing happens. I can remember as a child when there was the crisis in Cyprus, the Turkish army entered Cyprus. We had the Greek dictatorship then. My father was deeply opposed to it. We were in exile. But there was a possibility of war between Turkey and Greece. And he was in his 40s, but he wanted to go back to Greece because if there was a war, he was prepared to fight to defend Greece, even if that meant reconciliation. with the dictatorship that had exiled him. So there you go.

That's nationalism, the most powerful political ideology of the planet. And it really limits nationalism more than any other force limits what you can do with military power. Absolutely. It's what George Kennan was, he delved very, very deep into sociology exactly, because he tried to explain why nationalism was such a powerful force, which we hadn't really seen before.

But no, I just find it amazing that, well, I guess that the Western response to the terrorist attack. Again, I'm not sure how you see the likelihood of the CIA being involved in this. Obviously, the Russians blamed not just the Ukrainians, but also the British and the Americans. But irrespective, because that would be speculations, but what we could see was the political and media coverage of the terrorist attack. Instead of being, you know, how we would treat one of our own or just as a principle condemned terrorist attacks, there was this almost subheading in every article going, oh, look at the Putin. You couldn't even predict this terrorist attack. You know, look how weak the government is. It can't protect these people.

or surely people will protest now. So almost mocking or trying to stoke tensions or exploiting the terrorist attack. You know, the Russians, they do read the Western media. They see what we're trying to do, you know, taking advantage of a terrorist attack to try to undermine the government and so divisions. It's my point is it has the opposite effect. It's quite open what the intent is, I think. Well, it's also hard to think strategically, or to put it in slightly different terms, it's hard to think smartly when you're purveying all this misinformation and people believe that misinformation.

To go back to our discussion before about the position we were articulating that now is the time to cut a deal with the Russians, create a neutral Ukraine and minimize the amount of terror. that the Russians take. The counter that you invariably hear to that in the United States is that Putin cannot be trusted. He's a congenital liar. He's broken. Every agreement he's ever signed and so forth and so on. And this is a ludicrous argument. There's just no evidence to support it. I wrote a book, by the way, on lying in international politics, as you surely know, Glenn, right? So I've studied the subject of lying. Putin is hardly a congenital liar. I would be hard-pressed to find one example of him lying. I mean, I'm sure there are one or two cases out there, but the idea that he's a congenital liar is not a serious argument. And with regard to

the trust issue, he was the one who made a mistake trusting the West, right? The West bamboozled him, which they have now admitted, Angela Erkel and company over the whole Minsk Accords, right? But Putin has not been untrustworthy, in my opinion. You don't have to like Putin. You can condemn him for invading Ukraine. But making the argument that he's a congenital liar and that he is completely untrustworthy is an argument that has no basis in fact. But again, basis in fact is not a concept that means a lot in the West.

days. Very, very, very true. I mean, its purpose is to make the purpose of saying that is precisely in order to prevent negotiations from taking place. And of course, that's why we are where we are, because we're in a cul-de-sac. We have, we are facing a defeat, a major defeat. I mean, the one thing Boris Johnson has said, which is absolutely true, he's just said it, by the way, is that the defeat we're going to suffer in Ukraine, if Ukraine does go down, is going to be far worse than Afghanistan. I think we can all agree with that. I mean, it is going to be a major, it is going to be a major defeat. And we have these false arguments, always brought up, based on this false history, to prevent us taking steps which might just possibly, at least mitigate that defeat and make it less serious than it would otherwise be and perhaps just possibly

find some pathway forward. But I get the sense sometimes people, some people would prefer us to lose rather than compromise. I don't understand that kind of thinking myself. But when you meet and speak with some of these people, and I'm sure you've done that also, John, the idea of compromise of any kind is, again, somehow offensive to them. But the thing is, Alexander, if you portray Putin as the devil incarnate, the second coming of Adolf Hitler, which, of course, you and I know is ludicrous,

but lots of these people believe, then it's possible to compromise. How do you compromise with Adolf Hitler? But the argument we're making is that this is not Adolf Hitler, it's not even close, and a deal could be worked out. And in fact, this is an individual, Putin, who was interested in making deals not only before February 24th, 2022, but immediately thereafter at Istanbul. This is a guy who wrote a letter to both Stoltenberg and Biden on December 17, 2021, saying, let's work out a deal. This is somebody who was genuinely committed to making Minsk work.

