The Duran Podcast - Erdogan fights to hold on to Damascus

Episode Date: July 24, 2025

Erdogan fights to hold on to Damascus

All right, Alexander, let's do an update on what is going on in Syria. We had a U.S. brokered ceasefire between Israel and Al-Jolani. And it looks like that ceasefire held for maybe 12 hours at most. And we got more Israeli bombing into Syria, into Damascus, where the city, Israel once again claims that they're protecting the Druze community. And Al Jolani, he is, in my opinion, he's just doing as he's being told by Erdogan. Interesting, complicated situation is unfolding between Turkey and Israel, as far as maybe getting an understanding as to who's going to take what parts of Syria. At least that's how I see it.

And of course, the cover story in all of this is Al Jolani and the Druze community. I don't know. How are you seeing this? Well, you see, this is what's so complicated about this, because the underlying reality is what exactly what you said, that there is a carve-up of Syria taking place. We've discussed this the moment that Assad fled, that this is what would happen, that Turkey would establish its own zone of influence in Syria.

Israel would try and establish its own zone of influence in Syria. Each side would have its local outlets, allies and proxies, the Turkish government, Erdogan, government, are working through Al Jalani, and they're trying to base their support on their influence, their local allies are going to be the Sunnis and the, you know, the Sunni, the hardline Sunnis and the jihadi fighters that Erdogan has been backing for the last 10, well, almost 15 years actually in Syria. The Israelis have suddenly discovered a huge admiration and recognition of the plight of the Druze people. Before long, they'll be saying the same thing about the Kurds, if it suits them.

By the way, there's been long historic connections between some Kurdish factions and Israel as well. So this is a taskle for influence and control in Syria. And of course, it is a disaster for Syria. I mean, Syria, in effect, is being partitioned and is being divided into spheres of influence. So that is the big picture. But within that big picture, there is also the unfolding disaster within Syria for the Syrian people. because all that we're hearing about the, you know, terrible fighting that's going on in Sweda about the, you know, the cruelties and the fighting between the trues and the, they're called Bedouin tribesmen,

but we know who they really are, Jalalani's fighters. All that is absolutely, absolutely true. I mean, previously we had similar reports about the Alawites in Latakia region. Of course, nobody cared about the Alawites because they're not part of it. of this jigsaw puzzle that's being played out in Syria. It's much more convenient for people suddenly to notice the Druze there. The Christians also, no doubt, will become pawns in this game as well. But the fact that they are being used as pawns should not obscure the tragedy and the cruelty of what is actually happening.

and the tragedies that these people are suffering and the cruelties that all Syrians, regardless of their religious sentiments, are suffering as well. What happened in Syria back in the autumn was, as you've correctly said, essentially a coup. It brought a militant group to power in Syria. I suspect deeply unrepresentative of the majority. of people in Syria, regardless of which religious community they're coming from. But they're militant, and we see what they're prepared to do. So what is Erdogan looking to gain from this? I think Israel, we understand. I mean, Israel wants the territory, the Golden Heights.

They want to get as close to Damascus. I believe they don't want Damascus, but they want to get as close. to Damascus as they possibly can. Does Erdogan want Damascus? Or does he just want to get as far south as he can without getting Damascus? And at the end of the day, Erdogan has Al Jolani. I mean, Al Jolani is his puppet.

Al Jolani is also part of Israel's network. I mean, Al Jolani is, to me, he's part of all three the United States, Israel and Erdogan. I think he is leaning more towards Erdogan, or Erdogan has more control over him. But, I mean, he's essentially a figurehead. I don't even know if you can call him that. But he's been put in the office of president, unelected, after the coup, and he's kind of serving all three masters, it seems.

I mean, what is Erdogan's ultimate goal in all of this? And a fourth master as well, which is Qatar, which has paid a lot of the bills. Right. Just to say, but you're serving four masters, yeah. You're absolutely right. But I mean, the dominant figure, the person who ultimately controls him, he's Erdogan. It's Erdogan who has troops in Syria. It's Erdogan who's able to sustain whatever is left with the Syrian economy.