So he's not Adolf Hitler. But so many people believe that he is that it's very easy to sell the argument that you can't do diplomacy with him. You can't negotiate. And the end result is we're going to suffer a defeat. I would just embellish that term that you use defeat, Alexander, by saying a self-inflicted defeat. Yeah. Well, I think that's why the narrative has to change before peace negotiations is possible, because, well, as John said, if you think it's Hitler, you can't negotiate with Hitler. But if we can have some more openness in the media and, you know, just state the facts which can be confirmed,

such as, you know, the Western countries did sabotage the Minsk Agreement for seven years. And then when the Russians invaded, it was with force, the size and the actions with intention of imposing peace based on neutrality. I mean, even Zelensky's office confirmed on the day after Russia invaded on the 25th of February 2020, the day after, that they had been contacted by Moscow to start negotiations with the main focus being neutrality. So it's like throughout the whole process, the facts are already there. It's just that it doesn't come forth in the media. Because, again, if you say that after Russia's done with Ukraine, they will march on to NATO. As long as you say this, it's good for mobilizing support. But you can't get anyone to sit down at the negotiation table because, yeah, again, he's the new recarnation of Hitler in their mind.

And we tend to do this with all conflicts. You probably noticed if it's Milosevic, Assad, you know, whoever is our new Saddam Hussein, they're always the next Hitler. So it's always this, yeah. But the problem is once there's a Hitler, as I said, the only possible outcome is complete victory. And again, this is also a very hegemonic approach to security that is defeating your adversaries instead of finding common ground. And I think that's the wider curse of hegemon.

I'm thinking back what Alexander said before as well, the limitations of power, because the curse of Hedgemon is really, you don't have to be strategic anymore, because if strategy implies prioritizing regions, one over another, conflict versus another. But if you have global primacy, you can do everything, and you can make a lot of mistakes.

You can accrue all the costs. But over time, this builds up, the failure to prioritize. All of this begins to weigh you down. And I think we're reaching this breaking point now. But how are you going to restore strategic thinking? That would imply giving up on the whole concept of global primacy. And this has been effectively the core of the world order since the Cold War.

So it's a huge task. And all of this, I think, is reflected in the inability to even have basic diplomacy with the Russians over Ukraine. One last comment from me. And then I think I'm probably done. Just to say briefly, maybe we need a big defeat. to sober us up, because I'm not sure that there's anything else. I mean, it is going to be self-inflicted. We've had lots opportunity after opportunity,

if we're talking about Ukraine, to get out of this hole. Instead, we're just digging ourselves deeper and deeper in. And it's the same pattern that we follow in every other place. But perhaps, given that this mentality exists, we need that big defeat. And going back to that absolutely correct point, that John said, when a war is lost, people go back and they look at what led to the defeat and sometimes proper lessons alone from it. And maybe that's what we need to have.

It's a bitter thing to say, but maybe that's the future. I would just say this is a self-congratulatory comment, but I think the three of us, and there are many other people like us, gone a long way towards educating people in the broader public about what is really going on here. I think it's just unfortunate that we've had so little influence inside the mainstream media. We've been relegated in good part to the sidelines. But I think if we had had a more open debate from the get-go and people like us had been

able to participate in the mainstream, we'd be a lot better off with regard to Ukraine and a number of other crises around the world as well. I completely agree. I totally agree with that. Any final words before we wrap this up? Well, I think we are now moving fast, actually, in Ukrainian things. We'll see what happens. I think there's still a time. There's still the door open, but it's closing fast. And at some point, probably in this summer, it's going to shut.

And it will be decided militarily by the Russians. And then it will simply be a question of where they choose to stop. And what happens when they do? I would just conclude by saying that one should also recognize that there is an impending disaster in the Middle East. As a conflict, lost for the Israelis. and that has all sorts of consequences. The potential for escalation, as we talked about, is very real.

And then we haven't even talked about East Asia, where there is also potential for serious conflict, especially in the South China Sea these days. So I think the United States and the West more generally is in a heck of a lot of trouble. I agree. I think this is one thing that keeps me very worried as well. issue of Iran because I think they're in a similar situation as the Russians.

They're facing this dilemma on one hand. They don't, they have to retaliate against, you know, attacks on their diplomatic consulates. Given if you don't, you will only embolden your adversaries. This is also a concern the Russians have. They have to begin to retaliate against NATO. On the other hand, if they do retaliate, then this can draw into a huge, massive war. Now, you know, I think all they're able to. to be restrained to a certain extent. But as the conflict escalates, there's more and more bold attacks.

And, you know, even towards Russia, for example, now, you know, the Americans, Ian Stoltenberg, everyone's saying, oh, well, it's fine to strike deep inside Russia. It's war. That's what you have to do. And again, the same now with this very overt attacks on Iran. At some point, that dilemma doesn't permit restraint anymore. And it just becomes irresponsible. to not retaliate.

And I think I fear that's the point we reached with Iran now, though, that the Israelis have perhaps taken it too far. Anyways, thank you to both of you for anyone listening in. Much appreciate it. Thank you, Glenn. Thank you, Alexander. It was a pleasure, as always, and I look forward to doing it again. Absolutely.

So do I, very much.