It's through Erdogan that Jolani is able to recruit fighters. Jalani is, to all intents and purposes, Erdogan's, Now, that has been true, by the way, has been discussed not since the autumn, but since long before, that the connections between Al Jolani's network and Turkish intelligence is very well established. There is actually quite a lot of archive information about it if you want to spend your time and, you know, look it all up. So ultimately, he depends on Erdogan. Now, what are Erdogan's objectives? Does he want Damascus?

Absolutely. I think this is a key thing to understand about this. For Erdogan, Damascus is absolutely a key prize. If the government that Jalani represents, you know, as President al-Shara, loses control of Damascus, And this is a massive political defeat for Erdogan. I mean, he can no longer claim that he is in control of Syria anymore. Damascus isn't just the capital of Syria.

It's one of the historic Sunni cities. It was, for a time, the capital of the Islamic Caliphate of the 7th and 8th centuries. So, I mean, you know, this is an enormously important historic city. It was also a key city in the Ottoman Empire, just to say. It was where the Ottoman governor was based, who administered not just Syria, but also Palestine and Lebanon as well. So absolutely, Odawan, wants Damascus. The question is whether he can hold on to it. And whether what he's prepared to do in order to hold onto it.

And this is the trap, which he now finds himself in because he's overextended. Damascus is much closer to Israel than it is in some respects to Turkey, at least to the centers of Turkish power. Turkey is not really in a particularly strong position to take on the Israeli military in southern Syria and certainly not in order to defend Damascus itself. If the Israelis get close to Damascus, then that calls into question the entire viability of Damascus as a functioning city. So, you know, things could easily start to fall apart there,

which would not be a good look at all from Erdogan's point of view. And of course, he's also got to take into account that the hardliners in Israel, Benkvir Smotrich, those people, are now openly talking about the need to assassinate Al Jalani because they have an objective, I suspect, ultimately, to bring large areas of Syria itself under direct Israeli control. So these are the things which Erdogan perhaps never really understood and never really prepared for when he launched his war against Assad back in 2011. It was this massive mistake

that he made and he's got this problem. Now, what is he going to try and do? One, he's going to try to get the Americans to lean on the Israelis to keep the Israelis at bay. That may be difficult. And there are many, many people in the United States who don't like Jalani. You can see that in the media there and are upset about some of the things that are happening in Syria. And they don't like Erdogan either. And this is a longstanding issue for them. Also, if the Americans were to lean on the Israelis in that kind of way, that would give them leverage over Erdogan, which up to now he's never wanted.

But I think that's ultimately he's objective. at the present time. And he probably, what he's ultimately looking for is some kind of agreement. It would have to be an informal agreement because Turkey's public position is that they want to keep Syria united and whole. I mean, they don't want Syria to break up.

They don't want the Kurdish enclave, the Kurdish regions, become, you know, a separate self-governing enclave within Syria or an independent, independent of Syria. So he wants some kind of a deal done, an informal deal, setting out clear spheres of influence. And he's going to be spending nearly all his time and energy, I suspect, over the next few weeks and months, trying to negotiate his way through that. How that's done, I simply don't know.

And the Syria that is falling in, that fell into his lap into, in the autumn is turning into dust. The Syria that he, that he destroyed, that he helped to destroy along with the United States and Israel. Absolutely. Yeah, I mean, just to wrap up the video, I agree with you, Israel wants to directly take the land. I think that's their objective to make it part of Israel, whatever they take. Does Erdogan, I don't think Erdogan wants to take the Syrian land, make it part of Turkey, I think he would prefer to control it, but with a puppet in Damascus. Is that correct?

That's exactly that. I think that's the big difference between what Israel's goals are and what Erdogan's goals are. Yes. There are some people in Turkey who has been saying, you know, the Aleppo is a historic city. that was under the Ottomans and ought to be part of Turkey again. So there is that narrative among some people, but I do think that was Erdogan's plan. I think Erdogan, what he wanted was his people who are ideologically affiliated to him

through ultimately the Muslim Brotherhood to take control in Damascus and to govern Syria as a kind of vassal state of Turkey. with Turkey having economic control of Syria and its resources and its oil and its industries, which used to be, by the way, quite well developed. I mean, they're not in any kind of functional state anymore, but anyway, they used to be. So that was his objective, but of course it's not working out. And it was obvious it would never work out. It shouldn't be obvious.

It would never work out. The alliance is interesting that's forming in the Middle East. I don't even think it's an alliance, but it's this cooperation that appears to be forming in the region between Turkey and Israel, it's connected to Azerbaijan. Right? You see Azerbaijan is very closely aligned to Israel,

but of course, Azerbaijan is a client state of Turkey. I mean, Aliyah is a puppet of Erdogans. You see them trying to do the same or trying to figure out how they're going to cooperate in Syria, how they're going to carve up Syria and rule it between themselves. I mean, you do see in the region this kind of cooperation. I don't know if you have a better word for it between Israel and Turkey, and you do have some countries which fall under their domain.

Well, again, we're talking about what Erdogan would like. He would like a grand division of the entire... Middle East, into spheres of influence. I don't personally have any doubt about that. He's talked about it. He's made speeches in which he's essentially admitted that. The problem is that I don't think that works from an Israeli point of view. And this is the problem. You're talking about an alliance, a kind of same alliance between Turkey and Israel. But of course, all the public rhetoric is the exact diametric opposite, on both sides, by the way. And it's a alliance which is underpinned by extreme rivalry, because they have ultimately conflicting objectives. These are not two countries. Israel and

Turkey are countries that are not really at the moment, at the present time at least, easily compatible with each other. So, yes, I think that in the short, medium term, I suspect that after a horrific tragedy in Syria, some kind of a deal will come. We're going to get a broken Syria, which will be a major problem for Turkey, by the way, not so much for Israel, but mostly for Turkey.

I doubt that there's going to be this successful division of the Middle East into spheres of influence that Erdogan wants. And of course, if he does try and achieve it, he's going to run up against others, other big players in the region, Saudi Arabia and Iran that won't like him. Because that's the other thing. There is tension between Erdogan and not just NBS, but the Saudis. also because the Saudis are not, are very suspicious, have heard of one's attempts to present himself in Turkey as the leader of Sunni Islam. I wonder what the U.S. is this thinking about all

of this or what they're telling Israel or what Israel is telling the United States about, about all of these moves. Do you think the U.S. is looking at this favorably, some sort of grand bargain between Israel and Turkey? I think the U.S. is saying to Israel or Israel is saying to the U.S. we're going to do whatever we want to do. And the U.S. is just saying, okay, that's fine. I mean, who in the U.S.? I mean, if we're talking about Donald Trump, I think he would love of grand bargain

between Turkey and Israel. I mean, Trump loves the idea of grand bargains anyway. And I think if you could negotiate one and walk away and said that he did it, I think he love it. The trouble is, again, there are many different people with many different agendas about them at least in the United States. There is a very, very strong pro-Israel faction, which is probably the one that is ultimately in the ascendant. They don't like Erdogan either because they see him as unreliable and they don't like the fact that he's maintained good relations with Russia up to now and has dabbled with the bricks.

and all of that sort of thing. So he's got that problem. One of the problems about the United States and the way it conducts its policy in the Middle East is that even more than on any other foreign policy issue, I get the sense that the number of people who decide foreign policy, the foreign policy of the United States

with respect to the Middle East, that the group there is, is extremely small. They spend all, you could probably bring them all together into one room. It's extremely small. It is extremely hard line. And I don't think it is very interested in much of the complexities of the Middle East that we're talking about. All right, I guess we'll end the video there. I wonder if Greece and Cyprus are our understanding. what's going on. I doubt they are. Well, I'm sure they're not.

I'm sure they're not. And I would just add one other final point, which is that it's been fascinating to see the difficulties that the media in Europe is having with this affair in Syria. Because, I mean, a couple of weeks ago, old Jalani was a toast of everybody. He was the great, you know, liberator of Syria. Suddenly, they're having to deal with the fact that this fighting is taking place. in Suweda, and we're getting pictures of what is really going on. And you could see an almost kind of nervous breakdown, parts of the media in Europe taking place.

And then I've noticed one newspaper in particular in Britain, which is the Guardian, has basically stopped reporting the storm. Yeah. They supported the Al-Qaeda Al-Nusra HTS, $10 million bounty on his head. guy and now they're they're regretting it. Yeah. Okay. Anyway, we'll end the video there, the durand.locals.com.

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